

THE
WORKS
OF
J. J. ROUSSEAU.

Translated from the FRENCH.

IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOLUME the TENTH.

EDINBURGH.


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WORKS

J. J. ROUSSEAU



VOLUME IN THE

EDITION

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MILTON

This VOLUME contains,

A Treatise on the Social Compact; or the Principles of Politic Law.

A Project for Perpetual Peace.

An Expostulatory Letter from J. J. Rousseau to Christopher de Beaumont archbishop of Paris. To which is prefixed the Mandate of the said prelate, and also the proceedings of the parliament of Paris, relative to the new treatise on education entitled EMILIUS.

Anecdotes relative to the persecution of Mr J. J. Rousseau; contained in a letter from a gentleman at Neufchatel to his friend.

THE VOLUME

A Treatise on the Social Contract : or, the Principles of Political Law.

A Project for Human Rights.

An Essay on the Rights of Man, by J. J. Rousseau, in which he examines the Principles of the Social Contract, and the Rights of the Citizen, and the Rights of the Subject, and the Rights of the People, and the Rights of the Nation, and the Rights of the World.

Translated from the French, by G. G. Rousseau, Esq. in two Volumes. The first Volume contains the whole of the first Part, and the second Volume contains the whole of the second Part.

THE NO TREATISE A N

TREATISE

ON THE

SOCIAL COMPACT;

OR,

The PRINCIPLES of

POLITICAL LAW.

Federis est equitas.
Dicamus leges. Æneid. xi.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

MY design, in the present Treatise, is to inquire, Whether the nature of society admits of any fixed and equitable rules of government, supposing mankind to be such as they are, and their laws such as they might be made. In this investigation I shall endeavour constantly to join the considerations of natural right and public interest, so that justice and utility may never be dissimul'd.

This being premis'd, I shall enter on my subject, without expatiating on its importance. If it be ask'd, Whether I am a prince or legislator, that I thus take upon me to write on politics?

6 A TREATISE ON THE

lities? I answer, I am neither; and that it is for this reason I write. Were I a prince or legislator, I would not throw away my time in pointing out what ought to be done; I would myself put it in practice, or be silent.

As the citizen of a free state, and a member of the supreme power by birth, however weak may be the influence of my single vote in public affairs, the right of giving that vote is sufficient to impose on me the duty of making those affairs my study; thinking myself happy, in discussing the various forms of government, to find every day new reasons for admiring that of my own country *!

CHAP. I. *The subject of the first Book.*

MAN is born free, and yet is universally enslaved. At the same time an individual frequently conceives himself to be the lord and master over others, though only more eminently deprived of liberty. Whence can this change arise? Are there any means by which it may be rendered lawful? The former question I cannot answer, tho' I imagine myself capable of resolving the latter.

If I took into consideration only the existence and effects of power, I should say, So long as a people are compelled to obey, they do well to be obedient; but, as soon as they are in a capacity to resist, they do better to throw off the yoke of restraint: for, in recovering their liberty on the same plea by which they lost it, either they have a just right to reassume it, or those could have none who deprived them of it. But

of the will of the people, and the rights of the people, there

there is an inviolable right founded on the very nature of society, which serves as the basis of all others. Man doth not derive this right, however, immediately from nature; it is founded on mutual convention. We must proceed, then, to inquire, of what kind such convention must have been. But, before we come to argue this point, I should establish what I have already advanced.

CHAP. II. *On the primitive state of society.*

THE most ancient of all societies, and the only natural one, is that of a family. And even in this, children are no longer connected with their father than while they stand in need of his assistance. When this becomes needless, the natural tie is of course dissolved; the children are exempted from the obedience they owe their father, and the father is equally so from the solicitude due from him to his children; both assume a state of independence respecting each other. They may continue, indeed, to live together afterwards; but their connection, in such a case, is no longer natural, but voluntary; and even the family union is then maintained by mutual convention.

This liberty, which is common to all mankind, is the necessary consequence of our very nature; whose first law being that of self-preservation, our principal concerns are those which relate to ourselves: no sooner, therefore, doth man arrive at years of discretion, than he becomes the only proper judge of the means of that preservation, and of course his own master.

In a family, then, we may see the first model

of political societies: their chief is represented by the father, and the people by his children, while all of them being free, and equal by birth, they cannot alienate their liberty, but for their common interest. All the difference between a family and a state lies in this, That, in the former, the love which a father naturally bears to his children is a compensation for his solicitude concerning them; and, in the latter, it is the pleasure of command that supplies the place of this love, which a chief doth not entertain for his people.

Grotius denies that government is invested with power solely for the benefit of those who are governed, and cites the case of slaves as an example. It is, indeed, his constant practice to establish the matter of right on the matter of fact*. He might have employed a more conclusive method, though not a more favourable one for tyrannical governments.

It is then doubtful, according to Grotius, whether the whole race of mankind, except about an hundred individuals, belong to those individuals, or whether the latter belong to the whole race of mankind; and he appears, throughout his whole work, to lean to the former opinion. This is also the opinion of Hobbes. Thus they divide the human species into herds of cattle; each of which hath its keeper, who protects it from others only that he may make a property of it himself.

* "The learned researches into the laws of nature and nations are of nothing more than the history of ancient abuses; so that it is a ridiculous insatiation to be too fond of studying them." *Manuscript Treatise on the Interests of France*, by the Marquis d'A. This was exactly the case with Grotius.

As a shepherd is of a superior nature to his flock; so the herd-keepers of men, or their chiefs, are of a superior nature to the herd over which they preside. Such was the reasoning, according to Philo, of the Emperor Caligula; who concluded logically enough from this analogy, that either kings were gods, or their subjects no better than brutes.

This argument of Caligula bears much resemblance to those of Hobbes and Grotius. Aristotle had said, indeed, before either of them, that men were not naturally equal; but that some of them were born to slavery, and others to dominion.

Aristotle was right as to the fact, but mistook the effect for the cause. Nothing is more certain, than that every man born in slavery is born to be a slave. In such a state, men lose even the desire of freedom; and prefer subjection, as the companions of Ulysses did their brutality*. If there are any slaves, therefore, by nature, it is because they are slaves contrary to nature. Power first made slaves, and cowardice hath perpetuated them.

I have said nothing of king Adam, or the emperor Noah, father of three monarchs, who, like the children of Saturn, as some have imagined them to be, divided the world among them. I hope my moderation also in this respect will be esteemed some merit; for, as I am descended in a right line, from one of these princes, and probably from the eldest branch of the family, how do I know, that, by a regular deduction of my descent, I might not find myself the legitimate

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* See a little tract written by Plutarch, on the rationality of brutes.

mate heir to universal monarchy? Be this, however, as it may, it cannot be denied, that Adam had as good a title to the sovereignty of the world when he was the only person in it, as Robinson Crusoe had to that of his island under the same circumstances. A very great conveniency also attended their government; in that the monarch might rest securely on his throne, without fear of wars, conspiracies, or rebellion.

CHAP. III. *On the right of the strongest.*

THE strongest is not strong enough to continue always master, unless he transforms his power into a right of command, and obedience into a duty. Hence is deduced the right of the strongest; a right taken ironically in appearance, and laid down as an established principle in reality. But will this term never be rightly explained? Force, in the simplest sense, is a physical power; nor can I see what morality can result from its effects. To yield to superior force is an act of necessity, not of the will; at most it is but an act of prudence. And in what sense can this be called a duty?

Let us suppose, however, for a moment, this pretended right established, and we shall see it attended with inexplicable absurdities: for, if it be admitted that power constitutes right, the effect changes with the cause, and every succeeding power, if greater than the former, succeeds also to the right; so that men may lawfully disobey, as soon as they can do it with impunity; and, as right is always on the strongest side, they have nothing more to do, than to acquire supe-

superior force. Now what kind of right can that be, which vanishes with the power of enforcing it? If obedience be only exacted by compulsion, there is no need to make such obedience a duty; as when we are no longer compelled to obey, we are no longer obliged to it. It appears, therefore, that the word *right* adds nothing in this case to that of force, and in fact is a term of no signification.

Be obedient to the higher powers. If by this precept is meant, *subject to a superior force*, the advice is good, though superfluous; I will answer for it, such a rule will never be broken. All power, I own, is derived from God; but every corporeal malady is derived also from the same source. But are we therefore forbid to call in the physician? If a robber should stop me on the highway, am I not only obliged, on compulsion, to give him my purse, but am I also obliged to it in point of conscience, tho' I might possibly conceal it from him? This will hardly be averred; and yet the pistol he holds to my breast is in effect a superior force.

On the whole, we must conclude, then, that mere power doth not constitute right, and that men are obliged only to pay obedience to lawful authority. Thus we are constantly recurring to my first question.

CHAP. IV. *On slavery.*

AS no man hath any natural authority over the rest of his species, and as power doth not confer right, the basis of all lawful authority is laid in mutual convention.

If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate
his

his liberty, and become the slave of a master, why may not a whole people collectively alienate theirs, and become subject to a king? This proposition, however, contains some equivocal terms, which require explanation; but I shall confine myself to that of *alienate*. Whatever is alienated must be disposed of, either by gift or sale. Now a man who becomes the slave of another, doth not give himself away; but sells himself, at least for his subsistence. But why should a whole people sell themselves? So far is a king from furnishing his subjects subsistence, that they maintain him; and, as our friend Rabelais says, a king doth not live on a little. Can subjects be supposed to give away their liberty, on condition that the receiver shall take their property along with it? After this, I really cannot see any thing they have left.

It may be said, a monarch maintains among his subjects the public tranquillity. Be it so; I would be glad to know of what they are gainers, if the wars in which his ambition engages them, if his insatiable avarice, or the oppressions of his ministers, are more destructive than civil dissensions? Of what are they gainers, if even this tranquillity be one cause of their misery? A prisoner may live tranquil enough in his dungeon; but will this be sufficient to make him contented there? When the Greeks were shut up in the cave of the Cyclops, they lived there unmolested, in expectation of their turn to be devoured.

To say that a man can give himself away, is to talk unintelligibly and absurdly; such an act must necessarily be illegal and void, were it for no other reason than that it argues insanity

of mind in the agent. To say the same thing of a whole people therefore, is to suppose a whole nation can be at once out of their senses; but were it so, such madness could not confer right.

Were it possible also for a man to alienate himself, he could not in the same manner dispose of his children, who, as human beings, are born free; their freedom is their own, and nobody hath any right to dispose of it but themselves. Before they arrive at years of discretion, indeed, their father may, for their security, and in their name, stipulate the conditions of their preservation; but he cannot unconditionally and irrevocably dispose of their persons; such a gift being contrary to the intention of nature, and exceeding the bounds of paternal authority. It is requisite, therefore, in order to render an arbitrary government lawful, that every new generation should be at liberty to admit or reject its authority, in which case it would be no longer an arbitrary government.

To renounce one's natural liberty, is to renounce one's very being as a man; it is to renounce not only the rights, but even the duties, of humanity. And what possible indemnification can be made the man who thus gives up his all? Such a renunciation is incompatible with our very nature; for to deprive us of the liberty of the will, is to take away all morality from our actions. In a word, a convention, which stipulates on the one part absolute authority, and on the other implicit obedience, is in itself futile and contradictory. Is it not evident, that we can lie under no reciprocal obligation whatever to a person of whom we have a right to demand every thing? and doth not this circumstance, a-
gainst

gainst which he has no equivalent, necessarily infer such act of convention to be void? For what claim can my slave have upon me, when he himself, and all that belongs to him, are mine? His claims are of course my own; and to say those can be set up against me, is to talk absurdly.

Again, Grotius and others have deduced the origin of this pretended right from the superiority obtained in war. The conqueror, say they, having a right to put the vanquished to death, the latter may equitably purchase his life at the expence of his liberty; such an agreement being the more lawful, as it conduces to the mutual advantage of both parties.

It is clear and certain, however, that this pretended right of the victor over the lives of the vanquished is not, in any shape, the natural result of a state of war. This is plain, were it for no other reason than that the reciprocal relations of mankind, while living together in their primitive independence, were not sufficiently durable to constitute a state either of peace or war; so that men cannot be naturally enemies. It is the relation subsisting between things, and not between men, that gives rise to war; which arising thus, not from personal, but real, relations, cannot subsist between man and man, either in a state of nature, in which there is no settled property, or in a state of society, in which every thing is secured by the laws.

The quarrels, encounters, and duels of individuals, are not sufficient to constitute such a state of war; and, with regard to the particular combats authorized by the institutions of Lewis XI. king of France; they were only some of the abuses of the feudal government; a system truly
absurd

abford, as contrary to the principles of natural justice as of good policy.

War is not, therefore, any relation between man and man, but a relation between state and state; in which individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, or even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their particular community, but as its defenders. In short, a state can have for its enemy nothing but a state, not men; as between things essentially different there can be no common relation.

This principle is, indeed, conformable to the established maxims of all ages, and the constant practice of every civilized people. Declarations of war are made less to give notice to sovereigns, than to their subjects.

The foreigner, whether a sovereign, an individual, or a people, who plunders, kills, or takes prisoner a subject, without declaring war against his prince, is not an enemy, but a robber. Even in a time of war, a just prince may make himself master, in an enemy's country, of whatever belongs to the public; but he will respect the persons and private properties of individuals, he will respect those rights on which his own are founded. The design of war being the destruction of an hostile state, we have a right to kill its defenders while they are in arms; but as, in laying down their arms, they cease to be enemies, or instruments of hostility, they become in that case mere men, and we have not the least right to murder them. It is sometimes possible effectually to destroy a state, without killing even one of its members; now, war cannot confer any right or privilege, which is not necessary to accomplish its end and design. It is true,

true, these are not the principles of Grotius, nor are they founded on the authority of the poets; but they are such as are deduced from the nature of things, and are founded on reason.

With regard to the right of conquest, it has no other foundation than that of force, the law of the strongest. But, if war doth not give the victor a right to massacre the vanquished, this pretended right, which does not exist, cannot be the foundation of a right to enslave them. If we have no right to kill an enemy unless we cannot by force reduce him to slavery, our right to make him a slave never can be founded on our right to kill him. It is, therefore, an iniquitous bargain, to make him purchase, at the expence of liberty, a life, which we have no right to take away. In establishing thus a right of life and death over others, on that of enslaving them; and, on the other hand, a right of enslaving them on that of life and death; we certainly fall into the absurdity of reasoning in a circle.

Let us suppose, however, that this shocking right of general massacre existed, I still affirm, that a slave, made so by the fortune of war, or a conquered people, so reduced to slavery, lie under no other obligations to their master, than to obey him so long as he hath the power to compel them to it. In accepting of an equivalent for their lives, the victor confers on them no favour; instead of killing them uselessly, he hath only varied the mode of their destruction to his own advantage. So far, therefore, from his having acquired over them any additional authority, the state of war subsists between them as before; their relation to each other is the evident effect of it, and his exertion of the rights

of war is a proof, that no treaty of peace hath succeeded. Will it be said, they have made a convention? Be it so: this convention is a mere truce; and is so far from putting an end to the state of war, that it necessarily implies its continuation.

Thus, in whatever light we consider this affair, the right of making men slaves is null and void, not only because it is unjust, but because it is absurd and insignificant. The terms *slavery* and *justice* are contradictory, and reciprocally exclusive of each other. Hence the following proposal would be equally ridiculous, whether made by one individual to another, or by a private man to a whole people. *I enter into an agreement with you, altogether at your own charge, and solely for my profit, which I will observe as long as I please, and which you are to observe also as long as I think proper.*

CHAP. V. *On the necessity of recurring always to the primitive convention.*

ON the supposition that I should grant to be true what I have hitherto disproved, the advocate for despotism would, however, profit but little. There will be always a great difference between subjecting a multitude, and governing a society. Let individuals, in any number whatever, become severally and successively subject to one man, they are all, in that case, nothing more than master and slaves; they are not a people governed by their chiefs; they are an aggregate if you will, but do not form an association; there subsists among them neither commonwealth nor body-politic. Such a superior,

though he should become the master of half the world, would be still a private person, and his interest, separate and distinct from that of his people, would be still no more than a private interest. When such a person dies, also, the empire over which he presided is dissolved, and its component parts remain totally unconnected, just as an oak falls into a heap of ashes when it is consumed by the fire.

A person, says Grotius, may voluntarily bestow themselves on a king: according to Grotius, therefore, a people are a people before they thus give themselves up to regal authority. Even this gift, however, is an act of society, and presupposes a public deliberation on the matter. Hence, before we examine into the act by which a people make choice of a king, it is proper to examine into that by which a people became a people; for on this, which is necessarily prior to the other, rests the true foundation of society.

For, if in fact there be no prior convention, whence arises (unless indeed the election was unanimous) the obligation of the smaller number to submit to the choice of the greater? and whence comes it, that an hundred persons, for instance, who might desire to have a master, had a right to vote for ten others who might desire to have none? The choice by a plurality of votes is itself an establishment of convention, and supposes that unanimity must at least for once have subsisted among them.

CHAP. VI. *On the social pact or covenant.*

I Suppose mankind arrived at that term when the obstacles to their preservation, in a state of

of nature, prevail over the endeavours of individuals to maintain themselves in such a state. At such a crisis this primitive state therefore could no longer subsist, and the human race must have perished if they had not changed their manner of living.

Now as men cannot create new powers, but only compound and direct those which really exist, they have no other means of preservation, than that of forming, by their union, an accumulation of forces sufficient to oppose the obstacles to their security, and of putting these in action by a first mover capable of making them act in concert with each other.

This general accumulation of power cannot arise but from the concurrence of many particular forces; but the force and liberty of each individual being the principal instruments of his own preservation, how is he to engage them in the common interest, without hurting his own, and neglecting the obligations he lies under to himself? This difficulty, being applied to my present subject, may be expressed in the following terms:—

“To find that form of association which shall protect and defend, with the whole force of the community, the person and property of each individual; and in which each person, by uniting himself to the rest, shall nevertheless be obedient only to himself, and remain as fully at liberty as before.” Such is the fundamental problem, of which the Social Compact gives the solution.

The clauses of this compact are so precisely determined by the nature of the act, that the least restriction or modification renders them void

and of no effect; in so much, that although they may perhaps never have been formally promulgated, they are yet universally the same, and are every where tacitly acknowledged and received. When the social pact, however, is violated, individuals recover their natural liberty, and are re-invested with their original rights, by losing that conventional liberty for the sake of which they had renounced them.

Again; these clauses, well understood, are all reducible to one, viz. the total alienation of every individual, with all his rights and privileges, to the whole community. For, in the first place, as every one gives himself up entirely and without reserve, all are in the same circumstances, so that no one can be interested in making their common connection burdensome to others.

Besides, as the alienation is made without reserve, the union is as perfect as possible, nor hath any particular associate any thing to reclaim; whereas, if they should severally retain any peculiar privileges, there being no common umpire to determine between them and the public, each being his own judge in some cases, would in time pretend to be so in all, the state of nature would still subsist, and their association would necessarily become tyrannical or void.

In fine, the individual, by giving himself up to all, gives himself to none; and, as he acquires the same right over every other person in the community, as he gives them over himself, he gains an equivalent for what he bestows, and still a greater power to preserve what he retains.

If therefore we take from the Social Compact every thing that is not essential to it, we shall find it reduced to the following terms:

“ We,

"We, the contracting parties, do jointly and severally submit our persons and abilities to the supreme direction of the general will of all; and in a collective body, receive each member into that body as an indivisible part of the whole."

This act of association accordingly converts the several individual contracting parties into one moral collective body, composed of as many members as there are votes in the assembly, which receives also from the same act its unity and existence. This public personage, which is thus formed by the union of all its members, used formerly to be denominated a *CITY* *, and at present takes the name of a *republic* or *body-politic*. It is also called, by its several members, a *state*, when it is passive; the *sovereign*, when it is active; and simply a *power*, when it is com-

* The true sense of this word is almost entirely perverted among the moderns; most people take a town for a city, and an house-keeper for a citizen. Such are ignorant, however, that though houses may form a town, it is the citizens only that constitute a city. This same error formerly cost the Carthaginians very dear. I do not remember, in the course of my reading, to have ever found the title of *Cives* given to the subjects of a prince, not even formerly to the Macedonians, nor, in our times, to the English, though more nearly bordering on liberty than any other nation. The French are the only people who familiarly take on themselves the name of *citizens*, because they have no just idea of its meaning, as may be seen in their dictionaries; for, were it otherwise, indeed, they would be guilty of high treason in assuming it. This term is with them rather expressive of a virtue than a privilege. Hence, when Bodin spoke of the citizens and inhabitants of Geneva, he committed a wretched blunder in mistaking one for the other. Mr d'Alembert indeed has avoided this mistake in the *Encyclopædia*, where he has properly distinguished the four orders of people (and even five, reckoning mere strangers) that are found in our city, and of which two only compose the republic: No other French author that I know of hath ever comprehended the meaning of the word *citizen*.

compared with other bodies of the same nature. With regard to the associates themselves, they take collectively the name of the *people*; and are separately called *citizens*, as partaking of the sovereign authority; and *subjects*, as subjected to the laws of the state. These terms, indeed, are frequently confounded, and mistaken one for the other; it is sufficient, however, to be able to distinguish them when they are to be used with precision.

CHAP. VII. *Of the sovereign.*

IT is plain from the above formula, that the act of association includes a reciprocal engagement between particulars and the public; and that each individual, in contracting, if I may so say, with himself, is laid under a twofold engagement, viz. as a member of the sovereignty towards particular persons, and as a member of the state toward the sovereign. That maxim of the civil law, however, is inapplicable here, which says, that no one is bound by the engagements he enters into with himself; for there is a wide difference between entering into a personal obligation with one's self, and with a whole, of which one may constitute a part.

It is farther to be observed, that the public determination, which is obligatory on the subject with regard to the sovereign, on account of the twofold relation by which each stands contracted, is not, for the contrary reason, obligatory on the supreme power towards itself; and that it is consequently inconsistent with the nature of the body-politic, that such supreme power should impose a law, which it cannot break.

For,

For, as the sovereign stands only in a single relation, it is in the same case as that of an individual contracting with himself; whence it is plain, that there neither is, nor can be, any fundamental law obligatory on the whole body of a people, even the Social Compact itself not being such. By this, however, it is not meant, that such a body cannot enter into engagements with others, in matters that do not derogate from this contract; for, with respect to foreign objects, it is a simple and individual person.

But as the body-politic, or the sovereign, derives its very existence from this inviolable contract, it can enter into no lawful engagement, even with any similar body, derogatory from the tenor of this primitive act; such as that of alienating any part of itself, or of submitting itself entirely to a foreign sovereign. To violate the act whereby it exists, would be to annihilate itself; and from nothing can arise nothing.

No sooner are a multitude of individuals thus united in a body, than it becomes impossible to act offensively against any of the members without attacking the whole, and still less to offend the whole body, without injuring the members. Hence both duty and interest equally oblige the two contracting parties to assist each other; and the same persons ought to endeavour to include, within this twofold relation, all the advantages which depend on it.

Now the sovereign, being formed only by the several individuals of which the state is composed, can have no interest contrary to theirs: of course the supreme power stands in no need of any guarantee toward the subjects, because it is impossible that the body should be capable of
hurt-

hurting all its members; and we shall see hereafter, that it can as little tend to injure any of them in particular. Hence the sovereign is necessarily, and for the same reason that it exists, always such as it ought to be.

The case is different, however, as to the relation in which the subjects stand to the sovereign; as, notwithstanding their common interest, the latter can have no security that the former will discharge their engagements, unless means be found to engage their fidelity.

In fact, every individual may, as a man, entertain a particular will, either contradictory or dissimilar to his general will as a citizen. His private interest may influence him in a manner diametrically opposite to the common interest of the society. Reflecting on his own existence as positive and naturally independent, he may conceive what he owes to the common cause to be a free and gratuitous contribution, the want of which will be less hurtful to others than the discharge of it will be burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person of the state as an imaginary being, because it is not a man, he may be desirous of enjoying all the privileges of a citizen, without fulfilling his engagement as a subject; an injustice, that, in its progress, must necessarily be the ruin of the body-politic.

To the end, therefore, that the social compact should not prove an empty form, it tacitly includes this engagement, which only can enforce the rest, viz. that whosoever refuses to pay obedience to the general will, shall be liable to be compelled to it by the force of the whole body. And this is in effect nothing more than that they may be compelled to be free; for such

is the condition which, in uniting every citizen to the state, secured him from all personal dependence; a condition, which forms the whole artifice and play of the political machine: it is this alone that renders all social engagements just and equitable, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses.

CHAP. VIII. *Of civil society in general.*

THE transition of man from a state of nature to a state of society is productive of a very remarkable change in his being, by substituting justice instead of instinct as the rule of his conduct, and attaching that morality to his actions of which they were before destitute. It is in immediate consequence of this change, when the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse and the law of appetite, that man, who hitherto regarded only his own gratification, finds himself obliged to act on other principles, and to consult his reason before he follows the dictates of his passions. Although, by entering into a state of society, he is deprived also of many advantages which depend on that of nature, he gains by it others so very considerable: his faculties exert and expand themselves; his ideas are enlarged; his sentiments ennobled; and his whole soul is elevated to so great a degree, that, if the abuses of this new state do not degrade him below the former, he ought incessantly to bless that happy moment in which he was rescued from it, and converted from a stupid and ignorant animal into an intelligent and wise being. To state the balance of what is lost and gained

ed by this change, we shall reduce it to comparative terms. By entering into the social compact, man gives up his natural liberty or unlimited right to every thing which he is desirous of and can attain. In return for this, he gains social liberty, and an exclusive property in all those things of which he is possessed. To avoid any mistake, however, in the nature of these compensations, it is necessary to make a just distinction between natural liberty, which is limited by nothing but the inabilities of the individual, and social liberty, which is limited by the general will of the community; and also, between that possession which is only effected by force, or follows the right of prior occupancy, and that property which is founded only on a positive title.

To the preceding also may be added, as the acquisition of a social state, moral liberty, which only renders a man truly master of himself: for to be under the direction of appetite alone is to be in a state of slavery; while to pay obedience only to those laws which we prescribe to ourselves, is liberty. But I have said too much already on this subject, the philosophical meaning of the word Liberty being in this place out of the question.

CHAP. IX. *Of real demesnes.*

EACH member of the community, in becoming such, devotes himself to the public from that moment, in such a state as he then is, with all his power and abilities, of which abilities his possessions make a part. Not that in consequence of this act the possession changes its nature by changing hands, and becomes actual pro-

property in those of the sovereignty ; but as the power of the community is incomparably greater than that of an individual, the public possession is in fact more fixed and irrevocable, without being more lawful, at least with regard to foreigners. For every state is, with respect to its members, master of all their possessions, by virtue of the social compact, which, in a state, serves as the basis of all other rights ; but, with regard to other powers or states, it is master of them only by the right of prior occupancy, which it derives from individuals.

The right of prior occupancy, although more real than that of the strongest, becomes not an equitable right, till after the establishment of property. Every man hath naturally a right to every thing which is necessary for his subsistence ; but the positive act by which he is made the proprietor of a certain possession excludes him from the property of any other. His portion being assigned him, he ought to confine himself to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of possessions. Hence it is that the right of prior occupancy, though but of little force in a state of nature, is so respectable in that of society. The point to which we are chiefly directed in the consideration of this right, is rather what belongs to another, than what does not belong to us.

To define the right of prior occupancy in general terms, it is founded on the following conditions. It is requisite, in the first place, that the lands in question should be unoccupied ; secondly, that no greater quantity of it should be occupied than is necessary for the subsistence of the occupiers ; and, in the third place, that pos-
session

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session should be taken of it, not by a vain ceremony, but by actual cultivation, the only mark of property which, in defect of juridical titles, should be at all respected.

To allow the first occupier a right to as much territory as he may cultivate and is necessary to his subsistence, is certainly carrying the matter as far as is reasonable. Otherwise we know not how to set bounds to this right. Is it sufficient for a man to set foot on an uninhabited territory, to pretend immediately an exclusive right to it? Is it sufficient for him to have power enough at one time to drive others from the spot, to deprive them for ever afterwards of the right of returning to it? How can a man, or even a whole people, possess themselves of an immense territory, and exclude from it the rest of mankind, without being guilty of an illegal usurpation; since, by so doing, they deprive the rest of mankind of an habitation, and those means of subsistence which nature hath given in common to them all? When Nunez Balbao stood on the sea-shore, and in the name of the crown of Castile took possession of the Pacific Ocean and of all South America, was this sufficient to dispossess all the inhabitants of that vast country, and exclude all the other sovereigns in the world? On such a supposition, the like idle ceremonies might have been ridiculously multiplied, and his Catholic Majesty would have had no more to do than to have taken possession in his closet of all the countries in the world, and to have afterwards only deducted from his empire such as were before possessed by other princes.

It is easy to conceive, how the united and contiguous estates of individuals become the territory

ritory of the public, and in what manner the right of sovereignty, extending itself from the subjects to the lands they occupy, becomes at once both real and personal; a circumstance which lays the possessors under a state of the greatest dependence, and makes even their own abilities a security for their fidelity. This is an advantage which does not appear to have been duly attended to by sovereigns among the ancients, who, by styling themselves only kings of the Persians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, seemed to look on themselves only as chiefs of men, rather than as masters of a country. Modern princes more artfully style themselves the kings of England, France, Spain, &c. and thus, by claiming the territory itself, are secure of the inhabitants.

What is very singular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the possessions of individuals, so far from despoiling them thereof, that, on the contrary, it only confirms them in such possessions, by converting an usurpation into an actual right, and a bare possession into a real property. The possessors also being considered as the depositaries of the public wealth, while their rights are respected by all the members of the state, and maintained by all its force against any foreign power, they acquire, if I may so say, by a cession advantageous to the public, and still more so to themselves, every thing they ceded by it: a paradox which is easily explained by the distinction to be made between the rights which the sovereign and the proprietor have in the same fund, as will be seen hereafter.

It may also happen, that men may form themselves into a society, before they have any pos-

sessions; and that, acquiring a territory sufficient for all, they may possess it in common, or divide it among them, either equally, or in such different proportions as may be determined by the sovereign. Now, in whatsoever manner such acquisition may be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate, must be always subordinate to the right which the community hath over the possessions of all; for, without this, there would be nothing binding in the social tie, nor any real force in the exercise of the supreme power.

I shall end this book with a remark that ought to serve as the basis of the whole social system: and this is, that, instead of annihilating the natural equality among mankind, the fundamental compact substitutes, on the contrary, a moral and legal equality, to make up for that natural and physical difference which prevails among individuals, who, though unequal in personal strength and mental abilities, become thus all equal by convention and right *.

B O O K II.

CHAP. I. *That the sovereignty is unalienable.*

THE first and most important consequence to be

* This equality, indeed, is under some governments merely apparent and delusive, serving only to keep the poor still in misery, and favour the oppression of the rich. And, in fact, the laws are always useful to persons of fortune, and hurtful to those who are destitute: whence it follows, that a state of society is advantageous to mankind in general, only when they all possess something, and none of them have any thing too much.

be drawn from the principles already established, is, that the general will only can direct the forces of the state agreeable to the end of its original institution, which is the common good; for, though the opposition of private interests might make the establishment of societies necessary, it must have been through the coalition of those interests that such establishment became possible. The bonds of society must have been formed out of something common to those several interests; for, if there had been no point to which they could have been reconciled, no society could possibly have subsisted. Now it is only on these points that the government of society should be founded.

I say, therefore, that the sovereignty, being only the exertion of the general will, cannot be alienated; and that the sovereign, which is only a collective being, cannot be represented but by itself: the power of a people may be transmitted or delegated, but not their will.

It may not be absolutely impossible, that the will of an individual should agree, in some particular point, with the general will of a whole people: it is, however, impossible, that such agreement should be constant and durable; for the will of particulars always tends to make distinctions of preference, and the general will to a perfect equality. It is farther still more impossible, supposing such agreement might always subsist, to have any security that it would do so, as it could never be the effect of art, but of chance. The sovereign may say, My will is now agreeable to the will of such an individual, or at least to what he pretends to be his will: but it cannot pretend to say, I agree to whatever may be the will

of such an individual to morrow; as it is absurd for the will to lay itself under any restraint regarding the future, and as it is impossible for the will to consent to any thing contrary to the interest of the being whose will it is. Should a people therefore enter into the engagement of simply promising obedience, they would lose their quality as a people, and be virtually dissolved by that very act. The moment there exists a master, there can be no longer a sovereign, the body politic being thereby destroyed.

I would not be understood to mean, that the orders of a chief may not pass for the dictates of the general will, when the sovereign, though at liberty to contradict, does not oppose it. In such a case, it is to be presumed, from the universal silence of the people, that they give their consent. This will be farther explained in the end.

CHAP. II. *That the sovereignty is indivisible.*

FOR the same reason that the sovereignty is unalienable, it is also indivisible: for the will is general*, or it is not; it is that of the body of the people, or only that of a part. In the first case, this will, when declared, is an act of sovereignty, and becomes a law: in the second, it is only a particular will, or an act of the magistracy, and is at most a decree.

But our politicians, incapable of dividing the sovereignty in its first principles, divide it in its object: they distinguish it into power and will; into

* In order that this will should be general, it is not always necessary it should be unanimous: it is necessary, however, that every individual should be permitted to vote; every formal exclusion infringing the generality.

into a legislative and executive power ; into the prerogatives of taxation, of executing justice, and of making war ; into departments of domestic and foreign administration. Sometimes they blend all these confusedly together, and, at others, consider them as distinct and separate, making out the sovereign to be a fantastic compound, just as if they should compose a man out of several bodies, of which one should have only eyes, another arms, a third feet, and nothing more. It is said of the jugglers in Japan, that they will take a child, and cut it into pieces in the presence of the spectators ; then, throwing up its dismembered limbs one after another into the air, they are united, and the child descends alive and well as before. The legerdemain of our modern politicians greatly resembles this trick of the Japanese ; for they, after having dismembered the body-politic with equal dexterity, bring all its parts together by *hocus pocus* again, and represent it the same as before.

This error arises from their not having formed precise ideas of the sovereign authority, and from their mistaking the simple emanations of this authority for parts of its essence. Thus, for instance, the acts of declaring war and making peace are usually regarded as acts of sovereignty, which they are not ; for neither of these acts are laws, but consist only of the application of the law. Each is a particular act, determinate only of the meaning of the law in such case, as will be seen more clearly when the idea attached to the word *law* shall be precisely settled.

By tracing, in like manner, their other divisions, we shall find, that we are constantly mis-

taken whenever we think the sovereignty divided; and that the prerogatives, which are supposed to be parts of the sovereignty, are all subordinate to it, and always suppose the predetermination of a superior will, which those prerogatives only serve to put in execution.

It is impossible to say, in how much obscurity this want of precision hath involved the reasonings of authors on the subject of political law, when they came to examine into the respective rights of kings and people on the principles they had established. By turning to the third and fourth chapters of the first book of Grotius, the reader may see how that learned author, and his translator Barbeyrac, bewildered and entangled themselves in their own sophisms, thro' fear of saying too much or too little for their purpose, and of making those interests clash, which it was their business to reconcile. Grotius being dissatisfied with his own countrymen, a refugee in France, and willing to pay his court to Lewis XIII. to whom his book is dedicated, spared no art nor pains to strip the people of their privileges, and to invest kings with prerogative. Barbeyrac also wrote with a similar view, dedicating his translation to George I. of England. But, unluckily, the expulsion of James II. which he calls an abdication, obliged him to be much on the reserve, to turn and wind about, as he saw occasion, in order not to make William III. an usurper. Had these two writers adopted true principles, all these difficulties would have vanished, and they would have written consistently; in such a case, however, they could only, in sober sadness, have told the truth, and would have paid their court only

to the people. Now, to tell the truth is not the way to make a fortune; nor are ambassadors appointed, or places and pensions given away, by the populace.

CHAP. III. *Whether the general will can be in the wrong.*

IT follows, from what has been said, that the general will is always in the right, and constantly tends to the public good. It does not follow, however, that the deliberations of the people will always be attended with the same rectitude. We are ever desirous of our own good, but we do not always distinguish in what it consists. A whole people never can be corrupted; but they may be often mistaken, and it is in such a case only that they appear to seek their own disadvantage.

There is often a considerable difference between the will of all the members and the general will of the whole body: the latter regards only the common interest; the other respects the private interest of individuals, and is the aggregated sum of their particular wills: but, if we take from this sum those contradictory wills that mutually destroy each other *, the sum of the remaining difference is the general will.

If a people, sufficiently informed of the nature

* Each interests, says the Marquis d'A. has different principles. A coalition between two particular interests may be formed, out of opposition to that of a third. He might have added, that a coalition of all is formed out of opposition to the interest of each. Were there no different and clashing interests, that of the whole would be hardly distinguishable, as it would meet with no obstacle. All things would go regularly on of their own accord, and civil policy would cease to be an art.

ture of the subject under their consideration, should deliberate, without having any communication with each other, the general will would always result from the greater number of their little differences, and their deliberation would be such as it ought to be. But when they enter into cabals, and form partial associations at the expence of the general one, the will of each of these associations becomes general, with regard to the particular members of each; and in itself particular, with regard to the state. In such a case, therefore, it may be said, there is no longer as many voters as individuals, but only as many voices as there are associations. The differences then become less numerous, and give a less general result. Again, should one of these partial associations be so great as to influence all the rest, the result would no longer be the sum of many little differences, but that of one great one; in which case, a general will would no longer subsist.

It is requisite, therefore, in order that each resolution may be dictated by the general will, that no such partial societies should be formed in a state, and that each citizen should think for himself*. Such was the sublime institution of the great Lycurgus. But, if such partial societies must and will exist, it is then expedient to multiply their number, and prevent their inequality, as was done by Solon, Numa, and Ser-

* Vera cosa e, (says Machiavel,) che alcuni divisioni nuocono alle repubbliche, alcune giovano: quelle nuocono che sono dalle sette e da partigiani accompagnate: quelle giovano che senza sette, senza partigiani si mantengono. Non potendo adunque provvedere un fondatore d'una repubblica che non siano inimizie in quella, ha da proveder almeno che non vissano sette. *Hist. Florent.* l. vii.

Servius. These are the only salutary precautions that can be taken, in order that the general will may be properly informed, and the people not be mistaken as to their true interest.

CHAP. IV. *Of the limits of the sovereign power.*

IF the state, or the city, be a mere moral person, whose life depends on the union of its members, and if the most important of its concerns be that of its own preservation, it should certainly be possessed of an universal compulsive force, to move and dispose each part in such a manner as is most conducive to the good of all. As nature hath given every man an absolute power over his limbs, to move and direct them at pleasure, so the Social Compact gives to the body-politic an absolute power over all its members; and it is this power which, directed by the general will, bears the name, as I have already observed, of the sovereignty.

But, besides this public person, we are to consider farther the private persons of which it is composed, and whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it. We come now, therefore, to make a proper distinction between the respective privileges of the citizens and the sovereign*, as well as between the obligations the former lie under as subjects, and the natural rights they claim as men.

It is agreed, that what an individual alienates of his power, his possession, or his liberty, by the

* Be not in haste, attentive reader, to accuse me here of contradiction. I cannot avoid the seeming contradiction in terms, from the native poverty of the language. But have a little patience.

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the Social Compact, is only such parts of them whose use is of importance to the community; but it must be confessed also, that the sovereign is the only proper judge of this importance.

A citizen is bound to perform all the services he can possibly be of to a state, whenever the sovereign demands them; but the sovereign, on his part, cannot require any thing of the subject that is useless to the community: he cannot even be desirous of so doing; for, under the law of reason, nothing can be produced without a cause, any more than under the law of nature.

The engagements in which we are bound to the body of society are obligatory, only because they are mutual; and their nature is such, that we cannot, in discharging them, labour for the good of others, without at the same time labouring for that of ourselves. Wherefore, indeed, is it, that the general will is always in the right, and that all constantly desire the good of each, unless it be, because there is no one that does not appropriate the term each to himself, and who does not think of his own interest in voting for that of all? This serves to prove also, that an equality of privilege, and the notion of justice it produces, are derived from that preference which each naturally gives himself, and of course from the very nature of man; that the general will, in order to be truly such, ought to be so in its effect as well as in its essence; that it ought to flow from all, in order to be applicable to all; and that it must lose its natural rectitude, when it tends to any individual and determinate object; because judging, in such a case, of what is foreign to ourselves, we have no real principle of equity for our guide.

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In fact, as soon as we come to treat of a particular fact or privilege, on a point which has not been settled by a general and prior convention, than the affair becomes litigious. It is a process, in which the particulars interested are one party, and the public the other; but in which I see no law to decide, nor judge to determine. It would be absurd, therefore, in such a case, to think of referring it to any express decision of the general will, which could be no other than the decision of one of the very parties; and therefore must be, with regard to the other, foreign and partial, leaning to injustice, and subject to error. In the same manner, also, that a partial and particular will cannot represent the general will; so the latter, in its turn, changes its nature, when employed on a particular object, and cannot, in its general capacity, pronounce concerning any particular man or fact. Thus when the people of Athens, for instance, took upon them to appoint or cashier their chiefs, to decree honours to one, and inflict pains and penalties on another, and thus by numerous decrees exercised indiscriminately all the acts of government, they had then, properly speaking, no general will at all: the Athenian people, in this case, did not act in the capacity of sovereign, but in that of magistrate. This may appear contradictory to the common notions of things, but I must be allowed time to explain mine.

We may learn hence, that the general will consists less in the number of votes, than in the common interest that unites them; for, in this institution, every one subjects himself necessarily to those conditions which he imposes on others

there: hence the admirable conformity between interest and justice, which stamps on public declarations that characteristic of equity, which we see vanish in the discussion of particular subjects, for want of that common interest which unites and makes the criterion of the judge the same with that of the party.

In what manner soever we recur to the first principle, we always arrive at the same conclusion, *viz.* that the Social Compact establishes such an equality among the citizens, that all lay themselves under the same obligations, and ought all to enjoy the same privileges. Thus, from the very nature of this compact, every act of sovereignty, that is to say, every authentic act of the general will, is equally obligatory on, or favourable to, all the citizens, without distinction; in so much that the sovereign knows only the whole body of the nation, but distinguishes none of the individuals who compose it. What then is properly an act of sovereignty? It is not an agreement made between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between a whole body with each of its members: which convention is a lawful one, because founded on the social contract; it is equitable, because it is common to all; it is useful, because it can have no other object than the general good; and it is solid and durable, because secured by the public strength and the supreme power.

When the submission of subjects is owing only to such conventions, they pay in fact obedience to none but their own will; and to ask how far the respective privileges of the sovereign and citizens extend, is to ask merely how far the latter may enter into engagements with themselves,

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selves, viz. each individual with all collectively, and all collectively with each individual.

Hence we see, that the sovereign power, absolute, inviolable, and sacred as it is, neither does nor can surpass the bounds of such general conventions; and that every man hath a right to dispose, as he pleases, of that liberty and property which the terms of such conventions have left to his own disposal: so that the sovereign hath not any right to lay a greater burden on one subject than on another, because, in such a case, it becomes a particular affair, in which the sovereign hath no power to act.

These distinctions being once admitted, it is so far from being true that there is any real renunciation on the part of individuals when they enter into the Social Compact, that their situation becomes, by means of that very compact, much better than before; as, instead of making any alienation, they only make an advantageous exchange of an uncertain and precarious mode of subsistence, for a more settled and determinate one: they exchange their natural independence, for social liberty; the power of injuring others, for that of securing themselves from injury; and their own natural strength, which might be overcome by that of others, for a civil power which the social union renders invincible. Their very lives, which they have by these means devoted to the state, are continually protected; and even when they are obliged to expose themselves to death in its defence, what do they more than render back to society what they have before received of it? What do they more, in risking their lives for their country, than they would have been obliged to do

more frequently, and with much greater danger, in a state of nature; when, subject to inevitable outrages, they would have been obliged to defend their means of subsistence at the hazard of their lives? That every one lies under the obligation of fighting in defence of his country, is true; but then he is relieved by the laws from the necessity of fighting to defend himself. And are not men gainers, on the whole, by running part of those risks for their common security, which they must severally run for themselves were they deprived of that security?

CHAP. V. *On capital punishments.*

IT hath been asked, how individuals, having no right to dispose of their own lives, can transmit that right to the sovereign? The difficulty of resolving this question, arises only from its being badly expressed. Every man hath an undoubted right to hazard his life for its preservation. Was a man ever charged with suicide, for throwing himself from the top of an house in flames, in order to avoid being burnt? Was it ever imputed as a crime to a man, who might be cast away at sea, that he knew the danger of the voyage when he embarked?

The end of the Social Compact, is the preservation of the contracting parties. Such, therefore, as would reap the benefit of the end, must assent to the means, which are inseparable from some dangers and losses. He that would preserve his life at the expence of others, ought to risk it for their safety when it is necessary. Now, the citizen is no longer a judge of the danger to which the law requires him to be exposed:

posed: but when the prince declares that the good of the state requires his life, he ought to resign it; since it is only on those conditions he hath hitherto lived in security, and his life is not solely the gift of nature, but a conditional gift of the state.

The punishment of death inflicted on malefactors may be considered also in the same point of view: it is to prevent our falling by the hands of an assassin, that we consent to die on becoming such ourselves. We are so far from giving away our lives by this treaty, that we enter into it only for our preservation; as it is not to be presumed that any one of the contracting parties formed therein a premeditated design to get himself hanged.

Add to this, that every malefactor, by breaking the laws of his country, becomes a rebel and traitor; ceasing, from that time, to be a member of the community, and even declaring war against it. In this case, the preservation of the state is incompatible with his; one of the two must perish: and thus, when a criminal is executed, he doth not suffer in the quality of a citizen, but in that of an enemy. His trial and sentence are the evidence and declaration of his having broken the Social Compact, and that of consequence he is no longer a member of the state. Now, as he had professed himself such, at least by his residence, it is right that he should be separated from the state, either by banishment as a violator of the Social Compact, or by death as a public enemy: for such an enemy is not a moral personage, he is a mere man; and it is in this case only that the right of war takes place of killing an enemy.

But, it may be said, the condemnation of a criminal is a particular act. It is so ; and for that reason it does not belong to the sovereign : it is an act, for doing which the supreme power may confer the authority, though it cannot exercise such authority itself. My ideas on this subject are consistent, though I cannot explain them all at once.

It is to be observed, however, that the frequency of executions is always a sign of the weakness or indolence of government. There is no malefactor who might not be made good for something ; nor ought any person to be put to death, even by way of example, unless such as could not be preserved without endangering the community.

With regard to the prerogative of granting pardons to criminals, condemned by the laws of their country, and sentenced by the judges, it belongs only to that power which is superior both to the judges and the laws, viz. the sovereign authority. Not that it is very clear that even the supreme power is vested with such a right, or that the circumstances in which it might be exerted are frequent or determinate. In a well-governed State there are but few executions ; not because there are many pardoned, but because there are few criminals : Whereas when a state is on the decline, the multiplicity of crimes occasions their impunity. Under the Roman republic, neither the state nor the Consuls ever attempted to grant pardons ; even the people never did this, although they sometimes recalled their own sentence. The frequency of pardons indicates that in a short time crimes will not stand in need of them, and every one may see

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see the consequence of such conduct. But my reluctant heart restrains my pen; let us leave the discussion of these questions to the just man who hath never been criminal, and who never stood in need of pardon.

CHAP. VI. *On the law.*

HAVING given existence and life to the body politic, by a Social Compact, we come now to give it action and will, by a legislature. For the primitive act, by which such body is formed, determines nothing as yet with respect to the means of its preservation.

Whatever is right and conformable to order, is such from the nature of things, independent of all human conventions. All justice comes from God, who is the fountain of it; but could we receive it immediately from so sublime a source, we should stand in no need of government or laws. There is indeed an universal justice springing from reason alone; but, in order to admit this to take place among mankind, it should be reciprocal. To consider things as they appear, we find the maxims of justice among mankind to be vain and fruitless, for want of a natural support: they tend only to the advantage of the wicked, and the disadvantage of the just; while the latter observes them in his behaviour to others, but nobody regards them in their conduct to him. Laws and conventions, therefore, are necessary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine justice to its proper objects. In a state of nature, where every thing is common, I owe those nothing to whom I have promised nothing: I acknowledge nothing to be the

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property of another but what is useless to myself. In a state of society the case is different, where the rights of each are fixed by law.

We come at length, therefore, to consider what is law. So long as we content ourselves with the metaphysical idea annexed to this term, we must talk unintelligibly; and though we should come to a definition of natural law, we should not know thence any thing more of political law. I have already said there can be no general will relative to a particular object. In fact, every particular object must be within or without the state. If without, a will that is foreign, cannot with regard to it be general; and if the object be within the state, it must make a part of it: in which case there arises between the whole and the part, a relation that constitutes two separate beings; one of which is the part, but the whole wanting such part is not the whole; and so long as that relation subsists, there is no whole, but only two unequal parts; whence it follows, that the will of the one is no longer general with regard to that of the other.

But when a whole people decree concerning a whole people, they consider only their whole body; and, if it then forms any relation, it must be between the entire object considered in one point of view, and the entire object considered in another point of view, without any division of the whole. In this case, the matter of the decree is general as the will that decrees. Such is the act which I call a law.

When I say that the object of the laws is always general, I mean that the laws considers the subjects in a collective body, and their actions abstractedly; but never concerns itself with
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individual persons, nor particular actions. Thus the law may decree certain privileges, but it cannot bestow them on particular persons: the law may constitute several classes of citizens, and assign even the qualities which may entitle them to rank in these classes; but it cannot nominate such or such persons to be admitted therein: it may establish a legal government, and appoint an hereditary succession; but it cannot make choice of a king, nor appoint the royal family; in a word, every function that relates to an individual object, doth not belong to the legislative power.

Taking things in this light, it is immediately seen how absurd it is to ask in whose power it is to make laws? as they are acts of the general will; or whether the prince be above the laws? as he is but a member of the state. Hence also, it is plain, the law cannot be unjust, as nothing can be unjust to itself; as also what it is to be free, and at the same time subject to the laws, as the laws are only the records of our own will.

It is hence farther evident, the law re-uniting the universality of the will to that of its object, that whatever an individual, of what rank soever, may decree of his own head, cannot be a law: indeed, whatever the supreme power itself may ordain concerning a particular object is not a law, but a simple decree; it is not an act of the sovereignty, but of the magistracy.

I call every state, therefore, which is governed by laws, a Republic, whatever be the form of its administration; for in such a case only it is the public interest that governs, and whatever

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is public is something. Thus every lawful government is republican *. I shall explain hereafter what I mean by a government.

The laws are, strictly speaking, only the conditions of civil society. The people who submit to them should therefore be the authors of them; as it certainly belongs to the associating parties to settle the conditions on which they agree to form a society. But how are they to be settled? is it to be done by common consent, or by a sudden inspiration? hath the body politic an organ by which to make known its will? who shall furnish it with the necessary prescience to form its determinations and to publish them before-hand, or how shall it divulge them in the time of need? how shall an ignorant multitude, who often know not what they chuse because they seldom know what is for their good, execute an enterprize so great and so difficult as that of a system of legislature? A people must necessarily be desirous of their owd good, but they do not always see in what it consists. The general will is always in the right, but the judgment by which it is directed is not always sufficiently informed. It is necessary it should see objects such as they are, and sometimes such as they ought to appear; it should be directed to the salutary end it would pursue, should be secured from the seduction of private interests, should have an insight into the circumstances of time and

* I do not here mean, by the term *republican*, either an aristocracy or democracy; but in general every government influenced by the general will of the people, which is the law. To make a government legal, it is not necessary that it should be confounded with the sovereign, but that it should be the minister: so that in this sense even a monarchy is a republic. This will be more fully explained in the subsequent book.

and place; and should be enabled to set the present and perceptible advantages of things, against the distant and concealed evil that may attend them. Individuals often see the good which they reject; the public is desirous of that which it is incapable to see. Both stand equally in need of a guide: the former should be compelled to conform their desires to reason, and the latter should be instructed in the discovery of what it desires. It is thus from the proper information of the public, that there results an union of the understanding and the will in the body of society; and thence the exact concurrence of its parts, and in the end the greatest force of the whole. Hence arises the necessity of a legislator.

CHAP. VII. *Of the genius and character of a legislator.*

TO investigate those conditions of society which may best answer the purposes of nations, would require the abilities of some superior intelligence, who should be witness to all the passions of men, but be subject itself to none; who should have no connection with human nature, but should have a perfect knowledge of it; a being, in short, whose happiness should be independent of us, and who would nevertheless employ itself about ours*. It is the province of gods indeed to make laws for men.

The same argument which Caligula made use of in point of fact, Plato himself employs in point

* Nations become famous only as their legislature declines. The institution of Lycurgus made the Spartans happy for ages before they were famous in Greece.

point of right, when he goes about to define the civil or royal personage, in treating of a king. But if it be certain that a great prince is a personage rarely to be met with, what is that of a great legislator? The former hath nothing more to do than to follow the model designed by the latter. The one is the mechanical genius who invents the machine, the other only the workman who puts it into execution. In the commencement of societies, says Montesquieu, it is the principal persons in republics which form their institution; and afterwards it is the institution which forms the chiefs of republics.

He who should undertake to form a body politic, ought to perceive himself capable of working a total change in human nature; of transforming every individual, of himself a solitary and independent being, into a part of a greater whole, from which such individual is to receive in one sense his life and existence: he must be capable of altering the constitution of the man, in order to strengthen it; and to substitute a partial and moral existence, in the room of that physical and independent existence which we receive from the hands of nature. In a word, he must be able to deprive man of his natural abilities, in order to invest him with foreign powers which he cannot make use of without the assistance of others. The more such natural force is annihilated and extinct, the greater and more durable are those which are acquired, and the more perfect and solid is the social institution. So that if each citizen be nothing and can effect nothing but by the existence and assistance of all the rest, and the force acquired by the whole body be equal or superior to the sum of the natural
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forces of all its individuals, the legislature may be said to have reached the highest pitch of perfection it is capable to attain.

The legislator is in every respect a most extraordinary person in a state. If he be undoubtedly so on account of his genius, he is not less so from his function. Yet this is not that of the magistrate or the sovereign. That function, which constitutes the republic, doth not enter into its constitution. It is, on the contrary, a particular and superior employment that hath nothing in common with human government: for if he who hath the command over the citizens should not be entrusted with the command over the laws, he who hath the power over the laws ought as little to have the power over the citizens: for were it otherwise, his laws being made instrumental to his passions, would often serve to perpetuate his injustice, and he could never prevent particular views from altering his system.

When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by abdicating the throne. It was the custom of most of the Grecian cities to entrust their establishment with strangers; a custom that hath been often imitated by the modern republics of Italy: that of Geneva did the same, and found its account in it †. In the most flourishing age of Rome, that city suffered under flagitious acts of tyranny, and beheld itself on the brink

† Those who consider Calvin only as a theologist, know but little of his comprehensive genius. The digest of our laws, in which he had a considerable share, do him as much honour as his religious system; and what revolution soever time may effect in our public worship, the memory of this great man will continue to be revered so long as patriotism and a sense of liberty survive among us.

brink of ruin for having entrusted the sovereign power and the legislative authority in the same hands.

Even the Decemviri themselves, however, never assumed the right of passing any law merely on their own authority. *Nothing that we propose, said they to the people, can pass into a law without your consent. Be yourselves, ye Romans, the authors of those laws on which your happiness depends.*

The legislator, therefore, who digests the laws, should have no right to make them pass for such; nor indeed can the people, though inclined to do it, deprive themselves of that incommunicable right; because, according to the fundamental compact, it is the general will only that is obligatory on individuals; and it is impossible to be assured that any particular will is conformable to the general, till it be submitted to on the free suffrage of the people. I have said this before, but perhaps have not unnecessarily repeated it.

Thus, in the business of a legislature, we find two things apparently incompatible; a design superior to human abilities, carried into execution by an authority which is nothing.

Another difficulty which merits attention is, that wise men, in talking their own language to the vulgar, speak unintelligibly. And yet there are many kinds of ideas which it is impossible to convey in the language of the people. Views too general, and objects too distant, are equally beyond their comprehension; the individual, relishing no other plan of government than that which is conducive to his private interest, is with difficulty brought to see those advantages which are to be deduced from the continual checks

checks he may receive from salutary laws. In order to give a newly-formed people a taste for the sound maxims of policy, and induce them to follow the fundamental rules of society, it is necessary that the effect should in a manner become the cause; that the spirit of union which should be the effect of social institutions should preside to form that institution itself, and that men should be such before the laws are made as the laws are designed to make them. For this reason, therefore, the legislator being capable of employing neither force nor argument, he is of necessity obliged to recur to an authority of an higher order, which may compel without violence, and persuade without conviction. Hence it is that the founders of nations have been obliged, in all ages, to recur to the intervention of celestial powers; and have honoured their gods with their own wisdom, in order that the people, by submitting themselves to the laws of the state in the same manner as to those of nature, and acknowledging the same power in the formation of the city as in the formation of man, might bend more freely, and bear more tractably the yoke of obedience and public felicity.

Now the determinations of that sublime reason, which soars above the comprehension of vulgar minds, are those which the legislator puts into the mouths of his immortal personages, in order to influence those by a divine authority, who could not be led by maxims of human prudence. It does not belong to every man, however, to make the gods his oracles, nor even to be believed when he pretends to be their interpreter. The comprehensive genius of the legislator is the miracle that proves the truth of

his mission. Any man may engrave tables of stone, hire an oracle, pretend to a secret communication with some deity, teach a bird to whisper in his ear, or hit upon other devices to impose on a people. But he who knows nothing more, though he may be lucky enough to get together an assembly of fools and madmen, will never lay the foundations of an empire; the fabric raised by his extravagance presently falling, and often burying him in its ruins. A transitory union may be formed from slight and futile connections; nothing but the dictates of wisdom, however, can render it durable. The Jewish law, still subsisting, and that of the son of Ismael, which for ten centuries hath governed half the world, are standing proofs of the superior genius of those great men by whom they were dictated: and though the vanity of philosophy, and the blind prejudice of party, see nothing in their characters but fortunate impostors, the true politician admires, in their respective institutions, that sagacious and comprehensive power of mind which must ever lay the lasting foundation of human establishments.

It must not, from all this, be concluded, however, that religion and government have, in our times, as Warburton alledges, one common object; but only that in the first establishment of societies, the one was made instrumental to the other.

CHAP. VIII. *Of the people.*

AS the architect, before he begins to raise an edifice, examines into the ground where he is to lay the foundation, that he may be able to judge.

judge whether it will bear the weight of the superstructure; so the prudent legislator does not begin by making a digest of salutary laws, but examines first whether the people for whom such laws are designed, are capable of supporting them. It was for this reason Plato refused to give laws to the Arcadians and Cyrenians, knowing they were rich and luxurious, and could not admit of the introduction of equality among them. It was for this reason that Crete, though it boasted good laws, was inhabited by such bad men: Minos had only endeavoured to govern a people already depraved by vice. Various have been the nations that have made a distinguished figure in the world, and yet have not been capable of being governed by good laws; and even those who are capable of being so governed, continued so but a short time. Nations, as well as individuals, are docile only in their infancy: they become incorrigible as they grow old. When customs are once established and prejudices have taken root among them, it is a dangerous and fruitless enterprize to attempt to reform them. A people cannot even bear to have their wounds probed, though in order to be cured; but resemble those weak and cowardly patients who shudder at the sight of their physician. Not but that sometimes, as there are distempers which affect the brain of individuals and deprive them of the capacity of remembering what is past, there happen in states such revolutions as produce the same effect on a people, when the horror of the past supplies the place of oblivion, and the state, inflamed and exhausted by civil wars, rises again, if I may so express myself, out of its own ashes, and re-assumes the vigour of youth in for-

faking the arms of death. This was the case with Sparta in the time of Lycurgus, and of Rome after the Tarquins; and such hath been the case in modern times with Holland and Switzerland after the expulsion of their tyrants. But these events are rare; and are such exceptions as have their cause in the particular constitution of the state excepted. They cannot even take place twice among the same people: for though they may be made free when they are only barbarous and uncivilized; yet, when the resources of society are exhausted, they cannot be renewed. In that case, faction may destroy, but revolutions cannot re-establish their freedom; they require for ever after a master, and not a deliverer. Every free people, therefore, should remember this maxim, that though nations may acquire liberty, yet if once this inestimable acquisition is lost, it is absolutely irrecoverable.

There is in nations, as well as individuals, a term of maturity, at which they should be permitted to arrive before they are subjected to laws. This term, however, is not always easy to be known; and yet if it be anticipated, it may be of dangerous consequence. Again, one people may be formed to discipline in their infancy; while another may not be ripened for subjection till after many centuries. The Russians, for instance, will never be truly polished, because they were disciplined too soon. Peter had only an imitative turn: he had nothing of that true genius, whose creative power forms things out of nothing. Some of his measures, indeed, were proper enough, but most of them were ill-timed or ill-placed. He saw that his subjects were mere barbarians, but he did not see that they were not ripe

ripe for being made polite. He wanted to civilize them, when he should only have checked their brutality. He wanted to make them at once Germans and Englishmen; whereas he ought to have begun by making them first Russians; and thus he prevented his subjects from ever becoming what otherwise they might have been, by persuading them they were such as they were not. It is thus a French tutor forms his pupil to make a figure in his childhood, and to make none for ever afterwards. The empire of Russia, while it is ambitious of reducing all Europe to its subjection, will be subjected itself. Its neighbours, the Tartars, will in time become both its masters and ours. This event seems to me inevitable; all the monarchs in Europe seeming to act in concert, to accelerate such a revolution.

CHAP. IX. *The subject continued.*

IN the same manner as nature hath limited the dimensions of a well-formed human body, beyond which she produces only giants or dwarfs; so in the body-politic there are limits, within or beyond which a state ought not to be confined or extended; to the end that it may not be too big to be well governed, nor too little to maintain its own independency. There is in every body-politic a *maximum* of force which it cannot exceed, and from which it often recedes by extending its dominion. The more the social knot is extended, the more lax it grows; and in general, a little state is always proportionably stronger than a great one.

A thousand reasons might be given in sup-
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port of this maxim. In the first place, the administration of government becomes always more difficult as the distance from the seat of it increases, even as a body has the greatest weight at the end of the longest lever. It becomes also more burdensome in proportion as it is divided into parts: for every town hath first its own particular government to pay; that of each district again is paid by the same people; next that of the province, then that of particular governments with their viceroys, all of whom are to be paid as they rise in dignity, and always at the expence of the unhappy people; whom, last of all, the supreme administration itself crushes with the whole weight of its oppression. It is impossible so many needless charges should not tend continually to impoverish the people; who, so far from being better governed by these different ranks of superiors, are much worse so than if they had but one order of governors in the state. And yet with this multiplicity of rulers, they are far from being furnished with proper resources for extraordinary occasions; but on the contrary, when they have occasion to recur to them, the state is always on the brink of ruin.

Nor is this all; the government not only becomes less vigorous and active in putting the laws in execution, removing private oppression, correcting abuses, or preventing the seditious enterprises of rebellion in distant provinces; but the people have less affection for their chiefs, whom they never have an opportunity to see; for their country, which to them is like the whole world; and for their fellow-subjects, of which the greater part are utter strangers. The same laws cannot be convenient for so many va-

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rious people of different manners and climates, and who cannot be supposed to live equally happy under the same form of government. And yet different laws must occasion much trouble and confusion among people, who, living under the same administration, and carrying on a perpetual intercourse, frequently change their habitations, intermarry with each other, and, being educated under different customs, hardly ever know when their property is secure. Great talents lie buried, virtue lives obscured, and vice prevails with impunity, amidst that multitude of strangers which flock together round the chief seat of administration. The principals, overwhelmed with a multiplicity of business, can look into nothing themselves; the government of the state being left to their deputies and clerks. In a word, the measures to be taken, in order to maintain the general authority, on which so many distant officers are ever ready to encroach or impose, engross the public attention; there is none of it left to be employed about the happiness of the people, and indeed hardly any for their defence in case of need: thus it is that a body too unweildy for its constitution grows debilitated, and sinks under its own weight.

On the other hand, a state ought to be fixed on some basis, to secure its solidity, to be able to resist those shocks which it will not fail to encounter, and to make those efforts which it will find necessary to maintain its dependence. Nations have all a kind of centrifugal force by which they act continually against each other, and tend, like the vortices of Descartes, to aggrandise themselves at the expence of their neighbours. Thus the weak run in danger of being presently
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swallowed up by the strong; nor is there any security for them, but by keeping themselves in equilibrio with the rest, and making the compression on every side equal.

Hence we see it is prudent in some cases to extend, and in others to restrain, the limits of a state; nor is it one of the least arts in civil polity to distinguish between one and the other, and to fix on that advantageous proportion which tends most to the preservation of the state. It may be observed in general, that the reasons for extending dominion, relating to objects external and relative, ought to be subordinate to those for contracting it, whose objects are internal and absolute. A sound and vigorous constitution is the first thing to be considered; and a much greater reliance is to be made on a good government, than on the resources which are to be drawn from an extensive territory.

Not but that there have been instances of states so constituted, that the necessity of their making conquests hath been essential to their very constitution. It is possible also they might felicitate themselves on that happy necessity, which pointed out, nevertheless, with the summit of their grandeur, the inevitable moment of their fall.

CHAP. X. *The subject continued.*

THE magnitude of a body-politic may be taken two ways; viz. by the extent of territory, and the number of the people; a certain proportional relation between them constituting the real greatness of a state. It is the people which form the state, and the territory which affords subsistence to the people; this relation, there-

therefore exists, when the territory is sufficient for the subsistence of the inhabitants; and the inhabitants are as numerous as the territory can maintain. In this proportion consists the *maximum* of the force of any given number of people; for if the territory be too extensive, the defence of it is burdensome, the cultivation insufficient, and the produce superfluous: hence the proximate causes of defensive war. If, on the other hand, the territory be too small, the state is under the necessity of being obliged for part of its subsistence to its neighbours: hence the proximate causes of offensive war. Every people who, by their situation, have no other alternative than commerce or war, must be necessarily feeble: they must depend on their neighbours, on adventitious circumstances, and can only have a short and uncertain existence. They must conquer others, and thereby change their situation; or be conquered themselves, and thence be reduced to nothing. It is impossible such a state can preserve its independency but by its insignificance or its greatness.

It is not easy to calculate the determinate relation between the extent of territory and number of inhabitants sufficient for each other; not only on account of the difference in the qualities of the soil, in its degrees of fertility, in the nature of its productions, and in the influence of climate; but also on account of the remarkable difference in the temperament and constitution of the inhabitants; some consuming but little in a fertile country, and others a great deal on a barren soil. Regard must also be had to the degree of fecundity among the females, to the circumstances favourable or destructive to population,

lation, and to the number of people which the legislator may hope to draw from other countries by the advantages attending his scheme of government; so that he ought not to found his judgment on what actually exists, but on what he foresees may exist hereafter; not on the present state of population, but on that which will naturally succeed. In fine, there are a thousand occasions, on which local accidents acquire, or permit a state to possess, a larger share of territory than may appear actually necessary for present use. Thus a people may spread themselves over a large spot in a mountainous country, whose natural produce of wood or pasture requires less labour of cultivation; where experience teaches us that women are more fruitful than in the flat countries; and in which a large inclined superficies gives but a small horizontal base, by which only the land must be estimated in the affair of vegetation. A people, on the contrary, may inhabit a less space on the seashore, or even among rocks and almost barren sands; because the fishery supplies them with sustenance, instead of the produce of the earth; they can easily disburden their community by sending out colonies of its supernumerary inhabitants; and lastly, because it is necessary for them in such a case to live near to each other, in order to repel the invasions of pirates.

We may add to these conditional precautions, respecting the formation of a people, one that can be supplied by no other, but without which all the rest are useless: this is, that they should enjoy peace and plenty. For the time in which a state is forming, resembles that in which soldiers are forming a battalion; it is the moment

in which they are least capable of resistance, and the most easily defeated. They would even make a greater resistance when put into absolute disorder afterwards, than during the interval of their first fermentation, when each is taken up more about his own particular rank than the common danger. Should a war, a famine, or a rebellion, break out at such a crisis, the state would infallibly be subverted.

Not but there have been many governments established in times of disorder and confusion: in such cases, however, those very governments subverted the state. Usurpers have always given rise to, or took the advantage of, those times of general confusion, in order to procure such destructive laws, which the people never could have been prevailed on to pass at a more dispassionate season. The choice of the proper time for the institution of laws, is one of the most certain tokens by which we may distinguish the design of a legislator from that of a tyrant.

If it be asked then, what people are in a situation to receive a system of laws? I answer, those who, though connected by some primitive union either of interest or compact, are not yet truly subjected to regular laws; those whose customs and prejudices are not deeply rooted; those who are under no fear of being swallowed up by a sudden invasion, and who, without entering into the quarrels of their neighbours, are able to encounter separately with each, or to engage the assistance of one to repel the other; a people whose individuals may be known to each other, and among whom it is not necessary to charge a man with a greater burden than it is possible for him to bear; a people who can
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subſiſt without others, and without whom all others might ſubſiſt *; a people neither rich nor poor, but poſſeſſed of a competence within themſelves; a people, in ſhort, who poſſeſs at once the conſiſtency of an ancient nation, and the docility of a newly-created one. The great difficulty in legiſlation, conſiſts leſs in knowing what ought to be eſtabliſhed than what ought to be eradicated; and what renders it ſo ſeldom ſucceſſful, is the impoſſibility of finding the ſimplicity of nature in the wants of ſociety. It is true that all theſe circumſtances are very rarely united; and it is for this reaſon that ſo few ſtates have much to boaſt of in their conſtitution. There is ſtill one country in Europe capable of receiving laws: this is the iſland of Corſica. The valour and conſtancy, with which thoſe brave people recovered, and have defended their liberty, might deſervedly excite ſome wiſe man to teach them how to preſerve it. I cannot help ſurmizing, that this little iſland will, one day or other, be the aſtoniſhment of Europe.

CHAP. XI. *Of the various ſystems of legiſlature.*

IF we were to inquire, in what conſiſts precisely the greateſt good, or what ought to be the end

† If two neighbouring people were ſo ſituated that one could not ſubſiſt without the other, the circumſtances of the firſt would be very hard, and of the latter very dangerous. Every wiſe nation, in ſuch a caſe, would extricate itſelf as ſoon as poſſible from ſuch a ſtate of dependence. The republic of Thlaſcala, ſituated in the heart of the Mexican empire, choſe rather to be without ſalt, than purchaſe it, or even receive it gratis, of the Mexicans. The prudent Thlaſcalans ſaw through the ſnare of ſuch liberality. Thus they preſerved their liberty; this petty ſtate, included within that great empire, being, in the end, the cauſe of its ruin.

end of every system of legislature, we should find it reducible to two principal objects, *liberty* and *equality*; liberty, because all partial dependence deprives the whole body of the state of so much strength; equality, because liberty cannot subsist without it.

I have already explained the nature of social liberty; and with regard to equality, we are not to understand by that term, that individuals should all absolutely possess the same degree of wealth and power; but only that, with respect to the latter, it should never be exercised contrary to good order and the laws; and with respect to the former, that no one citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and that none should be so poor as to be obliged to sell himself †. This supposes a moderation of possessions and credit on the side of the great, and a moderation of desires and covetousness on the part of the little.

This equality, they tell us, is a mere speculative chimera, which cannot exist in practice. But though abuses are inevitable, does it thence follow they are not to be corrected? It is for the very reason that things always tend to destroy this equality, that the laws should be calculated to preserve it.

These general objects of legislature, however, should be variously modified in different

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† Would you give a state consistency and strength? prevent the two extremes as much as possible; let there be no rich persons nor beggars. These two conditions, naturally inseparable, are equally destructive to the commonwealth: the one furnishes tyrants, and the other the supporters of tyranny. It is by these the traffic of public liberty is carried on; the one buying, the other selling it.

countries, agreeable to local situation, the character of the inhabitants, and those other circumstances which require that every people should have a particular system of laws, not always the best in itself, but the best adapted to that state for which it is calculated. If, for example, the soil be ungrateful and barren, or the country too small for its inhabitants, cherish industry and the arts, the productions of which may be exchanged for the commodities required. On the other hand, if your country abounds in fertile hills and plenteous vales; if you live on a rich soil in want of inhabitants; apply yourselves to agriculture, which affords the means of population; and banish the destructive arts, which serve only to ruin a country, by gathering the few inhabitants of it together in one particular spot or two, to the depopulation of all the rest †. Do you occupy an extensive and commodious situation by the sea-side? Cover the ocean with your ships, cultivate the arts of navigation and commerce: you will by these means enjoy a brilliant but short existence. On the contrary, do the waves only waste their strength against your inaccessible rocks? Remain barbarous and illiterate; you will live but the more at ease, perhaps more virtuous, assuredly more happy. In a word, besides the maxims common to all nations, every people are possessed in themselves of some cause which influences them in a particular manner, and ren-

† The advantage of foreign commerce, says the Marquis d'A. is productive only of a delusive utility to the kingdom in general. It may enrich a few individuals, and perhaps some cities; but the whole nation gains nothing by it, nor are the people the better for it.

renders their own system of laws proper only for themselves. It is thus that in ancient times among the Hebrews, and in modern times among the Arabians, religion was made the principal object of national concern; among the Athenians, this object was literature; at Carthage and Tyre, it was commerce; at Rhodes, it was navigation; at Sparta war, and at Rome public virtue. The author of the *Spirit of laws* hath shewn, by a number of examples, in what manner the legislator should model his system agreeable to each of these objects.

What renders the constitution of a state truly solid and durable, is that agreement maintained therein between natural and social relations, which occasions the legislature always to act in concert with nature, while the laws serve only to confirm and rectify, as it were, the dictates of the former. But if the legislator, deceived in his object, should assume a principle different from that which arises from the nature of things; should the one tend to slavery and the other to liberty, one to riches, the other to population, one to peace, the other to war and conquests; the laws would insensibly lose their force, the constitution would alter, and the state continue to be agitated till it should be totally changed or destroyed, and nature have resumed its empire.

CHAP. XII. *On the division of the laws.*

IN order to provide for the government of the whole, or give the best possible form to the constitution, various circumstances are to be taken into consideration. Of these the first is the

action of the whole body operating on itself; that is, the relation of the whole to the whole, or of the sovereign to the state, which relation is composed of those between the intermediate terms, as will be seen hereafter.

The laws which govern this relation bear the name of politic laws; and are also called fundamental laws, not without some reason when they are wisely ordained. For if there be only one good method of government in a state, the people who have been so happy as to hit on that method ought to abide by it: but, wherefore should a people, whose laws are bad or defective, esteem such laws to be fundamental? Besides, a nation is in any case at liberty to change even the best laws, when it pleases: for if a people have a mind even to do themselves an injury, who hath any right to prevent them?

The second circumstance is the relations which the members of the community bear to each other and to the whole body; the first of which should be as little, and the last as great, as possible; so that every citizen should live in a state of perfect independence on all the rest, and in a state of the greatest dependence on the city. Both these are ever effected by the same means: for it is the power of the state only that constitutes the liberty of its members. On this second kind of relation is laid the immediate foundation of the civil laws.

It may be proper to consider also a third species of relation between the individual and the law; which gives immediate rise to penal statutes: these, however, are in fact less a distinct species of laws than the sanction of all the others.

To these three kind of laws, may be added a fourth,

fourth, more important than all the rest; and which are neither engraven on brass or marble, but in the hearts of the citizens, forming the real constitution of the state. These are the laws which acquire daily fresh influence, and, when others grow old and obsolete, invigorate and revive them: these are the laws which keep alive in the hearts of the people the original spirit of their institution, and substitute insensibly the force of habit to that of authority. The laws I here speak of are, manners, customs, and, above all, public opinion; all unknown or disregarded by our modern politicians, but on which depends the success of all the rest. These are the objects on which the real legislator is employed in secret, while he appears solely to confine himself to those particular regulations which compose only the preparatory centre of the vault, of which manners, more slow in their progress, form in the end the immoveable arch.

Of these classes, politic laws, or those which constitute the form of government, are relative only to my present subject.

B O O K III.

BEFORE we enter on a discussion of the several forms of government, it will not be improper to ascertain the precise meaning of that term; which as yet hath not been well explained.

CHAP. I. *On government in general.*

I MUST previously caution the reader to peruse

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ruse this chapter very deliberately, as it is impossible to render myself clearly intelligible to such as are not attentive.

Every free action hath two causes, which concur to effect its production; the one moral, *viz.* the will which determines the act; the other physical, *viz.* the power which puts it in execution. When I walk, for instance, toward any particular object, it is first necessary that I should will to go, and secondly that my feet should bear me forward. A paralytic may will to run, and an active racer be unwilling: the want of power in the one hath the same effect as the want of will in the other; both remain in their place. The body-politic hath the same principles of motion; which are distinguished also in the same manner by power and will; the latter under the name of the *legislative* power, and the former under that of the *executive* power. Nothing is or ought to be done without the concurrence of both.

We have already seen that the legislative power belongs to the people in general, and can belong to none else. On the other hand, it is easy to conclude, from the principles already established, that the executive power cannot appertain to the generality, as legislator or sovereign; because this power is exerted only in particular acts, which are not the province of the law, nor of course that of the sovereign, whose acts can be no other than laws.

To the public force, therefore, should be annexed a proper agent, which may re-unite and put it in action, agreeable to the directions of the general will; serving as a communication between the state and the sovereign, and effecting

ing the same purpose in the body-politic, as the union of the soul and body in man. Such is the rationale of government, so generally confounded with the sovereign, of which it is only the ministry.

What then is government? It is an intermediate body established between the subject and the sovereign, for their mutual correspondence; charged with the execution of the laws, and with the maintenance of civil and political liberty.

The members of which this body is composed, are called magistrates or *kings*, that is to say, *governors*, and the whole body bears the name of the *prince* *. Those, therefore, who affirm that the act, by which a people profess submission to their chiefs or governor is not a contract, are certainly right; it being in fact nothing more than the conferring a simple commission on the said chiefs; an employ, in the discharge of which they act as mere officers of the sovereign, exercising in his name the power which it hath placed in their hands, and which it may limit, modify, or resume, whenever it pleases, the alienation of its right so to do being incompatible with the very nature and being of society.

I call therefore, the legal exercise of the executive power, the *Government* or supreme administration; and the individual or body charged with that administration, the *Prince* or the *Magistrate*.

In the government are to be found those intermediate forces, whose relations compose that
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† Thus, at Venice, the college of senators is called the most serene prince, even when the doge is not present.

of the whole to the whole, or of the sovereign to the state. This last relation may be represented by that of the extremes of a constant proportion, the mean proportional of which is the government. The government receives from the sovereign those orders which it gives to the people; so that, in order to keep the state in due equilibrio, there should, every thing considered, be the same equality between the momentum or force of the government taken in itself, and the momentum or force of the citizens, who are the sovereign considered collectively on one side, and subjects considered severally on the other.

It is, besides, impossible to vary any of these three terms, without instantly destroying the proportions. If the sovereign should be desirous to govern, or the magistrate to give laws, or the subjects refuse to obey, disorder must immediately take place; the will and the power thus no longer acting in concert, the state would be dissolved, and fall into despotism or anarchy. Add to this, that as there can be but one mean proportional between each relation, there can be but one good government for a state. But as a thousand events may change the relation subsisting among a people; different governments may not only be good for different people, but even for the same people at different periods of time.

In order to give the reader an idea of the various relations that may exist between these two extremes, I shall, by way of example, make use of the number of people, as a relation the most easily expressed.

We will suppose, for instance, that a state is composed of ten thousand citizens. The sovereign must be considered as collectively only
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and in a body; but every particular in quality of subject is considered as an individual: thus the sovereign is in this case to the subject as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state shares only the ten thousandth part of the sovereign authority, while at the same time he is subjected to it in his whole person. Again, should the number of people be increased to an hundred thousand, the submission of the subjects would receive no alteration, each of them being totally subjected to the authority of the laws; while his share in the sovereignty, and vote in the enactment of these laws, would be reduced to the hundred-thousandth part; a tenth less than before. Thus the subject, remaining always a single integer, the proportion between him and the sovereign increases as the number of citizens is augmented: whence it follows, that as a state increases, the liberty of the subject diminishes.

When I say the proportion increases, I mean that it recedes farther from the point of equality. Thus the greater the proportion, in the language of the geometers, it is reckoned the less according to common acceptation: agreeable to the former, the relation, considered in point of quantity, is estimated by its extent; according to the latter, considered in point of identity, it is estimated by its proximation.

Now, the less proportion which particular voices bear to the general, that is to say, the manners to the laws, the more ought the general restrictive force to be augmented. Thus the government should be relatively more powerful as the people are more numerous.

On the other hand, the increasing greatness
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of a state affording the guardians of the public authority greater temptations and means to abuse their power, the more force a government is possessed of to restrain the people, the more ought the sovereign to be possessed of in its turn to restrain the government. I am not speaking here of absolute power, but of the relative forces of the component parts of the state.

It follows, from this two-fold relation, that the constant proportion between the sovereign, the prince, and the people, is not a mere arbitrary idea, but a necessary consequence of the very existence of the body-politic. It follows also, that one of the extremes, viz. the people as subjects, being a fixed term represented by unity wherever the two-fold ratio is increased or diminished, that the simple ratio must increase or diminish in like manner, and of course the mean term will be changed. Hence it appears there is no one settled constitution of government, but that there may be as many governments different in their nature as there are states differing in magnitude.

If any one should affect to turn my system into ridicule, and say, that, in order to find this mean proportional, and form the government as it ought to be, we have no more to do than to find the square root of the number of the people; I answer, that I here make use of the number of the people only by way of example; that the relations of which I have been speaking, are not only estimated by the number of individuals, but in general by the momentum or quantity of action, which arises from a combination of various causes; and though, in order to express myself concisely, I borrow the terms of geometry,

try, I am not ignorant that geometrical precision is not to be expected in treating of moral quantities.

The government is in miniature what the body politic containing it is at large. It is a moral person endowed with certain faculties, active as the sovereign, passive as the state, and capable of being resolved into other sensible relations, from which of course arises a new scale of proportion, and still another within this, according to the order of the courts of justice, till we arrive at the last indivisible term, that is to say, the sole chief or supreme magistrate, which may be represented in the centre of this progression, as an unity between the series of fractions, and that of whole numbers.

But, without embarrassing the reader with a multiplicity of terms, we shall content ourselves with considering the government as a new body in the state, distinct from the subjects and the sovereign, and existing between both.

There is this essential difference, however, between the government and the state, that the latter exists of itself, and the former only by means of the sovereign. Thus as the ruling will of the prince is, or ought to be, only the general will, or the law, the power of the prince is only that of the public centered in him; so that whenever he would derive from himself any absolute and independent act, the combination of the whole is effected. And if, at length, the prince should have a particular will of his own, more active than that of the sovereign, and should make use of the public power in his hands to enforce obedience to such particular will, forming, as it were, two sovereigns, the one

one of right and the other of fact, the social union immediately vanishes, and the body politic is dissolved.

In order that the body of government, nevertheless, may have an existence, a real life to distinguish it from that of the state; and that its members may act in concert, to answer the end for which it is instituted; it is necessary that it should be possessed of a particular identity, a sensibility common to all its members, a power and will of its own, for the sake of its preservation. Such a particular existence necessarily supposes that of assemblies and councils; of a power to deliberate and resolve; of the rights, titles, and privileges which belong exclusively to the prince, and render the situation of a magistrate the more honourable in proportion as it is more laborious. The difficulty lies in the method of disposing all the inferior parts of the whole body; so that, while it is strengthening its own constitution, it may not injure that of the state. At the same time, also, it should always distinguish between the peculiar force destined to its own preservation, and the public force destined to the preservation of the state; in a word, it should be always ready to sacrifice the government to the people, and not the people to the government.

To this we may add, that, although the artificial body of government be the work of another artificial body, and is possessed only of a borrowed and subordinate existence; this doth not prevent it from acting with different degrees of vigour and celerity, or from enjoying, if I may so express myself, a greater or less share of health and strength. In short, it may, without running diametrically opposite to the
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purposes of its institution, deviate from them more or less, according to the mode in which it is constituted.

It is from all these differences that arise those various relations and proportions, which the government ought to bear toward the state, according to those accidental and particular relations in which the state is modified. For the best government in itself may often become the worst, if the relation of its component parts are not altered according to the defects of the body-politic to which it belongs.

CHAP. II. *On the principle which constitutes the different forms of government.*

TO explain the general cause of these differences, it is necessary to distinguish here between the prince and the government, in the same manner as I have already done between the sovereign and the state. The body of the magistracy may be composed of a greater or a less number of members. It hath been observed also, that the relation the sovereign bears to the subject increases in proportion to the number of people; thus, by an evident analogy, we may say the same of the relation between the government and the magistrates.

Now the total force of the government, being always equal to that of the state, suffers no alteration; whence it follows, that the more such force is spent by the distribution of it among the members of the government, the less remains to be exerted on the whole body of people.

That government, therefore, which is in the hands of the greatest number of magistrates,

must be the most feeble. As this is a fundamental maxim, we shall take some pains to illustrate it.

In the person of the magistrate may be distinguished three wills essentially different. In the first place, the particular will of the individual, which tends only to his private advantage: secondly, that will which is common to him as a magistrate, tending solely to the advantage of the prince; being general with respect to the government, and particular with regard to the state, of which the government is only a part: and in the third place, the will of the people, or the sovereign will, which is general as well with regard to the state considered as a whole, as with regard to the government considered as a part of that whole.

In a complete system of legislature, the particular will, or that of the individual, should amount to nothing; the will of the body of government should be very limited, and of course the general or sovereign will the ruling and sole director of all the others.

According to the order of nature, however, these different wills are ranged in a contrary manner; being always more active as they are concentrated in themselves. Thus the general will is always the most feeble, that of the government next, and the will of the individual the strongest of all: so that each member of the administration is to be considered, first of all as an individual, secondly as a magistrate, and lastly as a citizen; a gradation directly opposite to that which the order of society requires.

The point being settled, let us suppose the administration of government committed to the hands

hands of one man. In this case the will of the individual, and that of the body of the magistracy, are perfectly united, and of consequence the latter possesses the greatest degree of intensity. Now, as it is on the degree of the will that the exertion of force depends, and as the absolute force of the government never varies, it follows that the most active of all administrations must be that of a single person.

On the contrary, if we unite the administration and the legislature; if we make the prince the sovereign, and the citizens all so many magistrates; in this case, the will of the government, confounded with the general will, would possess no greater share of activity, but would leave the particular will of individuals to exert its whole force. Thus the government, having always the same degree of absolute force, would be at its *minimum* of relative force or activity.

These relations are incontestable, and may be farther confirmed by other considerations. It is evident, for example, that the magistrate is more active in that capacity than the citizen in his; and that of course the will of the individual must have a more considerable share of influence in the administration of government, than in the actions of the sovereign; every magistrate being almost always charged with some function of government, whereas no citizen, considered as an individual, discharges any function of the sovereignty. Beside this, the real force of a state increases, as the state increases in magnitude, tho' not always in the ratio of that magnitude; but while the state remains the same, it is in vain to increase the number of magistrates, as the government will not thereby acquire any

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additional strength, because its force, being always that of the state, is constantly equal. And thus the relative force or activity of government is diminished, without its real and absolute force being augmented.

It is further certain, that public affairs must be transacted more or less expeditiously according to the number of people charged with their dispatch; that by laying too great a stress on prudence, too little is trusted to fortune; that the opportunity of success is thus frequently lost, and that by the mere force of deliberation the end of it is defeated.

This may serve to prove, that the reins of government are relaxed in proportion as the magistrates are multiplied; and I have before demonstrated, that the more numerous the people are, the more should the restraining power of government be increased: Hence it follows, that the proportion which the number of magistrates should hold to the government should be in the inverse ratio of the subjects to the sovereign; that is to say, the more extensive the state, the more contracted should be the government, the number of chiefs diminishing as that of the people increases.

I speak here only of the relative force of the government, and not of the rectitude or propriety of it. For, otherwise, it is certain, that the more numerous the magistracy is, the nearer doth the will of that body approach to the general will of the whole people; whereas, under a sole chief, the will of the magistracy is, as I have before observed, only that of an individual. Thus what is gained in one respect, is lost on the other; and the art of the legislator consists in

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in tracing the fixed point, at which the force and the will of the government, always in a reciprocal proportion to each other, unite in that proportion which is most advantageous to the state.

CHAP. III. *Of the actual distinctions of governments.*

WE have treated, in the preceding chapter, of the reasons for distinguishing the several species and forms of government, by the number of the members composing them; it remains therefore to shew, in the present, how these distinctions are actually made.

The sovereign authority may, in the first place, commit the charge of the government to the whole people, or to the greater part of them; the number of magistrates in such case exceeding that of private citizens. This form of government is distinguished by the name of a democracy.

Or, otherwise, the supreme power may commit the office of government into the hands of a few, so that the number of private citizens may exceed that of magistrates; and this form bears the name of an aristocracy.

Or lastly, the government may be entrusted to one magistrate only, who delegates his power to all the rest. This third form is the most common, and is called a monarchy or a regal government.

It is to be observed that all these forms, and particularly the two former, are susceptible of different degrees of perfection, and admit indeed of considerable latitude in their modification: for a democracy may comprehend the

whole people, or be limited to the half. An aristocracy also may comprehend any quantity from the half of the people to the smallest number indefinitely. Nay a monarchy itself is susceptible of some distribution. Sparta, for instance, had constitutionally two kings at a time; and the Romans had even eight emperors at once, without the empire having been actually divided. Thus, we see, there is a certain point, at which each form of government is confounded with that to which it is nearest related; and thus, under three distinguishing denominations only, government is really susceptible of as many different forms as there are citizens in the state.

To go still farther; as even one and the same government is capable, in many respects, of being subdivided into parts, of which the administration may respectively differ, there may result from the varied combinations of these forms a multitude of others, every one of which may be again multiplied by all the simple forms.

Politicians have in all ages disputed much about the best form of government, without considering that each different form may possibly be the best in some cases, and the worst in others.

If in different states the number of supreme magistrates should be in the inverse ratio to that of the citizens, it follows that the democratical government is generally speaking better suited to small states, the aristocratical to middling states, and the monarchical to great states. This rule is deduced immediately from our principles; but it is impossible to particularise the multiplicity of circumstances which may furnish exceptions against it.

CHAP. IV. *Of a democracy.*

THE institutor of a law should certainly know better than any other person, how it ought to be understood and executed. It should seem therefore, that the best constitution must be that in which the legislative and executive powers are lodged in the same hands. It is this very circumstance, however, that renders such a government imperfect; because there doth not exist the necessary distinction, which ought to be made in its parts; while the prince and the sovereign, being one and the same person, only form, if I may so express myself, a government without a government.

It is not proper that the power which makes the laws should execute them, or that the attention of the whole body of the people should be diverted from general views to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interest in public affairs; the abuse of the laws by the government, being a less evil than the corruption of the legislature; which is infallibly the consequence of its being governed by particular views. For in that case, the state being essentially altered, all reformation becomes impossible. A people who would not abuse the power of government, would be no more propense to abuse their independence; and a people who should always govern well, would have no occasion to be governed at all.

To take the term in its strictest sense, there never existed, and never will exist, a real democracy in the world. It is contrary to the natural order of things, that the majority of a peo-

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ple should be the governors, and the minority the governed. It is not to be conceived that a whole people should remain personally assembled to manage the affairs of the public; and it is evident, that no sooner are deputies or representatives appointed, than the form of the administration is changed.

It may be laid down indeed as a maxim, that when the functions of government are divided among several courts, that which is composed of the fewest persons will, sooner or later, acquire the greatest authority: though it were for no other reason than the facility with which it is calculated to expedite affairs.

Such a form of government supposes, also, the concurrence of a number of circumstances rarely united. In the first place, it is requisite that the state itself should be of small extent, so that the people might be easily assembled and all personally known to each other. Secondly, the simplicity of their manners should be such, as to prevent a multiplicity of affairs, and perplexity in discussing them: And thirdly, there should subsist a great degree of equality between the rank and fortunes of individuals; without which there cannot exist long any equality between them in point of right and authority. Lastly, there should be little or no luxury; for luxury must either be the effect of wealth, or it must make it necessary: it corrupts at once both rich and poor; the one by means of the possession of wealth, and the other by means of the want of it. Luxury makes a sacrifice of patriotism to indolence and vanity; it robs a state of its citizens, by subjecting them to each other, and by subjecting all to the influence of public prejudice.

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It is for this reason that a certain celebrated author hath laid down virtue as the first principle of a republican government: for all these circumstances cannot concur without the existence of public virtue. For want, however, of making proper distinctions, this great genius hath been led into frequent mistakes, as well as want of precision; not having observed, that, the sovereign authority being every where the same, the same principle must take place in every well constituted state; though, it is true, in a greater or less degree, according to the form of government.

To this it may be added, that no government is so subject to civil wars and intestine commotions as that of the democratical or popular form; because no other tends so strongly and so constantly to alter, nor requires so much vigilance and fortitude to preserve it from alteration. It is, indeed, in such a constitution particularly that the citizen should always be armed with force and constancy, and should repeat every day, in the sincerity of his heart, the saying of the virtuous Palatine *, *Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietum servitium*.

Did there exist a nation of gods, their government would doubtless be democratical; it is too perfect a form, however, for mankind.

CHAP. V. *Of an aristocracy.*

IN this form of government exist two moral persons, very palpably distinct, viz. the administration and the sovereign; which of course possess

† The Palatine of Posnania, father of the King of Poland, Duke of Lorrain.

possess two general wills, the one regarding the citizens universally, the other only the members of the administration. Thus, although the government may regulate the interior police of the state as it pleases, it cannot address the people but in the name of the sovereign, that is to say, the people themselves; which is a circumstance never to be omitted. The primitive societies of mankind were governed aristocratically. The heads of families deliberated among themselves concerning public affairs; the young people readily submitting to the authority of experience. Hence the names of *Priests*, the *Fathers*, the *Senate*, &c. The savages of North America are governed in the same manner to this day, and are extremely well governed.

But, in proportion as the inequality arising from social institutions prevailed over natural inequality, riches and power were preferred to age*, and the aristocracy became elective. At length power, transmitted with property from father to son, making whole families patrician, rendered the government hereditary, and boys of twenty became senators.

Aristocracy therefore is of three kinds; natural, elective, and hereditary. The first is applicable only to the most simple state of society, while the last is the worst of all kinds of government. The second is the best; and is what is most properly denominated an aristocracy.

Beside the advantage of the above-mentioned distinction, this form hath also that of the choice of its members. In a popular government, all the

* It is evident that the term *Optimates*, among the ancients, did not mean the best, but most powerful.

the citizens are born magistrates : but in this the number of the latter are very limited, and they become such only by election * ; a method by which their probity, their talents, their experience, and all those other reasons for preference in the public esteem, are an additional security that the people shall be wisely governed.

Again, their public assemblies are attended with more decorum ; affairs of state are more regularly discussed, and business executed with greater order and expedition ; while the credit of the state is better supported, in the eyes of foreigners, by a select number of venerable senators, than by a promiscuous or contemptible mob.

In a word, that order would be undoubtedly the best and most natural, according to which the wise and experienced few direct the multitude, were it certain that the few would in their government consult the interest of the majority governed, and not their own. It is absurd to multiply the springs of action to no purpose, or to employ twenty thousand men in doing that which an hundred properly selected would effect much better.

With regard to the particular circumstances requisite to this form of government ; the state should not be so small, nor the manners of the people so simple or so virtuous, as that the execution of the laws should coincide with the public will, as in a well-founded democracy. On the

* It is of great importance to regulate by law the method of choosing magistrates ; for, in leaving this to the prince, it is impossible to avoid falling into an hereditary aristocracy, as happened to the republics of Venice and Berne. Hence the first has been long since dissolved, but the second hath been supported by the great prudence of the senate. This is an exception, however, as dangerous as honourable.

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the other hand also, the state should not be so extensive that the governors, distributed up and down its provinces, might be able to render themselves, each in his separate department, independent of the sovereign.

But if an aristocracy requires fewer virtues than a popular government; there are yet some which are peculiar to it; such as moderation in the rich, and content in the poor: an exact equality of condition would in such a government be quite improper; nor was it observed even at Sparta.

If a certain degree, however, of inequality in the fortunes of the people be proper in such a government, the reason of it is, that in general the administration of public affairs ought to be put into the hands of those persons who can best devote their time to such service. Not, as Aristotle pretends, that the rich ought always to be preferred merely on account of their wealth. On the contrary, it is very necessary that an opposite choice should sometimes teach the people, that there exist other motives of preference much more important than riches.

CHAP. VI. *On monarchy.*

HITHERTO we have considered the prince as a moral and collective personage, formed by the force of the laws, and as the depository of the executive power of the state. At present, it is our business to consider this power as lodged in the hands of a physical personage or real man, possessed of the right of exerting it agreeable to the laws. Such a person is denominated a monarch or king.

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In other administrations it is common for a collective body to represent an individual being; whereas in this an individual is, on the contrary, the representative of a collective body; so that the moral unity which constitutes the prince, is at the same time a physical unity, in which all the faculties which the law combines in the former are combined naturally in the latter.

Thus the will of the people and that of the prince, together with the public force of the state, and the particular force of the government, all depend on the same principle of action: all the springs of the machine are in the same hand, are exerted to the same end; there are no opposite motions counteracting and destroying each other; nor is it possible to conceive any species of government in which the least effort is productive of so great a quantity of action. Archimedes, sitting at his ease on the shore, and moving about a large vessel on the ocean at pleasure, represents to my imagination an able monarch sitting in his cabinet, and governing his distant provinces, by keeping every thing in motion, while he himself seems immoveable. But, if no other kind of government hath so much activity, there is none in which the particular will of the individual is so predominant. Every thing, it is true, proceeds toward the same end; but this end is not that of public happiness; and hence the force of the administration operates incessantly to the prejudice of the state.

Kings would be absolute; and they are sometimes told, that their best way to become so, is to make themselves beloved by the people. This maxim is doubtless a very fine one, and even

in some respects true. But unhappily it is laughed at in courts. That power which arises from the love of the people is without doubt the greatest: but it is so precarious and conditional, that princes have never been satisfied with it. Even the best kings are desirous of having it in their power to do ill when they please, without losing their prerogatives. It is to no purpose that a declaiming politician tells them, that the strength of the people being theirs, it is their greatest interest to have the people flourishing, numerous, and respectable: they know that this is not true. Their personal and private interest is, in the first place, that the people should be so weak and miserable as to be incapable of making any resistance to government. I confess indeed, that, supposing the people to be held in perfect subjection, it would be to the interest of the prince that they should be rich and powerful, because their strength, being also his, serves to make him respectable to his neighbours; but as this interest is only secondary and subordinate, and that these suppositions are incompatible, it is natural for princes to give the preference always to that maxim which is the most immediately useful. This is what Samuel hath represented very forcibly to the Hebrews; and Machiavel hath made evident to a demonstration. In affecting to give instructions to kings, he hath given the most striking lessons to the people: His book entitled *The Prince*, is particularly adapted to the service of republics.

We have already shewn, from the general relations of things, that a monarchy is suitable only to great states; and we shall be more particularly convinced of it, on a further examination.

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The more numerous the members of the public administration, the more is the relation between the prince and the subjects diminished, and the nearer it approaches to nothing, or that point of equality which subsists in a democracy. This relation increases in proportion as the government is contracted; and arrives at its *maximum* when the administration is in the hands of a single person. In this case, then, there is too great a distance between the prince and people, and the state is void of connection. To supply its place, therefore, recourse is had to the intermediate ranks of people. Hence the several orders of nobility. But nothing of this kind is suitable to a small state, to which these different ranks are very destructive.

If the good government of a state be a matter of difficulty under any mode of administration, it is more particularly so in the hands of a single person; and every body knows the consequences when a king reigns by substitutes.

Again, there is one essential and unavoidable defect, which will ever render a monarchical government inferior to a republic; and this is, that in the latter, the public voice hardly ever raises unworthy persons to high posts in the administration; making choice only of men of knowledge and abilities, who discharge their respective functions with honour: whereas those who generally make their way to such posts under a monarchical government, are men of little minds and mean talents, who owe their preferment to the meretricious arts of flattery and intrigue. The public are less apt to be deceived in their choice than the prince; and a man of real merit is as rarely to be found in the mini-

stry of a king, as a blockhead at the head of a republic. Thus, when by any fortunate accident a genius born for government takes the lead in a monarchy brought to the verge of ruin by such petty rulers, the world is amazed at the resources he discovers, and his administration stands as a singular epoch in the history of his country.

To have a monarchical state well governed, it is requisite that its magnitude or extent should be proportioned to the abilities of the regent. It is more easy to conquer than to govern. By means of a lever sufficiently long, it were possible with a single finger to move the globe; but to support it, requires the shoulders of an Hercules. When a state may with any propriety be denominated great, the prince is almost always too little. And when, on the contrary, it happens, which however is very seldom, that the state is too little for its regent, it must be ever ill-governed; because the chief, actuated by the greatness of his own ideas, is apt to forget the interest of his people, and makes them no less unhappy from the abuse of his superfluous talents, than would another of a more limited capacity for want of those talents which should be necessary. It is thence requisite, that a kingdom should, if I may so say, contract and dilate itself, on every succession, according to the capacity of the reigning prince: whereas the abilities of a senate being more fixed, the state, under a republican government, may be confined or extended to any determinate limits, and the administration be equally good. The most palpable inconvenience in the government of a sole magistrate, is the default of that continued succession, which, in the two other kinds,
forms

forms an uninterrupted connection in the state. When one king dies, it is necessary to have another; but when kings are elective, such elections form very turbulent and dangerous intervals; and unless the citizens are possessed of a disinterestedness and integrity, incompatible with this mode of government, venality and corruption will necessarily have an influence over them. It is very rare that he, to whom the state is sold, does not sell it again in his turn, and make the weak repay him the money extorted from him by the strong. Every one becomes, sooner or later, venal and corrupt, under such an administration; while even the tranquillity, which is enjoyed under the kings, is worse than the disorder attending their *interregnum*.

To remedy these evils, crowns have been made hereditary, and an order of succession hath been established, which prevents any disputes on the death of kings: that is to say, by substituting the inconvenience of regencies to that of elections, an apparent tranquillity is preferred to a wise administration; and it is thought better to run the risk of having the throne supplied by children, monsters, and idiots, than to have any dispute about the choice of good kings. It is not considered, that, in exposing a state to the risk of such an alternative, almost every chance is against it.

Almost every thing conspires to deprive a youth, educated to the command over others, of the principles of reason and justice. Great pains, it is said, are taken to teach young princes the art of reigning; it does not appear, however, that they profit much by their education. It would be better to begin by teaching them

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subjection. The greatest monarchs that have been celebrated in history, are those who were not educated to govern. This is a science of which those know the least who have been taught the most, and is better acquired by studying obedience than command. *Nam utilissimus idem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe aut volueris.*

A consequence of this want of coherence, is the inconstancy of regal government, which is sometimes pursued on one plan, and sometimes on another, according to the character of the prince who governs, or of those who hold the reins of administration for him; so that its conduct is as inconsistent as the object of its pursuit is wavering. It is this inconstancy which keeps the state ever fluctuating from maxim to maxim, and from project to project; an uncertainty which does not take place in other kinds of government, where the prince is always the same. Thus we see, in general, that if there be more cunning in a court, there is more true wisdom in a senate; and that republics accomplish their ends, by means more constant and better pursued: while on the contrary, every revolution in the ministry of a court produces one in the state; it being the constant maxim with all ministers, and almost with all kings, to engage in measures directly opposite to those of their immediate predecessors. Again, it is from this very incoherence that we may deduce the solution of a sophism very common with regal politicians; and this is not only the practice of comparing the civil government of society to the domestic government of a family, and the prince

prince to the father of it, (an error already exposed,) but also that of liberally bestowing on the reigning magistrate all the virtues he stands in need of, and of supposing the prince always such as he ought to be. With the help of this supposition, indeed, the regal government is evidently preferable to all others, because it is incontestably the strongest; and nothing more is required to make it also the best, than that the will of the prince should be conformable to the general will of the people.

But if, according to Plato, the king by nature is so very rare a personage, how seldom may we suppose nature and fortune both concurred to crown him? If a regal education also necessarily corrupts those who receive it, what hopes can we have from a race of men thus educated? It is a wilful error, therefore, to confound a regal government in general with the government of a good king. But, to see what this species of government is in itself, it must be considered under the direction of weak and wicked princes; for such they generally are when they come to the throne, or such the throne will make them. These difficulties have not escaped the notice of some writers, but they do not seem to have been much embarrassed by them. The remedy, say they, is to obey without murmuring. God sends us bad things in his wrath, and we ought to bear with them as chastisements from on high. This way of talking is certainly very edifying; but I conceive it would come with greater propriety from the pulpit, than from the pen of a politician. What should we say of a physician who might promise miracles, and whose whole art should consist in
preach-

preaching up patience and resignation? It is obvious enough that we must bear with a bad government, when we live under it; the question is to find a good one.

CHAP. VII. *Of mixed governments.*

THERE is no such thing, properly speaking, as a simple government. Even a sole chief must have inferior magistrates, and a popular government a chief. Thus, in the distribution of the executive power, there is always a gradation from the greater number to the less; with this difference, that sometimes the greater number depends on the less, and at others the less on the greater.

Sometimes indeed the distribution is equal, either when the constituent parts depend mutually on each other, as in the English government; or when the authority of each part is independent, though imperfect, as in Poland. This last form is a bad one, because there is no union in such a government, and the several parts of the state want a due connection.

It is a question much agitated by politicians; Which is best, a simple or mixed government? The same answer, however, might be given to it, as I have before made to the like question concerning the forms of government in general.

A simple government is the best in itself, though for no other reason than that it is simple. But when the executive power is not sufficiently dependent on the legislative, that is to say, when there is a greater disproportion between the prince and the sovereign, than between the people and the prince, this defect must be

remedied by dividing the government ; in which case all its parts would have no less authority over the subject, and yet their division would render them collectively less powerful to oppose their sovereign.

The same inconvenience is prevented also by establishing a number of inferior magistrates, which tend to preserve a balance between the two powers, and to maintain their respective prerogatives. In this case, however, the government is not properly of a mixed kind ; it is only moderated.

The like means may also be employed to remedy an opposite inconvenience, as when a government is too feeble, by erecting of proper tribunals to concentrate its force. This method is practised in all democracies. In the first case, the administration is divided in order to weaken it, and in the second to enforce it : for a *maximum* both of strength and weakness is equally common to simple governments, while those of mixed forms always give a mean proportional to both.

CHAP. VIII. *That every form of government is not equally proper for every country.*

AS liberty is not the produce of all climates, so it is not alike attainable by all people. The more one reflects on this principle, established by Montesquieu, the more sensible we become of its truth. The more it is contested, the more we find it confirmed by new proofs.

Under every kind of government, the political personage, the Public, consumes much, but produces nothing. Whence then doth it derive

rive the substance consumed? Evidently from the labour of its members. It is from the superfluity of individuals that the necessities of the public are provided. Hence it follows, that a social state cannot subsist longer than the industry of its members continues to produce such superfluity.

The quantity of this superfluity, however, is not the same in all countries. It is in many very considerable, in some but moderate, in others null, and again in others negative. The proportion depends on the fertility of the climate, the species of labour required in the cultivation of the soil, the nature of its produce, the strength of its inhabitants, the consumption necessary to their subsistence, with many other similar circumstances.

On the other hand, all governments are not of the same nature; some devour much more than others; and their difference is founded on this principle, viz. that the farther public contributions are removed from their source, the more burdensome they grow. It is not by the quantity of the imposition that we are to estimate the burden of it, but by the time or space taken up in its returning back to the hands from which it is exacted. When this return is quick and easy, it matters little whether such imposition be small or great; the people are always rich, and the finances in good condition. On the contrary, however low a people be taxed, if the money never returns, they are sure by constantly paying to be soon exhausted; such a state can never be rich, and the individuals of it must be always beggars.

It follows hence, that the farther the people
are

are removed from the seat of government, the more burdensome are their taxes : thus in a democracy their weight is least felt ; in an aristocracy they fall more heavy ; and in a monarchical state they have the greatest weight of all. Monarchy, therefore, is proper only for opulent nations ; aristocracy for middling states ; and a democracy for those which are mean and poor.

In fact, the more we reflect on this circumstance, the more plainly we perceive the difference in this respect between a monarchical and a free state. In the latter, all its force is exerted for the public utility ; in the former, the public interest of the state and the private interest of the prince are reciprocally opposed, the one increasing by the decrease of the other. In a word, instead of governing subjects in such a manner as to make them happy, despotism makes them miserable, in order to be able to govern them at all.

Thus may we trace in every climate those natural causes, which point out that particular form of government which is best adapted to it, as well as even the peculiar kind of people that should inhabit it. Barren and ungrateful soils, whose produce will not pay for the labour of cultivation, would remain uncultivated and uninhabited ; or, at best, would be peopled only with savages. Those countries from which the inhabitants might draw the necessaries of life, and no more, would be peopled by barbarians, among whom the establishment of civil polity would be impossible. Such places as might yield to their inhabitants a moderate superfluity, would be best adapted to a free people : while the country where fertile plains and plenteous
vales

vales more bounteously reward the labours of the cultivator, would best suit with a monarchical form of government, in order that the luxury of the prince might consume the superfluity of the subjects; for it is much better that this superfluity should be expended by government than dissipated by individuals. I am not insensible that some exceptions might be made to what is here advanced; these very exceptions, however, serve to confirm the general rule, in that they are sooner or later constantly productive of revolutions, which reduce things to their natural order.

We should always make a distinction between general laws, and those particular causes which may diversify their effects. For, though the southern climates should be actually filled with republics, and the northern with despotic monarchies, it would be nevertheless true in theory, that, so far as climate is concerned, despotism agrees best with an hot, barbarism with a cold, and good polity with a temperate region. I am aware farther, that, even granting the principle, the application of it may be disputed. It may be said, that some cold countries are very fertile, while others more warm and southern are very barren. This objection, however, hath weight only with such as do not examine the matter in every point of view. It is requisite to take into consideration, as I before observed, the labour of the people, their strength, their consumption, with every other circumstance that affects the point in question.

Let us suppose two countries of equal extent, the proportion of whose product should be as five to ten. It is plain that, if the inhabitants of the first consume four, and of the latter nine,
the

the superfluity of the one would be $\frac{2}{3}$, and that of the other $\frac{1}{3}$. Their different superfluities being also in an inverse ratio to that of their produce, the territory whose produce should amount only to five, would have near double the superfluity of that which should amount to ten.

But the argument does not rest upon a double produce; nay, I doubt whether any person will place the actual fertility of cold countries in general, in a bare equality with that of warmer climates. We will suppose them, however, to be in this respect simply equal; setting England, for instance, on a balance with Sicily, and Poland with Egypt. Still farther to the South we have Africa and the Indies, and to the North hardly any thing. But to effect this equality in the produce, what a difference in the labour of cultivation! In Sicily they have nothing more to do than barely turn up the earth: in England agriculture is extremely toilsome and laborious. Now, where a greater number of hands is required to raise the same produce, the superfluity must necessarily be less.

Add to this, that the same number of people consume much less in a warm country than in a cold one. An hot climate requires men to be temperate, if they would preserve their health. Of this the Europeans are made sensible, by seeing those who do not alter their manner of living in hot countries, daily carried off by dysenteries and indigestion. Chardin represents us as beasts of prey, as mere wolves, in comparison of the Asiatics; and thinks those writers mistaken, who have attributed the temperance of the Persians to the uncultivated state of their country. His opinion is, that their country was so little cultivated,

vated, because the inhabitants required so little for their subsistence. If their frugality were merely the effect of the barrenness of their country, he observes, it would be only the poorer sort of them that should eat little; whereas their abstinence is general. Again, they would in such case be more or less abstemious in different provinces, as those provinces differed in degrees of sterility; whereas their sobriety is general, and prevails equally throughout the kingdom. He tells us, also, that the Persians boast much of their manner of living; pretending their complections only to be a sufficient indication of its being preferable to that of the Christians. At the same time he admits, that their complections are very fine and smooth; that their skin is of a soft texture, and polished appearance; while, on the other hand, the complection of the Armenians their subjects, who live after the European manner, is rough and pimply, and their bodies gross and unwieldy.

The nearer we approach to the line, it is certain, the more abstemious we find the people. They hardly ever eat meat; rice and maize are their ordinary food. There are millions of people in the Indies, whose subsistence does not amount to the value of a penny a day. We see even in Europe, a very sensible difference, in this respect, between the inhabitants of the North and South. A Spaniard will subsist a whole week on what a German would eat up at a single meal. In countries where the people are voracious, even luxury hath a tendency to consumption. Thus in England it displays itself in the number of dishes and quantity of solid meat on the table; while in Italy, a re-

past

past is furnished out with sweetmeats and flowers.

The luxury of dress presents us also with similar differences. In climates, where the change of the weather is sudden and violent, the people wear better and plainer clothes; while in those where the inhabitants dress only for ornament, brilliancy is more consulted than use. Even clothes themselves are an article of luxury. Thus at Naples, you will daily see gentlemen walking about in laced clothes, without stockings. It is the same with regard to buildings: magnificence only is consulted, where nothing is to be feared from the inclemencies of the weather. At Paris and London, people are desirous of warm and commodious apartments. At Madrid, they have superb saloons, but no fashies nor casements; and their beds lie open to the rats that harbour in the roof.

The aliment is also more substantial and nourishing in hot countries than in cold; this is a third difference that cannot fail to have an influence over the second. Wherefore is it that the Italians eat such a quantity of vegetables? Because they are good, and of an excellent flavour. In France, where they are themselves nourished chiefly by water, they are less nutritive, and are held of little consequence. They occupy nevertheless as much ground, and cost as much pains to cultivate them. It hath been experimentally proved, that the corn of Barbary, in other respects inferior to that of France, gives a greater quantity of meal, and that the French corn yields still more than that of the North. Hence it may be inferred, that a similar gradation is carried on in the same direction from the line to the pole. Now, is it not an evident disadvantage

tage to have, in an equal produce, a less quantity of aliment?

To all these different considerations I may add another, which arises from, and serves to confirm them: this is, that hot countries require fewer inhabitants than the cold, and yet afford subsistence for more; a circumstance that causes a two-fold superfluity, always to the advantage of despotism. The more the same number of people are distributed over the face of a large territory, the more difficult becomes a revolt; as they cannot meet together so readily or secretly, and it is always easy for the government to cut off their associations, and ruin their projects. On the other hand, the more a numerous people are collected together, the less can the government assume over the sovereign; the chiefs of a faction may deliberate as securely at their meetings, as the prince in his council; and the mob are as readily assembled in the public squares, as the troops in their quarters. It is the advantage of a tyrannical government, therefore, to act at great distances; its force increasing with the distance, like that of a lever*, by the assistance of a proper center. That of the people, on the contrary, acts only by being concentrated; it evaporates and loses itself when dilated, even as gunpowder scattered on the ground,

* This doth not contradict what is advanced in Chap. ix. Book II. concerning the inconvenience of great states; the matter in question there being the authority of the government over its members, and here of its influence over the subjects. Its members, scattered about in different places, serve as points of support to enable it to act at a distance on the people; but it hath no such props to assist its action on its members themselves. Thus in one case the length of the lever is the cause of its strength, and in the other of its weakness.

ground, takes fire, particle by particle, and is productive of no effect. Countries thinly inhabited are the most proper places for tyrants; wild beasts reign only in deserts.

CHAP. IX. *Of the marks of a good government.*

WHEN it is asked, therefore, in general terms, What is the best form of government? the question is as indeterminate as unanswerable; or rather it may be reasonably answered as many different ways as there are possible combinations of the absolute and relative circumstances of a people.

But if it be asked, By what signs may it be known whether any given people are well or ill governed? this is quite another thing; and the question, as to the fact, is to be resolved.

This question, however, is never actually resolved, because every one is for doing it after his own manner. The subject cries up the public tranquillity, the citizen the liberty of individuals; the one prefers the security of property, the other that of his person; the one maintains the best government to be the most severe, the other affirms that to be best which is most agreeable; the latter is for punishing crimes, the former for preventing them; the one thinks it a fine thing to be dreaded by his neighbours, the other thinks it better to be unknown to them; the one is satisfied if money does but circulate, the other requires the people should have bread. Were they even agreed also on these and other similar points, they would not be much nearer the end of the dispute. Moral quantities are deficient in point of precision; so

that, were men agreed on the sign, they would still differ about its estimation.

For my part, I am astonished that a sign so very simple should be mistaken, or that any should be so disingenuous as not to acknowledge it. What is the end of political society? doubtless the preservation and prosperity of its members. And what is the most certain sign or proof of these? certainly it is their number and population. Let us not look elsewhere, then, for this disputed proof; since it is plain, that government must be the best, under which the citizens increase and multiply most, supposing all other circumstances equal, and no foreigners naturalized or colonies introduced to cause such increase; and that, on the contrary, that government must be the worst, under which, *ceteris paribus*, the number of people should diminish. This being admitted, the decision of the question becomes an affair of calculation*, and as such I give it up to the arithmeticians.

CHAP.

* It is on the same principle that we ought to judge of the several periods of time that deserve the preference, in being distinguished for the prosperity of mankind. We have in general too much admired those in which literature and the fine arts have flourished, without penetrating into the secret cause of their cultivation, or duly considering their fatal effects; *idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset*. Shall we never be able to see, through the maxims laid down in books, the interested motives of their authors?—No; let writers say what they will, whenever the inhabitants of a country decrease, it is not true that all things go well, whatever be its external prosperity and splendour: A poet possessed of an hundred thousand livres a-year, does not necessarily make the age he lives in the best of all others. We should not too much regard the apparent repose of the world, and the tranquillity of its chiefs, as the well-being of whole nations, and particularly of the most populous states. A storm of hail may lay waste some few provinces, but it seldom causes a famine.

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CHAP. X. *Of the abuse of government, and its tendency to degenerate.*

AS the particular will of the prince acts constantly against the general will of the people, the government necessarily makes a continual effort against the sovereignty. The greater this effort is, the more is the constitution altered; and as in this case there is no other distinct will to keep that of the prince in equilibrio, it must sooner or later infallibly happen, that the prince will oppress the sovereign, and break the social compact. This is an inherent and unavoidable defect, which, from the very birth of the political body, incessantly tends to its dissolution, even as old age and death tend to the dissolution of the natural body.

There are two general methods according to which

Temporary tumults and civil wars may give much disturbance to rulers; but they do not constitute the real misfortunes of a people, who may even enjoy some respite, while they are disputing who shall play the tyrant over them. It is from their permanent situation that their real prosperity or calamity must arise: when all submit tamely to the yoke, then it is that all are perishing; then it is that their chiefs, destroying them at their ease, *ut solitudo faciat pacem appellant*. When the intrigues of the nobility agitated the kingdom of France, and the coadjutor of Paris carried a poignard in his pocket to parliament, all this did not hinder the bulk of the French nation from growing numerous and enjoying themselves in happiness and ease. Ancient Greece flourished in the midst of the most cruel wars; human blood was spilt in torrents, and yet the country swarmed with inhabitants. It appears, says Machiavel, that, in the midst of murders, proscriptions, and civil wars, our republic became only the more powerful; the virtue of the citizens, their manners, their independence, had a greater effect to strengthen it, than all its dissensions had to weaken it. A little agitation gives vigour to the mind; and liberty, not peace, is the real source of the prosperity of our species.

which a government degenerates; viz. when it contracts itself, or when the state is dissolved. The government contracts itself, when its members are reduced from a great number to a few; that is to say, from a democracy to an aristocracy, and from an aristocracy to a royalty. This is its natural tendency*. Should it make a retro-

* The slow formation and progress of the republic of Venice, present a notable example of this succession; and it is very surprising, that in the space of 1200 years the Venetians should be got no farther than to the second term, which began in the year 1298. With regard to the ancient dukes, with which their constitution is reproached, it is certain, whatever some writers may say, that they were not sovereigns.

The Roman republic will, doubtless, be made an objection, as having taken a contrary route, in its progress from monarchy to aristocracy, and from aristocracy to democracy. I am, however, far from thinking this was the real case.

The first establishment of Romulus was a mixed government, which degenerated presently into despotism. From very particular causes the state perished before its time, as a new-born infant before it attained the age of manhood. The expulsion of the Tarquins, was the true era of the rise of that republic; although it did not assume at first a determinate form, because the work was but half done in not having abolished the order of patricians. For hence, an hereditary aristocracy, the worst of all administrations, acting in opposition to the democracy, the form of government remained indeterminate; not being fixed, as Machiavel observes, till the establishment of tribunes; when, and not before, it was a real government under the form of a true democracy. In fact, the people were then not only sovereign, but also magistrate and judge; the senate being a tribunal of an inferior order, formed to temper and correct the government; while even the consuls themselves, although patricians, first magistrates, and, as generals, absolute in the field, yet at Rome they were only presidents of the assemblies of the people.

From this time it is evident the government followed its natural bias, and tended strongly toward aristocracy. The patrician order dying away of itself, the aristocracy subsisted no longer in the members of that body, as at Venice and Genoa, but in the body of the senate composed of Patricians and Plebeians, and even in the body of tribunes when they began to

progressive change, by having the number of its members increased, it might be said to relax or dilate itself; but this inverse progress is impossible.

In fact, a government never changes its form, except its spring of action be too much worn to support its own. Now, if it relaxes still more by being extended, its force becomes absolutely nothing, and is still less capable of supporting itself. It is necessary therefore to wind up and renew such spring in proportion as it gives way; otherwise the state it is intended to support, must necessarily fall.

The dissolution of the state indeed may happen two ways. First, when the prince does not govern according to law, but arrogates the sovereign power to himself: in which case he effects a remarkable change, whereby not the government, but the state itself is contracted. What I mean to say is, that the great state is thence dissolved, and that he forms another within it, composed only of the members of the government, who are only the masters and tyrants over the rest of the people. So that when the government usurps the sovereignty, at that instant the Social Compact is broken, and the individuals, who were citizens before, are restored to the rights of natural liberty, and are compelled, not legally obliged, to obedience.

It

to usurp an active power. For words make no alteration in things. When the people have chiefs who govern in their stead, whatever denomination be given to those chiefs, the government is always an aristocracy. From the abuse of the aristocratical form, arose the civil wars and the triumvirate. Sylla, Julius Cæsar, and Augustus, indeed became real monarchs, and at length under the despotism of Tiberius the state was finally dissolved. The Roman history, therefore, doth not tend to disprove my principle, but to confirm it.

It is the same thing when the members of government assume separately the power they are entitled to exercise only collectively; which is no less an infringement of the laws, and is productive of still worse consequences. For, in this case, there may be said to be as many princes as magistrates; while the state, no less divided than the government, is totally dissolved, or changes its form.

When the state is dissolved, the abuse of government, of whatever nature it be, takes the common name of anarchy. To distinguish more nicely, *democracy* is said to degenerate into *ochlocracy*; *aristocracy* into *oligarchy*; and I may add, *monarchy* into *tyranny*: but this last term is equivocal, and requires some explanation. In the vulgar sense of the word, a tyrant is a king who governs by force and without regard to justice or the laws. In the more precise and determinate sense, it means any individual who assumes the royal authority, without having a right to it. In this latter sense the Greeks understood the word tyrant; and give it indiscriminately both to good and bad princes whose authority was not legal *. Thus, *tyrant* and *usurper* are two words perfectly synonymous.

To give different names, however, to different things, I call the usurpation of regal authority

* *Omnes enim et habentur et dicuntur tyranni, quæ potestate utuntur perpetua, in ea civitate qua libertate usæ est.* CORN. NEPOS. IN MILTIADA. It is true that Aristotle makes a distinction between the tyrant and king, in that the one governs for his own good, and the other for the good of his subjects: but besides that all the Greek writers use the word tyrant in a different sense, as appears particularly by the Hieron of Xenophon, it would follow from Aristotle's distinction that no king ever existed on the face of the earth.

rity tyranny, and that of sovereign power *despotism*. The tyrant is he who takes upon himself, contrary to law, to govern according to law; and the despotic chief, one who places himself above the laws themselves. Thus a tyrant cannot be despotic, though a despotic prince must always be a tyrant.

CHAP. IX. *Of the dissolution of the body-politic.*

SUCH is the natural and unavoidable tendency of even the best constituted governments. If Rome and Sparta perished, what state can hope to last for ever? In our endeavours to form a durable establishment, we must not think therefore to make it eternal. If we would hope to succeed, we must not attempt impossibilities, nor flatter ourselves to give that permanency to human institutions, which is incompatible with their nature.

The politic body, as well as the physical, begins to die at its birth, and bears in itself the causes of its destruction. Both, however, may possess a constitution more or less robust, and adapted to different periods of duration. The constitution of man is the work of nature; that of the state, is the work of art. It doth not depend on men to prolong their lives; but it depends on them to prolong that of the state as much as possible, by giving it a constitution the best adapted to longevity. The most perfect constitution, it is true, will have an end; but still so much later than others, if no unforeseen accident bring it to an untimely dissolution.

The principle of political life lies in the sovereign authority. The legislative power is the heart

heart of the state; the executive is the brain, which puts every part in motion. The brain may be rendered useless by the palsy, and yet the individual survive. A man may become an insensible driveller, and yet live: but as soon as the heart ceases to beat, the animal is dead.

The state doth not subsist by virtue of the laws, but by the gislative power. The statutes of yesterday are not in themselves necessarily binding to-day, but the tacit confirmation of them is presumed from the silence of the legislature, the sovereign being supposed incessantly to confirm the laws not actually repealed. Whatever is once declared to be the will of the sovereign, continues always so, unless it be abrogated.

Wherefore, then, is there so much respect paid to ancient laws? Even for this reason. It is rational to suppose, that nothing but the excellence of the ancient laws could preserve them so long in being; for that, if the sovereign had not found them always salutary and useful, they would have been repealed.

Hence we see, that the laws, instead of losing their force, acquire additional authority by time in every well formed state; the prepossession of their antiquity renders them every day more venerable; whereas, in every country where the laws grow obsolete, and lose their force as they grow old, this alone is a proof that the legislative power itself is decayed, and the state extinct.

CHAP. XII. *By what means the sovereign authority is maintained.*

THE sovereign, having no other force than the legislative power, acts only by the laws; while

while the laws being only the authentic acts of the general will, the sovereign cannot act unless the people are assembled. The people assemble! you will say. What a chimera!—It is indeed chimerical at present; though it was not reckoned so two thousand years ago. Are mankind changed in their nature since that time?

The bounds of possibility in moral affairs are less confined than we are apt to imagine: It is our foibles, our vices, our prejudices, that contract them. Mean souls give no credit to the sentiments of heroic minds; while slaves affect to turn the notion of liberty into ridicule.

By what hath been done, however, we may judge of what may be done again. I shall not speak of the petty republics of ancient Greece; but the Roman republic was undoubtedly a great state, and the city of Rome a great city. By the last register of the citizens of Rome, their number amounted to four hundred thousand persons capable of bearing arms; and the last register of the empire amounted to more than four millions of citizens, without reckoning subjects, women, children, or slaves.

How very difficult, you will say, must it have been, to assemble frequently the people of that capital and its environs? And yet hardly a week passed in which the Roman people were not assembled, and on some occasions several times a week. This numerous body indeed not only exercised the functions of sovereignty, but also in some cases those of government. They sometimes deliberated on state-affairs, and at others decided in judicial causes; the whole people being publicly assembled almost as frequently in the capacity of magistrates as citizens.

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By recurring to the primitive state of nations, we shall find that most of the ancient governments, even the monarchical, as that of Macedon and others, had the like popular assemblies. Be this, however, as it may, the fact being once incontestibly proved, obviates all difficulties; for, to deduce the possibility of a thing from its having actually happened, will admit of no objection.

CHAP. XIII. *The subject continued.*

IT is not enough, however, that the people once assembled should fix the constitution of the state, by giving their sanction to a certain code or system of laws: it is not enough that they should establish a perpetual government, or provide once for all by the election of magistrates. Besides the extraordinary assemblies, which unforeseen accidents may require, it is necessary they should have certain fixed and periodical meetings, which nothing might abolish or prorogue: so that the people should on a certain day be legally summoned by law, without any express statute being required for their formal convocation.

But, excepting these regular assemblies, rendered legal by the date, all others, unless convoked by the proper magistrate previously appointed to that end, agreeable to prescribed forms, should be held illegal, and all their determinations declared null and void, because the very manner of the people's assembling should be determined by law.

As to the frequency of legal assemblies, it depends on so many different considerations, that
it

it is impossible to lay down any precise rules on this head. It can only be said in general, that the more powerful the government, the more often ought the sovereignty to display itself.

All this, it may be said, is very well for a single town or city; but what must be done in a state comprehending several cities? Must the sovereign authority be distributed, or ought it to centre in one to the total subjection of the rest?

I answer, Neither one nor the other. In the first place, the sovereign authority is simple and uniform, so that it cannot be divided without destroying it. In the next place, one city cannot be legally subject to another, any more than one nation to another; because the essence of the body-politic consists in the union of obedience and liberty, and in the terms *subject* and *sovereign* being those identical correlatives, the ideas of which are united in the single term *citizen*.

I answer farther, that it is fundamentally wrong, to unite several towns to form one city; and that such union being made, the natural inconveniences of it must ensue. The abuses peculiar to great states must not be made objections to the system of one, who maintains the exclusive propriety of little ones. But how, it will be said, can little states be made powerful enough to resist the great?—Even as the cities of ancient Greece were able to resist the arms of a powerful monarch; and as, in more modern times, Switzerland and Holland have resisted the power of the house of Austria.

In cases, also, where the state cannot be reduced within proper bounds, there remains one resource; and this is by not permitting the existence of a capital, but removing the seat of go-

vernment from one town to another, and assembling the states of the country in each alternately.

People a country equally in every part; diffuse the same privileges and advantages throughout; and the state will become at once the strongest and the best governed. Remember that the walls of cities are founded on the ruins of the villages, and that the splendid palaces in town are raised at the expence of miserable cottages in the country.

CHAP. XIV. *Subject continued.*

NO sooner are the people legally assembled, in a sovereign body, than the jurisdiction of government ceases, the executive power of the state is suspended, and the person of the meanest citizen becomes as sacred and inviolable as the greatest magistrate; because when the body represented appears, it is not requisite that the representatives of it should exist. Most of the tumults which happened in the *Comitia* at Rome, were owing to the general ignorance or neglect of this rule. On those occasions, the consuls were only presidents of the assembly of the people, the tribunes merely orators*, and the senate absolutely nothing.

These intervals of suspension, when the prince acknowledges, or at least ought to acknowledge, an actual superior, have been always formidable; and such assemblies which are the safeguards of the body-politic, and serve as so many checks to ad-

* Nearly in the sense given to those who speak on any question in the parliament of England. The resemblance of their employments set the consuls and tribunes together by the ears, even when their jurisdiction was suspended.

administration, have always been a terror to the rulers; so that they have spared no pains in raising objections and difficulties, nor scrupled making any fair promises to render the people averse to such meetings. When the latter, therefore, have been avaritious, mean, or cowardly, preferring their ease to liberty, they have not been able to withstand long the repeated efforts of government: and thus it is that, this encroaching power incessantly augmenting, the sovereignty becomes totally extinct, and thus most cities come to an untimely end.

Sometimes, however, there is introduced between sovereign authority and arbitrary government, a mean term of power, of which it is necessary to treat.

CHAP. XV. *Of deputies or representatives.*

WHEN the service of the public ceases to be the principal concern of the citizens, and they had rather discharge it by their purses than their persons, the state is already far advanced toward ruin. When they should march out to fight, they pay troops to fight for them, and stay at home. When they should go to council, they send deputies, and stay at home. Thus, in consequence of their indolence and wealth, they in the end employ soldiers to enslave their country, and representatives to betray it.

It is the bustle of commerce and the arts; it is the sordid love of gain, of luxury and ease, that thus convert personal into pecuniary services. Men readily give up one part of their profit, to increase the rest unmolested. But supply an administration with money, and they will

presently supply you with chains. The very term of *taxes* is slavish, and unknown in a free city. In a state truly free, the citizens discharge their duty to the public with their own hands, and not by money. So far from paying for being exempted from such duty, they would pay to be permitted to discharge it themselves. I am very far from adopting received opinions, and think the services exacted by force a less infringement of liberty than taxes.

The better the constitution of a state, the greater influence have public affairs over private, in the minds of the citizens: they will have, also, much fewer private affairs to concern them; because the sum total of their common happiness, furnishing a more considerable portion to each individual, there remains the less for each to seek from his own private concerns. In a city well governed, every one is ready to fly to its public assemblies; under a bad government, they are careless about going thither at all, because no one interests himself in what is doing there: it is known that the general will does not influence them, and hence at length domestic concerns engage all their attention. Good laws tend to the making better, while bad ones are introductory of worse. No sooner doth a citizen say, What are state-affairs to me? than the state may be given up for lost.

It is this want of public spirit, the influence of private interest, the extent of states, conquests and abuses in government, that have given rise to the method of assembling the people by deputies and representatives. The assembly of these representatives is called, in some countries, the third estate of the nation; so that the

particular interests of the two orders are placed in the first and second rank, and the public interest only in the third.

The sovereignty, however, cannot be represented, and that for the same reason that it cannot be alienated. It consists essentially of the the general will, and the will cannot be represented: it is either identically the same, or some other; there can be no mean term in the case. The deputies of the people, therefore, neither are nor can be their representatives; they are only mere commissioners, and can conclude on nothing. Every law that is not confirmed by the people in person is null and void; it is not in fact law. The English imagine they are a free people; they are however mistaken: they are such only during the election of members of parliament. When these are chosen, they become slaves again; and indeed they make so bad a use of the few transitory moments of liberty, that they richly deserve to lose it.

The notion of representatives is modern; descending to us from the feudal system, that most iniquitous and absurd form of government, by which human nature was so shamefully degraded. In the ancient republics, and even monarchies, the people had no representatives; they were strangers to the term. It is even very singular, that at Rome, where the Tribunes were so much revered, it was never imagined they could usurp the functions of the people; and as strange that they never once attempted it. One may judge, however, of the embarrassment sometimes caused by the multitude, by what happened in the time of the Gracchi, when
part

part of the citizens gave their votes from their house-tops.

Where men value their liberty and privileges above every thing, inconveniences and difficulties are nothing. Among this wise people things were held in a proper estimation? they permitted the Lictors to do what they would not suffer the Tribunes to attempt; they were not afraid the Lictors would ever think of representing them.

To explain, nevertheless, in what manner these Tribunes did sometimes represent them, it will be sufficient to conceive how government represents the sovereign. The law being only a declaration of the general will, it is clear that the people cannot be represented in the legislative power; but they may, and ought to be, in the executive, which is only the application of power to law. And this makes it evident, that, if we examine things to the bottom, we shall find very few nations that have any laws. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the Tribunes, having no part of the executive power, could not represent the Roman people by virtue of their office, but only in usurping those of the senate.

Among the Greeks, whatever the people had to do, they did it in person; they were perpetually assembled in public. They inhabited a mild climate, were free from avarice, their slaves managed their domestic business, and their great concern was liberty. As you do not possess the same advantages, how can you expect to preserve the same privileges? Your climate being more severe, creates more wants*; for six months

* To adopt in cold countries the luxury and effeminacy of the

months in the year your public squares are too wet or cold to be frequented; your hoarse voices cannot make themselves heard in the open air; you apply yourselves more to gain than to liberty, and are less afraid of slavery than poverty.

On this occasion, it will probably be asked me, if liberty cannot support itself without the assistance of slavery? Perhaps not. At least the two extremes approach very near. Whatever does not exist in nature, must have its inconveniences, and civil society still more than any thing else. There are some circumstances so critically unhappy, that men cannot preserve their own liberty but at the expence of the liberty of others; and in which a citizen cannot be free without aggravating the subjection of his slaves. Such was the situation of Sparta. As for you, ye moderns, you have no slaves; but are slaves yourselves, and purchase their liberty by your own. You may, if you please, boast of this preference; for my part, I find more meannets in it than humanity.

I do not intend, however, by this to inculcate that we should have slaves, or that it is equitable to reduce men to a state of slavery; having already proved the contrary. I am here only giving the reasons why certain modern nations who imagine themselves free, employ representatives, and why the ancients did not. But let this be as it will, I affirm, that when once a people make choice of representatives, they are no longer free.

Every thing duly considered, I do not see a
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the East, is to appear desirous of slavery, without having the same excuse for submitting to it.

possibility of the sovereign maintaining its rights, and the exercise of its prerogatives, for the future among us, unless the state be indeed very small. But if it be so very small, will it not be liable to lose its independency? No. I will make it hereafter appear in what manner the exterior power of a great people may be united with the policy and good order of a little one.

CHAP. XVI. *That the institution of government is not a compact.*

THE legislative power being once well established, we proceed to settle the executive power in the same manner: for the latter, which operates only by particular acts, being essentially different from the other, is naturally divided from it. If it were possible for the sovereign, considered as such, to possess the executive power, the matter of right and fact would be so confounded, that we should be no longer able to distinguish what is law and what is not; the body-politic also being thus unnaturally situated, would soon become a prey to that violence, which it was originally instituted to correct.

The citizens being, by virtue of the Social Compact, all equal, that which all may perform, all may prescribe, whereas none can have a right to require another to do what he does not himself. Now it is properly this right, indispensibly necessary to animate and put the body-politic in motion, with which the sovereign invests the prince in the institution of government.

It has been pretended by some, that the act forming this institution was a contract between the

the people and the chiefs of which they made choice ; a contract in which the two parties stipulated the conditions on which the one obliged themselves to command, and the other to obey. I am persuaded every one will agree with me, that this was a very strange mode of contract. But let us see whether this opinion is in itself well founded.

In the first place, the supreme authority can no more modify or alter its form, than it can alienate itself ; to limit or restrain, would be to destroy it. It is absurd and contradictory to say the sovereign made choice of a superior : to oblige itself to obey a master, is to dissolve its own constitution, and restore its members to their natural liberty.

Again, it is plain that such a supposed contract between the people in general and certain particular persons would be a particular act ; whence it follows, that it would not be a law nor an act of sovereignty, and of consequence would be illegal.

It is farther evident, that the contracting parties would remain, respecting each other, simply under the laws of nature, without any security for the performance of their reciprocal engagements, a circumstance totally repugnant to a state of civil society. The party only who might have the power, could enforce the execution of the terms ; so that we might as well give the name of a contract, to the act of a man who should say to another, " I give you my whole property, on condition that you will restore me just as much of it as you please."

There is but one compact in a state ; and that is the act of association, which alone is exclusive
of

of every other, as it is impossible to imagine any subsequent public contract which would not be a violation of the original.

CHAP. XVII. *Of the institution of government.*

WHAT notion, then, are we to form of the act by which government is instituted? In answer to this question, I shall first remark, that this act is complicated, or composed of two others, viz. the establishment of the law and execution of it.

By the first, the sovereign enacts that a government should be established in such or such a form; and it is clear, this being a general act, that it is a law.

By the second, the people name the chiefs who are to be charged with the administration of the government so established. Now this nomination, being a particular act, is not a second law, but only a consequence of the first, and in reality an act of government.

The difficulty lies in being able to comprehend how an act of government can take place before the government existed; and how the people, who must be always either sovereign or subjects, become prince or magistrate in certain circumstances.

We have here made a discovery of one of these astonishing properties of the body-politic, by which it reconciles operations apparently contradictory to each other; this act being effected by a sudden conversion of the sovereignty into a democracy: so that, without any sensible change, and only by means of a new relation of all to all, the citizens, becoming magistrates, pass
from

from general acts to particular ones, and from enacting laws to the execution of them.

This change of relation is not a matter of mere speculation, unexemplified in practice: it takes place very frequently in the parliament of England, where, among the commons, the whole house is formed, on certain occasions, into a committee, for the better inquiry into and discussion of the matter in hand; the members become mere commissioners of the sovereign court they constituted but a moment before. Agreeable to which, the inquiry being ended, they make a report to themselves, as the House of Commons, of their proceedings as a grand committee, and deliberate anew under the former title on what they had already determined under the latter.

Such, indeed, is the peculiar advantage of a democratical government, that it is established in fact by the simple act of the general will. After which, this provisional government continues, if such be the intended form; or establishes, in the name of the sovereign, the form of government adopted by law; and thus every thing proceeds according to order. It is impossible to institute a government in any other legal manner, without renouncing the principles before established.

CHAP. XVIII. *Of the means of preventing the usurpations of government.*

FROM the foregoing illustrations results the confirmation of what is asserted in the XVIth chapter, viz. that the act which institutes government is not a contract, but a law; that the

depositories of the executive power are not the masters, but the servants of the people; that the people may appoint or remove them at pleasure; that they have no pretence to a contract with the people, but are bound to obey them; and that in accepting the offices the state imposes upon them, they only discharge their duty as citizens, without having any sort of right to dispute the conditions.

When it so happens, therefore, that the people establish an hereditary government, whether monarchical, and confined to one particular family, or aristocratical, and divided among a certain order of citizens, they do not enter thereby into any formal engagement; they only give the administration a provisional form, which remains legal till they think proper to change it.

It is certain that such changes are always dangerous; and that a government once established should not be meddled with, unless it be found incompatible with the public good; but this circumspection is a maxim of policy, and not a matter of right. The state, however, is no more bound to resign the civil authority into the hands of its magistrates or chiefs, than the military authority into those of its generals.

It is certain, also, that great care should be taken to observe all those formalities, which, in such a case, are requisite to distinguish a regular and legal act from a seditious commotion; to distinguish between the general will of a whole people, and the clamours of a faction. In which latter case, a people are particularly obliged to give the best founded remonstrances no farther countenance, than in the utmost strictness of justice they may deserve. Of this obligation,
how.

however, the prince may take great advantages, in order to preserve his power in spite of the people, without running the risk of being charged with usurping it. For in appearing only to make use of his prerogatives, he may extend them, and, under the pretence of maintaining the public peace, may prevent those assemblies which might otherwise be calculated to re-establish the good order of government: so that he might profit by that silence which he keeps from being broken, and by those irregularities which he himself might cause to be committed; pleading in his favour the tacit approbation of those whose fears keep them silent, and punishing those who are bold enough to speak. It was thus the *Decemviri*, at first elected for one year only, and afterwards continued for another, attempted to perpetuate the duration of their power, by preventing the *Comitia* from assembling as usual; and it is by such easy means that all the governments in the world, when once invested with power, usurp sooner or later the sovereign authority.

These periodical assemblies, of which I have spoken above, are very proper to prevent or protract this misfortune, particularly when they require no formal convocation; for then the prince cannot prevent them without declaring himself openly a violator of the laws and an enemy to the state.

The opening of these assemblies, which have no other object than the preservation of the social contract, ought always to be made by two propositions, which can never be suppressed, and should pass separately by vote.

First, Whether it be the determination of the

sovereign to preserve the present form of government.

Second, Whether it be the determination of the people to continue the administration in the hands of those who are at present charged with it.

It is to be observed, that I here take for granted, what I conceive has already been demonstrated, viz. that there is no fundamental law in any state, which such state cannot repeal, not excepting even the social compact: for, should all the citizens assemble with one accord to break this compact, it would undoubtedly be very legally dissolved. Grotius even thinks that an individual may renounce the state of which he is a member, and resume his natural independence and property by leaving the country *. Now it would be very absurd to suppose that the whole body of citizens united, could not do that in concert, which any one of them might do separately.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I. *That the general will cannot be annihilated.*

SO long as a number of individuals remain perfectly united and consider themselves as one body, they can have but one will; which re-

* With this exception, however, that he does not fly, to elude his duty, and avoid serving his country on any emergency, when his service is required. In this case, his flight would be criminal, and highly deserving of punishment. It would not be a retreat, but desertion.

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relates to their common preservation and welfare. All the resources of the state are then simple and vigorous, its political maxims clear and obvious; it comprehends no intricate and opposite interests; but that of the public is demonstrably evident to all, and requires only the gift of common-sense to understand it. Peace, concord, and equality, are enemies to political refinements. When men are honest and simple, their very simplicity prevents their deception; they are not to be imposed on by sophistry, but are too artless even to be duped. When it is known, that, among the happiest people in the world, a number of peasants meet together under the shade of an oak, and regulate the affairs of state with the most prudential oeconomy, is it possible to forbear despising the refinements of other nations, who employ so much artifice and mystery to render themselves splendidly miserable?

A state thus simply governed hath need of but few laws; while in proportion as it becomes necessary to promulgate new ones, that necessity is universally apparent. The first person who proposes them, takes on himself to speak only what every one hath already thought; and neither eloquence nor intrigue is requisite to make that pass into a law, which every one had already resolved to do as soon as he should be assured others would do the same.

That which deceives our reasoners on this subject, is, that, seeing none but such states as were badly constituted at their beginning, they are struck with the impossibility of maintaining such a police in them. They smile to think of the absurdities into which a designing knave or

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insinuating orator might lead the people of Paris and London. They are not apprised that a Cromwell and a Beaufort would have been treated as incendiaries at Berne and Geneva, and have underwent the discipline due to their demerit.

But when the bonds of society begin to relax, and the state to grow weak; when the private interests of individuals begin to appear, and that of parties to influence the state; the objects of public good meet with opposition: unanimity no longer presides in the assemblies of the people; the general will is no longer the will of all; contradictions and debates arise, and the most salutary counsel is not adopted without dispute.

Again, when the state is bordering on ruin, and exists only in empty form; when the social tie no longer connects the hearts of the people; when the basest motives of interest impudently assume the sacred name of the public good; then is the general will altogether silent: individuals, actuated by private motives, cherish no more the sentiments of citizens, than if the state had never existed; while the mock legislature pass, under the name of laws, those iniquitous decrees which have no other end than private interest.

Doth it follow from hence, however, that the general will is annihilated or corrupted? No. This remains ever constant, invariable, and pure; though it is subjected to that of party. There is not an individual who doth not see, while he detaches his own interest from that of the public, that he cannot separate himself from it entirely: but his share in the common evil seems nothing in comparison to the good which he proposes to secure exclusively to himself.

self. Setting this motive aside, he is as ready to concur in measures for the good of the public, and that even for his own sake, as any one. Nay, even in selling his vote, he doth not lose all sense of the general will; he only eludes it. The fault he is guilty of, lies in changing the state of the question, and making an answer to what is not asked him; so that, instead of admitting by his vote, *that it is to the interest of the state*, he says, *it is to the interest of such an individual or such a party, that this or that law should pass*. Thus the order which should prevail in the public assemblies of the state, should not be calculated so much to preserve the general will inviolate, as to cause it to be always interrogated, and to make it answer.

I might here make a variety of reflections on the simple right of voting in every act of the sovereignty; a right which the citizens cannot be deprived of: as also on the rights of thinking, proposing, and debating, on public matters; privileges which government is ever solicitous enough to confine to its own members. This subject, however, is of importance enough to deserve a whole treatise of itself; and it is impossible for me to say every thing in the present.

CHAP. II. *On votes.*

IT is evident, from what has been said in the preceding chapter, that the manner in which public affairs are carried on, may afford a sure indication of the actual state of manners, and the health of the body-politic. The more concord there is in public assemblies, that is to say, the nearer the members approach to unanimity
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in giving their votes, the more prevalent is the general will among them : but long debates, dissensions, and commotions, evince the ascendancy of particular interests and the decline of the state.

This appears less evident, indeed, when two or more orders of men enter into the constitution ; as at Rome, where the quarrels of the Patricians and Plebeians occasioned frequent disturbances in the *Comitia*, even in the most flourishing times of the republic. This exception, however, is more apparent than real : as in that case there exists, by a defect inherent in the body-politic, two states in one ; and that which is not true of both together, may nevertheless be true of each apart. It is also true in fact, that, even during the most turbulent times of the republic, the decrees of the Plebeians, when the Senate did not intermeddle, were passed with great tranquillity agreeable to the plurality of voices. The citizens having but one common interest, the people could have but one will.

Unanimity returns again at the opposite extremity of the circle ; and this is where the citizens, reduced to slavery, have neither liberty nor will. In such a situation, fear and flattery pervert their votes into acclamations ; they no longer deliberate among themselves, but either adore or curse their tyrants. Such were the debased principles of the Senate under the Roman emperors. Under these circumstances also the sentiments of the public were frequently expressed with the most ridiculous precaution ; Tacitus observing, that, under Otho, the Senators, while they loaded Vitellius with execrations, affected at the same time to make a confused
and

and clamorous noise, in order to prevent his knowing, should he become their master, what any individual had said.

From these considerations may be deduced the maxims on which the manner of counting votes and comparing different suffrages should be regulated, according as the general will is more or less easy to be discovered, and the state more or less advanced towards its decline. There is but one law, which in its own nature requires unanimous consent: and this is the Social Compact. For civil association is the most voluntary act in the world: every man being born free, and master of himself, no one can lay him under restraint, on any pretence whatever, without his own consent. To affirm that the son of a slave is born a slave, is to affirm he is not born a man.

If there be any persons, however, who oppose this contract itself, their opposition does not invalidate that contract; it only hinders their being comprehended therein; and they remain aliens in the midst of citizens. When a state is formed, a consent to its institution is inferred by the residence of the party: to submit to residence in any country, is to submit to its sovereignty*.

If we except this primitive contract, the determination of the majority is always obligatory on the rest: this is a necessary consequence of the contract itself. But it may be asked, How can

* This must always be understood, however, of a free state, from which people have the liberty to depart with their effects at pleasure. For in others, the consideration of their family, their property, the want of an asylum, necessity or violence, may detain an inhabitant in a country contrary to his will; in which case, his simple residence neither implies his consent to the contract, nor his violation of it.

can a man be free, and yet be obliged to conform to the will of others? How can the members of an opposition be called free-men, who are compelled to submit to laws which they have not consented to? I answer, that this question is not properly stated. The citizen consents to all laws passed by a majority, though some of them in particular may have passed contrary to his inclination; nay, he consents to those by which he is punishable for the breach of any one. The constant will of all the members of a state, is the the general will; and it is this alone that makes them either citizens or freemen*. When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, they are not precisely demanded, Whether they severally approve or reject the proposition; but, Whether it be conformable or not to the general will, which is theirs as a collective body. Each person, therefore, in giving his vote declares his opinion on this head; and on counting the votes, the declaration of the general will is inferred from the majority. When a law thus passes contrary to my opinion, it proves nothing more than that I was mistaken, and that I concluded the general will to be what it really was not. So that, if my particular advice had been followed, it would have been contrary to my will, which as a citizen is the same as the general, and in that case I should not have been free.

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* At Genoa we see the word *Libertas* inscribed on the chain of the galley-slaves, and on the doors of the prisoners: the application of which device is beautiful and just; as it is in fact only the criminals of all states that infringe the liberty of the citizen. A country, whose malefactors should be all actually chained to the oar, would be a country of the most perfect liberty.

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This argument supposes, indeed, that all the characteristics of the general will are contained in the plurality of votes: and when this ceases to be the case, take what course you will, there is an end of liberty.

In having shewn how the will of particulars and parties is substituted for the general in public deliberations, I have already sufficiently pointed out the practicable means of preventing such abuses; of this, however, I shall speak further hereafter. With regard to the proportional number of votes that indicate this general will, I have also laid down the principles on which it may be determined. The difference of a single voice is enough to break the unanimity; but between unanimity and an equality there is a variety of proportions; to each of which the number in question may be applied, according to the circumstances of the body-politic.

There are two general maxims, which may serve to regulate these proportions: the one is, that the more grave and important the deliberations, the nearer ought the determination to approach to unanimity: the other is, that the more expedition the affair requires, the less should unanimity be insisted on. In deliberations where the matter should be immediately determined, the majority of a single vote should be sufficient. The first of these maxims seems most applicable to permanent laws, and the second to matters of business. But be this as it may, it is from their judicious combination that the best proportions must be deduced concerning that plurality in whose votes should be supposed to consist the general will.

CHAP. III. *Of election.*

WITH regard to the election of a prince or of magistrates, which, as I before observed, is a complicated act, there are two methods of proceeding; viz. by choice, and by lot. They have each been made use of in different republics; and we see in our own times, a very intricate mixture of both in the election of the doge of Venice.

The preference by lot, says Montesquieu, is of the nature of a democracy. This I admit, but not for the reasons given. The choice by lot, says he, is a method which offends nobody, by permitting each citizen to entertain the reasonable hope of being preferred to the service of his country.

This, however, is not the true reason. If we reflect that the election of chiefs is a function of government and not of the sovereignty, we shall see the reason why this method is of the nature of a democracy, in which the administration is so much the better as its acts are fewer.

In every real democracy, the office of magistrate is not advantageous, but expensive and burdensome, so that it were unjust to impose it on one person rather than another. The law, therefore, imposes that charge on him to whose lot it falls: for in this case, all standing an equal chance, the choice doth not depend on human will, nor can any particular application change the universality of the law.

In an aristocracy, the prince makes choice of the prince; and, the government providing for itself, here it is that votes are properly applicable. The apparent exception, in the election of

of the doge of Venice, confirms this distinction, instead of destroying it. Such a mixed form as is used by the Venetians is adapted to a mixed government: for it is a mistake to suppose the government of Venice a true aristocracy. If the lower order of people, indeed, have no share in the government, the nobility stand in their place, and become the people in respect to the administration. What a number is there of the inferior order of nobles, who stand no chance of ever getting into the magistracy, and reap no other advantage from their rank than the empty title of Excellency, and the privilege of sitting in the great Council! This great Council being as numerous as our general Council at Geneva, its illustrious members have no greater privileges therefore than our ordinary citizens. It is certain, that, setting aside the extreme disparity of the two republics, the burghers of Geneva represent exactly the Patricians of Venice, our natives and sojourners represent the citizens and people, and our peasants the inhabitants of the *terra firma* belonging to that state. In a word, consider their Venetian republic in what light you will, abstracted from its grandeur, its government is no more aristocratical than that of Geneva. All the difference is, that we have no occasion for this kind of election.

The choice by lot is attended with very little inconvenience in a real democracy, when all men being nearly on an equality, as well with regard to manners and abilities as to sentiments and fortune, the matter of choice is indifferent. But I have already observed, a true democracy is only imaginary.

When the election is of a mixed form, viz.

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by vote and by lot, the first ought to provide for those officers which require proper talents, as in military affairs; the other being best adapted to those which require only common sense, honesty, and integrity; such as the offices of judicature; because, in a well-formed state, those qualities are possessed by all the citizens in common.

No election, either by vote or lot, hath place under a monarchical government; the monarch himself being the only rightful prince and legal magistrate, the choice of his substitutes is vested in him alone. When the Abbe de St Pierre, therefore, proposed to increase the number of the king's councils in France, and to elect their members by ballot, he was not aware that he proposed to change the form of the French government.

It remains to speak of the manner of giving and collecting votes in popular assemblies; but perhaps an historical sketch of the Roman police relating to this point, will explain it better than all the maxims I should endeavour to establish. It is worth the pains of a judicious reader to attend a little particularly to the manner in which they treated affairs, both general and particular, in a council of two hundred thousand persons.

CHAP. IV. *Of the Roman Comitia.*

WE have no authentic monuments of the earliest ages of Rome; there is even great reason to believe that most of the stories told us of them are fabulous †; and indeed, the most in-

† The name of *Rome*, which it is pretended was taken from *Romulus*, is Greek, and signifies *force*; the name of *Numa* is Greek,

interesting and instructive part of the annals of nations in general, which is that of their establishment, is the most imperfect. Experience daily teaches us to what causes are owing the revolutions of kingdoms and empires; but as we see no instances of the original formation of states, we can only proceed on conjectures in treating this subject.

The customs we find actually established, however, sufficiently attest, there must have been an origin of those customs. Those traditions, also, relating to such origin, which appear the most rational, and of the best authority, ought to pass for the most certain. These are the maxims I have adopted in tracing the manner in which the most powerful and free people in the universe exercised the sovereign authority.

After the foundation of Rome, the rising republic, that is to say, the army of the founder, composed of Albans, Sabines, and foreigners, was divided into three classes; which, from that division, took the name of tribes. Each of these tribes was subdivided into ten *Curia*, and each *Curia* into *Decuria*, at the head of which were placed Chiefs respectively denominated *Curiones* and *Decuriones*.

Beside this, there were selected from each tribe a body of an hundred cavaliers or knights, called *Centurions*; by which it is evident, that these divisions, not being essential to the good order of a city, were at first only military. But it seems as if the presaging instinct of future greatness induced the little town of Rome to

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Greek also, and signifies *law*. What probability is there that the two first kings of this city should have been called by names so expressive of their future actions?

adopt at first a system of police proper for the metropolis of the world.

From this primitive division, however, there speedily resulted an inconvenience. This was, that the tribe of Albans, and that of the Sabines, always remaining the same, while that of the strangers was perpetually encreasing by the concourse of foreigners, the latter soon surpassed the number of the two former. The remedy which Servius applied to correct this dangerous abuse was to change the division; and to substitute, in the room of distinction of race, which he abolished, another taken from the parts of the town occupied by each tribe. Instead of three tribes, he constituted four; each of which occupied one of the hills of Rome, and bore its name. Thus by removing this inequality for the present, he prevented it also for the future; and in order that such division should not only be local but personal, he prohibited the inhabitants of one quarter of the city from removing to the other, and thereby prevented the mixture of families.

He doubled also the three ancient centuries of cavalry, and made an addition of twelve others, but always under their old denomination; a simple and judicious method, by which he completely distinguished the body of knights from that of the people, without exciting the murmurs of the latter.

Again, to these four city tribes, Servius added fifteen others, called rustic tribes, because they were formed of the inhabitants of the country, divided into as many cantons. In the sequel were made an equal number of new divisions, and the Roman people found themselves di-

divided into thirty-five tribes; the number at which their divisions remained fixed till the final dissolution of the republic.

From the distinction between the tribes of city and country, resulted an effect worthy of observation; because we have no other example of it, and because Rome was at once indebted to it for the preservation of its manners and the increase of its empire. It might be conceived the city tribes would soon arrogate to themselves the power and honours of the state, and treat the rustics with contempt. The effect, nevertheless, was directly contrary. The taste of the ancient Romans for a country life is well known. They derived this taste from the wise institutor, who joined to liberty the labours of the peasant and the soldier, and consigned, as it were, to the city, the cultivation of the arts, trade, intrigue, fortune, and slavery.

Thus the most illustrious personages of Rome, living in the country, and employing themselves in the business of agriculture, it was among these only the Romans looked for the defenders of their republic. This station, being that of the most worthy patricians, was held in universal esteem: the simple and laborious life of the villager was preferred to the mean and lazy life of the citizen; and a person who, having been a labourer in the country, became a respectable housekeeper in town, was yet held in contempt. It is with reason, says Varro, that our magnanimous ancestors established in the country the nursery for those robust and brave men, who defended them in time of war and cherished them in peace. Again, Pliny says in express terms, the country tribes were honoured because

of the persons of which they were composed; whereas such of their individuals as were to be treated with ignominy were removed into the tribes of the city. When the Sabine, Appius Claudius, came to settle in Rome, he was loaded with honours, and registered in one of the rustic tribes, which afterwards took the name of his family. Lastly, the freed-men were all entered in the city tribes, never in the rural; nor is there one single instance, during the existence of the republic, of any one of these freed-men being preferred to the magistracy, altho' become a citizen.

This was an excellent maxim; but was carried so far, that it effected an alteration, and undoubtedly an abuse in the police of the state.

In the first place, the Censors, after having long arrogated the right of arbitrarily removing the citizens from one tribe to another, permitted the greater part to register themselves in whatever tribe they pleased; a permission that could surely answer no good end, and yet it deprived these officers of one of their severest methods of censure. Besides, as the great and powerful thus got themselves registered in the rural tribes, and the freedmen, with the populace, only filled up those of the city, the tribes in general had no longer a local distinction; but were so strangely mixed and jumbled together, that their respective members could be known only by appealing to the registers; so that the idea attached to the word tribe, was changed from real to personal, or rather became altogether chimerical.

It happened also, that the tribes of the city, being nearer at hand, had generally the greatest influence in the *Comitia*, and made a property of
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the state, by selling their votes to those who were base enough to purchase them.

With regard to the *Curia*, ten having been instituted in each tribe, the whole Roman people, included within the walls, made up thirty *Curia*, each of which had their peculiar temples, their gods, officers, and feasts called *Compitalia*, resembling the *Paganalia* afterwards instituted among the rustic tribes.

At the new division made by Servius, the number thirty not being equally divisible among the four tribes, he forbore to meddle with this mode of distribution; and the *Curia*, thus independent of the tribes, formed another division of the inhabitants. No notice, however, was taken of the *Curia*, either among the rustic tribes, or the people composing them; because the tribes becoming a mere civil establishment, and another method having been introduced for raising the troops, the military distinctions of Romulus were dropt as superfluous. Thus, though every citizen was registered in some tribe, yet many of them were not included in any *Curia*. Servius made still a third division, which had no relation to the two former, and became in its consequences the most important of all. He divided the whole Roman people into six classes, which he distinguished neither by persons nor place, but by property. Of these the higher classes were filled by the rich, the lower by the poor, and the middle classes by those of middling fortunes. These six classes were subdivided into one hundred ninety-three other bodies called centuries; and these were again so distributed, that the first class alone comprehended more than half the number of
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centuries, and the last class only one single century. In this method the class that contained the fewest persons had the greater number of centuries; and the last class was esteemed only a subdivision, although it contained more than half the inhabitants of Rome.

In order that the people should penetrate less into the design of this latter form of distribution, Servius affected to give it the air of a military one. In the second class he incorporated two centuries of armourers, and annexed two instruments of war to the fourth. In each class, except the last, he distinguished also between the young and the old, that is to say, those who were obliged to bear arms, from those who were exempted from it on account of their age; a distinction which gave more frequent rise to the repetition of the *census* or enumeration of them, than even the shifting of property: lastly, he required their assembly to be made on the *Campus Martius*, where all those who were of age for the service were to appear under arms.

The reason why he did not pursue the same distinction of age in the last class, was, that the populace, of which it was composed, were not permitted to have the honour of bearing arms in the service of their country. It was necessary to be housekeepers, in order to attain the privilege of defending themselves. There is not one private centinel perhaps, of all those innumerable troops that make so brilliant a figure in the armies of modern princes, who would not, for want of property, have been driven out with disdain from a Roman cohort, when soldiers were the defenders of liberty.

In the last class, however, there was a distinction.

distinction made between what they called *Proletarii* and those denominated *Capite Censi*. The former, not quite reduced to nothing, supplied the state at least with citizens, and sometimes on pressing occasions with soldiers. As to those who were totally destitute of substance, and could be numbered only by capitation, they were disregarded as nothing; Marius being the first who deigned to enroll them.

Without taking upon me here to decide, whether this third species of division be in itself good or ill; I may venture safely to affirm, that nothing less than that simplicity of manners which prevailed among the ancient Romans, the disinterestedness, their taste for agriculture, their contempt for trade and the thirst of gain, could have rendered it practicable. Where is the nation among the moderns, in which voracious avarice, a turbulence of disposition, a spirit of artifice, and the continual fluctuation of property, would permit such an establishment to continue for twenty years, without overturning the state? Nay, it must be well observed, that the purity of the Roman manners, and the force of a censure more efficacious than the institution itself, served to correct the defects of it at Rome, where a rich man was often removed from his own class, and ranked among the poor, for making an improper parade of his wealth.

It is easy to comprehend from this, why mention is hardly ever made of more than five classes, though there were in reality six. The sixth, furnishing neither the army with soldiers, nor the *Campus Martius* * with voters, and being
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* I say the *Campus Martius*, because it was there the Comitia

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of hardly any use in the republic, was hardly ever accounted any thing.

Such were the different divisions of the Roman people. We will now examine into the defects of which they were productive in their assemblies. These assemblies, when legally convoked, were denominated *Comitia*, and were held in the *Campus Martius* and other parts of Rome: being distinguished into *Curiata*, *Centuriata*, and *Tributa*, according to the three grand divisions of the people into *Curia*, *Centuries*, and *Tribes*. The *Comitia Curiata* were instituted by Romulus, the *Centuriata* by Servius, and the *Tributa* by the Tribunes of the people. Nothing could pass into a law, nor could any magistrates be chosen but in the *Comitia*; and as there was no citizen who was not enrolled in a *Curia*, *Century*, or *Tribe*, it follows that no citizen was excluded from giving his vote; so that the Roman people were truly sovereign both in right and fact.

To make the assembly of the *Comitia* legal, and give their determinations the force of laws, three conditions were requisite. In the first place, it was necessary that the magistrate or body convoking them should be invested with proper authority for so doing; secondly, that the assembly should occur on the days permitted by law; and thirdly, that the augurs should be favourable to their meeting.

The reason of the first condition needs no explanation. The second is an affair of police; thus it was not permitted the *Comitia* to assemble on
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the assembled by centuries; in the two other forms, they assembled in the *Forum* and other places, where the *Capite Censi* had as much influence and importance as the principal citizens.

market-days, when the country people, coming to Rome on business, would be prevented from transacting it. By the third, the Senate kept a fierce and turbulent multitude under some restraint, and opportunely checked the ardour of the seditious Tribunes; the latter, however, found more ways than one to elude the force of this expedient.

But the laws and the election of the chiefs were not the only matters submitted to the determination of the *Comitia*; the Roman people having usurped the most important functions of government, the fate of Europe might be said to depend on their assemblies. Hence the variety of objects that came before them gave occasion for divers alterations in the form of these assemblies, according to the nature of those objects.

To judge of these diversities, it is sufficient to compare them together. The design of Romulus in instituting the *Curia*, was to restrain the Senate by means of the people, and the people by the Senate, while he himself maintained his influence equally over both. By this form, therefore, he gave to the people all the authority of number to counterbalance that of power and riches, which he left in the hands of the Patricians. But, agreeable to the spirit of monarchy, he gave more advantage to the Patricians, by the influence of their clients to obtain the majority of votes. This admirable institution of patrons and clients was a masterpiece of politics and humanity, without which the order of Patricians, so contrary to the spirit of the republic, could not have subsisted. Rome alone hath the honour of giving to the world
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this fine example, of which no abuse is known to have been made, and which nevertheless hath never been adopted by other nations.

This division by *Curie* having subsisted under the kings till the time of Servius, and the reign of the last *Tarquin* being accounted illegal, the regal laws came hence to be generally distinguished by the name of *leges curiata*.

Under the republic, the *Curie*, always confined to the four city tribes, and comprehending only the populace of Rome, could not arrive either at the honour of sitting in the Senate, which was at the head of the Patricians, or at that of being Tribunes, which, notwithstanding they were Plebeians, were yet at the head of the citizens in easy circumstances. They fell, therefore, into discredit, and were reduced to so contemptible a state, that their thirty *Lictors* assembled to do the whole business of the *Comitia Curiata*.

The division by *Centuries* was so favourable to aristocracy, that it is not at first easy to comprehend why the Senate did not always carry their point in the *Comitia Centuriata*, by which the Consuls, Censors, and Prætors, were chosen. It is in fact certain, that out of the hundred and ninety-three centuries, forming the six classes of the whole Roman people, the first class containing ninety-eight of them, and the votes being reckoned only by centuries, this first class alone had more votes than all the others. When the centuries of this class, therefore, were found to be unanimous, they proceeded no farther in counting votes; whatever might be determined by the minority being considered as the opinion of the mob. So that it might be justly said, that

that in the *Comitia Centuriata* matters were carried rather by the greater quantity of money than the majority of votes.

But this extreme authority was moderated by two causes. In the first place, the Tribunes, generally speaking, and always a considerable number of wealthy citizens, being in this class of the rich, they counterpoised the credit of the Patricians in the same class. The second cause lay in the manner of voting, which was this; the centuries, instead of voting according to order, beginning with the first in rank, cast lots which should proceed first to the election. And to this the century whose lot it was, proceeded * alone; the other centuries being called upon another day to give their votes according to their rank, when they repeated the same election, and usually confirmed the choice of the former. By this method the preference of rank was set aside, in order to give it according to lot, agreeable to the principles of democracy.

There is another advantage resulting from this custom; which is, that the citizens residing in the country had time between the two elections to inform themselves of the merit of the candidates thus provisionally nominated; by which means they might be better enabled to give their vote. But under the pretence of expediting affairs, this custom was in time abolished, and the two elections were made the same day.

The *Comitia by Tribes*, were, properly speaking, the great Council of the Roman people.

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* The century thus preferred by lot was called *Prærogativa*, because it was the first whose suffrage was demanded; and hence is derived the word *prærogative*.

These were convoked only by the Tribunes; by these also the Tribunes were chosen, and by these the *plebiscita* or laws of the people were passed. The Senators were not only destitute of rank in these assemblies; they had not even the right to be present at them; but, obliged to pay obedience to laws in the enacting of which they had no vote, they were in that respect less free than the lowest citizens. This injustice, however, was very ill understood, and was in itself alone sufficient to invalidate the decrees of a body, whose members were not all admitted to vote. Had all the Patricians assisted at these *Comitia*, as they had a right, in quality of citizens, they could have had no undue influence where every man's vote was equal, even from the lowest of the people to the highest personage of the state.

It is evident, therefore, that, exclusive of the good order that resulted from these several divisions, in collecting the votes of so numerous a people, the form and method of these divisions were not indifferent in themselves; each being productive of effects, adapted to certain views in regard to which it was preferable to any other.

But without entering into a more circumstantial account of these matters, it is plain from what hath been advanced, that the *Comitia Tribunata* were the most favourable to a popular government, and the *Comitia Centuriata* to an aristocracy. With respect to the *Comitia Curiata*, of which the populace formed the majority, as they were good for nothing but to favour tyrannical designs, they remained in this contemptible state into which they were fallen; even

even the contrivers of sedition themselves not chusing to employ means which must have exposed too openly their designs. It is very certain that all the majesty of the Roman people was displayed only in the *Comitia Centuriata*, which only were complete ; the *Curiata* wanting the rustic Tribes, and the *Tribunata* the Senate and Patricians.

With regard to the method of collecting the votes, it was, among the primitive Romans, simple as their manners, though still less simple than that of Sparta. Every one gave his vote aloud, which the register took down in writing ; the plurality of votes in each tribe determined the vote of that tribe, and the plurality of votes in the tribes determined the suffrage of the people. In the same manner also they proceeded with regard to the *Curie* and the Centuries. This custom was a very good one, so long as integrity prevailed among the citizens, and every one was ashamed to give his public sanction to an unworthy person or cause. But when the people grew corrupt and sold their votes, it became necessary to make them give their votes more privately, in order to restrain the purchasers by distrust, and afford knaves an expedient to avoid being traitors.

I know that Cicero censures this alteration, and attributes to it in a great degree the ruin of the republic. But, though I am sensible of all the weight of Cicero's authority in this case, I cannot be of his opinion. I conceive, on the contrary, that the ruin of the state would have been accelerated had the Romans neglected making this alteration. As the regimen of people in health is not proper for the sick, so it is

absurd to think of governing a corrupt people by the same laws as were expedient for them before they were corrupted. There cannot be a stronger proof of this maxim, than the duration of the republic of Venice; the shadow of which still exists, solely because its laws are adapted only to bad men.

On this change in the manner of voting, tablets were distributed among the citizens, by means of which they could give their suffrage without its being known. On this occasion other methods were of course made use of in collecting votes, such as counting the number of voices, comparing it with that of the tablets, &c. Not that these methods were so effectual as to prevent the returning officers † from being often suspected of partiality: and it is plain in the sequel, by the multiplicity of laws made to prevent bribery and corruption in elections, that they could not effect this point.

Toward the decline of the republic, recourse was had to very extraordinary expedients to make up for the insufficiency of the laws. Prodigies were sometimes played off with success; but this scheme, though it imposed on the multitude, did not impose on those who influenced them. Sometimes assemblies were called suddenly, and in great haste, that the candidates might not have time to create an undue interest: at others, again, the whole session was spent in declamation, when it was seen that the people were biassed to take a wrong side. At length, however, ambition eluded all these precautions; and it is almost incredible that, in the midst of
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† Custodes, Diribitores, Rogatores suffragiorum.

so many abuses, this immense people still continued, by virtue of their ancient laws, to elect their magistrates, to pass laws, to judge causes, and to expedite both public and private affairs, with as much facility as could have been done in the Senate itself.

CHAP. V. *On a tribunate.*

WHEN it is impracticable to establish an exact proportion between the component parts of a state, or that inevitable causes perpetually operate to change their relations, a particular magistracy is instituted, which, not incorporating with the rest, replaces every term in its true relation, and constitutes in itself a due medium either between the prince and the people, between the prince and the sovereign, or, in cases of necessity, at once between both.

This body, which I shall call a *Tribunate*, is the preserver of the laws and of the legislative power. It serves sometimes to protect the sovereign against the government, as the tribunes of the people did at Rome; sometimes to protect the government against the people, as at present the council of the *ten* do at Venice; and again, at others, to maintain an equilibrium both on the one part and the other, as did the Ephori at Sparta.

The Tribunate is not a constitutional part of the city, and ought not, therefore, to have any share in the legislative or executive power. Even in this, however, its own is much greater: for being able to do nothing itself, it may prevent any thing from being done by others. It is more sacred and revered, as defender of the

laws, than the prince who executes them, or the sovereign who enacts them. This was very evident at Rome, when the haughty patricians, who always despised the people collectively, were nevertheless obliged to give place to their common officers, without command or jurisdiction.

The Tribunate, when judiciously moderated, is the firmest support of a good constitution; but if it have ever so little ascendancy of power, it subverts every thing. With regard to its weakness, it is not natural to it; for, provided it have any existence at all, it can never have too little power.

It degenerates into tyranny when it usurps the executive power, of which it is only the moderator, and when it would interpret the laws which it should only protect. The enormous power of the Ephori, which was exercised without danger while Sparta retained its purity of manners, served only to increase the corruption of them when once begun. The blood of Agis spilt by those tyrants was revenged by his successor: the crime and the punishment of the Ephori accelerated equally the ruin of that republic; for after the time of Cleomenes, Sparta was nothing. The destruction of the Roman republic was effected in the same manner: the excessive power which the Tribunes by degrees usurped, served at length, with the help of the laws made in defence of liberty, as a security to the Emperors who destroyed it. As for the council of *ten* at Venice, it is a most sanguinary tribunal, equally horrible to the patricians and the people; and which is so far from openly protecting the laws, that it now serves but secretly to effect the breach of them.

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The Tribunate is enfeebled, as well as the government, by increasing the number of its members. When the Roman Tribunes, at first two, and afterwards five, had a mind to double their number, the Senate did not oppose it; being well assured they should be able to make one a curb to another; which was actually the case.

The best way to prevent the usurpations of so formidable a body, a way that no government hath hitherto adopted, would be to render such a body not permanent, but to regulate the intervals during which it should remain dissolved. These intervals, which should not be so great as to give abuses time to strengthen into customs, might be fixed by law, in such a manner that it would be easy to abridge them, in case of necessity, by extraordinary commissions.

This method appears to me to be attended with no inconvenience; because, as I have already observed, the Tribunate making no essential part of the constitution, may be suppressed without injury: and it appears to me effectual, because a magistrate newly re-established doth not succeed to the power of his predecessor, but to that which the law confers on him.

CHAP. VI. *Of the dictatorship.*

THAT inflexibility of the laws, which prevents their yielding to circumstances, may in some cases render them hurtful, and in some critical juncture bring on the ruin of the state. The order and prolixity of forms, take up a length of time, of which the occasion will not always admit. A thousand accidents may happen for which the legislature hath not provided; and

and it is a very necessary foresight to see that it is impossible to provide for every thing.

We should not be desirous, therefore, of establishing the laws so firmly as to suspend their effects. Even Sparta itself sometimes permitted the laws to lie dormant.

Nothing, however, but the certainty of greater danger should induce a people to make any alteration in government; nor should the sacred power of the laws be ever restrained unless the public safety is concerned. In such uncommon cases, when the danger is manifest, the public safety may be provided for by a particular act, which commits the charge of it to those who are most worthy. Such a commission may pass, in two different ways, according to the nature of the danger.

If the case require only a greater activity in the government, it should be confined to one or two members; in which case, it would not be the authority of the laws, but the form of the administration only, that would be changed. But if the danger be of such a nature, that the formality of the laws would prevent a remedy, then a supreme chief might be nominated who should silence the laws, and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, the general will cannot be doubted; it being evident, that the principal intention of the people must be to save the state from perdition. By this mode of temporary suspension the legislative authority is not abolished; the magistrate who silences it, cannot make it speak, and though he over-rules cannot represent it; he may do every thing indeed but make laws.

The first method was taken by the Roman Senate,

Senate, when it charged the consuls, in a sacred manner, to provide for the safety of the commonwealth. The second took place when one of the consuls nominated a dictator*; custom which Rome adopted from the example of Alba.

In the early times of the republic, the Romans had frequent recourse to the dictatorship, because the state had not then sufficient stability to support itself by the force of its constitution. The manners of the people, also, rendering those precautions unnecessary which were taken in after-times, there was no fear that a dictator would abuse his authority, or that he would be tempted to keep it in his hands beyond the term. On the contrary, it appeared, that so great a power was burdensome to the person invested with it, so eager were they to resign it; as if it were a difficult and dangerous post to be superior to the laws.

Thus it was not the danger of the abuse, but of the debasement of this supreme magistracy, that gave occasion to censure the indiscreet use of it in ancient times. For when they came to prostitute it in the affair of elections and other matters of mere formality, it was very justly to be apprehended that it would become less respectable on pressing occasions; and that the people would be apt to look upon an office as merely titular, which was instituted to assist at empty ceremonies.

Toward the end of the republic, the Romans, becoming more circumspect, were as sparing of the dictatorship, as they had before been prodigal of
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* This nomination was secretly made in the night, as if they were ashamed of the action of placing any man so much above the law.

of it. It was easy to see, however, that their fears were groundless, that the weakness of the capital was their security against the internal magistrate; that a dictator might in some cases have acted in defence of public liberty, without ever making encroachments on it; and that the Roman chains were not forged in Rome itself, but in its armies abroad. The weak resistance which Marius made to Sylla, and Pompey to Cæsar, shewed plainly how little the authority from within the city could do against the power from without.

This error led them to commit great blunders. Such, for instance, was their neglecting to appoint a dictator in the affair of Catiline. For, as it engaged only the city, or at most a province in Italy, a dictator invested with that unlimited authority which the laws conferred on him might easily have dissipated that conspiracy, which was with difficulty suppressed by a numerous concurrence of fortunate circumstances, which human prudence had no reason to expect. Instead of that, the Senate contented itself with committing all its power into the hands of Consuls; whence it happened that Cicero, in order to act effectually, was obliged to exceed that power in a capital circumstance; and though the public, in their first transports, approved of his conduct, he was very justly called to an account afterwards for the blood he had spilt contrary to the laws; a reproach they could not have made to a dictator. But the eloquence of the Consul carried all before it; and preferring, though a Roman, his own glory to his country, he thought less of the most legal and certain method of saving the state, than the means of securing all the honour
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of such a transaction to himself *. Thus was he very justly honoured as the deliverer of Rome, and as justly punished as the violator of its laws. For, however honourable was his repeal, it was certainly a matter of favour.

After all, in whatever manner this important commission may be conferred, it is of consequence to limit its duration to a short term; which should on no occasion be prolonged. In those conjunctures, when it is necessary to appoint a Dictator, the state is presently saved or destroyed; which causes being over, the dictatorship becomes useless and tyrannical. At Rome, the Dictators held their office only for six months; and the greater part resigned before that term expired. Had the time appointed been longer, it is to be apprehended they would have been tempted to make it longer still; as did the *Decemvir*, whose office lasted a whole year. The Dictator had no more time allowed him than was necessary to dispatch the business for which he was appointed; so that he had not leisure to think of other projects.

CHAP. VII. *Of the censorship.*

AS the declaration of the general will is made by the laws, so the declaration of the public judgment is made by their censure. The public opinion is a kind of law, which the Censor puts in execution, in particular cases, after the example of the prince.

So far, therefore, is the censorial tribunal from being

* This is what he could not be certain of, in proposing a Dictator; not daring to nominate himself, and not being assured his colleague would do it.

being the arbiter of popular opinions, it only declares them; and, whenever it departs from them, its decisions are vain and ineffectual.

It is useless to distinguish the manners of a nation by the objects of its esteem; for these depend on the same principle, and are necessarily confounded together. Among all people in the world, it is not nature, but opinion, which determines the choice of their pleasures. Correct the prejudices and opinions of men, and their manners will correct themselves. We always admire what is beautiful, or what appears so; but it is in our judgment we are mistaken; it is this judgment then we are to regulate. Whoever judges of manners, takes upon him to judge of honour; and whoever judges of honour, decides from opinion.

The opinions of a people depend on the constitution; though the laws do not govern manners, it is the legislature that gives rise to them. As the legislature grows feeble, manners degenerate, but the judgment of the censors will not then effect what the power of the laws have not before effected.

It follows hence, that the office of a Censor may be useful to the preservation of manners, but never to their re-establishment. Establish Censors during the vigour of the laws; when this is past, all is over; no legal means can be effectual when the laws have lost their force.

The Censor is preservative of manners, by preventing the corruption of opinions, by maintaining their morality and propriety, by judicious applications, and even sometimes by settling them when in a fluctuating situation. The use of seconds in duels, though carried to the greatest excess

excess in France, was abolished by the following words inserted in one of the king's edicts; *As to those who have the cowardice to call themselves seconds.* This judgment anticipating that of the public, was effectual, and put an end to that custom at once. But when the same edicts pronounced it cowardice to fight a duel; though it is certainly true, yet as it was contrary to the popular opinion, the public laughed at a determination so contrary to their own,

I have observed elsewhere *, that the public opinion being subjected to no constraint, there should be no appearance of it in the tribunal established to represent it. One cannot too much admire with what art this spring of action, entirely neglected among the moderns, was employed by the Romans, and still more effectually by the Lacedemonians.

A man of bad morals, having made an excellent proposal in the council at Sparta, the Ephori, without taking any notice of it, caused the same proposal to be made by a citizen of character and virtue. How honourable was this proceeding to the one, and how disgraceful to the other; and that without directly praising or blaming either! Some drunkards of Samos having behaved indecently in the tribunal of the Ephori, it was the next day permitted, by a public edict, that the Samians might become slaves. Would an actual punishment have been so severe as such impunity? When the Spartans had once passed their judgment on the decency or propriety of any behaviour, all Greece submitted to their opinion.

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O

CHAP.

* I do but slightly mention here, what I have treated more at large in my Letter to M. d'Alcambert.

CHAP. VIII. *Of political religion.*

IN the first ages of the world, men had no other kings than gods, nor any other government than what was purely theocratical. It required a great alteration in their sentiments and ideas, before they could prevail on themselves to look upon a fellow-creature as a master, and think it went well with them.

Hence, a deity being constantly placed at the head of every political society, it followed that there were as many different gods as people. Two communities, personally strangers to each other, and almost always at variance, could not long acknowledge the same master; nor could two armies, drawn up against each other in battle, obey the same chief. Thus Polytheism became a natural consequence of the division of nations, and thence the want of civil and theological toleration, which are perfectly the same, as will be shewn hereafter.

The notion of the Greeks, in pretending to trace their own gods among those of the Barbarian nations, took its rise evidently from the ambition of being thought the natural sovereigns of those people. In this age, however, we think that a most absurd part of erudition which relates to the identity of the deities of different nations, and according to which it is supposed that Moloch, Saturn, and Chronos, were one and the same god; and that the Baal of the Phenicians, the Zeus of the Greeks, and the Jupiter of the Latins, were the same deity; as if any thing could be found in common between chimerical beings bearing different names!

If it be asked why there were no religious wars among the Pagans, when every state had thus its peculiar deity and worship; I answer, it was plainly for this very reason, that each state having its own peculiar religion as well as government, no distinction was made between the obedience paid to their gods and that due to their laws. Thus their political were at the same time theological wars; and the departments of their deities were prescribed by the limits of their respective nations. The god of one people had no authority over another people; nor were these Pagan deities jealous of their prerogatives, but divided the adoration of mankind amicably between them. Even Moses himself sometimes speaks in the same manner of the God of Israel. It is true the Hebrews despised the gods of the Canaanites, a people proscribed and devoted to destruction, whose possessions were given them for an inheritance: but they speak with more reverence of the deities of the neighbouring nations whom they were forbidden to attack. *Wilt thou not possess that, says Jephtha to Sihon king of the Ammonites, which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us, them will we possess.* There is in this passage, I think, an acknowledged similitude between the rights Chemosh, and those of the God of Israel.

But when the Jews, being subjected to the kings of Babylon, and afterwards to those of Syria, persisted in refusing to acknowledge any god but their own, this refusal was esteemed an act of rebellion against their conqueror, and drew upon them those persecutions we read of in their history, and of which no other example is extant

previous to the establishment of Christianity *.

The religion of every people being thus exclusively annexed to the laws of the state, the only method of converting nations was to subdue them: warriors were the only missionaries; and the obligation of changing their religion being a law to the vanquished, they were first to be conquered before they were solicited on this head. So far were men from fighting for the gods, that their gods, like those of Homer, fought in behalf of mankind. Each people demanded the victory from its respective deity, and expressed their gratitude for it by the erection of new altars. The Romans, before they besieged any fortress, summoned its gods to abandon it; and though it be true they left the people of Tarentum in possession of their angry deities, it is plain they looked upon those gods as subjected and obliged to do homage to their own: They left the vanquished in possession of their religion, as they sometimes did in that of their laws; a wreath for Jupiter of the Capitol being often the only tribute they exacted.

At length, the Romans having extended their religion with their empire, and sometimes even adopted the deities of the vanquished, the people of this vast empire found themselves in possession of a multiplicity of gods and religions; which not differing essentially from each other, Paganism became insensibly one and the same religion throughout the world.

Things were in this state when Jesus came to establish his spiritual kingdom on earth; a design

* It is evident that the war of the Phocians, called an holy war, was not a religious war: Its object was to punish sacrilege, and not to subdue infidels.

sign which, necessarily dividing the theological from the political system, gave rise to those intestine divisions which have ever since continued to embroil the profession of Christianity. Now this new idea of a kingdom in the other world having never entered into the head of the Pagans, they regarded the Christians as actual rebels, who, under an hypocritical shew of humility, waited only a proper opportunity to render themselves independent, and artfully to usurp that authority, which in their weak and infant state they pretended to respect: and this was undoubtedly the cause of their being persecuted.

What the Pagans were apprehensive of, also did, in process of time, actually come to pass. Things put on a new face; and the meek Christians, as their number increased, changed their tone, while their invisible kingdom of the other world became, under a visible head, the most despotic and tyrannical in this.

As in all countries, however, there were civil governors and laws, there resulted from this twofold power a perpetual struggle for jurisdiction, which renders a perfect system of domestic policy almost impossible in Christian states; and prevents us from ever coming to a determination, whether it be the prince or the priest we are bound to obey.

Some nations indeed, even in Europe or its neighbourhood, have endeavoured to preserve or re-establish the ancient system, but without success; the spirit of Christianity hath universally prevailed. Religious worship hath always remained, or again become independent of the sovereign, and without any necessary connection with the body of the state. Mahomet had very

salutary and well-connected views in his political system; and so long as his modes of government subsisted under the caliphs and their successors, that government remained perfectly uniform, and so far good. But the Arabians becoming wealthy, learned, polite, indolent, and cowardly, were subdued by the Barbarians: then the division between the two powers recommenced; and though it be less apparent among the Mahometans than among Christians, it is nevertheless to be distinguished, particularly in the sect of Ali: there are some states also, as in Persia, where this division is constantly perceptible.

Among us, the kings of England are placed at the head of the church, as are also the Czars in Russia: but by this title they are not so properly masters as ministers of the religion of those countries: they are not possessed of the power to change it, but only to maintain its present form. Whenever the Clergy constitute a collective body*, they will be both masters and legislators in their own cause. There are therefore two sovereigns in England and Russia, as well as elsewhere.

Of all Christian authors, Mr. Hobbes was the only one who saw the evil and the remedy, and who

* It must be observed, that it is not so much the formal assemblies of the clergy, such as are held in France, which unite them together in a body, as the communion of their churches. Communion and excommunication form the social compact of the clergy; a compact by means of which they will always maintain their ascendancy over both kings and people. All the priests that communicate together are fellow-citizens, tho' they should be personally as distant as the extremities of the world. This invention is a master-piece in policy. The Pagan priests had nothing like it; and therefore never had any clerical body.

who hath ventured to propose the re-union of the two heads of this eagle, and to restore that political union, without which no state or government can be well constituted. But he ought to have seen, that the prevailing spirit of Christianity was incompatible with his system, and that the interest of the church would be always too powerful for the state. It was not so much that which was really false and shocking in the writings of this philosopher, as what was really just and true, that rendered him odious †.

I conceive that, by a proper display of historical facts, in this point of view, it would be easy to refute the opposite sentiments both of Bayle and Warburton; the former of which pretends that no religion whatever can be of service to the body-politic, and the latter that Christianity is its best and firmest support. It might be proved against the first, that every state in the world hath been founded on the basis of religion; and against the second, that the precepts of Christianity are at the bottom more prejudicial than conducive to the strength of the state.

In order to make myself fully understood, I need only give a little more precision to the vague ideas generally entertained of political religion.

Religion, considered as it relates to society, which is either general or particular, may be distinguished into two kinds, viz. the religion of the man, and that of the citizen. The first, desti-

† In a letter of Grotius to his brother, dated the 11th of April 1643, may be seen what that great Civilian approved and blamed in his book *De cive*. It is true, that Grotius, being indulgent, seems inclined to forgive the author the faults of his book, for the sake of its merits; the rest of the world, however, were not so candid.

destitute of temples, altars, or rites, confined purely to the internal worship of the Supreme Being, and to the performance of the eternal duties of morality, is the pure and simple religion of the gospel; this is genuine theism, and may be called the law of natural divinity. The other, adopted only in one country, whose gods and tutelary saints are hence peculiar to itself, is composed of certain dogmas, rites, and external modes of worship prescribed by the laws of such country; all foreigners being accounted infidels, aliens, and barbarians; this kind of religion extends the duties and privileges of men no farther than to its own altars. Such were all the religions of primitive ages, to which may be given the name of the law of civil or positive divinity.

There is a third kind of religion still more extraordinary, which dividing society into two legislatures, two chiefs, and two parties, subjects mankind to contradictory obligations, and prevents them from being at once devotees and citizens. Such is the religion of the Lamas, of the Japanese, and of the Roman Catholics; which may be denominated the religion of the priests, and is productive of a sort of mixed and unsociable obligation, for which we have no name.

If we examine these three kinds of religion in a political light, they have all their faults. The third is so palpably defective, that it would be mere loss of time to point them out. Whatever contributes to dissolve the social union is good for nothing: all institutions which set man in contradiction with himself are of no use.

The second is so far commendable as it unites
divine

divine worship with a respect for the laws, and that, making the country the object of the people's adoration, the citizen is taught that to serve the state is to serve its tutelary divinity. This is a species of theocracy, in which there should be no other pontiff than the prince, no other priests than the magistrates. To die, in such a state, for their country, is to suffer martyrdom; to violate the laws is impiety; and to doom a criminal to public execration, is to devote him to the anger of the gods.

It is blameable, however, in that, being founded on falsehood and deceit, it leads mankind into error; rendering them credulous and superstitious, it substitutes vain ceremonies instead of the true worship of the Deity. It is further blameable, in that, becoming exclusive and tyrannical, it makes people sanguinary and persecuting; so that a nation shall sometimes breathe nothing but murder and massacre, and think at the same time they are doing an holy action in cutting the throats of those who worship the gods in a different manner from themselves. This circumstance places such a people in a natural state of war with all others, which is very unfavourable to their own safety.

There remains then only the rational and manly religion of Christianity; not, however, as it is professed in modern times, but as it is displayed in the gospel, which is quite another thing. According to this holy, sublime, and true religion, mankind, being all the children of the same God, acknowledge themselves to be brothers, and the society which unites them dissolves only in death.

But this religion, having no particular relation
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to the body-politic, leaves the laws in possession only of their own force, without adding any thing to it; by which means the firmest bonds of such particular society are of no effect. Add to this, that Christianity is so far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the state, that it detaches them from it, as well as from all worldly objects in general: than which nothing can be more contrary to the spirit of society.

It is said, that a nation of true Christians would form the most perfect society imaginable. To this assertion, however, there is one great objection; and this is, that a society of true Christians would not be a society of men. Nay, I will go so far as to affirm, that this supposed society, with all its perfection, would neither be of the greatest strength nor duration. In consequence of its being perfect, it would want the strongest ties of connection; and thus this very circumstance would destroy it.

Individuals might do their duty, the people might be obedient to the laws, the chiefs might be just, the magistrate incorrupt, the soldiery might look upon death with contempt, and there might prevail neither vanity nor luxury, in such a state. So far all would go well; but let us look further.

Christianity is a spiritual religion, relative only to celestial objects: the Christian's inheritance is not of this world. He performs his duty, it is true; but this he does with a profound indifference for the good or ill success of his endeavours. Provided he hath nothing to reproach himself with, it is of little importance to him whether matters go well or ill here below. If the state be in a flourishing situation, he can hardly

hardly venture to rejoice in the public felicity, lest he should be puffed up with the inordinate pride of his country's glory; if the state decline, he blesses the hand of God that humbles his people to the dust.

It is farther necessary to the peace and harmony of society, that all the citizens should be without exception equally good Christians; for if unhappily there should be one of them ambitious or hypocritical, if there should be found among them a Catiline or a Cromwell, it is certain he would make an easy prey of his pious countrymen. Christian charity doth not easily permit the thinking evil of one's neighbour. No sooner should an individual discover the art of imposing on the majority, and be invested with some portion of public authority, than he would become a dignitary; Christians must not speak evil of dignities: thus respected, he would thence assume power; Christians must obey the superior powers. Does the depositary of power abuse it? he becomes the rod by which it pleases God to chastise his children.

And, would their consciences permit them to drive out the usurper, the public tranquillity must be broken, and violence and bloodshed succeed: all this agrees but ill with the meekness of true Christians; and, after all, what is it to them, whether they are freemen or slaves in this vale of misery? Their essential concern is to work out their salvation, and obtain happiness in another world; to effect which, their resignation in this is held to be their duty.

Should such a state be forced into a war with any neighbouring power, the citizens might march readily to the combat without thinking
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of flight; they might do their duty in the field, but they would have no ardour for victory, being better instructed to die than to conquer. Of what consequence is it to them, whether they are victors or vanquished? Think what advantages an impetuous and sanguine enemy might take of their stoicism! Draw them out against a brave and generous people, ardently inspired with the love of glory and their country; suppose, for instance, your truly Christian republic against that of Sparta or of Rome; what would be the consequence? Your devout Christians would be beaten, discomfited, and knocked on the head, before they had time to look about them; their only security depending on the contempt which their enemy might entertain for them. It was, in my opinion, a fine oath that was taken by the soldiers of Fabius. They did not make a vow either to die or conquer; they swore they would return conquerors, and punctually performed their oath. Christian troops could not have made such a vow, they would have been afraid of tempting the Lord their God.

But I am all this while committing a blunder, in speaking of a Christian republic; one of these terms necessarily excluding the other. Christianity inculcates servitude and dependence; the spirit of it is too favourable to tyrants, for them not sometimes to profit by it. True Christians are formed for slaves; they know it, and never trouble themselves about conspiracies and insurrections; this transitory life is of too little value in their esteem.

Will it be said, The Christians are excellent soldiers? I deny it. Produce me your Christian troops. For my part, I know of no true Christian

Roman soldiers. Do you name those of the Crusades? I answer, That, not to call in question the valour of the Crusaders, they were very far from being Christian citizens: they were the soldiers of the priest, the citizens of the church; they fought for its spiritual country, which, some how or other, it had converted into a temporal one. To set this matter in the best light, it was a kind of return to Paganism; for as the gospel did not establish any national religion, an holy war could not possibly be carried on by true Christians.

Under the Pagan emperors, the Christian soldiers were brave; of this all the Christian writers assure us, and I believe them; the motive of their bravery was a spirit of honour or emulation, excited by the Pagan troops. But when the emperors became Christians, this motive of emulation no longer subsisted; and when the Cross had put the Eagle to flight, the Roman valour disappeared.

But, laying aside political considerations, let us return to the matter of right, and ascertain its true principles with regard to this important point. The right which the social compact confers on the sovereign, extending no farther than to public utility *, the subject is not accountable to that sovereign on account of any opi-

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nions

* In a republic, says the Marquis d'A. every one is perfectly at liberty, because no one may injure another. This is the invariable limit of republican liberty, nor is it possible to state the case more precisely. I cannot deny myself the pleasure of sometimes quoting this manuscript, though unknown to the public, in order to do honour to the memory of an illustrious and respectable personage, who preserved the integrity of the citizen even in the ministry, and adopted the most upright and salutary views in the government of his country.

nions he may entertain that have nothing to do with the community. Now it is of great importance to a state, that every citizen should be of a religion that may inspire him with a regard for his duty: but the tenets of that religion are no farther interesting to the community than as they relate to morals, and to the discharge of those obligations which the professor lies under to his fellow-citizens. If we except these, the individual may profess what others he pleases, without the sovereign's having any right to interfere; for, having no jurisdiction in the other world, it is nothing to the sovereign what becomes of the citizens in a future life, provided they discharge the duties incumbent on them in the present.

There is a profession of faith, therefore, purely political; the articles of which it is in the province of the sovereign to ascertain, not precisely as articles of religion, but as the sentiments due to society, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or faithful subject †. Without compelling any one to adopt these sentiments, the sovereign may also equitably banish him the society; not indeed as impious; but as unfociable, as incapable of having a sincere regard to justice, and of sacrificing his life, if required, to his duty. Again, should any one, after having made a public profession of such sentiments,

† Cæsar, in pleading for Catiline, endeavoured to establish the doctrine of the mortality of the Soul: Cato and Cicero, in answer to him, did not enter into a philosophical discussion of the argument; but contented themselves with shewing that Cæsar had spoken like a bad citizen, and advanced a dogma pernicious to the state. And this was in fact in the only point that came before the Senate of Rome, and not a question in theology.

timents, betray his disbelief of them by his misconduct, he may equitably be punished with death; having committed the greatest of all crimes, that of belying his heart in the face of the laws.

The tenets of political religion should be few and simple; they should be laid down also with precision, and without explication or comment. The existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, prescient, and provident Deity; a future state; the reward of the virtuous, and the punishment of the wicked; the sacred nature of the social contract, and of the laws; these should be its positive tenets. As to those of a negative kind, I would confine myself solely to one, by forbidding persecution.

Those who affect to make a distinction between civil and religious toleration, are, in my opinion, mistaken. It is impossible to live cordially in peace with those whom we firmly believe devoted to damnation: to love them would be to hate the Deity for punishing them; it is therefore absolutely necessary for us either to persecute or to convert them. Wherever the spirit of religious persecution subsists, it is impossible it should not have some effect on the civil-police; in which case, the sovereign is no longer sovereign even in a secular view; the priests become the real masters, and kings only their officers.

In modern governments, where it is impossible to support an exclusive national religion, it is requisite to tolerate all such as breathe the spirit of toleration toward others, provided their tenets are not contradictory to the duty of a good citizen. But whosoever should presume to say,

There is no salvation out of the pale of our church, ought to be banished the state, unless indeed the state be an ecclesiastical one, and the prince a pontiff. Such a dogma is of use only in a theocratical government; in every other it is destructive. The reason which it is said Henry IV. gave for embracing the Roman Catholic religion, ought to have made an honest man reject it, and more particularly a prince capable of reasoning on the subject.

CHAP. IX. *The conclusion.*

HAVING thus stated the true principles of politic law, and endeavoured to fix the state on its proper basis, it remains to shew in what manner it is supported by external relations.

Under this head would be comprehended, the laws of nations and commerce, the laws of war and conquest, leagues, negotiations, treaties, &c. But these present a new prospect, too vast and extensive for so short a sight as mine; which should be confined to objects less distant, and more adapted to my limited capacity.

A
PROJECT
FOR A
PERPETUAL PEACE.

AS a more noble, useful, and delightful Project never engaged the human mind, than that of establishing a perpetual peace among the contending nations of Europe, never did a writer lay a better claim to the attention of the public than he who points out the means to carry such a design into execution. It is, indeed, very difficult for a man of probity and sensibility, not to be fired with a kind of enthusiasm on such a subject: nay, I am not clear that the very illusions of an heart truly humane, whose warmth makes every thing easily surmountable, are not in this case more eligible than that rigid and forbidding prudence, which finds, in its own indifference and want of public spirit, the chief obstacle to every thing that tends to promote the public good.

I doubt not that many of my readers will be fore-armed with incredulity, to withstand the pleasing temptation of being persuaded; and indeed I sincerely lament their dulness in mistaking obstinacy for wisdom. But I flatter myself, that many an honest mind will sympathise with me in that delightful emotion, with which

I take up the pen to treat of a subject so greatly interesting to the world. I am going to take a view, at least in imagination, of mankind united by love and friendship: I am going to take a contemplative prospect of an agreeable and peaceful society of brethren, living in constant harmony, directed by the same maxims, and joint sharers of one common felicity; while, realizing to myself so affecting a picture, the representation of such imaginary happiness will give me the momentary enjoyment of a pleasure actually present.

I could not resist the impulse of devoting a few lines, at the beginning of my performance, to a sentiment with which my heart is replete. Let us now endeavour to reason coolly on the subject. Being resolved to advance nothing which I cannot prove, I think myself authorised to desire the reader to deny nothing which he cannot confute: for I am not so much afraid of those who may argue, as of such as withhold their assent to arguments to which they will nevertheless make no objection.

It requires no very long or close attention to the means of bringing any kind of government to perfection, to perceive many obstacles and embarrassments, which arise less from the nature of the constitution than from its external relations: so that the care, which ought to be devoted to the domestic policy of a state, is necessarily bestowed on securing its dependency; more pains been taken to enable it to resist other states, than to improve its own government. If the social union were, as pretended, rather the effect of reason than the passions, how could men have been so long in finding out that they
have

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have always done either too much or too little for their own happiness; that individuals, being in a social state with regard to their fellow countrymen, and in a state of nature with respect to the rest of the world, they have only prevented civil bloodshed among particulars, to excite national wars, a thousand times more general and destructive; and that by attaching ourselves to the interest of particular persons, we become enemies to our whole species.

If there be any way to remove these fatal contradictions, it is perhaps by a confederative form of government only; which, connecting whole nations by the same ties that unite individuals, may equally subject both the one and the other to the authority of the laws. This mode of government appears, besides, preferable to every other, as it comprehends at once the advantages both of great states and small ones: it is respectable abroad from its power; its laws are vigorously executed; and it is the only form which is adapted equally to restrain the subject, the magistrate, and foreign states.

This form of government, indeed, although it seem novel in some respects, and has been well understood only by the moderns, was not unknown to the ancients. The Greeks had their Amphictiones, the Tuscans their Leucumoni, the Latins their Fœder, the Gauls their cities, and the expiring state of Greece became famous for the Achean League. None of those ancient confederacies, however, displayed so much wisdom as the modern ones of the German Empire, the Helvetic League, or the union of the States-General. If these bodies-politic also are still but few, and far from being arrived at that perfection

tion they are capable of, it is because the best of them is not so easily put in execution as may be imagined; and that in politics as well as in morals, the extent of our knowledge proves hardly any thing any more than that of our misfortunes.

To these public confederacies may be added others not less real, though less apparent, which are tacitly formed by the union of interests, a conformity of maxims, a similarity of customs, and various other circumstances which admit certain common relations to subsist even between divided nations. Thus it is that all the powers of Europe form a kind of system among themselves, which unites them by the same religion, by the same law of nations, by morals, literature, commerce, and by a sort of equilibrium which is the necessary result of them all; and which, though nobody studies to preserve, is not so easily destroyed as many people imagine.

The national society has not always subsisted in Europe; the particular causes, which first gave rise to it, still serving to preserve and maintain it. In fact, before the Roman conquests, the people of this part of the world were all barbarians, unknown to each other: they had nothing in common but the most simple faculties of human beings; faculties that, debased by slavery, hardly raised them a degree above the brutes. Hence the Greeks took upon them, out of their philosophical vanity, to distinguish mankind, as it were, into two species; one of which, viz. their own, was formed to command; and the other, comprehending the rest of the world, to obey. It followed from this principle, that a Gaul or an Iberian was looked upon by a Greek, as we look upon a Hottentot

or

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or a North-American Indian : while the barbarian nations themselves bore as little affinity to each other, as the Greeks bore to any of them.

But when this people, naturally pre-eminent, had been subdued by the Romans their slaves, and great part of the known world had submitted to the same yoke, a civil and political union of course formed itself between the several members of the same empire ; an union that was rendered much closer by that very wise or very foolish maxim, of conferring on the vanquished the rights and privileges of the victors ; and more particularly by the famous decree of Claudius, which admitted all the subjects of Rome into the number of Roman citizens.

To the political chain, which thus united all the members in one body, were now added civil institutions and laws, which gave new force to such connections, by determining, in a clear, precise, and equitable manner (at least as far as the extent of so vast an Empire would admit of) the reciprocal rights and duties of the sovereign and subjects, as well as those of the latter among themselves. The Theodosian code, and after that the books of JUSTINIAN, formed new links in the chain of reason and justice, aptly substituted for those of the sovereign power, which were in a very palpable state of relaxation. This substitute greatly delayed the dissolution of the Empire, and long maintained its drooping jurisdiction over those very barbarians who were working its desolation.

A third tie, still stronger than the preceding, was that of religion : nor can it be denied that Europe is particularly indebted to Christianity for that kind of social union which is constantly kept

kept up between its members : so that the people which have not adopted the sentiments of the rest, in this particular, have always remained aliens among them. Christianity, the subject of contempt, at its rise, served at length as an asylum to its detractors : nay, the Roman empire itself, after having so cruelly and vainly persecuted it, found in it those resources which it could not draw from its military power. Its missions were of more service than its conquests. It sent Bishops to repair the blunders of its Generals, and triumphed by its Priests when its Soldiers were defeated. It was thus the Franks, the Goths, the Lombards, and a thousand others, submitted to the authority of Rome, after they themselves had reduced her empire ; and received with the law of the Gospel, that of the Prince who first caused it to be promulgated among them.

Such was the respect still paid to that imperial body, that its destroyers prided themselves in its titles, even in its expiring moments ; while those very conquerors, who had debased the Empire, became officers of it ; and the greatest Kings contended for Patrician honours, governments, and consulships : even as a lion cringing to the man he might devour, those tremendous victors paid homage to that throne which they had the power to subvert when they pleased.

It was thus the Priesthood and the Empire formed a social chain between various people ; who, without having any real connection of interests, privileges, or dependence, enjoyed a community of maxims and opinions ; the influence of which has remained after the principle has been destroyed. The ancient state of the

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the Roman Empire hath continued to form a kind of union between the members of which it was composed: while Rome possessing another sort of dominion after the dissolution of the Empire, there resulted from this twofold connection a closer society among the nations of Europe, where the centre of the two powers had existed, than in other parts of the world, where the inhabitants are too much dispersed to hold correspondence with each other, and have besides no particular point of union.

Add to this, the peculiar situation of Europe, more equally populous and fertile; better connected in its several parts; the continual admixture of interests, which consanguinity, commerce, arts, and navigation, continually effect between sovereigns; the multitude of rivers, and diversity of their course, which facilitate the communication of different parts; the inconstancy of the inhabitants, which induces them to travel and pass frequently from one country to another; the invention of printing, and prevailing taste for letters, which hath formed a community of knowledge and studies; and lastly, that multiplicity and small extent of many states, which, added to the calls of luxury, and to the diversity of climates, render the one always necessary to the other: all these things united form in Europe, not merely, as in Asia or Africa, an ideal collection of people, who have nothing but a nominal community between them; but an actual society, which has its religion, morals, customs, and even its laws, from which none of the people composing it can separate without causing an immediate disturbance.

To behold, on the other hand, the perpetual
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diffensions, depredations, usurpations, rebellions, wars, and murders, which are constantly ravaging this respectable abode of philosophers, this brilliant asylum of the arts and sciences; to reflect on the sublimity of our conversation and the meanness of our proceedings, on the humanity of our maxims and the cruelty of our actions, on the meekness of our religion and the horror of our persecutions, on a policy so wise in theory and so absurd in practice, on the beneficence of sovereigns and the misery of their people, on governments so mild and wars so destructive; we are at a loss to reconcile these strange contrarieties, while this pretended fraternity of European nations appears to be only a term of ridicule, serving ironically to express their reciprocal animosity.

And yet, in all this, things only take their natural course; every society destitute of laws or magistrates, every union formed or supported by chance, must necessarily degenerate into quarrels and diffensions upon the first change of circumstances. The ancient union of the European nations hath rendered their interests and privileges extremely complicated: they bear against each other in so many points, that the least agitation of any one puts the whole in motion. Their diffensions are also by so much the more fatal as their connections are intimate; while their frequent quarrels are almost as unnatural and cruel as civil wars.

It must be admitted, therefore, that the present relative state of the European powers is a state of war; and that the partial treaties subsisting between some of them, are rather temporary truces, than a state of actual peace; whether

ther it be owing to those treaties having no other guarantees than the contracting parties, or that their respective rights are never duly ascertained, and the pretensions thence subsisting among powers who acknowledge no superior infallibly prove the source of new wars, as soon as different circumstances empower the pretend-ers to assert their claims.

To this it may be added, that the law of nations not being universally concerted and established, but having no general principles, and incessantly varying according to time and place, it is full of contradictory maxims, which can never be reconciled but by the right of the strongest: so that the judgment being without a sure guide, and always biassed in doubtful cases by self-interest, war becomes sometimes inevitable, even when both parties may be desirous of acting justly. All that can be done, with the best intentions, therefore, is to decide this kind of disputes by force of arms, or to palliate them by temporary treaties. But no sooner is occasion taken to revive the cause of quarrel, than it takes a new form, and all is complication and confusion: the real grounds of the affair are not to be seen; usurpation passes for right, and weakness for injustice; while, amidst the general disorder, every one finds himself insensibly so far displaced, that, if it were possible to recur to the real and primitive right, there would be few sovereigns in Europe who ought not to refund every thing they possess.

Another source of war, less obvious though not less real, is, that things do not change their form in changing their nature; that states which are hereditary in fact, remain elective in ap-

pearance; that there are parliaments or national states in monarchies, and hereditary chiefs in republics; that one power really dependent on another, still preserves the appearance of liberty; that all the subjects of the same sovereign are not governed by the same laws; that the order of succession is different in different provinces of the same state; in fine, that all governments naturally tend to a change, without there being a possibility of preventing it. Such are the general and particular causes which connect us for our ruin, and lead us to describe the charms of social virtue with our hands constantly stained with human gore.

The causes of an evil being once known, the remedy, if any such there be, is sufficiently indicated by the same means. It is plain to every one, that society is formed by a coalition of interests; that every dissension arises from an opposition of interests; that, as a thousand fortuitous events may change and modify both the one and the other, it is necessary that every society should possess a coercive force, to direct and concert the movements of its several members, in order to give their common interests and reciprocal engagements that solidity which they could not separately acquire.

It would otherwise be a great mistake to suppose, that such a state of constraint could ever change, merely from the nature of things, and without the assistance of art. The present system of Europe hath attained precisely that degree of solidity, which may keep it in a perpetual agitation, without ever effectually subverting it: thus, if our misfortunes cannot be increased, they are still less capable of being put
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an end to; because no great revolution can now ever happen.

To prove this, as far as it is necessary, we shall begin with taking a general view of the present state of Europe. The situation of the mountains, seas, and rivers, which serve as boundaries to the several nations inhabiting it, seem also to have determined the number and extent of those nations; so that the political order of this part of the world may be said to be, in some respects, the work of nature.

In fact, we are not to suppose that the boasted balance of power in Europe hath been actually established; or that any body has done any thing really with a view to support it. It is found, indeed, to exist; and those who find they have not weight enough to destroy it, cover their own particular designs with the pretence of maintaining it. But whether attended to or not, this balance certainly subsists, and needs no other support than itself, if it were to remain uninterrupted: nay, though it should occasionally be disturbed on one side, it presently recovers itself on the other: so that if the princes, who are accused of aspiring to universal monarchy, were really so aspiring, they displayed in this particular much more ambition than judgment; for how could they reflect a moment on such a project, without discovering it to be ridiculous? How could they be insensible, that there is no power in Europe so much superior to the rest, as to be able ever to become their master? Those conquerors, who have brought about great revolutions, have always effected it by the sudden march of unexpected armies; by bringing foreign troops, differently trained to

war, against people disarmed, divided, or undisciplined: But where shall we find an European prince whose forces the others are not acquainted with? where find one to subdue the rest, when the greatest of them all forms so small a part of the whole, and they are all so vigilant against each other's encroachments? Can any one maintain more troops than all the rest? He could not; or, if he could, he would only be the sooner ruined, or his troops would be so much the worse as they were more numerous. Could he have them better disciplined? They would be less in proportion. Besides, military discipline is nearly the same, or shortly will be so, all over Europe. Can he have more money? Pecuniary resources are common, and money never was known to make any great conquests. Could he make a sudden invasion? Want of subsistence, or fortified towns, would every moment oppose his progress. Would he insensibly augment his power and dominion? He will then afford his enemies the means of uniting to resist him: time, money, and men, will soon fail him. Will he create dissensions among other powers, in order to conquer them one after another? The maxims of European policy will render that scheme ineffectual; nor could the weakest of princes be taken in such a snare. In short, not one of them having exclusive resources, the resistance he will meet with must at length equal his efforts; and time will soon repair the casualties of fortune, if not with regard to each particular prince, at least with regard to the general system.

Will it be supposed, that two or three potentates might enter into an agreement to subdue the

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the rest? Be it so. These three potentates, be who they may, will not possess half the power of all Europe. The other parts will, therefore, certainly unite against them; and to succeed, they must be able to subdue a power greater than themselves. Add to this, that the views of any three such powers are too opposite, and their jealousy of each other too great, ever to permit the forming of such a project; and also, that if they had formed it, and actually begun to put it into execution with success, that very success would sow the seeds of dissension among the allied conquerors, as it would be morally impossible that their conquests should be so equally divided that each should be satisfied with his acquisition: in which case the dissatisfied party would of course oppose the progress of the others; who, for the like reasons also, would soon disagree between themselves.

I much doubt if, since the world existed, there ever were seen three, or even two, great potentates, that cordially united to subdue the rest, without quarrelling about the contingencies of the war, or their share of the conquest; and affording, by their misunderstanding, new resources to the weaker party. Thus, suppose what we will, it is highly improbable that any prince, or league of princes, will hereafter be able to effect any considerable and permanent change in the political state of Europe.

Not that I pretend to say that the Alps and Pyreneans, the Rhine or the Sea, are insurmountable obstacles to ambition: but these obstacles are supported by others, which strengthen them, or serve to make states recur to their former limits, whenever they have been occasion-

ally removed. The present system of Europe has its support, in a great measure, in the arts of political negotiations, which almost always balance each other. But it hath a still more solid support in the Germanic body; situated almost in the centre of Europe, keeping the other parts in awe, and serving more effectually perhaps to the support of its neighbours than to that of its own members; a body that is formidable to other states on account of its extent and the number and wealth of its inhabitants, at the same time that it is useful to all by its constitution; which, depriving it of the means and inclination of making conquests, is the rock on which conquerors generally split. It is certain, that, notwithstanding the defects in the constitution of the Empire, the balance of power in Europe will never be destroyed so long as that constitution subsists; that no potentate need be apprehensive of being dethroned by another; but that the treaty of Westphalia will be always the basis of our political system. Thus the law of nations, the study of which is so much cultivated in Germany, appears to be of much greater importance than is generally imagined; being not only the law of Germany, but, in some respects, that of all Europe.

But though the present system is not to be removed, it is for that very reason the more tempestuous; as there subsists between the European powers a kind of continual action and re-action, which, without entirely displacing them, keeps them in constant agitation; their efforts being always ineffectual and always regenerating, like the waves of the ocean, which incessantly agitate its surface without raising it above the shore:

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so that the people are perpetually harrassed, without any sensible advantage being derived from it to their sovereign.

It would be easy for me to deduce the same truth from the particular interests of all the courts in Europe: for I could readily shew, that these interests are so connected as to restrain their forces within reciprocal respect. But the notions of wealth and commerce having given rise to a species of political fanaticism, they occasion such sudden changes in the apparent interests of princes, that no stable maxim can be established upon those which are the true: because at present every thing depends on oeconomic, and most of them whimsical principles, which are taken into the heads of ministers. Be this, however, as it may, commerce, which tends daily to an equilibrium, will, by depriving some potentates of their exclusive advantages, deprive them, at the same time, of one of the greatest means they possessed of giving laws to others *.

If I have insisted on that equal distribution of power which results from the present constitution of Europe, it has been in order to deduce from it an important inference regarding the establishment of a general association: for to form
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* There has been a change of circumstances since I wrote the above; my principle, nevertheless, will always remain true, Thus for example, it is easy to foresee, that, before twenty years are at an end, England, glorious as it now is, will be undone, and will besides have lost the remainder of its liberty. It is generally affirmed, that agriculture flourishes in that island: but for my part, I would venture to lay a wager it is upon its decline. London is daily increasing, the country therefore must be depopulating. The English are proud of being conquerors, it will not therefore be long before they are slaves.

a solid and durable confederacy, it is requisite that all the members of it should be under such reciprocal dependence, that no one of them should be in a capacity to withstand all the rest; and that such particular associations as might injure the general one, should meet with obstacles sufficient to prevent their execution: for, without this, the confederacy would be fruitless, and each member, though under an apparent subjection, would be really independent. Now, if these obstacles are such as I have before described, even at present, when all the powers of Europe are at liberty to make with each other what treaties offensive or defensive they please; let the reader judge what would be the case if one grand confederacy were entered into, armed with power, and always ready to oppose such as would attempt to disturb or destroy it. This suffices to shew, that such an association would not consist of futile deliberations, which each party might disregard with impunity; but that there would arise from it an efficient power, capable of restraining the ambitious within the limits of the General Treaty.

From this state of the case may be deduced three incontestable truths. One is, that, if we except the Turk, there subsists between all the nations of Europe a social connection; which, tho' but imperfect, is still closer than the looser ties of humanity in general. The second is, that the imperfect state of this society makes the condition of those who compose it worse than it would be if they had no society at all among them. The third is, that the primitive ties, which makes this society hurtful, render it, at the same time, improveable, and more easy to be

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be brought to perfection : so that all its constituents might derive their happiness from that which is at present the cause of their misery; and convert that state of war, which now subsists among them, into a perpetual peace.

Let us inquire now in what manner this great work, commenced by fortune, may be compleated by reason ; and how that free and voluntary society, which unites all the European states, assuming the force and solidity of a body truly political, may be converted into a real confederacy. It is indubitable that such an establishment, giving to this association its necessary perfection, would remove its abuses, extend its advantages, and compel all parties to concur to the common good. But to this end it is necessary that no considerable power should refuse to enter into the association ; that a judiciary tribunal should be established, invested with authority to institute such laws and regulations as all the members are to obey ; that this tribunal be invested with a coercive and coactive force to compel each particular state to submit to the result, whether active or restrictive, of the general deliberations ; in short, that it be fixed and durable, to prevent the several members from withdrawing themselves from it at pleasure, whenever they conceive their own particular interests incompatible with the general. These are the tokens by which it might be certainly known if the institution were prudent, useful, and impregnable. We come now to extend this supposition, in order to find out by analysis what effects ought to result from such a confederacy ; what means are proper to establish it,

it, and what reasonable hope may be formed of its being carried into execution.

It is a custom among us, for a kind of general diets to assemble, from time to time, under the appellation of a Congress; to which envoys are solemnly deputed from all the states of Europe, to return back just as they went: for they either meet to say nothing, or to treat of public affairs as if they were private, to deliberate gravely whether the table should be round or square, whether there shall be more or fewer doors to their assembly-room, whether a certain plenipotentiary should sit with his face or his back toward the window, whether another should advance a foot more or less on a visit of ceremony, or on a thousand other points of the like importance, ineffectually debated for these three centuries past, and undoubtedly well worthy to employ the politicians of the present.

It is possible that the members of some one of these assemblies may be endowed with common sense; it is not even impossible that they may be sincerely disposed to the public good; and by the reasons hereafter to be deduced, it may be conceived, that, after having obviated many difficulties, they may have orders from their respective sovereigns to sign the general confederacy; a summary of which I suppose to be contained in the five following articles.

By the first, the contracting sovereigns should establish between themselves a perpetual and irrevocable alliance; appointing plenipotentiaries to hold a fixed and permanent diet, or congress, at a certain place; in which diet all the differences arising between the contracting parties shall

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shall be regulated and decided by way of arbitration.

By the second, the number of sovereigns should be specified whose plenipotentiaries are to have votes in the Congress, with those who should be invited to accede to the treaty; also the order, time, and manner, in which the office of President is to pass from one to another at equal intervals; and, lastly, the respective quota of contributions, and the manner of raising them, to supply the general expences.

By the third, the confederacy should guarantee to each of its members the possession and government of all the states it at present possesses, as well as the elective or hereditary succession, as it may be established by the fundamental laws of each country. In order also to cut off at once the source of disputes incessantly recurring among them, it should be agreed to make the actual possession and the treaties last concluded, the basis of the mutual rights of the contracting powers; who are to renounce for ever and reciprocally all their prior pretensions, except future successions liable to be contested, and other rights in reversion, which are to be determined by arbitration at the diet, without the parties being ever permitted to do themselves justice by force, or to take up arms against each other, under any pretence whatever.

By the fourth, it should be specified that every ally, who shall break the treaty, shall be put under the ban of the empire, and proscribed as a common enemy; that is, if he refuses to comply with the decisions of the diet, makes preparations for war, negotiates treaties repugnant to the confederacy, or takes up arms to resist or
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attack any of the allies. It should be farther agreed also, by the same article, that all the contracting parties shall arm themselves to act offensively, jointly, and at the common expence, against every state put under the ban of the empire, until such state shall lay down its arms, and submit to execute the determinations of the congress, repair the wrongs, reimburse the expence, and even compensate for making preparations for war contrary to treaty.

And, lastly, by the fifth article, the plenipotentiaries of the European confederacy should always be empowered to form, in the diet, such regulations as shall be judged expedient to procure all possible advantage to the whole of the European Republic, and its several members, in consequence of instructions from their respective courts, and having a majority of votes for the proposition of such regulations, and three-fourths five years after for their final determination. But that no alteration shall ever be made in these five fundamental articles, without the unanimous consent of the whole confederacy.

I know not but these articles, thus concisely expressed and couched in general terms, may be liable to a thousand little objections, many of which may require explanations more at large; but little difficulties easily yield to necessity, and are of no consequence in a project of such importance as the present. When the regulation of the Congress itself should come to be minutely considered, no doubt a thousand obstacles will present themselves; but there will be found ten thousand ways of removing them. The point in question now is, Whether, from the nature of things, the project be or be not possible.

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possible. A man might write volumes to no purpose, if every exigence were to be foreseen, and its expedient provided. So long as one adheres to incontestable principles, it is not requisite to convince every one's understanding, to obviate all objections, or to point out particularly how things are to be brought about. It is sufficient to shew, that what is proposed is not impracticable.

What remains, therefore, to be examined, in order to form a judgment of our system? Only two questions; for I would not affront the reader's understanding so much as to offer to prove that peace is, in general, preferable to war.

The first of these questions is, Whether the confederacy proposed will certainly attain the proposed end, and prove sufficient to secure a solid and lasting peace to Europe?

The second is, Whether it be the interest of sovereigns to establish such a confederacy, and buy a constant peace at such a rate?

If the general and particular utility of our project may be thus demonstrated, there will appear no longer any cause, in the reason of things, that can prevent the effects of an establishment that depends altogether on the will of those who are interested in it.

To begin with the discussion of the first article, let us apply what has been already advanced on the general system of Europe, and the common effort which confines each potentate in a certain degree within his own limits, and prevents his encroaching so far as to prove the entire destruction of others. To make my arguments also on this head more clear, I shall here subjoin a list of the nineteen potentates which

may be conceived to constitute our European Republic; each of which having an equal vote, there will of course be nineteen votes in the Congress.

The Emperor of the Romans.

The Emperor of Russia.

The King of France.

The King of Spain.

The King of England.

The States-General.

The King of Denmark.

Sweden.

Poland.

The King of Portugal.

The Sovereign of Rome.

The King Prussia.

The Elector of Bavaria and his associates.

The Elector Palatine and his associates.

The Swiss and their allies.

The Ecclesiastical Electors and their associates.

The Republic of Venice and her associates.

The King of Naples.

The King of Sardinia.

The many less considerable sovereigns, such as the Republic of Genoa, the Dukes of Modena and Parma, with several others omitted in this list, are to be joined to the least powerful of those mentioned, in form of association, enjoying a right to vote with them, after the manner of the *votum curiatum* of the Counts of the Empire. It were useless to give here a more particular enumeration, because accidents may daily arise to give occasion for reforming our project, even to the very moment of putting it in execution. Such accidents, however, make no alteration in the basis of our system.



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One need only cast an eye on the above list, to perceive very evidently, that it is impossible for either of the powers composing it, to be in a situation capable of opposing all the others united; or that any partial league can be formed among them, able to make head against the grand confederacy.

For how would such league be formed? Would it be concerted by some of the most powerful princes? We have already shewn, that even in such a case it could not be durable; and it is now easy to see farther, that it is inconsistent with the general system of every great potentate, and with the interests inseparable from their constitution. Would such a league be concerted between one great state and several small ones? The other great powers, united in one confederacy, would presently crush it: it is indeed natural to suppose, that the grand alliance being always united and armed, it would be easy for it, by virtue of the fourth article, to prevent, or instantly to suppress, every partial and seditious alliance that should tend to disturb the public tranquillity.

Observe what happens in the Germanic body, notwithstanding the abuse of its police, and the great inequality of its members; is there yet one, even of the most powerful, amongst them, that will venture to expose himself to the ban of the Empire, by directly infringing the laws of its constitution? unless he has reason, indeed, to think that the Empire will not act in earnest against him.

I look upon it, therefore, as demonstrated, that, if the European congress were once established, there would be no danger of future re-

bellions; and that though some abuses would probably be introduced, they never could proceed so far as to elude the design of the institution. It remains now to inquire, Whether that design will be properly effected by the institution itself.

To this end, we shall consider the motives which induce princes to take up arms. These are either to make conquests, to defend themselves against invaders, to reduce a too powerful neighbour, to protect the injured, to decide disputes that cannot be amicably adjusted, or, lastly, to enforce obedience to treaties. There can be no cause or pretext for war that may not be ranged under one of these six heads: now it is evident, that not one of all the six can subsist in the new state of things under a confederacy.

In the first place, all hopes of conquest must be given up, from the impossibility of making any; it being certain, that whoever attempts it must be presently stopped in his career by a superior force; so that he will risk the losing his all, while he is sure he cannot gain any thing. Every ambitious prince, desirous to aggrandize himself in Europe, does two things: he begins by strengthening himself with good alliances; after this, he endeavours to surprise his enemy unprovided. But particular alliances will avail nothing against a general and stronger one always subsisting; while princes, having no longer any pretext to take up arms, they cannot take such a step without being perceived, prevented, and punished by the confederacy, which is constantly in arms.

The same reason which takes from each prince the hope of conquest, takes from him also the
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feared of being conquered; his dominions, guaranteed by all Europe, being as well secured to him as the estates of private subjects in a well-governed kingdom; nay more so, even in the same proportion as their sovereign, their sole protector, is less powerful than the potentates of all Europe united.

There would no longer be excited a desire to reduce a neighbouring power, from whom there would be no longer any thing to fear; nor would there even be any temptation to it when there would exist no hopes of success. With regard to the maintenance of the rights of each party, it may be remarked, at first view, that a deal of chicanery, with many obscure and confused pretensions, will be annihilated by the third article of the confederacy; which definitively regulates all the reciprocal rights of the allied sovereigns, on the footing of their actual possessions. Hence all possible pretensions and demands will become clear for the future, and be determined by the congress, as they occasionally arise. Add to this, that if my rights are infringed, I ought to defend them by the same means. Now as no one can encroach upon them by force of arms, without incurring the ban of the congress; so it is no longer necessary that I should by force of arms defend them. The same may be said of slighter injuries, wrongs, and reparations, and of all the unforeseen differences that may arise between sovereigns. The same power which protects their rights, ought also to redress their grievances.

As to the last article, its solution is evident. It is plain, at first sight, that, as there is no aggressor to be feared, there is no need of any de-

sensive treaty; and that, as none could be formore solid and effectual than that of the grand confederacy, every other would be useless, unlawful, and of course null and void.

It is impossible, therefore, that the confederacy being once established, should there remain any seeds of hostility among the confederates, or that the design of a perpetual peace should not be fully accomplished by the execution of the system projected.

It remains now for us to examine the other question, respecting the interests of the several contracting parties: for it is easily discernible, that the public interest may plead in vain against that of individuals. To prove that peace is, in general, preferable to war, would be saying nothing to one who should think he had reasons to prefer war to peace; while to point out the means of establishing a lasting peace, would be only to excite him to oppose it.

It may indeed be said, that sovereigns will, by this project, be deprived of the right of doing themselves justice, or of doing injustice to others, when they please; they will be deprived of the power of aggrandizing themselves; they must renounce that formidable pomp of power with which they delight to terrify the world, and that glory of conquest from which they now derive honour. In fine, they will be reduced to the necessity of being just and peaceable. What will be their indemnification for the loss of all these?

I will not venture to reply, with the Abbe de ST PIERRE, that the real glory of princes consists in their promoting the public good and the happiness of their subjects; that their true interest

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rest depends on their glory, and that the glory they acquire in the opinion of the wise is proportioned to the service they are of to mankind; that the project of a perpetual peace, being the greatest that ever was formed, ought to confer immortal glory on its author; that the putting it into execution, being, in like manner, the most useful to subjects, would be still more glorious to sovereigns; that this enterprize would be particularly the only one unsullied with blood and rapine, with sorrow and execration; and in fine, that the most certain way for a prince to distinguish himself among the herd of kings, is to labour for the public good. Such are the sentiments which, broached in the cabinet of princes, have brought ridicule on the author and his projects. But let us not, like them, despise his reasons: we have nothing to do with the virtues of princes; let us speak of their interests.

All the powers of Europe have real or groundless demands on one another, which are incapable of being clearly ascertained, because there is no constant and common rule by which to determine them, and also because they are often founded on equivocal and uncertain facts. The differences hence arising also are equally indeterminate, as well from want of competent arbitrators, as because each power reclaims, without scruple, those cessions, which have been exacted of him by the more powerful, in the way of treaty, or after unsuccessful wars. It is an error, therefore, to insist only on our claims on others, without reflecting on their claims on us, when there is on neither side either more justice or advantage in the means of enforcing our reciprocal pretensions. No sooner doth any thing
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depend on accident, than the actual possession is of such value, that no wise man will risk it for future profit, even upon an equal chance; whilst all the world must blame a man, who, in easy circumstances, should, in hopes to double his fortune, venture the whole on one cast of the dice.

But it has been made clear, that, even as things now stand, every power ambitious of aggrandizing itself, must meet with a resistance superior to its utmost efforts: whence it follows, that the strongest having no motive for playing, nor the weakest any prospect of winning, it becomes the interest of both, to give up what they covet, in order to secure what they possess.

Let us consider the waste of men, of money, of powers of every kind, and in what manner every state is exhausted even by the most successful war; and compare the injuries it has received with the advantages it has derived from it; we shall find the imaginary winner is still a loser; and that the conqueror, always weaker than before the war commenced, has no other consolation than to see the vanquished more exhausted than himself: while even this advantage is less real than apparent; because the superiority, which may be acquired over an adversary, hath, in the mean time, been lost with regard to neutral powers; which, without varying their situation, grow so much the stronger, with regard to us, as we grow weak.

If all Kings are not yet convinced of the folly of making conquests, it appears, at least, that the wisest of them begin to see that they cost more than they are worth. Without entering into a thousand distinctions on this head,
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which might lead us too far out of the way, it may be said, in general, that a Prince, who, by enlarging his territories, loses as many old subjects as he acquires new, becomes weaker by his acquisition; because, with more territories to defend, he hath no more subjects to defend it.

Now, it is well known, that, as wars are carried on at present, the destruction caused among the soldiery is one of the least causes of the depopulation they occasion. It is there, indeed, that the loss is more immediately felt; but there is occasioned, at the same time, a more important and irreparable loss than that of those who perish, by the want of such as might otherwise be born; by the increase of taxes, by the interruption of commerce, by the desertion of the country and the decrease of agriculture; thus the evil, which is at first hardly perceptible, is cruelly felt in the end; when we are astonished at our having been so weak as to endeavour to become powerful.

But what renders conquests still less interesting, is, that means are known at present, by which princes may increase their power two or three fold, not only without extending their territories, but sometimes by contracting them, as was very wisely done by the Emperor Adrian. It is now obvious, that the power of princes depends on the number of their subjects; and it is a truth naturally arising from what has been advanced, that of two states, containing the same number of inhabitants, that which occupies the smallest territory is actually the most powerful. It is then by means of good laws, by a prudent police, by enlarged views of oeconomy, that a wise sovereign is certain of augmenting
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his forces, without putting any thing to the hazard: the real conquests he makes over his neighbours are the useful establishments he forms within his own kingdoms; while every additional new-born subject increases his power as much as if he had destroyed an enemy.

It must not be here objected, that I prove too much, in that, if things were as I represent them, each prince having an interest in abstaining from war, and his particular interests uniting with the general to the preservation of peace, such peace ought naturally to establish and support itself without a confederacy. This would be to reason very badly on the present state of things: for, though it would certainly prove more advantageous to all parties to be constantly at peace, the general want of security in this case has this effect, that each party, being uncertain of keeping out of wars, strives to commence hostilities at least with advantage, on every favourable occasion; whence it happens, that many, and these even offensive, wars, proceeds from the unjust precaution of securing one's own possessions, rather than from the design of usurping those of others. However salutary, indeed, all public-spirited maxims may be in general, it is certain, that, if we consider them only in a political, nay, even sometimes in a moral view, they become hurtful to the party who perseveres in the practices of them towards the rest of the world, when nobody will practise them towards him.

I have nothing to say on the parade of arms; because, being destitute of all solid foundation, whether of hope or fear, such parade is mere childrens play, and monarchs ought not to dandle

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dance puppets. I shall be as silent also on the glory of conquerors; because if there be some monsters who regret the want of objects to massacre, they ought not to be reasoned with, but deprived of the means of gratifying their sanguinary fury.

The guaranty of the third article superseding all motives for making war, there can be no better reason for any potentate's declaring it against others, than they will have for commencing hostilities against him: at the same time, it is certainly a great advantage to be secured from the risk of being in the situation wherein one is singly opposed to all.

With regard to the dependence of each party on the common tribunal, it is very clear, that it will not diminish their separate claims to sovereignty; but will, on the contrary, rather confirm such claims; which are rendered more certain by the third article; according to which, each power guarantees not only its own states against all foreign invasion, but also its sovereign authority over its subjects. Thus princes will not become the less absolute for entering into this confederacy, but will be more immoveably fixed on their respective thrones; while, by submitting to the judgment of the Congress in their disputes with their equals, and by divesting themselves of the dangerous power of seizing upon the property of others, they will render their actual rights more secure, by renouncing those which are false or doubtful. Add to this, that there is a wide difference between a dependence on others, and on a body-corporate, of which each party is always a member, and in his turn the president: for in the latter case,
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his independency is only the more ascertained by the guarantees afforded him. It would be alienated in the hands of a master, but is confirmed in those of associates.

This is confirmed by the example of the Germanic body; for, though the sovereignty of its members be varied, in many respects, by the constitution of the Empire, and are of course in a less agreeable situation than they might be as members of the European confederacy, there is nevertheless not one among them, how jealous soever he may be of his authority, who would render his independence absolute, were it in his power, by detaching himself from the rest of the Empire.

It is farther to be observed also, that the Germanic body, having a permanent chief, his authority is constantly tending to usurpation; a circumstance that could never happen in the European Congress, where the presidentship would be alternate, and no respect would be had to the inequality of the several potentates.

To all these considerations may be added another, still more important to people who are so fond of money as princes always are: this is, the facility of amassing a great quantity, from the advantages resulting, both to them and their people, from a perpetual peace; considering the vast expence that will be saved in the article of military preparations, in the keeping up of fortifications, and the support of numerous troops, which eat up the revenues, and become every day more burdensome both to prince and subject.

I am sensible it is not convenient for sovereigns to disband all their forces, and to have no troops ready to repel sudden invaders, and to suppress
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popular insurrections. I am sensible, also, that the several members of the confederacy will be obliged to furnish their contingents, as well for guarding the frontiers of Europe, as for the support of the confederate army destined occasionally to enforce the determinations of the Congress. But when all those charges are defrayed, and the extraordinary expences of war totally suppressed, there will still be a saving of more than half the present military expences; which will lessen the burden laid on the subject, and fill the coffers of the sovereign: so that the people will be subject to much fewer taxes; and the prince, being much enriched, would be enabled to give encouragement to trade, agriculture, and arts, as well as to lay the foundation of useful establishments that would still farther increase his and his people's wealth. Add to this, that the independence of the state would derive from such means a much greater security than it could do from the maintenance of national troops, and that military pomp, which is constantly exhausting it in the midst of peace.

It will be said, perhaps, that the frontier-countries would be then in a more disadvantageous situation, and would still have as many wars to maintain against the Turks, the Tartars, and the Corsairs of Africa.

To this I answer, first, That those countries are, as it is, in the same circumstances; and that therefore our project would be of no positive disadvantage to them, though less advantageous than it might be to others; this being an unavoidable inconvenience, to which their situation naturally exposes them. Secondly, That by being freed from any apprehensions of

danger on the side of Europe, they would be much better able to oppose their other enemies. Thirdly, That the demolition of the fortresses in the interior parts of Europe, and the saving of the expences necessary for their support, would enable the confederacy to establish a great number of fortresses on the frontiers, without expence to any particular member. Fourthly, That such fortresses, built, garrisoned, and maintained at the common expence, would prove a security, as well as a saving of charges, to the potentates on the frontiers, whose states they would more immediately protect. Fifthly, That the troops of the confederacy, stationed on the confines of Europe, would be always ready to repel any invader. And, sixthly, That a body so powerful as the European Republic, would be too formidable to foreign princes, for them to entertain a design of attacking any of its members; since we see the Germanic body, though much less powerful, is yet sufficiently so to awe its neighbours into respect, and to afford an useful protection to the princes composing it.

It may be objected farther, that, should the Europeans cease to make war on each other, the military art would soon fall into neglect and oblivion; that their troops would lose their courage and discipline; that there would no longer exist either generals or soldiers; and that Europe would thus lie at the mercy of the first foreign invader.

To this I reply, that one of these two things must happen; either that our neighbours of the other parts of the world would make war on Europe, or that they would respect the confederacy so much as to leave it in peace.

Now

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Now, in the first case, there would be opportunities enough of cultivating military talents, in raising and forming troops. The armies of the confederacy would be, in that respect, the school of Europe; people would repair to the frontiers to learn the art of war, while the arts of peace would flourish in the interior parts, and thus the advantages of both would be united. Can it be thought necessary that we should be always cutting one another's throats, to cultivate the art of war? or are the French less brave, because the provinces of Anjou and Touraine are at peace with each other?

In the second case, it must be owned, that no opportunity would be left of cultivating the military art; but then there would remain no longer any necessity for it. For, what purpose would it serve to train people to arms, who would have no enemy to attack? And which is to be preferred, the cultivation of a destructive art, or the project that renders it useless? If a secret were existing, by means of which mankind might enjoy constant health, would it not be absurd to reject it, because it would deprive the Physicians of the opportunities of acquiring experience? It remains to be shewn which of the two arts, in this parallel, is most salutary, and best deserves to be retained.

Let us not be terrified with a sudden invasion; it is well known that Europe has, on that score, nothing to fear, and that this first invader will never appear. This is not a time for the irruptions of Barbarians, who seemed to drop in swarms from the clouds. Since we have been able to take a nearer survey of the whole surface of the earth, nothing can approach

us, that may not be seen at a great distance. There is no potentate in the world, at present, in a situation formidable against all Europe. And if ever there should be such a power, either we shall have time to prepare ourselves, or shall be at least in a better situation to oppose him, being united in one body, than when our long disputes are to be terminated at once, in order to patch up an hasty union.

Thus we have shewn, that all the pretended inconveniencies of such a confederacy are, on examination, reducible to nothing. We now ask, if any man in the world will venture to affirm as much of those inconveniencies which arise from the present manner of deciding the disputes of sovereigns by the law of the strongest? That is to say, from that impolitic state of war, which necessarily results from the absolute and mutual independence of sovereigns, in the imperfect state of society which at present subsists between them in Europe?

To be better able to judge of these latter inconveniencies, I shall just recapitulate a summary of them in a few words; and leave it to the reader's examination.

1. No one's rights are secured but those of the strongest.
2. Continual and unavoidable changes in the relations subsisting between nations, which hinder any of them from fixing in their own hands the power they actually possess.
3. No perfect security for any power till its neighbours be subdued or destroyed.
4. The general impossibility of destroying them; as even by destroying one, others are formed.
5. The precautions and immense expences attendant on being always upon one's guard.
6. The want of

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of forces and of defence in minorities and revolts; for when the state is divided, who can support one party against the other? 7. The want of security for the performance of mutual engagements. 8. Justice is never to be obtained from others without great loss and expence, nor always then; while the object in dispute seldom proves an indemnification. 9. The unavoidable risk princes run of losing their dominions, and sometimes their lives, in the prosecution of their rights. 10. The necessity of taking a part in the quarrels of neighbours, and of being drawn into a war contrary to one's inclination. 11. The interruption of trade and public supplies, at a time when they are most required. 12. The continual danger from a powerful neighbour, if one is weak, and from a league, if one is strong. 13. The inutility of prudence with regard to what is subject to fortune; the perpetual destruction of people; the diminution of the strength of the state both from good and ill success; the total impossibility of establishing a good government, of accounting any thing one's own, and rendering either ourselves or others happy.

Let us recapitulate, in the same manner, the advantages which the confederate princes of Europe will reap from arbitration.

1. Absolute security that their present and future differences will be always terminated without a war; a security incomparably more useful to sovereigns, than that of never being engaged in a law-suit would be to any of their subjects.

2. The removal of all subjects in dispute, or their reduction to little or nothing, by the cessa-

tion of all former pretensions; which will compensate for what they give up, and secure what they possess.

3. Complete and constant security for the person, family, and dominions of the prince, and of the order of succession fixed by the laws of each country, as well against the ambitious views of unjust pretenders, as against the revolts of rebellious subjects.

4. Perfect security for the execution of all reciprocal engagements between prince and prince, by the guaranty of the whole European republic.

5. Perfect and perpetual liberty and security, in regard to commerce, as well that carried on between the states of the confederacy, as that carried on separately by each state with distant nations.

6. A total and perpetual suppression of the extraordinary military expence, both by sea and land, in times of war, and even a considerable diminution of the ordinary expences in time of peace.

7. The sensible progress of agriculture and population, with the increasing wealth of the people and the revenue of the prince.

8. The facilitating all establishments, which may redound to the glory and authority of the sovereign, increase the public resources, or promote the happiness of the people.

I now leave the reader, as I before observed, to his examination of all these articles, and to form a comparison between the state of peace resulting from the proposed confederacy, and the state of war which results from the present impolitic state of Europe.

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If we have reasoned rightly in laying down this project, it has been demonstrated, first, That the establishment of a perpetual peace depends solely on the consent of the respective sovereigns, and that there is no other obstacle to it than their opposition. Secondly, That this establishment would be every way useful; and that no comparison is to be made, even with regard to them, between the inconveniences and advantages resulting from it. Thirdly, That it is reasonable to suppose their inclination will agree with their interests. And, lastly, that this establishment, if once formed on the plan proposed, would be solid and lasting, and perfectly answer the end designed. We cannot, indeed, take upon us to say, that the sovereigns of Europe will actually adopt our project, (who can answer for the judgment of others?) but we can safely say, they would adopt it, if they knew their true interests: for it should be observed, that we have not supposed men to be such as they ought to be, good, generous, disinterested, and public-spirited from motives of humanity; but, on the contrary, such as they really are, unjust, avaricious, and more solicitous for their private interest than that of the public. The only supposition we have made, is, that mankind have sense enough in general to know what is useful to them, and fortitude enough to embrace the means of their own happiness. Should our project, nevertheless, fail of being put into execution, it will not be neglected because it is chimerical, but because the world is absurd, and there is a kind of absurdity in being wise among fools.

AN
EXPOSTULATORY
LETTER
FROM
J. J. ROUSSEAU,
Citizen of GENEVA.
TO
CHRISTOPHER de BEAUMONT,
Archbishop of PARIS.
TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,
The MANDATE of the said Prelate,
AND ALSO
The Proceedings of the Parliament of Paris,
relative to the New Treatise on Education
entitled EMILIUS.

*Da veniam si quid liberius dixi, non ad contumeliam tuam, sed ad
defensionem meam. Prasumpsi enim de gravitate et prudentia
tua, quia potes considerare quantam mihi respondendi necessitatem
imposueris.* AUG. Epist. 23^a. ad PASCENT.

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PROCEEDINGS
IN THE
PARLIAMENT of PARIS.

ENTERED, this day, the officers of our Lord the King; M. Omer-Joly de Fleury, advocate of our said Lord the King, presenting an information to the Court, against a work entitled *Emilius*, &c. by J. J. Rousseau, citizen of Geneva, in words and to the effect following:

That the said work appears to be composed only with a view to re-establish natural religion; the author labouring, in the plan of education he affects to pursue with his pupil, to illustrate and recommend that criminal system.

That the author affects to instruct his said pupil according to nature, which he makes his only guide in the formation of his moral man; that he regards all religions as equally salutary, and as having all their peculiar reasons in the climate, government, genius of the people, or other local cause, which makes the one preferable to another only according to the circumstances of time and place.

That he would have man confine himself to that kind of knowledge which instinct alone prompts him to pursue; pretending that the passions are the principal instruments of our preservation; and asserting that men may be saved without believing in God, on the supposition of an invincible ignorance, which he maintains
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some persons may lie under with regard to the Deity, and which will excuse their unbelief. That, according to the principles of this writer, we should be directed in the choice of a religion by reason only; by the dictates of which we should also leave the mode of that worship which mankind are to pay, to the Supreme Being; whom the author affects to honour, in speaking with impiety of those external ceremonies of religion, which that Being hath established, or the church hath prescribed, under the direction and influence of his holy Spirit.

That, in consequence of this system of admitting no other than natural religion, whatever form it assume among different people, he hath endeavoured to disprove the truth of the holy scriptures and prophecies, the certainty of the miracles contained in the sacred writings, the infallibility of revelation, and the authority of the church: that, in recurring on every occasion to this natural religion, he undertakes to justify not only all religions indiscriminately, pretending that salvation may be found in all; but even the infidelity and scepticism of all those whom we may in vain endeavour to convince of the divinity of Jesus Christ and the truth of the Christian religion, which alone hath God for its author, and with regard to which he carries his blasphemy so far, as to treat it as ridiculous and contradictory, and to inculcate a sacrilegious indifference for its mysteries and tenets; all which he endeavours to destroy.

That such are the impious and detestable principles which the writer proposes to establish in his said treatise; throughout which he subjects religion to the examination of reason, which
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can establish only mere human creeds, and which admits of no other truths or dogmas in religion than such as it may please the understanding, left to its own light, or rather its own darkness, to receive or reject.

That to these impieties the author hath added many indecent details and illustrations directly contrary to modesty and decorum, as well as pretensions tending odiously and falsely to misrepresent the sovereign authority, to destroy the principles of that obedience which is due to it, and to lessen the respect and affection of the subjects for their kings.

That the informants conceive these instances sufficient to give the court an idea of the work in question: that the maxims which are scattered throughout, unite to form a chimerical system, as impracticable in the execution, as absurd and criminal in its design: that subjects educated in such maxims could not fail of being prejudiced in favour of scepticism and toleration; of being abandoned to their passions, and devoted to the pleasures of sense; of becoming deaf to every thing but the voice of nature; and of substituting, instead of the noble desire of true glory, this pernicious phrenzy of singularity. What rules for the formation of manners! What members of church and state must such children prove who are educated in principles that are equally shocking to the citizen and Christian!

That the author of the said book, not having scrupled to set his name to the work, cannot be too expeditiously prosecuted; for that it is of importance, since he is known, that justice should make an example as well of the writer, as of those who may be discovered to have assist-

ed either in the printing or distributing a work that deserves, together with its author and publisher, to be treated with the greatest severity.

That such is the substance of the written information, now left, with a copy of the book, in court. On this the officers retired.

The matter of the said information having been taken into consideration, it is resolved by the Court, That the said printed book, entitled *Emilius*, &c. be torn to pieces and burnt, in the court of the palace, at the foot of the grand stairs, by the common executioner. All persons possessed of copies of the said book, are also enjoined to bring them to the register of the court, in order to have them suppressed. And all booksellers are expressly forbidden to print, sell, or publish the said book; as are also all hawkers and others, either to vend or distribute the same, under pain of being immediately prosecuted to the utmost severity of the law. It is also ordered by the Court, at the request of the King's Attorney-general, That information be taken before the reporting counsel of all such writers as may be found in Paris; and before the lieutenants-criminal of their respective bailiwicks, of all such as may offer, without the said city, to give evidence against the author, printers, or venders of the said book. That the said information, when taken, be communicated to the King's Attorney-general; to be proceeded on as he shall judge proper, or the Court order relating thereto. It is further ordered, That the said J. J. Rousseau, mentioned in the title-page of the said book, be in the mean time apprehended, taken, and committed to the prisons of the Conciergerie of the palace, in order to be heard

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heard and interrogated before the said reporting counsel, touching the matter of the said book; and to answer to the information which the Attorney-general hath taken against him: and in case the said J. J. Rousseau cannot be apprehended and taken, on search after his person, for fourteen days, that his effects be seized, and an inventory thereof be taken, and lodged in the hands of the commissaries appointed for that purpose, till the said Rousseau shall appear agreeable to this order. And to these purposes it is ordered, that a copy of the said book be left with the register of this court, to serve for the instructions relative to the process. Ordered, lastly, That the present arret be printed, published, and stuck up wherever it may be thought requisite. Done in parliament, *June 9, 1762.*

Signed, Du FRANC.

On Friday the 11th of *June 1762*, the above-mentioned book was torn to pieces, and burned at the foot of the great stair-case of the palace, by the public executioner, in the presence of me Etienne Dagobert Ysabeau, one of the three principal commissaries of the great chamber, assisted by the two serjeants of the court.

Signed YSABEAU.

THE
M A N D A T E
OF THE
ARCHBISHOP of PARIS;

Condemning the New Treatise on Education, entitled Emilius, &c. by J. J. Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva.

CHristopher de Beaumont, by the grace of God, and by favour of the holy apostolic see, archbishop of Paris, duke of St Cloud, peer of France, commander of the order of the Holy Ghost, patron of the Sorbonne, &c. to all the faithful of our diocese, health and benediction.

St Paul, my dear brethren, hath foretold, that perilous times should come, in which men should be lovers of themselves, proud, blasphemers, unholy, false accusers, high-minded, lovers of pleasures more than of God, men of corrupt minds, reprobates concerning the faith *. And in what times hath this prediction been more literally fulfilled than in the present ! Infidelity, encouraged by the passions, presents itself in every shape, in order to accommodate itself in some measure to persons of all ages, characters, and conditions of life. Sometimes, in order

* 2 Tim. iii. 1, 4, 8.

order to insinuate itself into the minds of those who are captivated with trifles, it assumes a light, agreeable, and frivolous style; hence we see a numerous tribe of romances, equally impious and obscene, whose sole end is to divert the imagination, with a view to seduce the understanding and to corrupt the heart. Sometimes, assuming an air of sublimity, it affects to recur to the first principles of human knowledge, and pretends to deduce from thence authority for casting off a yoke said to be disgraceful to humanity, even that of divinity itself. Sometimes it furiously declaims against religious zeal, and in a rage preaches up universal toleration. And again, sometimes, uniting all the different modes of language, it mingles gravity with mirth, the maxims of purity with those of charity, truth with error, and religion with blasphemy; endeavouring, in a word, to reconcile light with darkness, and Christ with Belial. This, my dear brethren, appears in a particular manner the object of a recent publication, entitled *Emilius*, &c. A writer hath here started up, who, educated in the midst of error, is full of the language of philosophy, though no true philosopher: possessed of a multiplicity of knowledge, which nevertheless hath not served to enlighten his understanding, he hath made use of it to darken the understanding of others; he is given up to paradoxes both in opinion and practice, uniting simplicity of manners with ostentation of doctrine, a zeal for ancient maxims with a passion for establishing the most singular novelties, the obscurity of retirement with a desire of being known to the whole world. We have seen his invectives against those very sci-

ences which he himself cultivated : we hear him acknowledge the excellence of the gospel, while he is endeavouring to depreciate its tenets ; and see him describing the beauty of virtue, at the same time that he is striving to extinguish the love of it in the hearts of his readers. He hath assumed the preceptorship of human kind, in order to deceive them ; he hath erected himself into a public monitor, to lead the world astray ; and hath played the oracle of the age, in order to complete its destruction. In a former treatise, on the Inequality of Mankind, he hath reduced man to a level with the brutes : in another production, still more recent, he hath insinuated all the poison of inordinate pleasure, under pretence of prohibiting it : and, in the present, he takes advantage of the earliest moments of life, to establish in the mind of man the maxims of irreligion and infidelity.

What a horrid enterprise, my dear brethren ! The education of youth is one of the most important objects of the zeal and solicitude of the pastors of the church. We are sensible that, in order to reform the world, as far as the weakness and corruption of our nature will permit, it would be sufficient to observe, under the direction and impressions of grace, the dawnings of human reason, and to direct it in the way that leads to all truth. By such means, the mind, as yet exempt from prejudice, may be put for ever on its guard against error ; and the heart, as yet a stranger to the violent passions, may receive impressions of every virtue. But to whom doth it more properly belong, than to us and our fellow-labourers in the ministry, thus to watch over the early progress of Christian youth ; to
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furnish them with the spiritual milk of the word, so that they may grow in grace †; to prepare them betimes, by salutary exhortations, to be sincere worshippers of the true God, faithful subjects to their king, and men worthy to become the support and ornament of their country?

Now the author of *Emilius*, my dear brethren, hath laid down a plan of education, which, so far from being consistent with Christianity, is not even calculated to form either good citizens or good men. Under the vain pretence of restoring man to himself, and educating his pupil agreeable to nature, he assumes as a maxim, an assertion contradictory not only to the doctrines of religion, but also to the experience of all ages and nations. "We lay it down, says he, as an incontestable maxim, that the first emotions of nature are always right; and that there is no original perversity in the human heart." How contradictory is this to the doctrines of the holy Scripture and the church, respecting the change made in our nature by the fall! In this maxim, we lose sight of that divine ray which discovers to us the mystery of our own hearts. Yes, my dear brethren, we find within us a striking mixture of greatness and meanness, of a passion for truth and a love of error, of an inclination to virtue and a tendency to vice: an astonishing contrast, which, disconcerting the pagan philosophers, left them to blunder on in vain speculations! A contrast, of which revelation discloses the source, in the deplorable disobedience of our first parents! In consequence of their defection it is, that man finds himself drawn by a fatal tendency to vice: and how is he

he to resist and stand against it, if his infancy be not conducted by preceptors replete with attention, virtue, and prudence; and if, during the whole course of his life, he doth not, under the protection and by the grace of God, make continual and forcible efforts against it? Alas! my dear brethren, in spite of the most careful and virtuous education, in spite of the most encouraging promises and dreadful menaces of religion, the failings of youth are still too frequent, too numerous. Into what errors, into what excesses, do they not, when left alone, precipitate themselves! The torrent breaks in upon them, in spite of the strongest mounds that may be thrown up to oppose it: what would be the case, then, if no obstacle were raised to break its efforts and divert its force?

The author of *Emilius*, who professes to be of no religion, points out the way, nevertheless, without designing it, which leads infallibly to true religion. "How shall we, says he, who, on all occasions, pretend to cast off the yoke of authority; we who pay no regard to opinion; who would teach our pupil nothing but what he might have learnt himself in any country; in what religion shall we educate *Emilius*? To what sect shall we unite the man of nature? The answer appears to me very simple: We shall unite him neither to one nor another; but place him in a proper situation, and qualify him to make choice of that which the best use of his reason may induce him to adopt."

Would to God, my dear brethren, this object had been attained! Had the author really qualified his pupil to make choice of that religion which the best use of his reason would have

have induced him to adopt, he would infallibly have prepared him for receiving the doctrines of Christianity. For certain it is, my dear brethren, that the light of nature conducts to the light of the gospel; and the duty of a Christian is indeed a *reasonable* service †. In fact, if the best use of our reason does not lead us to the Christian revelation, our faith is in vain, and our hope of none effect. But in what manner you may say, doth the best use of our reason, conduct us to the inestimable blessing of faith, and from thence to the precious assurance of salvation? It is to reason itself, that we may safely appeal. If we acknowledge a God, our great concern is next to know whether he hath condescended to speak to mankind in another manner than by the works of nature. To determine this, we must examine if the evidence of the facts on which revelation is founded be not superior to all the efforts of the most artful chicanery.

Infidelity hath often attempted to invalidate the evidence of these facts, and as often hath been convinced of its importance. God hath borne witness of himself in the holy Scriptures, and this testimony is most worthy of belief. What remains, therefore, for a man who makes the best use of his reason, but to acquiesce in this testimony? It is thy grace, O Lord, which completes this work of illumination; it is that which determines the will, which forms the heart of the Christian; but it is the display of its evidence, and the force of its motives, that previously employ and purify the understanding; and in this work, not less noble than indispensable, consists that best use of our reason, which

† Rom. xii. 1.

the author of *Emilius* undertakes to speak of, without having any fixed or certain idea concerning it.

In order that a youth should possess the requisite docility to receive his tutor's instructions, this author would have him be destitute of every principle of religion. His reason for which extraordinary document is this: "To know good from evil, and to be sensible of the duties of a man, is not the province of a child.—I should as soon, adds he, require a child to be five feet high, as to have judgement at ten years of age." Doubtless, my dear brethren, the human understanding hath its progress, and is improved by degrees: but doth it thence follow, that a child at ten years of age should not know the difference between good and evil; that he should confound prudence with folly, good nature with cruelty, and virtue with vice? May he not be sensible, at that age, that obedience to his parents is a virtue, and disobedience a vice? To assert he is not, my dear brethren, is to calumniate human nature, in supposing it capable of a degree of stupidity to which it is a stranger. "Every child who believes in God, says this author, is an idolater or an anthropomorphite." But, if it be an idolater, it must believe in many gods, and attribute the divine nature to insensible images. If it be only an anthropomorphite, it invests the true God with a corporeal form. Now we can suppose neither the one nor the other of a child who is educated a Christian. Its education may possibly be deficient in this particular; but it is highly unjust to impute that to religion, which is only owing to the defects of instruction. Add to this, that it cannot be

expected a boy of ten years of age should be a philosopher; hence, though he may be well taught, he may but ill explain himself: but, when we teach him that the Deity is of a different nature from objects of sense; that, possessed of infinite intelligence, and supreme power, it executes whatever it pleases; we certainly give him such a notion of God as is adapted to his understanding. It is not to be doubted that an atheist might easily perplex and confound such a young believer with his artful sophisms: but not all his address can make it appear, that, when a child so instructed believes in God, he is nothing more than an idolater or anthropomorphite; that is to say, that he believes only in the existence of a chimera.

But this author, my dear brethren, goes still farther, and denies that even a young man of fifteen is capacitated to believe in God. Man at that age, therefore, must be supposed not to know whether there is a God or not; it is in vain the works of nature display the glory of their Creator, he understands not their expressive language. It must be supposed that he exists without knowing to whom he owes existence; and that reason itself contributes to involve him in this ignorance and darkness. It is thus, my dear brethren, that blind impiety endeavours to darken, with the clouds of obscurity, the torch which religion presents to mankind in every period of human life. St Augustine reasoned justly on other principles, when, in speaking of his early years, he said, "I fell, at that time, Lord, into the hands of those who are careful to call on thy name; and comprehended by their discourses concern-

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ing thee, and agreeable to the capacity of my tender years, that thou wert something great; and that, although invisible, and removed beyond the reach of our senses, thou couldst hear our prayers and relieve us. Hence I began, from my very infancy, to address thee by prayer, and to regard thee as my protector and my support; the earliest employment of my tongue being to call on thy holy name *."

Let us go on, my dear brethren, to the farther unaccountable paradoxes of the author of *Emilius*. Let us see whether, after having reduced young persons to such a state of profound ignorance with respect to the attributes of the Deity, he will admit them to know more of themselves. Do they know whether they are possessed of a soul distinct from the body? Or do they look on themselves as beings purely material and subject to the laws of mechanism? The author of *Emilius* doubts whether it be time to teach a pupil, even at eighteen years of age, that he hath a soul; pretending, that "if he learns it sooner, he runs a risk of never knowing it so long as he lives." But will he not admit, that youth may be sensible of their moral duties? No. If we believe our author, "There are none but physical objects that will interest children, particularly those whose vanity is not yet excited, and that are not corrupted by the poison of prejudice."

Agreeable to these notions, he would have all the pains we take in the earlier part of education confined to what is material and terrestrial in man. Exercise, says he, their bodies, their organs,

* Lib. I. Confess. chap. ix.

gans, their natural forces; but keep the soul as inactive as possible.

This mental indolence and inactivity appears to him necessary, in order to dispose the mind to receive those errors he means to inculcate. But to think of instructing mankind in wisdom, at a season when their growing passions are most prevalent, is to inculcate it in a manner which the author himself explodes.

How opposite, my dear brethren, is such a mode of education as this, to that which right reason and true religion unitedly dictate! These require that a prudent and vigilant preceptor should be on the watch, as it were, to discover in the pupil the first dawnings of intelligence, in order to captivate the understanding with the beauty of truth; and for the first emotions of the heart, in order to engage it by the charms of virtue. How much better is it, in fact, to prevent obstacles, than to leave them to be surmounted? How much is it to be feared, if the impressions of vice should precede the precepts of virtue, that men, when arrived at a certain age, will want both courage and will to resist vicious allurements? Doth not happy experience daily demonstrate, that persons educated in virtuous principles, recovering from the irregularities of an ill-spent youth, return at last to the salutary practice of those maxims they were taught in their childhood?

We need not however be surprised, my dear brethren, that this author defers so long the knowledge of the existence of a Deity, when he doth not believe it necessary to salvation.

“It is clear, (says he, in the character of an imaginary personage,) that a man may, under

some circumstances, live to grow old without believing in God ; and yet he would not, for that reason, be deprived of his presence in the other world, if his unbelief was involuntary."

Observe, my dear brethren, the author does not mean here a person who is incapable of the use of reason, but merely one whose reason might have received no assistance from information. Now such a pretence is absurd, particularly on the system of this writer, who affirms human reason to be absolutely perfect. St Paul indeed assures us, that, among the Pagan philosophers, many had, by the force of reason alone, arrived at the knowledge of the true God. " That which may be known of God, saith the apostle, is manifest in them ; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead : so that they are without excuse ; because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools †."

Now, if such was the crime of these men, who, being subjected by the prejudices of their education to the worship of idols, yet did not fail to attain to the knowledge of the true God ; how can those, who have no such obstacles to surmount, be so innocent and blameless as to merit the enjoyment of the presence of God in another life ? how can they be excusable, (possessed of right reason as our author supposes,)

* Rom. i. 19.

poses,) in having contemplated during this life the magnificent prospect of the universe, and yet remain ignorant of its Creator, Preserver, and Governor?

The same writer, my dear brethren, takes openly the side of scepticism with regard to creation and the unity of God. Thus he makes the same imaginary personage say, "I believe that the world is governed by a wise and powerful Will. I see it, or rather I feel it, and this is of importance for me to know: but is the world eternal, or is it created? Are things derived from one self-sufficient principle, or are there two or more? And what is their essence? Of all this I know nothing, nor do I see that it is of any consequence I should.—I give up all such idle disquisitions, which serve only to make me discontented with myself, are useless in practice, and superior to my understanding." What is it this daring author means to say? He believes the world to be governed by a wise and powerful Will; he confesses it is of importance to him to know this: and yet he knows not, he says, whether things are derived from one self-existent principle, or from many; and he pretends it is of little consequence whether he doth or no. If there be really a wise and powerful Being who governs the world, is it conceivable that he should not be the sole principle or efficient cause of all things? And can it be more important to know one than the other? What a contradiction! He knows nothing of the nature of God; and yet presently after he acknowledges this Supreme Being to be possessed of intelligence, power, will, and goodness; is not this to have an idea of the divine nature? The uni-

ty of God appears to him a futile and indeterminate question; as if the notion of a multiplicity of gods were not the greatest of all absurdities. *The plurality of Gods*, says Tertullian very expressively, tends to the nullity of God. To admit a God, is to admit a supreme and independent Being, to which all other beings are subordinate. This writer insinuates, therefore, that there are many gods.

It is not surprising, my dear brethren, that a man who gives into such errors respecting the Deity, should stand up to oppose the religion he hath revealed. According to this author, all revelations in general debase the Deity, in ascribing to him human passions. "So far from giving us enlightened notions of the Supreme Being, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the most obscure and confused ideas. To the inconceivable mysteries by which the Deity is hid from our view, they add the most absurd contradictions."

We may, with much greater justice, my dear brethren, reproach this author with inconsistency and absurdity. It is he who degrades the Deity, who confounds and debases our notions of that great Being, by directly disputing his essence, and questioning his unity.

He is sensible that the truth of the Christian revelation is proved by facts; but concerning the miracles constituting the principal evidence of that revelation, he cries out, "Who were witnesses to these miracles?—Men—Always human testimony! It is always men that tell me what other men have told them. What a number of these are constantly between me and the Deity!" To justify this complaint, my dear bre-

brethren, we ought to be able to affirm that a revelation must be false when it is not made to every individual; we ought to be able to say, "God cannot require us to believe any thing he hath said, unless he had particularly addressed himself to us." But are there not an infinite number of facts, even prior to that of the Christian revelation, of which it would be absurd to doubt? Now by what means do we acquire the knowledge of these facts but by human testimony? By what other means did our author himself become acquainted with Sparta, with Athens, and with Rome, on whose laws, manners, and heroes, he lavishes such extravagant encomiums? What a number of men there must have been between him and the events which relate to the origin and catastrophe of those ancient republics! What a number of men between him and even the historians that have transmitted to us an account of those events! The scepticism of our author, therefore, with regard to this particular, is evidently founded on nothing but his own infidelity.

"What if a man (says he, a little farther) should come and harangue us in the following manner: *I come, ye mortals, to announce to you the will of the Most High; acknowledge in my voice that of him who sent me. I command the sun to move backwards, the stars to change their places, the mountains to disappear, the waves to remain fixed on high, and the earth to wear a different aspect.* Who would not, at the sight of such miracles, immediately attribute them to the Author of nature?" Who would not think, my dear brethren, that a writer who speaks in this manner wanted only to be a witness to a

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miracle, to become a Christian? But hear what he says further: "The most important examination, after all, remains to be made into the doctrines delivered.—After proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, you are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by that of the doctrine.—Now, what is to be done in this case? There is but one step to be taken, To recur to reason, and leave miracles to themselves: better indeed had it been never to have had recourse to them." That is, my dear brethren, as much as to say, "Shew me a miracle, and I will believe; and yet, when you have shewn me a miracle, I will not believe." What inconsistency and absurdity! But it is well known, that, in the affair of miracles, we do not admit that sophistry with which the author of this treatise reproaches us.

When the doctrine is acknowledged to be divine, and to be founded on the truth of positive revelation, we make use of it, indeed, to judge of the miracles; that is, to reject the pretended prodigies which impostors may set up against such doctrine. When the point in question is an entire new doctrine, which is said to be dictated by the Spirit of God, miracles are produced as proofs of it: that is to say, the person who assumes the character of a missionary from the Most High, confirms his mission and the doctrines he preaches by miracles, which are the testimony of God himself. Thus the doctrine and the miracles are made use of respectively, according to the different points of view in which they are placed, in the study or illustration of religion. But in this there is no abuse of argument, ridiculous sophistry, or absurd

fur'd reasoning in a circle, as hath been frequently demonstrated by those who have undertaken to obviate this trite objection. Nor is it probable that the author of *Emilius* should be ignorant of these demonstrations: but according to the plan he hath pursued, of throwing obscurity on all revealed religion and supernatural operations, he maliciously imputes to us such arguments as are disgraceful to reason. Thus he represents us as enthusiasts, whom a false and blinded zeal urges on to prove two principles, one by the other, without any diversity in the state of the question or method. Where, my good brethren, is that philosophical candour, that sincerity, of which this writer makes so great a boast?

Will it be believed, that, after having taken the greatest pains to invalidate the human testimony of the Christian revelation, the same author should pay it the most solemn and positive deference imaginable? To convince you, however, of his strange inconsistency, and at the same time to serve for your edification, my dear brethren, I shall cite the passages wherein he hath done this in the plainest terms. "I will confess to you, says he, that the majesty of the scriptures strikes me with admiration, as the purity of the gospel hath its influence on my heart. Peruse the works of our philosophers with all their pomp of diction; how mean, how contemptible are they, compared with the scriptures! Is it possible that a book, at once so simple and sublime, should be merely the work of man? Is it possible that the sacred Personage, whose history it contains, should be himself a mere man? Do we find that he assumed the tone
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of an enthusiast or ambitious sectary? What sweetness, what purity in his manners! What an affecting gracefulness in his delivery! What sublimity in his maxims! What profound wisdom in his discourses! What presence of mind, what subtilty, what truth in his replies! How great the command over his passions! Where is the man, where is the philosopher, who could so live and so die, without weakness and without ostentation?——Yes, if the life and death of Socrates are those of a sage, the life and death of Jesus are those of a God. Shall we suppose the evangelic history a mere fiction? Indeed, my friend, it bears not the marks of fiction; on the contrary, the history of Socrates, which no body presumes to doubt, is not so well attested as that of Jesus Christ.——It is more inconceivable that a number of persons should agree to write such a history, than that one only should furnish the subject of it. The Jewish authors were incapable of the diction, and strangers to the morality contained in the gospel; the marks of whose truth are so striking and inimitable, that the inventor would be a more surprising character than the hero of it.”

It would be difficult, my dear brethren, to express a more explicit homage to the authenticity of the Gospel: And yet the author acknowledges it only in consequence of human testimony. It is always men that report what other men have reported. What a number of men between God and him! Nothing can be more evident than that the writer here contradicts himself, and is confuted on his own principle. How strangely infatuated therefore is this author, to add, “And yet, with all this,
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the same Gospel abounds with incredible relations, with circumstances repugnant to reason, and which it is impossible for a man of sense either to conceive or admit. What is to be done amidst all these contradictions? Be modest and circumspect: regard in silence what cannot be either disproved or comprehended; and humble thyself before the Supreme Being, who only knows the truth. Such is the involuntary scepticism in which I remain." But can this scepticism, my dear brethren, be indeed involuntary, when he refuses to admit the doctrines of a book, which, by his own confession, cannot be the work of man! when this book bears the marks of truth, so striking, so great, and so inimitable, that the inventor would be more astonishing than the hero of it? Surely we may here safely say, that iniquity hath belied itself.

It appears, my dear brethren, that this author hath rejected revelation, only to adopt natural religion. "What God requires us to do, says he, he doth not tell us from the mouths of others; but inscribes it in the bottom of our hearts." But hath not God written in our hearts the obligation of believing in him, when we are convinced that it is he who hath spoken? Now what certitude have we not that the Scriptures are the word of God? The actions of Socrates, of which no one hath the least doubt, are, by the confession of this author himself, not so well attested as those of Jesus Christ. Natural religion, therefore, itself, directs us to receive that which is revealed. But it is not certain that this author really admits of natural religion; at least he doth not acknowledge its necessity. No, my dear brethren: "If I am mistaken, says he,

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it is without design. This is sufficient to prevent my errors from being imputed to me as a crime. And though you should be mistaken in the same manner, it is of very little consequence." That is to say, it is sufficient, according to this writer, to be persuaded you are in possession of the truth, in order that such persuasion, though attended with the most monstrous errors, should not be a subject of reproach; and that every man, who professes himself to be sincere and ingenuous, should be accounted religious and wise, though adopting even the horrid doctrines of atheism. Is not this to throw open the door to all the modes of superstition, fanatical systems, and chimerical notions of the human mind? is not this a maxim that would countenance as many different religions and modes of worship as there are different people in the world? Alas! my dear brethren, be not deceived in this particular. Sincerity is no farther to be esteemed than as it is docile or enlightened. We are commanded to study our religion, and to believe its doctrines in sincerity and truth. We have, for our warrant, the authority of the church; let us learn to know it, and to repose ourselves safely therein. We may then place confidence in our sincerity, and spend our lives in peaceful expectation of that moment which shall open to us the light of eternity.

A further instance, my dear brethren, of the flagrant insincerity of the unbeliever we are refuting, is the manner in which he supposes the Catholic and the Christian to reason on matters of religion. What futile and ridiculous arguments doth he put into the mouths, both of the one and the other, in order to render them contempt-

temptible ! He hath written an imaginary dialogue between a Christian whom he supposes inspired, and an infidel whom he styles a rationalist. Hear what they are made to say. The former begins. " Your reason tells you that the whole is greater than a part ; but I tell you, from God, that a part is greater than the whole." To which the latter replies : " And who are you that dare to tell me that God contradicts himself ? In whom shall I rather believe ? in him who instructs me, by means of reason, in the knowledge of eternal truths ; or in you who would impose on me, in his name, the greatest absurdity ?"

But with what assurance, my dear brethren, doth this writer impute such arguments to Christians ? The God of reason, we affirm to be the God of revelation also. Reason and revelation are the two organs by which he hath been pleased to make himself known to mankind, either by way of teaching them the truth, or instructing them in the knowledge of his will. Should one of these organs contradict the other, it is certain that God would contradict himself. But can God be said to contradict himself, because he commands us to believe incomprehensible truths ? You tell us, ye impious infidels, that the tenets, which we look upon to be revealed, contradict eternal truths : but it is not sufficient for you merely to assert this ; and could you have proved it, you would have done it long ago, and triumphed in the victory. The insincerity of the author of *Emilius*, is not less reprehensible in the language of his pretended catholic. " We catholics, says he, make a great noise about the authority of the church : but what

what do we gain by it, if it requires as many proofs to establish this authority, as other sects require immediately to establish their doctrines? The church determines that the church has a right to determine. Is not this a special proof of its authority?" Who would not think, my dear brethren, from the pretences of this impostor, that the authority of the church is to be proved only by its own decisions; and that it proceeds arbitrarily thus, "I determine that I am infallible; therefore, I am infallible." A scandalous imputation, my dear brethren! The grounds of Christianity, the spirit of the gospel, and even the errors and weakness of the human understanding, all serve to demonstrate that the church established by Jesus Christ is an infallible church. We are assured, that, as the divine Legislator always instructed mankind in the ways of truth, the church of Christ will ever do the same. We prove the authority of the church therefore, not from that authority itself, but from that of Jesus Christ; a method of reasoning not less exact than that which he reproaches us with is senseless and ridiculous.

It is not only in our times, my dear brethren, that the spirit of irreligion hath been a spirit of independence and revolt. And, in fact, how is it to be expected that men, so daring as to refuse to submit to the authority of God himself, should respect that of kings, who are representatives of God; or that of magistrates, who are the representatives of kings? "Mankind, says the author of *Emilius* to his pupil, is essentially made up of the common people; so that, were there not a king left upon the face of the earth, they would not be missed, and things would go on

on just as well without them.—The many (says he a little farther) will be always sacrificed to the few, and public interest to that of particulars. The specious names of justice and moderation will be made the instruments of violence and the weapons of iniquity. Hence it follows, (continues he) that those distinguished orders of men, which pretend to be useful to the rest, are in reality, at the expence of the rest, useful only to themselves: and hence may be determined in what consideration they ought to be held, according to the rules of right reason and justice.” Thus, my dear brethren, doth impiety presume to question the intentions of Him *by whom kings reign*; thus doth it take delight in corrupting the sources of public felicity, and in propagating those maxims which tend to confusion and anarchy, with all their dreadful consequences! But what doth religion teach us in this case? “Fear God, honour the king *—— Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation *.”

Yes, my dear brethren, in every thing relative to civil objects, you ought to be as obedient to your prince, and to those who are deputed to exercise his authority, as unto God himself. Your duty to that supreme Being alone should set bounds to your submission; and if then you should be deemed culpable, and suffer for your obedience to his great commands, you should

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* 1 Peter ii. 17.

* Rom. xiii. 1, 2.

submit without murmur or complaint. Even Nero and Domitian themselves, who chose rather to be a scourge to the earth than the fathers of their people, were accountable only to God for the abuse of that power he put into their hands.

“ Christians (says St *Augustine*) are obedient to their temporal lord, for the sake of their eternal one.”

We have taken notice, my dear brethren, but of a few of the many impieties contained in this treatise of *Education* : a work equally meriting the anathemas of the church, and the severity of the laws : and what more can be necessary to inspire you with horror against it ? Miserable would it be for you, and unhappy for society, if your children were educated in the principles of this author. As nothing but religion hath taught us to know the nature of man, his greatness, his misery, and future destiny, it belongs only to that religion to form the understanding of youth, to improve their manners, and to procure for them lasting happiness both in this life and that which is to come. We are not insensible, my dear brethren, how laborious and difficult a task is the work of a truly Christian education ; nor that a very considerable share of prudence and knowledge is necessary to discharge it. What an admirable mixture of good nature and resolution it requires ! What prudence, to adapt ourselves to all conditions, ages, dispositions and characters, without departing from our duty ! what zeal, what patience, to nourish in young and tender minds the precious seeds of innocence and virtue ; to root up, as far as possible, those vicious inclinations,

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tions, which are the sad effects of our original depravity; and, in a word, to teach them, according to *St Paul*, to “live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ *!”

We say therefore unto all those who are charged with so important and honourable a function as the education of youth, Plant ye and water, in the firm hope that the Lord, assisting your endeavours, will give an increase: “Be instant in season and out of season,” according to the directions of the same apostle; “reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long suffering and doctrine †.” Above all, be careful to unite instruction with example: instruction without example is a disgrace to the instructor, and a subject for scandal to him who is instructed. Let the pious and charitable Tobit be your model; “carefully instruct your children, in doing the works of justice, in giving alms, in calling to mind the Lord, and in praising him at all times in sincerity and with all their might;” and your posterity, like that of this holy patriarch, will be loved of God and of man.

But at what time ought the education of children to commence? At the first dawn of intelligence: and this dawn is sometimes premature. “Train up a child in the way he should go, (saith the wise man;) and when he is old, he will not depart from it ‡.” Such is in fact the ordinary course of human life: even in the midst of licentiousness, and during the empire of the passions, the principles of a Christian

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* Titus ii. 22.

† 2 Tim. iv. 2. ‡ Prov. xxii. 6.

education afford a light which occasionally discovers to the sinner the horror of that abyss into which he is plunged, and displays the means of his escape. How many are there, I say again, who, after having spent their youth in vice and libertinism, are brought back by this light into the paths of virtue; and, pursuing, though late, the principles of religion and humanity, become an honour to themselves and to their country!

It remains, my dear brethren, that, in the close of this exhortation, I conjure you by the mercy of God, to attach yourselves inviolably to that holy religion in which you have had the happiness to be educated; to defend yourselves against the approach of an absurd philosophy, which hath nothing less in view than to rob you of the inheritance of Jesus Christ, to render his promises void, and to set him on a footing with the founders of those religions whose frivolous or pernicious doctrines have proved their imposture. The Christian faith is despised, rejected, and insulted, only by those who are ignorant of it, or on whose irregularities it is too great a restraint. But the gates of hell shall never prevail against it. The Christian and catholic church is the commencement of the eternal kingdom of Jesus Christ: "Nothing is stronger (says St John Demasene) than the church; it is a rock which the waves beat against in vain; it is a mountain which nothing can shake."

For the foregoing causes, respecting the new treatise on education, entitled *Emilius*, &c. by J. J. Rousseau, citizen of Geneva; after consulting with divers persons distinguished for their learning and piety, and calling upon the name
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of the Lord, we condemn the said book, as containing abominable doctrines, calculated to invalidate the principles of natural justice, and to subvert the foundations of the Christian religion: as inculcating maxims contrary to the morality of the gospel; tending to disturb the peace of society, and to excite subjects to revolt against the authority of their lawful sovereigns: as containing a great number of propositions severally false, scandalous, full of rancour against the church and its ministers, derogatory from the respect due to the holy scriptures and the traditions of the church, erroneous, impious, blasphemous and heretical. We therefore expressly forbid the inhabitants of our diocese to read or keep the said book, under the severest penalty of the law. We also direct that this our Mandate be read in all the parochial churches of the city, suburbs, and diocese of *Paris*; and also to be published and affixed wherever it may be judged needful. Given at our Archiepiscopal palace in *Paris*. Aug. 20. 1762.

Signed, CHRISTOPHER Archbishop of *Paris*,

By M. DE LA TOUCHE.

A N

Expostulatory Letter

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CHRISTOPHER DE BEAUMONT,
Archbishop of *Paris*.

WHEREFORE, my Lord, should there be any altercation between you and me? what language can we speak, or how shall we understand each other, when there is hardly any thing in common between us?

I am compelled, nevertheless, to make you a reply; you yourself have compelled me to it. Had you only attacked my book, your censures might have passed unanswered: but you have attacked my personal character; and by so much the greater sanction your authority bears in the eye of the public, the less it becomes me to be silent when I am the object of your defamation. But before I proceed to my defence, I cannot forbear reflecting a little on the peculiarity of my destiny: peculiar indeed to myself alone. I was born with some share of natural genius; the public have authorised me to make this boast. I spent my youth, nevertheless, in a happy obscurity, out of which I never attempted to emerge. Had I made such an attempt, indeed, it would have been as great a peculiarity, that,
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during the vivacity of youth, I should not have succeeded, as that I should succeed too well in the sequel, when that vivacity began to decay. In this obscurity, my Lord, instead of a fortune I always despised, and a name I have since bought too dear, I possessed the only blessings my heart was desirous of, those of tranquillity and friendship. Thus, easy in my mind, and happy in my friends, I drew near my fortieth year; when, unluckily, an academical question engaged my attention, and drew me into a profession for which nature never intended me. The unexpected success of my first essay proved seductive. A numerous party of opponents started up against me, and, without understanding my arguments, answered them with a petulance that piqued me, and a degree of vanity that perhaps excited mine. I stood up, of course, in my own defence; and, being urged from one dispute to another, found myself engaged in a career of controversy almost before I was aware. Thus I became an author at a time of life when authors usually throw up their profession, and a man of letters even from my contempt for that character. From this time I have been a writer of some little consequence with the public: but from this time, alas! my friends and my repose have left me. My labour was all I got for my pains; and a little reputation was to make up for every thing else. If this be an indemnification to those who are ever absent from themselves, it never was any to me.

Had I placed even for a moment any hopes on so frivolous a gratification, I should have been soon undeceived. In what a fluctuation hath the public opinion constantly been with
regard

regard to my abilities and character! Being at a distance, I was judged of only by interest or caprice, and for hardly two days together was ever looked upon in the same light. Sometimes I was a dark and gloomy being, at others an angel of light. I have seen myself, within the space of a year, applauded, courted, entertained, and requested even at court; and again speedily after, insulted, threatened, hated, and condemned. Over night, assassins lay in wait for me in the streets; and in the morning, I was threatened with a *lettre-de-cachet*. The good and the evil came from almost the same source; and both of them were the effect of a mere song.

I have written, it is true, on several subjects, but always on the same principles; I had constantly the same system of morals, the same faith, the same maxims, and, if you will, the same opinions. Very different, however, have been the opinions that have been passed on my books, or rather on the author of my books; because I have been judged rather from the subjects I treated of, than from my sentiments on those subjects. After the publication of my first discourse*, I was said to be a writer fond of paradoxes, who amused himself in proving things he did not believe. After my Letter on the French Music, I was called a professed enemy to that nation, and was very near being treated as a conspirator and traitor: one would have thought, by the zeal shewn on that occasion, that the fate of the French monarchy depended on the reputation of their opera. After my discourse on the Inequality of Mankind, I was
deemed

* In answer to the question, Whether the cultivation of the arts and sciences had contributed to the purity of manners?

deemed an atheist and misanthrope: after my Letter to Mr d'Alembert on the theatres, I was celebrated as the defender of Christian morals: after Eloisa, I was supposed to be passionate and tender: at present, I am a monster of impiety, and shall probably by and by be a miracle of devotion.

Thus fluctuating is the public opinion concerning me; those who adopt it being as ignorant why they detest me now, as why they once respected me. As to myself, however, I have always remained the same; more zealous, perhaps, than enlightened in my researches, but sincere in all, even against myself; simple and well-meaning, but susceptible and weak; often doing wrong, yet always respecting what was right; connected by friendship, never by circumstances, and ever more strongly influenced by sentiment than interest; requiring nothing from others; unwilling to render myself dependent on any; submitting to their prejudices as little as to their will, and preserving my own as free as my reason; fearing God, without being afraid of the devil; reasoning on matters of religion, without licentiousness; approving neither impiety nor fanaticism, but hating persecutors still worse than infidels; without disguising my sentiments from any one, without affectation, without artifice, without deceit; telling my faults to my friends, my sentiments to all the world, and to the public those truths which concern it, without flattery and without pride; equally careless whether I should please or offend it. Such are my crimes, and such are my merits.

At length, totally disgusted with that intoxicating vapour of reputation, which inflates without

without satisfying; wearied with importunities of indolent visitors, who, over-burdened with their own time, were prodigal of mine; and sighing after the necessary repose my heart is so fond of, I had joyfully laid down my pen. Satisfied with the reflection that I had never taken it up but for the good of my fellow-creatures, I required only, as the reward of my zeal, that I might be permitted to live unmolested in my retreat, and to die in peace. In this, however, I was mistaken: the officers were sent to apprehend me, and just at the moment that I flattered myself the troubles of my life were at an end, my greatest misfortunes began. There is something very particular in all this; yet this is nothing.

A citizen of Geneva gets a book printed in Holland; and by an arret of the Parliament of Paris, this book is burnt by the common hangman, without any respect shewn to the sovereign whose privilege it had obtained. A Protestant proposes, in a Protestant country, certain objections against the Church of Rome; and he is condemned by the parliament of Paris. A republican makes objections, in a republican state, against monarchy; and he is condemned by the parliament of Paris. The parliament of Paris must surely have strange notions of their jurisdiction, to suppose it extends over the whole human race.

The same parliament, ever so remarkably circumspect in their proceedings when individuals of their own nation are concerned, break thro' all order in passing sentence on a poor foreigner. Without knowing whether he was really the author of the book imputed to him, whether he
acknow-

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acknowledged it, or caused it to be printed; without any regard to the unhappiness of his situation, or pity for his bodily infirmities, they began their process by ordering him to be clapped up in prison. Thus they would have had him taken out of his bed, and dragged from his house, to be thrown among infamous criminals to rot in a jail. Nay, who knows but they might have burnt him at the stake, without suffering him to speak in his defence! for what reason is there to think they would have proceeded more regularly afterwards than at first, in a prosecution so violently commenced, as to be almost without example, even in the countries of the inquisition! Thus it is, in my case alone, that this sagacious tribunal forgets its prudential maxims: it is against me only, that a people, who boast so much of their humanity, and by whom I thought myself beloved, act with the strangest barbarity: it is thus, the country I preferred as an asylum above all others, justifies my giving it that preference! I know not how far such proceedings may be consistent with the laws of nations; but I know very well, that where they are carried on, a man's liberty, and perhaps his life, lies at the mercy of the first printer who chuses to set his name to a book.

A citizen of Geneva owes no respect to such unjust magistrates, who order persons to be apprehended and committed to prison, on the first scandalous information given them, without citing the accused to appear and answer for himself. Now, not having been cited to appear, he is not obliged to do it. But, being thus attacked by force and violence, he is justified in flying from persecution. He shakes the dust off his feet,

fect, therefore, and leaves an inhospitable country, where the strong are so ready to oppress the weak, and to load the stranger with chains, without hearing his defence; without knowing whether the act he is accused of be criminal; or being so, whether he hath indeed committed it. He abandons with regret the pleasing solitude he had chosen, leaving all his possessions, his few, but valuable friends, behind. Weak and infirm as he is, he is obliged to undergo the fatigues of a long journey; hoping at the end of it to breathe freely in a land of liberty. He repairs to his own country, flattering himself his reception there will console him for his past disgrace—But what am I going to say? My heart sinks, my hand trembles, and my pen falls to the ground: I will be silent, nor be guilty of exposing my country.

And wherefore am I thus treated? I do not ask for what reason, but on what pretence? The magistrates have been rash enough to judge me guilty of impiety, without reflecting that the book containing the pretended instances of it is in every body's hands. What would they not give effectually to suppress that authentic testimony in my favour; that they might then be able more boldly to say it contains what they pretend to have found there! But this proof of my innocence will remain in spite of all their efforts to suppress it; and posterity will be amazed, in looking therein for the enormous crimes imputed to the author, to find only the errors and mistakes of a sincere friend to virtue.

I shall avoid speaking of my contemporaries, because I would be hurtful to none. But the Atheist Spinoza was peaceably suffered to teach his

his doctrines to the world ; he met with no opposition in printing or selling his works. He came to France, and was well received there ; all the states of Europe were ready to afford him countenance, or at least protection. He was offered professorships by some princes, and particularly honoured by others ; living and dying peacefully, and even respected. And yet, in an age so much celebrated as the present for philosophy, reason, and humanity, a defender of the cause of truth is proscribed and pursued from state to state, from asylum to asylum, without the least regard for his indigence, or pity for his infirmities ; and all for having proposed, with great circumspection, and even with great respect and tenderness for mankind, some doubts founded on the honour of the supreme Being. For this he is hunted through the world, with a bitterness of persecution the vilest malefactor never experienced, and which would be even cruel to exert against a man possessed of health and strength to support him under it. Prohibited the use of the common elements of fire and water in almost every part of Europe, he is driven from his very retreat in the woods ; and is only safe in the fortitude of an illustrious protector, and the goodness of an enlightened prince ; all which became necessary to ensure him an asylum in the midst of the mountains. Instead of safety thus procured, he had, in all probability, spent the remainder of his miserable life in chains, or perished beneath the torture, had he been found during the first phrenzy which seized on governments, at the mercy of his inhuman persecutors.

Escaped from the hangman, he fell next into
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the hands of the priests: not that I shall mention any ill treatment, as surprising, he might meet with from them: but surely it is something wonderful, that a man of virtue, whose mind is as noble as his birth, an illustrious archbishop, who ought to suppress their baseness, should authorise it! Yet so it is; this Catholic prelate issues out a mandate against a Protestant author; he mounts his tribunal to examine into the particular doctrines of an heretic; and although he condemns indiscriminately every one that is not of his church, yet he refuses to permit the accused to err his own way, but prescribes in a manner the path in which he must descend to hell. No sooner have the inferior clergy received his sanction, but they fly with virulence on the enemy whom they imagine to be levelled with the ground, and to lie at their mercy. There is not the meanest vicar or ignorant curate of a country parish, who doth not take a pride in insulting the devoted author, whom the senate and their bishop have united to crush.

Thus, my Lord, have I displayed the unhappy circumstances peculiar to my situation, of which there is no precedent. Nor is this all. The present is perhaps one of the most difficult passages of my life; one of those in which revenge and self-love are the most easily satisfied, and least permit a man of integrity to be moderate. Ten lines more, and I cover my persecutors with eternal ridicule. Oh that the public did but know two anecdotes, without my being at the trouble of telling them! oh that they did but know who were the persons that meditated my ruin, and what steps they have taken to effect it! They would see by what

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contemptible insects, by what dark means, the powers of government are sometimes moved: they would see by what foul leaven the parliament was put into a ferment. They would see from what a ridiculous cause the several states of Europe united in league together against the son of a watchmaker! How greatly should I enjoy their surprise, were I not myself so nearly concerned in it!

Hitherto my pen, though bold in relating the truth, hath always kept itself free from satire; it hath always respected the character of others in defending my own. Shall I now, therefore, when I am going to lay it aside, dip it into calumny, or copy the style of my enemies? No; be theirs all the advantage of stabbing men in the dark. For my part, I would only defend myself openly, and would do nothing more than act in my own defence. To this end, what the public already know, is sufficient; or at least what they may know without my giving any one offence.

A surprising thing of this kind, and what I may safely say, is to see the intrepid Christopher de Beaumont, whom no power could reduce to make peace with the Jansenists, become, without knowing it, the dupe of their animosity: to see their most irreconcilable enemy raging against me, because I would not be of their party; because I would not write against the Jesuits, whom I do not love, though I have no cause of complaint against them, and think them ill treated. If your Lordship pleases to cast your eye over the sixth volume of the *New Eloisa*, you will there discover, in a note, page 138, the true source of my misfortunes. I have pro-

phesied in that note, (for I intermeddle also sometimes with prophesying,) that as soon as the Jansenists should gain the superiority, they would be more persecuting and severe than their enemies. I did not then know, however, that my prediction would be verified on myself. The thread of this clue would not be difficult for those to unravel who know how my book hath been treated. I cannot say more on this head without saying too much; but I may at least inform you, what sort of people you have been influenced by without suspecting it.

Will it be believed that you would have attacked my book had it not been first censured by the parliament? Some people may believe it, or at least say it; but you, whose conscience will not permit of deceit, will not say so. My Discourse on the Inequality of Mankind was generally read throughout your diocese, and yet you published no mandate against it. My Letter to M. de Alembert was as general, and yet you published no mandate against it. The New Eloisa was universal, and yet your Lordship issued no mandate. All these books, however, which you must have read, since you judge of them, contain the same maxims, and display, without disguise, the same modes of thanking.

If the subject of them did not admit of their being so fully explained, they gained in force what they lost in extent, and express the author's profession of faith with less reserve than that of the Savoyard curate. Wherefore, my Lord, did you not exert yourself on these occasions? Was your flock then less dear to you? did they read my books less? did they dislike my writings more? were they less exposed to error?

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error? No—But the Jesuits were not then laid under proscription. I had not then fallen into the snares my enemies have since laid for me. That fatal note was not then known: and when it was known, the public had already passed their judgment of approbation on the book. It was too late to think of raising their resentment on that score for the present; it was thought proper to defer it to a more convenient opportunity. The occasion was attentively watched for, and eagerly seized, with all that fury which is common to partial zealots; nothing now was talked of but imprisonment and tortures. My book was said to be the signal for anarchy, and the trumpet of atheism; the author was stigmatised as a monster of iniquity, and it was thought amazing that he had been so long permitted to live.

Amidst this universal clamour, your Lordship would have been ashamed to be silent; you chose therefore rather to commit an act of cruelty, than to be accused of wanting zeal. You chose rather to serve your enemies, than to bear the insult of their reproaches. Such, my Lord, you must own, was the true motive of your mandate; and such are the facts whose concurrence may, in my opinion, be very justly denominated singular.

Justice, I know, hath long given place to the maxims and formalities of state. I am not insensible, that, in some circumstances, a man invested with a public character is unhappily compelled against his will to act against honest men. To be moderate among zealots, is to expose one's self to their fury; and I can easily conceive, that, in such a combination as that

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to which I have fallen a victim, it is necessary to join the cry and hunt with the wolves, or run the risk of being devoured by them. I do not complain therefore that your Lordship has issued a mandate against my book; but I complain that you have done it against myself, and that with as little candour as truth. I complain, that, authorising by your own language that which you reproach me for having put into the mouth of a dogmatist, you load me with calumnies which, without hurting my cause, attack my honour, or rather your's. I complain that you have wantonly, without reason, without necessity, and without regard to my misfortunes, abused me in a manner the most unworthy your own character. And after all, my Lord, what is it I have done? I, who have always spoken of you with so much esteem; I, who have so often admired your unshaken fortitude, - tho' lamenting, it is true, the use which your prejudices induced you to make of it; I, who have always respected, and still respect, your virtues, even though you have so grossly injured me.

But thus it is that people extricate themselves from difficulties, when they are determined to find fault, and are themselves in the wrong. As you could not answer my objections, you have imputed them to me as crimes; you imagined you should make me despicable, by ill-treating me; but you have been mistaken. On the contrary, without invalidating my arguments, you have made every humane and generous mind take part in my sufferings; you have given occasion for every person of sense to reflect, that a man who judged so ill of the author, was still less qualified to judge well of his book.

You

You have shewn yourself, my Lord, neither humane nor generous; and yet you might have been so, without omitting any of the arguments you have made use of against my book: nay, I will take upon me to say, they would in that case have had much more weight. I must acknowledge, also, that I have no right to require those virtues of you, nor to expect any thing like them from an ecclesiastic. We shall inquire however, if you have at least been equitable and just; for this is a duty imposed on all mankind, nor are the saints themselves excused in the breach of it.

Your Lordship's mandate hath two points in view; the one is to censure my book, and the other to abuse my person. I shall think I have made a sufficient reply to it, therefore, if I prove, that, wherever you have endeavoured to refute me, you have reasoned falsely; and that where you have insulted me, you have been guilty of calumny. But when we prove our assertions as we go on, and are compelled by the importance of the subject and the quality of our adversary to proceed sedately, and to follow him step by step through all his censures, every word almost requires a page; thus while a short satire is amusing to the reader, a long defence becomes irksome and tedious. Notwithstanding this inconvenience, however, I must make a defence, or sit down contented under your falsest imputations. I am resolved, therefore, to defend myself; but shall rather defend my honour than my book. It is not the creed of the Savoyard curate that I examine, but the mandate of the archbishop of Paris; the scandal thrown on the editor only obliging him to
speak

peak of the work itself. I will endeavour to do myself justice, because it is my duty; I owe it to my own character. At the same time, however, I am very sensible how disagreeable a circumstance it is to contend with such a powerful adversary, and that the mere justification of the innocent can afford but very dull entertainment to the reader.

The fundamental principle of all morality, that on which I have reasoned in all my writings, and which I explained in the last with all the perspicuity I was master of, is this: That man is naturally good; that he loves justice and order; that there is no original perversity in the human heart, and that the first emotions of nature are always right. I have shown, that the only passion which is born with man, to wit, self-love, is in itself indifferent either to good or evil; that it becomes good or evil only by accident, and according to the circumstances in which it is displayed. I have shewn that none of the vices imputed to the human heart are natural to it: I have described the manner in which they arise; have traced, as it were, their genealogy; and shewn the manner in which, by a successive deviation from their original goodness, mankind are become what they are.

I have explained farther what I understand by this original goodness, which does not seem to flow from that indifference to good and evil which is natural to self-love. Man is not a simple, but a compound being, formed of two substances. It is true, that all the world do not agree in this; but you and I, my Lord, are agreed in it, and I have endeavoured to demonstrate it to others. This being admitted then, self-love

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is not a simple passion ; but hath two principles, viz. the intelligent being and the sensitive being, whose happiness is not one and the same. The sensual appetites tend to the gratification of the body, and the love of order to that of the mind. This last passion, expanded and become active, is denominated conscience ; but conscience displays itself, and acts only from knowledge. It is by acquiring knowledge only that man acquires a sense of order ; and it is from his acquiring this sense, that his conscience induces him to love it. Conscience is, therefore, nothing in those men who have never compared different objects and seen their relations. In such a state as this, a man knows nothing but himself ; he doth not see his own happiness to be consistent with, or opposed to, that of others : he neither loves nor hates ; but, confined solely to physical instinct, is a mere sensitive being, an idiot. This I have shewn at large in my Discourse on the Inequality of Mankind.

When, by a developement of the passions, the progress of which I have traced out, men begin to look round on their fellow-creatures, they begin also to see the relation they stand in to one another, and to the objects about them ; hence arise their ideas of agreement or disagreement, of justice, of order, and the like. It is now that moral beauty becomes perceptible, and the conscience begins to act. They now possess virtues ; and if they have vices also, it is because their separate interests increase, and their ambition is excited in proportion as their knowledge grows extensive. So long also as the opposition of their interests is less than the concurrence of their knowledge, men are essentially good.

good. Such is the second state of mankind

But when all the particular interests of individuals interfere, and clash against each other; when self-love is converted, by its fermentation, into self-interest; and opinion, by rendering the whole universe necessary to each individual, makes them all enemies from their birth, and causes the happiness of one to depend on the misery of another; then conscience, too feeble to withstand the violence of the passions, is silenced by their impetuosity, and remains a mere empty word, which mankind reciprocally make use of to deceive each other. Then every one pretends to sacrifice his own interest to that of his country, and all are liars. Not one is desirous of the public good, unless it coincides with his own; and hence this coincidence between the public and private good becomes the object of that true policy, which alone is calculated to make men virtuous and happy. But I am now beginning to talk a strange language, as little understood by the majority of readers as by your Lordship. This is the third and last state, beyond which nothing remains to be done; and thus we see how man, being naturally and originally good, individuals become wicked. The great object of my book is the means of preventing this defection. Not that I affirmed it, in the present order of things, to be absolutely possible; but this I affirmed, and do still, that there are no other means of effecting it but those I have pointed out.

Your Lordship is, nevertheless, pleased to say, my plan of education is so far from being consistent with Christianity, that it is not adapted to either form citizens or men. Your only
proof

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proof of this assertion, however, is the doctrine of original sin. Now baptism, my Lord, is the only means of deliverance from original sin and its effects. Whence it follows, according to your arguments, that there never were any citizens or men in the world but Christians. You must either deny this consequence, therefore, or own that you have proved too much.

As you go so far back for your proofs, I must do the same for my objections to them. And first it appears to me, that this doctrine of original sin, subject as it is to the most striking difficulties, is not to be found in the scriptures, so clearly or so strictly expressed as the rhetorical Augustine and other theologues have been pleased to maintain. It is farther hardly possible to conceive, that God should create so many innocent souls, with a view to join them to corrupt bodies, there to contract a moral impurity, for which he should damn them to all-eternity in hell, though guilty of no other crime than what was the immediate effect of that union which was his own work. I shall not say, whether (as you have boasted) 'by this system you have cleared up the mystery of the human heart; but I affirm that you have greatly obscured by it the justice and goodness of the supreme Being. If you have removed one objection, it hath been only to substitute others much greater in its place.

But after all, what hath this doctrine to do with the author of *Emilius*? It is certain, that notwithstanding he conceived his book might be of use to mankind in general, he wrote it more particular for Christians; for the use of men, cleansed from the guilt of original sin and
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its effects, at least with regard to their souls, by the sacrament instituted for that purpose. According to that doctrine, we all recovered our primitive innocence in our infancy, being rendered by baptism as pure of heart as Adam came out of the hands of God. Will you say, that we have contracted new impurities? How? As we began the world with being thus cleansed, in what manner can we have contracted them since? Is not the blood of Christ sufficiently efficacious to wash away the stain? or is our guilt the effect of the natural corruption of the flesh; and hath God made us originally corrupt, independent of original sin, on purpose to have the pleasure of punishing us? You attribute to original sin the vices of those whom you affirm to be cleansed from it; and yet blame me for having attributed their vices to another cause. Is it just to make it criminal in me not to reason so bad as your Lordship?

It may be said, indeed, that the effects which I attribute to baptism * do not appear by any external signs; that Christians are not less prone to vice than infidels; whereas, according to my supposition, the native virulence of sin should ap-

* Burnet supposes, that the corruption and mortality of the human race, in consequence of the fall of Adam, were the natural effect of the forbidden fruit; that aliment containing some poisonous juices, which proved destructive to the animal economy, by irritating the passions, weakening the understanding, and diffusing principles of vice and mortality throughout the whole man. In this case, however, the nature of the remedy being adapted to that of the disease, it is plain that baptism ought to have a physical operation on the body of man, by restoring to him that constitution he enjoyed in a state of innocence, and, if not the immortality dependent on it, at least all the moral effects of such a re-establishment of the animal economy.

appear in the latter, and make an evident distinction between them. With the assistance, it might be said, of gospel morality, added to baptism, all Christians ought to resemble angels; while infidels, being not only uncleansed from original sin, but also given up to false worship, would be little better than devils. I can imagine, that, if this difficulty were artfully insisted on, it would prove very embarrassing: for what answer can we make those who are ready to demonstrate, that the effects of a redemption, purchased at so high a price, are, with regard to the moral virtues of mankind, next kin to nothing? But, setting aside my suspicion, that no expedient, agreeable to sound theology, can be found to get over this difficulty, were I to admit that baptism does not effectually remedy the corruption of our nature, your Lordship will not be found to have reasoned a jot better. We are sinners, you say, because of the sins of our first parents: but how came our first parents to be sinners themselves? Why is not the same reason, by which you would explain Adam's sin, applicable to his posterity, without imputing to them his guilt? and why must we impute injustice to God, in that we are made sinners, and subjected to punishment from the vice of our birth, when our first parents were sinners, and were punished in like manner, without it? Original sin may serve to explain every thing but its own principle, and this is the very thing to be explained.

You advance that, according to my principle, we lose sight of that ray of light which discovers to us the mystery of our own hearts; and at the same time do not see that my principle, more

universal than yours, explains even the sin of the first man Adam *, which your's leaves in obscurity. You behold man only as being in the hands of the devil, and I explain the manner of his fall. The cause of evil is, according to you, the corruption of our nature; and this very corruption

* To demur against an useless and arbitrary prohibition, is nothing but what is natural; but it is so far from being vicious in itself, that it is conformable to the order of things, and the constitution of human nature: for man would not be in a state to provide for his own preservation, if he had not a very lively sense of self-love, and of all those rights and privileges he hath received from nature. An omnipotent Being would require nothing but what is useful; but a feeble being, whose power is farther limited and restrained by law, loses part of himself by such restraint, and is urged doubtless to reclaim what he is thus deprived of. To impute this to him as a crime, is to make it criminal in him to be himself and not another person; it is to require him to be, and not to be, at the same time. For this reason, the command which was broken by Adam appears to me to have been rather a paternal advice, than an absolute prohibition; a kind of friendly warning to him, to abstain from a pernicious and deadly fruit. This idea is surely more conformable to our notions of the goodness of the Deity, and even to the text, than that which divines have been pleased to teach us; for, with regard to the twofold death, it hath been shown, that the phrase *morte morietis* is not so emphatical as they pretend; being only an hebraism, made use of in other parts of scripture, where such emphasis could not take place. There is, besides, so natural a motive for indulgence and commiseration in the subtilty of the serpent, and the seduction of the woman, that, all circumstances considered, the crime of Adam appears really but a venial sin. And yet, according to our divinos, what a shocking punishment attends it! it is impossible to conceive any thing more terrible! For what greater punishment could Adam have been subjected to, even for the greatest of crimes, than that of being condemned, together with his posterity, to death in this world, and to suffer to all eternity amidst the flames of hell in the next? Can such a punishment be inflicted by the God of mercy on a poor unhappy being, merely for suffering himself to be deceived? How do I abominate this discouraging doctrine of our cruel theologues? I should think myself a blasphemer indeed, if I were tempted but for a moment to believe it.

ruption is the evil of which I would discover the cause. We both are agreed, I imagine, that man was created originally good; but you say he is wicked because he is wicked, and I endeavour to shew how he became so. Which of us, do you think, approaches nearest to first principles?

And yet you proceed in a triumphant manner, as if you had levelled my argument with the ground. You oppose against me, as an immovable obstacle, "that striking mixture of greatness and meanness, of zeal for truth and love for error, of inclination to virtue and tendency to vice," which is to be found in man. "Astounding contrast! (say you,) which disconcerts the pagan philosophy, and leaves it to wander in vain speculation!"

The theory of man, however, is not a vain speculation, as it is founded in nature, and proceeds only on the support of well-connected facts, which, leading us to the sources of the passions, teach us how to regulate their course. If you are pleased to call the Savoyard's creed heathen philosophy, I can make no reply to such an imputation, because I cannot comprehend your meaning*; but I think it ludicrous enough that you should borrow his own terms to tell us he hath not explained what he hath explained so clearly.

Your Lordship will permit me to remind you of the conclusion you have drawn from an objection so well discussed, with all the chain of consequences attending it. "Man finds him-

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self

* Unless, indeed, it relates to what his lordship charges me with in the sequel, of admitting a plurality of Gods.

self impelled by an unhappy tendency to vice : and how shall he make head against it, if he be not, in his infancy, put under the direction of preceptors, abounding in virtue, diligence and wisdom ; or if, during his whole life, he does not, under the protection and with the grace of God, make continual and powerful efforts to withstand it ?" This is as much as to say, We see mankind are wicked, notwithstanding they are kept under the most tyrannical subjection, from their infancy ; if, therefore, they are not kept under such early subjection, how shall they ever become virtuous and prudent, since by constantly tyrannizing over them, it is impossible to make them so !

The force of our arguments concerning education will become more sensible if we apply them to a different subject. Let us, therefore, suppose, my Lord, a man should address himself to us in the following manner. " You give yourselves a great deal of trouble to make choice of the most equitable governments, and to procure good laws. But I will demonstrate to you, in the first place, that your forms of government themselves occasion those evils for which you think them a remedy. I will prove to you farther, that it is impossible you should ever have either good laws or equitable governments ; and lastly, I will point out to you the true way to prevent all the evils you complain of, without government, and without laws."

Let us suppose, that, after this, he should lay down his system, and point out his pretended means, I do not inquire whether his system be reasonable, or his means practicable. If they were not, it is possible he would only be looked upon

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as a lunatic, and be very justly confined to a dark chamber. But if unhappily his system should be well founded and practicable, it would go much worse with him; and you will readily conceive, my Lord, or others will do it for you, that it would be difficult to find racks and tortures enough to punish the detestable wretch for being in the right. But this is not strictly the present case; and whatever might befall the person of such a victim, it is certain an inundation of writings would burst out against his book. There would not be a single scribbler in the town, or under-graduate of the college, but, in order to pay his court to those in power, and proud of a *cum privilegio* to his writings, would load him with a pamphlet of abuse, and boast of having silenced the man, who might either be prevented speaking, or might hold such antagonists in too much contempt to answer them. But this case also is not exactly to the present point. We will suppose then, lastly, that some grave personage, interested in the affair, should think himself obliged to follow the example of others, and, amidst other declamatory abuses, should address the culprit as follows. "What dost thou mean, abandoned wretch? wouldest thou overturn all government and law, when these are our only check on vice, and even these can hardly restrain it within moderate bounds? Good God! what would become of us, if we had neither laws nor government? Take away our prisons and our gibbets, and thefts and robberies would become universal: O, thou art an abominable wretch!"

If, after so harsh a reproof, the poor man might venture to speak, he would doubtless express

himself thus : " Excuse me, my noble Lord, your honour is guilty of a *petitio principii*. I did not say that vice ought not to be suppressed : But I say it would be better to prevent its existence. I would provide against the insufficiency of the laws ; and you object to me that very insufficiency. You accuse me of introducing abuses, because, instead of remedying, I chuse rather to prevent them.—What ! if there were a method by which we might live always in health, must it be suppressed because the physicians would have nothing to do ? Your honour is desirous of seeing racks and gibbets, and I of seeing no malefactors to require them ; with all due submission, therefore, I do not think myself that abominable wretch your honour pronounces me."

But to return to your Lordship's mandate. " Alas ! my dear brethren, in spite of the principles of the most salutary and virtuous education, and notwithstanding the most encouraging promises and the most terrible menaces of religion, the errors of youth are still too frequent." But I have proved that the education which you call the most salutary, is the most absurd and senseless ; that the education you call the most virtuous, is in fact the cause of all the vices of children : I have proved, that all the celestial glories of paradise have less influence over them than a lump of sugar-candy, and that they are much more afraid of being tired at vespers than of burning in hell : I have proved, that all the errors and extravagancies of youth, which you complain cannot be prevented by your means, are really effected by them. " Into what errors and excesses doth not youth, when let alone, precipitate itself ?" Youth, my Lord, when let alone,
never

never goes astray; all its errors arise from being missed. The companions and mistresses of young men, only complete what their priests and preceptors begun. This, my Lord, I have proved. But your Lordship proceeds: "It is a torrent that rushes forth, in spite of the most powerful dykes that can be raised to oppose it: what then would be the consequence, if no obstacles were made use of to withstand its efforts?" In answer to this, I might say, "It is a torrent which breaks down your feeble dykes, and carries all before it. Enlarge its bed, and let it flow without obstacle, and it will do no harm." But I am ashamed of employing on so serious a subject such a florid declamation as each party makes use of at pleasure, and which proves nothing on either side.

It appears, however, that, notwithstanding the extravagancies of youth are too numerous and frequent on account of original sin, your Lordship ship is not at so great variance with them on the whole; as you seem to be so well satisfied with that salutary and virtuous method of education, which is practised by your preceptors so full of virtue, diligence, and wisdom; so that you think youth would be still greater losers were they educated in any other manner; and it seems that you do not in fact think quite so ill of the present age, *the sink of all ages*, as you affect to speak in your mandate.

I confess, indeed, it is quite superfluous for those people to project new schemes of education, who are well satisfied with the present; but if this be the case with your Lordship, you must agree with me that you are not very nice or difficult in this matter. Had you been so easy
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with regard to doctrines, your diocese had not experienced the troubles with which it hath been long agitated; the storm you raised would not have fallen on the Jesuits; I should not have been oppressed for the sake of company; and you would have enjoyed a greater share of tranquillity as well as myself.

You confess, that to reform the world as far as the weakness, and, according to you, the corruption of our nature, will permit, it is sufficient to observe, under the direction and influence of grace, the dawnings of human reason, and to direct them carefully to the paths of truth. "By such means (say you) those minds, which are as yet exempt from prejudices, may be put always upon their guard against error; those hearts which are as yet free from violent passions, may take the impression of every virtue." So far then we are agreed, for this I have said myself. It is true, I did not add that children should only be educated by priests; nor did I even think it necessary in order to make them citizens of men; but this error, if it be one, is so common among Catholics, that it surely should not be thought so very great a crime in a Protestant. I do not inquire whether, in your country, the priests themselves are accounted very good citizens; but as it has been your business to educate the present generation, it lies between you on one part, and your former mandates on the other, to decide whether the pupils have profited so much by the spiritual milk of the world, as to become such good saints, such sincere worshippers of God, such great men, "as to be worthy of being the support and ornament of their country." I might add to this, another observation which ought to strike

strike all good Frenchmen, and of course your Lordship as such; and this is, That of all the several kings that have reigned over your nation, the very best of them is the only one who was not educated by priests.

But of what consequence is this, since I do not exclude them from that task! Let them educate youth, if they are capable of it; I pretend not to oppose it; so that what you have said on that head, doth not in the least affect my book. Will you assert that my plan is a bad one, merely because it is better adapted to other people than it is to those of the church?

If a man is naturally good, as I think I have sufficiently demonstrated; it follows, that he will remain such, unless some foreign cause corrupts him: and if men be originally wicked, (which great pains have been taken to make me believe;) it still follows, that the wickedness comes from some foreign cause. Close up, therefore, all the avenues of vice, and the human heart will be always good.

On this principle I lay down the negative plan of education as the best, or rather as the only one that is good for any thing. I prove that all positive education acts contrary to the end designed, and shew in what manner the point aimed at may be attained.

I call that positive education which tends to form the understanding before the proper time, and to give a child prematurely the knowledge of the duties of a man. I call that negative education, which tends to perfect the corporeal organs, the instruments of our knowledge, and which prepares us for reasoning by exercising our senses. Do what we will, however, negative

tive education is not inactive. It is true, it does not inculcate virtue, but it prevents the introduction of vice: it doth not teach us the truth, but preserves us from error. It disposes a child towards every thing that may lead to truth, when he is in a capacity to comprehend it; and to good, when he is in a capacity to love and admire it.

This fact displeases and offends you; it is easy to see the reason of it. You begin by calumniating the design of the proposer. According to you, this inactivity of the mind appeared to me necessary in order to dispose it to receive the errors I wanted to inculcate. It is not, however, very easy to conceive what error a tutor can want to inculcate, who teaches his pupil nothing so carefully as to be sensible of his own ignorance, and to know that he knows nothing. You agree that the understanding is progressive, and is formed by degrees. "But doth it thence follow, (say you,) that a child at the age of ten years should not know the difference between good and evil, that he should confound wisdom with folly, gentleness with cruelty, and virtue with vice?" Doubtless all this will follow, if the judgment doth not sooner unfold itself. "What!" you proceed, "will he not perceive that it is good to obey his parents, and that it is evil to disobey them?" So far from it, my Lord, that I maintain he will, on the contrary, perceive, that to leave his play to go to his book, notwithstanding it may be done in obedience to his parents, is an evil; and that to disobey them, in possessing himself of some delicious forbidden fruit, is a good. I must confess, indeed, he will perceive that it is an evil to be punished, and that it is good

good to be rewarded; and it is by the balance of this contradictory good and evil that infantine prudence is always regulated. This I think I have fully demonstrated in my two first volumes, and particularly in the dialogue between the preceptor and the child. But you, my Lord, refute my two volumes in as many lines: thus, "To assert this, my dear brethren, is to calumniate human nature, in imputing to it a degree of stupidity which is foreign to it." It is certainly impossible to make use of a keener or more concise argument. But this ignorance, which you are pleased to call stupidity, is constantly found in every mind lying under the restraint of imperfect organs or under the want of due cultivation: this is an observation easily made, and may be confirmed by the whole world. To impute this ignorance, therefore, to human nature, is not to calumniate or revile it: it is you, my Lord, who have done this, in imputing to it a malignity to which it is a stranger.

But you go on: "To think of instructing mankind only at a season when their growing passions are most prevalent, is to inculcate it in a manner which the author himself explodes."

Here is another sinister intention, which your Lordship is so good as to impute to me, though I dare say no other person would ever have found it in the book. I have shewn, in the first place, that a child educated after my method would not be under the tyranny of the passions at the time you speak of: secondly, I have shewn in what manner the lessons of prudence may retard the developement of those very passions. It is the bad effects of your own mode of education that you impute to mine; while
you

you object to me those faults which I teach you how to prevent. I have secured the heart of my pupil till he arrive at the age of manhood ; and when I see the passions ready to break forth, I even then take measures to retard their progress. Prudential instructions are of no use to a child when very young, as he can neither interest himself in them nor understand them. They are also useless when he is grown up and his heart is already agitated by the passions. It is at the period only which I have pointed out that they can be really useful ; for then, whether it be to instruct or to divert the attention of youth, it is equally necessary that such attention should be engaged.

You say, " In order that youth should possess the requisite docility to receive our instructions, I would have them be destitute of every principle of religion. The reason, my Lord, is plain ; I would have them be of some religion, and am therefore against teaching them any thing the truth of which they are not capacitated to understand. But had I said, my Lord, that, " in order to find youth possessed of the requisite docility to receive our instructions, we must be careful to begin with them before they come to years of understanding ;" should I have reasoned worse than your Lordship ? and can this be any prepossession in favour of the instructions you give to children ? According to you, I made choice of the age of reason to inculcate error ; and you anticipate that age to inculcate truth. You are solicitous, and in haste, to instruct a child, before he is capable of discerning right from wrong ; while I am indifferent, and wait to deceive him, till he is capable of judging for him-

himself. Is this a natural conclusion? Which, my lord, is most to be suspected of imposture, he who would address himself only to men, or he who would have to do solely with children?

You censure me for having affirmed and demonstrated, that every child who believes in God is necessarily an idolater or anthropomorphite; and controvert that assertion, by affirming that we can suppose neither one nor the other of a child that receives the education of a Christian. This, my Lord, is the matter in question: it remains to examine the proofs. Mine is, that no education, however truly Christian, can confer a degree of understanding on a child, which is above his years, or detach his ideas from material objects, from which even grown persons cannot detach theirs. I will appeal farther to experience; advising my readers to consult their own memory, and to recollect whether in believing a God, during their infancy, they did not always attach some corporeal image to their idea of the Deity. When you tell a child "that the Deity is like nothing which comes under the cognisance of our senses," his mind is either so perplexed as to understand nothing, or he understands that the Deity is nothing. When you talk to him of *infinite intelligence*, he is ignorant what *intelligence* is; and still more so of what you mean by the term *infinite*. You may, indeed, make him repeat after you the words you dictate to him; you may also, if it be required, make him say he understands them; for that concession costs him little, and he had much rather say he comprehends you, than be chid or beaten for want of apprehension. The ancients, not even excepting the

Jews, universally represented the Deity as a corporeal Being; and are there not many Christians, particularly Roman Catholics, who do the same at this day? If your children talk like men, it is because your men are still children: and this is the very reason why your inexplicable mysteries no longer puzzle any one, the terms of them being as easily got by rote as any other. It is, indeed, one of the great conveniences of modern Christianity, to be satisfied with a certain jargon of words without ideas.

From an examination into that intelligence which leads to the knowledge of God, I find it unreasonable to believe this knowledge "always necessary to salvation." As proof of this, I cite the case of idiots and children; with whom also I rank those persons who have not acquired sufficient knowledge to comprehend the existence of God. On this occasion you say, "We need not be surprised, however, my dear brethren, that this author defers so long the knowledge of the existence of a Deity, when he doth not believe it necessary to salvation." Thus you begin, by rendering my proposition more obnoxious, in charitably suppressing the word *always*; which not only softens, but in fact gives it a different sense; for, according to the manner in which I have expressed myself, it is admitted that this knowledge is usually necessary; and according to that you impute to me, it never is necessary. After this little piece of deceit, your Lordship proceeds thus: "It is clear (says he, in the character of an imaginary personage,) that a man may, under some circumstances, live to grow old, without believing in God; and yet he would not, for that reason, be deprived of his

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his presence in the other world, if his unbelief were voluntary: and this I affirm to be sometimes the case."

Before I proceed to transcribe your remark on this passage, you will permit me to make mine; and this is, that the pretended personage you speak of here, is really myself, and not the curate; this passage, which you imagined to be in his creed, being in a different part of my work. You must read, my Lord, very carelessly, and quote very inaccurately, those writings you nevertheless so severely condemn. A person in office, who takes upon him thus to censure others, ought surely to be a little more exact. I come now to your remark: "Observe, my dear brethren, the author doth not mean here a person who is incapable of the use of reason, but merely one whose reason might have received no assistance from information." After this you affirm the proposition to be absurd. "St Paul, you say, assures us indeed, that, among the pagan philosophers, many had, by the force of reason alone, arrived at the knowledge of the true God; and thereupon you quote the words of that apostle."

It is often, my Lord, but a small fault, not to understand the author we read; but it is a great one not to understand him before we attempt to refute him, and still a much greater not to do it before we take upon ourselves to abuse him. Now, you have not understood that passage of my book, which you have here attacked, any more than you have done many others. The reader will judge, however, whether this be my fault or yours, when I have quoted the passage itself throughout.

“ We Protestants hold, that no child, who dies before he arrives at the age of reason, is deprived of salvation : the Roman Catholics believe the same of every child that is baptized, though it should never once have heard the name of God. There are some cases, therefore, in which men may be saved without believing in God, as in infancy and imbecillity of mind, as in idiots and madmen, where the understanding is incapable of the operations requisite to infer an acknowledgment of the Deity. All the difference that I see here between me and you, is, that you think children of seven years of age capacitated to believe in God, and I do not think them capable of it even at fifteen. Whether I am right or wrong in this particular, it is not in itself an article of faith, but only a simple observation in natural history.

“ On the same principles it is evident, that if a man should arrive at old age without believing in God, he would not be deprived of his presence in the other world, provided his infidelity be not wilful ; and this, I say, may sometimes happen. You will admit that, with respect to madmen, a malady deprives them of their intellectual faculties, but not of their condition as men, nor of course their claim to the beneficence of their Creator. Why then will you not admit the same claim, in those who, sequestered in their infancy from all society, have lived the real life of a savage, deprived of that information which is to be acquired only by conversation with mankind ? For it is a demonstrable impossibility, that such a savage should ever raise his ideas to the knowledge of the true God. Reason tells us, that man is

punishable only for his wilful errors, and that invincible ignorance can never be imputed to him as a crime. Hence it should follow, that, in the eye of eternal justice, every man who would have believed, had he had the opportunities of information, will appear as a believer; and that none will be punished for infidelity but those whose hearts refuse to admit the truth."

Such is the passage as it stands in my book; on the perusal of which, your error must be evident to every reader. Your mistake lies, in that you understood, or would have others to understand, that, according to my notions, a person must be instructed in the existence of God, to believe in such existence: whereas my sentiments are very different. I say, that a man's understanding must be ripened, and his mind cultivated to a certain degree, before he is in a capacity to comprehend the proofs of the existence of God, and more particularly so to enable him to discover them himself, without having been informed of them. I speak of barbarians and savages, and you object to me the case of philosophers. I say, that some degree of philosophy is necessary to elevate our minds to the ideas of the true God; and you quote St. Paul against me, who acknowledges, that the pagan philosophers did acquire ideas of the true God. I say, that some men of ignorant and uncultivated minds, may not be in a capacity to form just notions of the Deity; and you say, that people properly instructed may form such notions; and on these allegations it is that you pronounce my opinion a manifest absurdity. How! my Lord, will you say, that, because a professed Civilian ought to understand the laws

of his country, it is absurd to suppose a child who cannot read can be ignorant of them ?

When a writer is careful to avoid perpetual repetition, and hath once clearly expressed himself on any one point, he is not bound to recur always to the same proofs in reasoning on the same subject. The several parts of his writings serve to explain each other ; and the latter, if he preserves any method, always suppose the former. This is what I have endeavoured always to do, and have particularly effected as to the matter in question.

You suppose, with almost all those who treat these subjects, that man comes into the world with a perfect capacity of reasoning, and hath nothing to do but employ it. Now, this is not true ; for reason is an acquisition, and that one of the slowest of the human mind. Man learns to see with his intellectual as well as with his corporeal eyes : but he is much longer about the former than the latter ; because the relations between intellectual objects, being not commensurable like those of material bodies, they are discoverable only by estimation ; and because our first desires and necessities being merely physical, they do not make the examination of such objects sufficiently interesting. We must learn to view two objects at a time, and to form a comparison between them ; we must even learn to compare a variety of objects together, to recur by degrees to their causes, and thence to trace them down to their effects ; it is necessary for us to have combined an infinite number and diversity of relations, in order to acquire the ideas of agreement, proportion, harmony, and order. The man who, deprived of the assistance
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of his fellow-creatures, and incessantly occupied in providing for his necessities, is reduced to the simple progress of his own ideas, will make but little advances in this kind of knowledge; he will grow old and die, without ever emerging from the infancy of reason. Now, can you sincerely believe, my Lord, that out of a million of men, living and dying in that manner, there would be one who should attain a thought of God?

The order of the universe, admirable as it is, doth not appear equally so to every eye. The vulgar pay but little attention to it, being in want of that knowledge which is necessary to render it apparent, and having never learned to reflect on what they see. It is neither perverseness nor obstinacy that prevent their being sensible of his wonderful harmony of things; it is only ignorance and dulness. The least study fatigues such people, as the least manual labour fatigues the student. They have heard of the works of God and the wonders of nature. They repeat the same words indeed, but without annexing to them the same ideas; and are but little affected by those circumstances that elevate the mind of the philosopher to the contemplation of his Creator. Now if, even among us, the common people, who have the opportunity of so much instruction, are still so very dull and stupid; what must be the case with those poor people, who, being left to themselves from their infancy, have learnt nothing from others? Can you believe that an Hottentot, or Laplander, philosophises much on the revolutions of the planets and the generation of things? And yet the Hottentots and Laplanders, living together
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in societies, have a multitude of acquired and communicated ideas, by the help of which they may form some gross notions of a Deity. They have some sort of a catechism; but a savage, wandering solitarily in the woods, can have none at all. You will say, perhaps, no such creature actually exists: be it so. He may be supposed, nevertheless, to exist; and certainly there are men in the world who never entered into any kind of philosophical conversation in their lives, and whose whole time is spent in seeking out their subsistence, eating, and sleeping. What shall we do with these people, the Eskimaux, for example? Shall we make theologists of them?

My opinion, therefore, is, that the human mind, such as it comes out of the hands of nature, destitute of instruction and improvement, is not in a capacity of itself to raise its ideas to the sublime conceptions of the Deity; but that these conceptions present themselves in proportion as the mind is cultivated and enlightened. I am of opinion, that God manifests himself, in his works, to all those who have thought and reflected thereon; that he reveals himself to every one that is enlightened by knowledge, in the prospect of the universe; that when our eyes are once opened to his works, we must wilfully shut them, to be blind to their great Author; that every atheistical philosopher must be insincere, or be blinded by pride; but that a man, grossly incapacitated, though simple and sincere, whose mind is without error and without vice, may not be able, through involuntary ignorance, to raise his ideas to the Author of his being, or form conceptions of God, without being subject

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to have this ignorance imputed to him as a crime, or being punishable for a fault in which his heart had no share. The one is not enlightened, and the other refuses to be so; between which there appears to me a very wide difference.

Apply the passage you quoted from St Paul to this opinion, and you will see, that, instead of contradicting, it is perfectly consistent with it: you will see that this passage relates solely to those pretended sages, to whom the things that are to be known of God have been made manifest; and of whom he says, "The invisible things of him, that is, his eternal power and Godhead, are seen by the creation of the world, being considered in his works, to the intent that they should be without excuse. But that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was full of darkness; who, while they professed themselves to be wise, became fools."

The reason, for the apostle's reproaching the philosophers with not having glorified the true God, not being applicable to my supposition, is altogether in my favour; and confirm, what I have myself said, "that every philosopher who is an unbeliever, is to blame; because he makes a bad use of the understanding he hath cultivated, and is in a capacity of understanding the truths he rejects." It appears, in fine, from the very passage itself, that you did not understand me; and that you charge me with having said what I neither said nor thought, viz. that men believe in God only upon the authority of others:
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* His Lordship indeed doth not expressly say this; but it
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in which you are so wide of the mark, that, on the contrary, I have only distinguished between the case wherein men may acquire the knowledge of God of themselves, and that in which they must be obliged to the assistance of others.

But supposing, my Lord, that you had been right in your criticism, and that you had solidly refuted my opinion, it would not thence follow that such opinion must be palpably absurd, as you are pleased to term it: a man may be mistaken without being extravagant or ridiculous, as every error is not an absurdity. My respect for your Lordship makes me more sparing of my epithets: it is not my fault, also, if the reader should supply their omission.

It is thus, my Lord, proceeding always to censure without understanding me, you pass on from one imputation, equally false and important, to another which is more so. After having unjustly accused me of denying the evidence of the Deity, you charge me, still more unjustly, with calling in question his unity. Nay, on this head you go still farther, and take the pains, contrary to your usual custom, of entering into an argument on the subject; the only part of your Mandate, where you have Reason on your side, being that wherein you refute an extravagant position which I never laid down.

The passage you object to is this; or rather the passage in which you relate mine; for the Reader must remember, it is your Lordship that always sets me forth. “ I believe, *he makes the same imaginary personage say*, that the world is
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is the only meaning I can reasonably annex to his words, supported by those of St Paul; and I can reply only to what I understand.

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governed by a wise and powerful will. I see it, or rather I feel it: and this is of importance for me to know: But is the world eternal, or is it created? Are things derived from one self-sufficient principle, or are there two or more? And what is their essence? Of all this I know nothing, nor do I see it is of any consequence I should *.—I give up all such idle disquisitions, which serve only to make me discontented with myself, are useless in practice, and above my comprehension."

I must here observe, by the way, that this is the second time you call the Savoyard Curate a chimerical or supposed personage. Pray, my Lord, how do you know this to be the case? I have asserted what I knew; you have ventured to deny what you know nothing of: Which of us is, in this case, the most daring? It is well known, I confess, that there are few priests who believe in God; it is not therefore proved, however, that there are none at all. But, to proceed with your Mandate.

"What is it this daring Author means to say?—The unity of God appears to him a futile and indeterminate question; as if the notion of a multiplicity of Gods was not the greatest of absurdities. *The plurality of Gods*, says Tertullian very expressively, *tends to the nullity of God*. To admit a God, is to admit a supreme independent Being, to whom all the other Beings are subordinate †. This Writer insinuates, there-

* This break indicates an omission of two lines, by which the passage is moderated, and which the Archbishop would not transcribe. See Mandate, page 235. and Emilius, vol. ii. page 144.

† Tertullian is here guilty of a sophism very common with the

therefore, that there are many Gods."

But who is it says there are many Gods? Ah! my Lord, you would have been glad, very probably, that I had been guilty of such an absurdity; in which case, you certainly would not have taken the pains to write a Mandate against me.

I neither know how, nor why, things are as they are; and many others, who pique themselves on explaining their causes, know just as little as myself. But I can evidently see, there is but one first moving Cause, as every thing clearly tends to the same end. I acknowledge, therefore, the existence of one sole supreme Will, which directs and governs all things; and one sole supreme Power, which animates and influences all things. I attribute this power and will to one and the same Being; because of their perfect agreement and union, which is more easily conceived in one than in two; and because it is unreasonable to admit of more Beings than are necessary. And indeed, even the evil itself, of which we are sensible, is not absolute, and is so far from operating fundamentally against the good, that it concurs with it to the production of universal harmony.

But the reason why things are, is precisely to be distinguished under two ideas, viz. the thing which makes, and the thing which is made: nay, it requires some considerable effort of the mind to

the fathers. He defines the word *God* after the manner of the Christians; and then accuses the Pagans of contradiction, because, contrary to his definition, they admit of many gods. It was not worth while to impute an error to me which I have not committed, merely to introduce so unseasonably a sophism of Tertullian.

to unite these two ideas in the same object; as we cannot conceive how any thing acts, without supposing at the same time the existence of some other being on which it acts. It is farther certain, that we have ideas of two distinct substances; viz. Matter and Spirit; of a thinking substance, and an extended substance; and these two ideas are very easily conceived, the one without the other.

There are, therefore, two methods, in which we may conceive the origin of things: either as they proceed from two different causes; the one alive, the other dead; the one moving, the other moved; the one active, the other passive; the one efficient, the other instrumental: or otherwise, as they are derived from one sole cause, possessed in itself of every thing which is, and every thing which is made. Neither of these opinions, however, though so long agitated by the metaphysicians, can be easily reconciled to human reason: for, if the eternal and necessary existence of matter hath its difficulties, the creation of it must be attended with no less; the philosophers who have in all ages meditated on this subject, having unanimously rejected the possibility of its creation; except a very small number, perhaps, who appear to have sincerely submitted their reason to authority: though, whether these were truly sincere or not, the motives of interest, ease or security, render justly doubtful; and, indeed, it will be impossible to come to any assurance on this head, so long as we run a risk in speaking the truth.

On the supposition that things are derived from one sole eternal principle; this principle being simple in its essence, cannot be a com-

pound of matter and spirit, but is either matter or spirit alone. Now, from the deductions of the Savoyard Curate, he cannot conceive that this principle should be matter; and if it be spirit, he cannot conceive how matter could receive its being from such a cause; for, to this end, it is necessary to conceive its creation: Now, the idea of creation, viz. the idea by which we conceive that, from a simple act of volition, nothing becomes something, is, of all ideas that are not evidently contradictory, the least comprehensible by the human mind.

Beset by such difficulties on both sides, the good priest remained undetermined, resolving not to perplex himself with doubts of mere speculation, which could have no manner of influence on his moral duties. For, after all, to what purpose should I explain the origin of things, provided I know in what manner they actually subsist; if I know my own place among them, and, in consequence of that, the obligations imposed on me?

But should we even suppose two original principles*, (a supposition, however, which the Curate doth not make,) we should not thereby suppose the existence of two Gods; unless indeed we supposed, with the Manicheans, that these principles are both active; a doctrine diametrically opposite to that of our Curate, who very positively, and in the most express terms, admits only of one first intelligence, one active prin-

* He who knows only two substances, can imagine the existence only of two principles; so that the words, *or more*, annexed, are in some measure expletive, serving to intimate, that it is of as little consequence to know the number of these principles as their nature.

principle, and, of course, but one God.

I must own indeed, that, the creation of the world being clearly related in our translations of the book of Genesis, to reject that account would be to reject the authority, if not of the holy Scriptures, at least of the translations given us of them; and this is the very reason of the Curate's retaining those doubts, which might not have arisen without such authority. For, setting this consideration aside, the co-existence of two principles * serves better to explain the constitution of the universe, and to remove those difficulties which cannot be solved without it; and particularly, among others, that of the origin of evil. Add to this, that we ought to be perfectly acquainted with the Hebrew tongue, and even to have been contemporary with Moses, to know precisely what sense he attached to the word which is rendered to us *created*. This term is too philosophical to have had originally that known and popular acceptation which we give it at present on the credit of our divines. The acceptation of this term may have been changed, and have misled even the Septuagint themselves, possessed as they already were with

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* It may not be amiss to remark, that this question about the eternity of matter, which so startles our modern divines, gave but little concern to the fathers, whose sentiments were more similar to those of Plato. Not to speak of Justin Martyr, Origen, and others, Clement Alexandrine takes the side of the affirmative so strongly in his *Hypotyposes*, that Photius would have it, on this account, that his book had been interpolated. The same opinion, however, appears again in the *Stromates*, where Clement relates that of Heraclitus without amendment. This father indeed endeavours, in the fifth book, to establish one sole principle; but this is, because he refuses to give that name to matter, even admitting its eternity.

the terms and questions of the Greek Philosophy. Nothing is more common than for words to change their meaning in process of time; and thereby cause us to attribute to ancient authors, who have used them, ideas they never entertained. It is very doubtful whether the Greek word was used in the sense we please to give it; and it is very certain that the Latin term had not the same sense, as Lucretius, who expressly denies the possibility of all *creation*, makes frequent use of the same term to express the formation of the universe and its parts. In fine, M. de Beaufobre hath proved, that the notion of Creation is not to be met with in the ancient Jewish Theology; and you have too much learning, my Lord, to be ignorant, that many writers, who have had the greatest respect for the sacred writings, have not been able, nevertheless, to discover the absolute creation of the universe, in the account given by Moses. Thus our Curate, who was not imposed on by the arbitrary authority of the divines, might very well doubt, without being the less orthodox, whether there existed two eternal first principles, or only one.

This is, indeed, a matter purely philological and philosophical, in which revelation hath nothing to do. Be this, however, as it will, this is not a subject of dispute between you and me. I do not undertake to defend the sentiments of the Curate; but to point out the fallacies and mistakes of your Lordship.

Now, you are totally in the wrong, to advance that the unity of God appeared to me an idle question, and above the human understanding; as, in the very work you condemn, this
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unity is established and maintained by argument. Again, you are quite wrong in bringing the testimony of Tertullian, to prove against me, that the passage in question implies there are many Gods: for, without having recourse to Tertullian, I agree with you that it doth imply there are many Gods. You are wrong, nevertheless, to call me, on this account, rash and daring: for where there is no positive assertion, there can be no temerity. Is it to be conceived that an author must be stigmatized with presumption, only for being less presumptuous than yourself?

You are farther wrong in conceiving that you have justified those particular tenets, which attribute human passions to the Deity, and which, so far from clearing up our notions of that great Being, serve only to obscure and debase them. You are wrong in falsely accusing me of perplexing and debasing those notions; of controverting the divine essence which I have not controverted, and of calling in doubt his unity which I never questioned. But supposing I had done it, what is the consequence? To recriminate on others, is not to justify one's self! but he whose sole defence is to accuse the supposed criminal, may very justly be suspected of being the only one who is guilty.

The contradiction you reproach me with, in the same passage, is also as ill founded as the preceding accusation. "He knows, say you, nothing of the nature of God; and yet presently after he acknowledges this Supreme Being to be possessed of intelligence, power, will, and goodness: is not this to have an idea of the divine nature?"

The answer I shall make your Lordship on this head is as follows. " God is intelligent; but in what manner? Man is intelligent by the act of reasoning, but the Supreme Intelligence lies under no necessity to reason. He requires neither premises nor consequences; not even the simple form of a proposition: His knowledge is purely intuitive; he beholds equally what is and will be; all truths are to him as one idea, as all places are but one point, and all times one moment. Human power acts by the use of means, the divine power in and of itself. God is powerful because he is willing, his will constituting his power. God is good: nothing is more manifest than this truth. Goodness in man, however, consists in a love to his fellow-creatures; and the goodness of God in a love of order: for it is on such order that the connection and preservation of all things depend. Again, God is just: this I am fully convinced of, as it is the natural consequence of his goodness. The injustice of men is their own work, not his; and that moral disorder, which, in the judgment of some philosophers, makes against the system of providence, is in mine the strongest argument for it. Justice in man, indeed, is to render every one his due; but the justice of God requires, at the hands of every one, an account of the talents with which he has intrusted him.

In the discovery, however, by the force of reason, of those divine attributes of which I have no absolute idea, I only affirm what I do not clearly comprehend, which is in effect to affirm nothing. I may say, it is true, that God is this or that; I may be sensible of it, and fully convinced within myself that he is so. I am yet
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never the better able to conceive how or in what manner he is so.

In short, the greater efforts I make to contemplate his infinite essence, the less I am able to conceive it: but I am certain that he is, and that is sufficient; the more he surpasses my conceptions, the more I adore him. I humble myself before him, and say, "Being of beings, I am because thou art; to meditate continually on thee is to elevate my thoughts to the Fountain of existence. The most meritorious use of my reason is to be annihilated before thee: it is the delight of my soul to feel my weak faculties overcome by the splendor of thy greatness."

Such is my answer, and I flatter myself it is satisfactory. Will it be necessary for me to tell your Lordship from whence it is taken? I have taken it, word for word, from the very passage wherein you accuse me of contradiction*; and you have made just such a use of it as all my adversaries do, who transcribe the objections I myself raise, and suppress my solutions. Their answer is therefore already written, and is contained in the work they refute. But we proceed, my Lord, to the discussion of matters of the utmost importance.

After having attacked my system and my book, you make an attack also on my religion; and because the Roman-Catholic Curate had objections against his church, you endeavour to make me pass for an enemy to mine; as if, to propose the difficulties attending any particular opinion, were to renounce it; as if all human knowledge had not its particular difficulties; as if

* Emilius, Vol. ii. p. 166.

if even geometry itself were entirely free from them, or that the geometricians made it a rule to be silent lest they should depreciate the certainty of their art.

The answer I have ready to make, is to declare, with my usual frankness and sincerity, my sentiments with respect to religion; such as I have constantly professed them to be in all my writings, and such as they have always been both on my lips and in my heart. Nay, I will go still farther, and declare why I published the Curate's creed; and why, in spite of all the clamours that have been raised against it, I shall ever esteem it to be the best and most useful performance this age hath produced. Neither persecution, nor arrests, shall ever make me change my tone: the divines, in bidding me be humble, shall not make me an hypocrite; nor shall the philosophers, by taxing me with hypocrisy, make me profess myself an infidel. I will speak of my religion, because I have one: and I will speak of it boldly, because I have the courage to declare what it is; and it were to be wished, for the happiness of mankind, it were that of the whole human race.

My Lord, I am a Christian, a sincere Christian, according to the doctrine of the Gospel. I am a Christian, not as a disciple of priests, but as a disciple of Jesus Christ. My great Master refined but little on doctrinal tenets, but insisted strongly on moral obligations. He prescribed fewer articles of faith than good works; he commanded us to believe only so much as is necessary to make us good. When he superseded the law and the prophets, it was more by acts of virtue than articles of belief. And he hath told
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me, as well in his own words, as by those of his apostles, "That whoſo loveth his brother hath fulfilled the law."

With regard to myſelf, being firmly convinced of the eſſential truths of Chriſtianity, which are the foundation of all good morality, I endeavour to nourish my heart with the ſpirit of the Goſpel, without perplexing my head about what appears in it dark and obſcure; and being as fully perſuaded, that whoſoever loveth God above all things, and his neighbour as himſelf, is a true Chriſtian, I ſtrive to prove myſelf ſuch, laying aſide all thoſe doctrinal ſubtilties, thoſe important trifles with which the Phariſees ſo perplex our duty and confound our belief; placing, with St Paul, even faith itſelf below charity.

Happy in having been educated in a religion the moſt rational and pure upon earth, I remain inviolably attached to the worſhip of my fathers: Like them, I take ſcripture and reaſon for the only rules of faith: Like them, I pay no implicit regard to human authority, nor ſubſcribe to their formulas till I perceive the truth of them: Like them, I heartily join with the true ſervants of Jeſus Chriſt, and the real worſhippers of God, to pay him homage, with the communion of the faithful in his church. It is pleaſing and conſolatory, to be numbered among its members, to aſſiſt in this public worſhip of the Deity, and to reflect, while I am in the miſt of them, Here am I with my brethren.

Penetrated with due reſpect for a worthy paſtor, who, reſiſting the torrent of example, and judging in the truth, hath not excluded from his church a defender of God's cauſe, I ſhall preſerve

serve to the latest hour of my life a grateful remembrance of charity, so truly Christian. I shall ever think it an honour to be numbered among his flock, and hope never to bring a scandal on its members either by my sentiments or conduct. But when injurious priests arrogate to themselves a power to which they have no just pretensions; when they take upon them to dictate what I shall believe, and insolently bid me explain this, disown that, retract my words, or disguise my meaning; their arrogance hath no effect on my sincerity: they cannot make me be guilty of falsehood in order to be orthodox, or say what I do not think merely to please them. And though my veracity may give them so much offence as to make them eager to cut me off from the church, I am little terrified by a menace which it is not in their power to put in execution. They cannot prevent my heart from being united to the faithful; they cannot blot out my name from among the elect, if it be written in that number. They may deprive me, indeed, of many of the comforts of this life, but they cannot deprive me of my hope in that which is to come; where it is my most sincere and ardent wish to have Jesus Christ himself the umpire and judge between them and me.

Such, my Lord, are my real sentiments; which, however, I do not lay down as a rule for others, but only declare them to be mine, and that such they will remain, as long as it pleases, not men, but God, who alone is capable of changing my heart and mind. For so long as I may be what I am, and think as I now do, I shall speak as I now speak. Very opposite, I must own, is this conduct to that of your nominal Christians; who

who are always ready to believe, or to say, what their ease, or interest, require them to say or believe; being satisfied they are good Christians enough, provided their writings are not burnt, and no arrest be issued out against them. They live like people firmly persuaded, that it is not merely necessary they should confess this or that article, but that such confession is sufficient to entitle them to heaven: whereas I am persuaded, on the contrary, that the essential part of religion consists in the discharge of practical duty; and that it is not merely necessary that a man should be just, compassionate, humane, and charitable, but that whoever is truly so, believes enough for his salvation. As for the rest, indeed, I must own their doctrine is much more commodious than mine, and that it would cost a man much less trouble to get himself ranked among the number of the faithful for his opinions than for his virtues.

Whether I ought to have kept my sentiments on these matters to myself, as it is incessantly told me; or whether, when I had the courage to publish and own them, I attacked the laws and disturbed the peace of society; we shall enquire presently. But before I enter on this inquiry, permit me to intreat your Lordship, and every reader of this letter, to place some confidence in the solemn declarations of a friend to truth, and not to follow the example of those who, without proof or probability, and solely on the suggestions of their own hearts, accuse me of atheism and irreligion, and that in contradiction to the most serious and positive protestations, and which nothing on my part ever rendered suspected. I should not think I have
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the appearance of a man who disguises his sentiments; nor is it easy to see what interest I can have in so doing. It ought to be presumed, at least, that a man, who expresses himself so freely concerning what he doth not believe, must be sincere in what he actually professes; and that when his conversation, his actions, and his writings, all perfectly agree on this head, whoever shall dare to affirm he is guilty of falsehood, without having the omniscience of the Deity, must be guilty of a notorious falsehood himself.

I had not always the happiness of a retired life; I have mixed with people of all characters, have known men of all parties, believers of all sects, and freethinkers of all systems. I have seen the high and the low, the libertine and the philosopher. I have had friends who have been sincere, and others who were not so: I have been beset with spies and with enemies; and the world is full of people who hate me for the injuries they have done me. I conjure them all, notwithstanding, of what kind soever, publicly to declare what they know of my belief as to matters of religion; to declare, whether during the most constant familiarity, the most intimate connection, whether in the midst of convivial gaiety, or in the most secret confidence of private conversation, they ever found me different from myself in this respect. Let them declare, if, when they were pleased to rally or argue with me, they found me at any time affected with their arguments or railleries; if they ever caught me varying in my sentiments, or if they could discover any thing in the bottom of my heart which I concealed from the public. Let them
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say, if, at any time whatever, they have found in me even the shadow of imposture or hypocrisy; let them declare what they know, and expose me to the world. I not only consent to it, but beg them to do it; dispensing with every obligation they may think themselves under to the contrary. Let them speak out boldly, not what they would have me be, but what they know I am. Let them judge of me from their consciences; I am not afraid to trust my honour in their hands, and promise to take no exceptions at what they may truly aver.

Let those who charge me with the want of religion, because they themselves have none, and cannot conceive how others can have any; let these, I say, first agree, if they can, among themselves. Some of them discover only an atheistical system in my works; others again pretend, that in my writings I aim at glorifying God without believing in him in my heart. They tax my writings with impiety, and my sentiments with hypocrisy. But if I publicly teach atheism, I am not in that, according to their notions, an hypocrite; and if I affect to believe what I do not, in that I inculcate no impiety. Thus by comparing their contradictory imputations, their calumny exposes itself; but malevolence is blind, and passion is incapable of reason. I do not, indeed, pretend to that degree of faith which is so much the boast of persons of indifferent probity, that implicit belief which hesitates at nothing, but readily admits of every thing that is proposed to it, and throws aside or dissembles concerning those objections it cannot resolve. I have not the happiness to see in revelation the evidence they pre-

tend to find there; and if I declare myself in its favour, it is because my heart induces me to it, because it presents nothing to me but consolation, and because there appear to me as many difficulties in rejecting it; but it is not because its evidence appears to me demonstrative, for in reality it doth not. Indeed I am not sufficiently learned ever to understand a demonstration which requires such profound erudition to deduce and comprehend. Is it not, however, very whimsical to conclude, that I, who openly profess my doubts and objections, am an hypocrite; and that those people who are so very positive, and who decide so absolutely on most points, and are so certain of every thing, without having better proof than myself; that those people, in short, who are not a jot more learned than I am, and who, without obviating my objections, reproach me with proposing them, should be accounted sincere?

But to what end should I be a hypocrite, and what should I gain by it? I have openly made an attack on particular interests, have stirred up all parties against me; the cause of God and of humanity is what I have maintained, and who is there concerns himself about that? What I have written on this subject hath not made the least impression; nor is there a soul who thinks himself obliged to me for it. Had I declared myself openly in favour of atheism, the devotees could not have used me worse, and my other enemies, not less dangerous, would not have given my reputation such frequent stabs in secret. Had I declared myself openly in favour of atheism, the one party would have attacked me with more reserve, in seeing me defended by
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the other, and observing me disposed in myself to revenge: But a man who fears God, is himself little to be feared; his party is not formidable; he is alone, or nearly so, and the world may safely do him a great deal of wrong, before he will think of returning it. Had I declared myself openly in favour of atheism, in thus separating myself from the church, I should at once have deprived its ministers of the means of incessantly harassing me, and making me bear all the little airs of their ecclesiastical tyranny: I should not have been subject to so many idle censures; but, instead of so furiously condemning my writings, they would have been under the necessity of refuting them, which would not have been quite so easy. In short, had I declared myself openly in favour of atheism, they would at first have made a little clamour, which would have soon subsided; and I should have been soon at peace, as have been all others: the people of God would have taken no cognisance of me, nor thought they did me a favour in not treating me as a person excommunicated; so that I should thus have been quit with the world. The saints of Israel would not have writ me anonymous letters, venting their charity in pious abuses; they would not have taken the trouble to assure me, in all meekness and humility, that I was a wicked wretch, an execrable monster, and that it had been but too happy for the world had some good Christian but taken care to stifle me in my cradle. Again, the well-meaning part of mankind, regarding me, on their part, as a reprobate, would never have tormented themselves or me to bring me back into the right way: they would not have pulled me to the right and to the left,

nor have wearied me out with their remonstrances : they would not have reduced me to the necessity of commending their zeal, while I condemned their importunity ; or of gratefully acknowledging they were called, to plague me to death with their good-will.

No, my Lord, to be an hypocrite, I must be both a madman and a fool : I should be mad to turn impostor for any thing I require of mankind ; and a consummate fool, not to see that the method I have taken, could lead only to misfortunes in this life ; and that, if even I might reap some advantages by it, I could not do it without contradicting myself. It is not too late, indeed, to take these advantages now ; I need only bring myself to impose on the world for a moment, and I might triumph over my enemies. I am not as yet arrived at old age, and may possibly have long to suffer ; the public opinion respecting me may change once again ! But if ever I arrive at honours or fortune, by whatever means I may attain them, I shall then be assuredly an hypocrite.

A friend to truth doth not stake his reputation on one opinion or another ; whatever he says, provided it be what he thinks, conduces to his purpose. He who is interested only in being sincere, hath no temptation to deceive ; and there is no man of common sense, who doth not prefer the most simple method when it is also the most certain. My enemies may make the most of their abuse ; they will not be able to deprive me of the honour of being a man who speaks truth on all occasions ; of being the only author of these times, as well as of many preceding ages, that hath written sincerely, and hath said
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only what he believed. They may for a while fully my reputation by dint of false reports and calumnies; it will, sooner or later, however, triumph over them; for while they will be varying in their ridiculous imputations, I shall remain the same, and, without any other art than my native frankness, shall have it always in my power to disappoint them.

“ But this frankness, it may be said, is unreasonable with regard to the public. The truth is not to be spoken at all times; and though sensible people may be of your opinion, it is not proper the vulgar should adopt such sentiments.” Such are the reflections which are made me on all sides; and perhaps such is the reflection you yourself would make me were we alone in your closet. Such changeable creatures are men! They vary their language as they do their habit, and speak the truth only in their night-gowns. When they are dressed, they are equipped only to deceive; and are not only knaves and impostors in the face of the world, but are not ashamed to punish, against the dictates of their own consciences, every one who dares not be as knavish and deceitful as themselves. But is the maxim itself true, that truth ought not to be spoken at all times? or rather, that all truth ought not to be divulged? Were it also true, would it thence follow that no error should be disproved? or that the extravagances of mankind are so sacred, that we should respect them all without exception? This is a point which ought to be examined, before I admit so vague and suspicious a maxim; which, were it true in itself, might be rendered false by misapplication. I have a great inclination, my Lord, to adopt here my

usual method, and to give the history of my ideas as a reply to my accusers; for I conceive I cannot more fully justify all I have dared to say, than by repeating all I have dared to think.

No sooner was I of an age to observe mankind, than I took notice of their actions, and listened to their discourse; when seeing their behaviour agreed but little with their conversation, I endeavoured to find out the reason of that difference; and discovered, that to be and to appear were two things, as different as those of speaking and acting; this latter difference being the cause of the former, and arising itself from a cause which remains to be pointed out.

This I found to exist in the present defective state of society, in every respect contrary to nature, which nothing can totally suppress; incessantly tyrannizing over her, and forcing her to reclaim her just rights. I traced the consequences of this contradiction, and saw that it was alone sufficient to account for all the vices of individuals, and all the evils of society. Hence I concluded, it was unnecessary to suppose men naturally wicked, when I could thus trace the origin and progress of their depravity. These reflections naturally conducted me to farther researches into the human mind, considered in a state of civil society; in which I found that the cultivation of science, and the propagation of vice, went hand in hand together, and increased in the same proportion, not indeed with regard to individuals, but to a whole people; a distinction which I have always been careful to make, though none of my opponents have attended to it.

I sought the truth in books; but there I found

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nothing but falsehood and errors. I consulted authors themselves : but they were mere quacks, who diverted themselves with imposing on mankind ; who had no rule of action but self-interest, and had no other God than reputation ; ever ready to decry and calumniate the great who did not treat them as they pleased, and still more ready to lavish panegyric indiscriminately on those who might hire them.

By attending on those who were authorised to speak in public, I soon found they were either afraid or unwilling to say any thing disagreeable to those by whom they were authorised ; and that being hired by the strong to direct the weak, they could only speak to the latter of their duties, and the former of their privileges. Thus public instruction will always tend to imposture, so long as those who administer it find their interest in deceit ; and it is for them only that the truth is not proper to be spoken. But wherefore should I be an accomplice with men of this stamp ?

Are there any public prejudices which ought to be respected ? This may possibly be ; but it must be when those prejudices are so intimately connected with the order of society, that they cannot be eradicated without rooting up at the same time those things by which they are counteracted ; so that it may be expedient to permit the evil on account of the good. But when things are brought to such a situation that every change must be for the better, can there be any prejudices so respectable that we must sacrifice to them reason, virtue, justice, and all the benefits which truth may be productive of to mankind ? For my part, I have engaged myself

self to speak the truth, whenever it may be useful, as far as it is in my power : This is an engagement also which I ought to fulfil to the utmost of my abilities, and which no one can fulfil in my stead ; because, every one being equally bound to all, no one can discharge the obligation of another. “ Divine truth, saith St Augustin, is neither mine, your’s, nor his ; but belongs to us all, on whom it forcibly calls to act in concert to make it known to the world, under the penalty of being useless to ourselves if we do not communicate it to others : for whoever would appropriate to himself a blessing which God would have every one enjoy, loses by that very usurpation the good of which he robs the public, and finds himself involved in error for having betrayed the truth.”

Mankind ought not to be instructed by halves. If they ought to remain in error, why ought they not to be left in ignorance ? To what purpose are there so many schools and universities, to teach them what they ought not to know ? What is the design of your colleges, your academies, and so many other learned institutions ? Is it merely to amuse and deceive the public, by vitiating their reason, and preventing their discovering of the truth ? Yes, ye professors of falsehood, it is to abuse, that ye pretend to instruct us, and, like the merciless robbers who hang up lanthorns on the rocks to deceive the unhappy mariner, ye light us on to destruction.

Such were my notions when I first took up the pen ; and in laying it down, I have no reason to change my sentiments. I have always observed, that the mode of public instruction had two essential defects, which it is impossible to

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remove. The one is, the insincerity of the instructors; and the other, the blindness of the instructed. If men without passions were to instruct men without prejudices, their knowledge might indeed be more confined, but it would be more certain, and reason would always bear the sway. Now, the interest of public instructors will be ever the same; but the prejudices of the people, having no fixed foundation, are variable, and may be altered, perverted, augmented, or diminished. It is only on this side, therefore, that instruction can have any certain hold of mankind, and it is to this every friend to truth should incline. He may have some hope of making the people more reasonable, but can have none of making their leaders more honest.

I have seen the same deceit prevail in religion as in politics, and have been much more concerned at it. The evils of government may render its subjects miserable only upon earth; but who knows how far mistakes in point of conscience may not be injurious to unhappy mortals hereafter? I have observed the world full of creeds, tenets, and modes of worship, all followed without any real belief therein; and have seen, that nothing of all these affecting either the understanding or the heart, they had but very little influence on moral conduct. I must speak to you, my Lord, on this head, without disguise. The true believer cannot accommodate himself to this grimace: He is sensible that man is an intelligent being, requiring a reasonable worship; and that he is a social being, whose system of morals should be adapted to the purposes of humanity. Let us find, in the first place,
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this worship and this morality, which would be applicable to mankind in general. If, after this, it be requisite to distinguish them into national forms, we should examine into their foundations, relations, and conveniences; and, after having determined what are the religion and morality of the man, determine what are those of the citizen. In doing this, we should be particularly careful not to imitate your good friend M. *Joli de Fleury*, who, to establish his Jansenism, would root up all natural law and moral obligation: so that, according to him, a contract between a Christian and an infidel must be void, because there is no law common to both.

Hence I saw there were two methods of examining and comparing different religions: the one relative to the truth and falsehood they contained, either with regard to the natural or supernatural facts on which they were established, or with regard to the ideas we derive from reason of the Supreme Being and the religious worship he requires of us; the other relative to their moral and temporal effects upon earth, according to the good or evil they might be of to society and to mankind. Now, we must not, in order to prevent this two-fold examination, begin by affirming, that both these things go together, and that the truest religion is also the most salutary for society; this being precisely the point in question: nor ought men to raise an outcry of impiety and atheism against those who treat this question; as it is one thing to believe, and another to examine into the effects of our belief.

It appears very certain, indeed, that if man be naturally formed for society, the truest religion

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gion must be also the most social and humane: for God would certainly have us to be what he made us ; and if it be true that we are naturally wicked, we should be disobedient to him in wishing to be otherwise. Add to this, that religion, considered as a kind of relation between God and man, cannot contribute to the glory of the former, but by the happiness of the latter; because the other term of the relation, which is God, is above every thing that man can do either for or against it.

This opinion, however, probable as it is, is subject to great difficulties, on account of historical facts which contradict each other. The Jews were enemies by birth to all other people; and founded their own establishment on the destruction of seven nations, according to the express orders which they received from God. Again, the Christians have had their holy wars; and war is undoubtedly destructive to mankind. All parties have persecuted and been persecuted in their turn; and persecution is undoubtedly hurtful to mankind. Many sects of them profess, and make a merit of celibacy; but celibacy is undoubtedly so hurtful to mankind, that if it were adopted universally, the whole human race must perish *. If these considerations be not suf-

* Chastity and continence have their use, even with regard to population; it is always good to have the command over one's self; hence a state of virginity is always respectable: but it does not thence follow, that it is good or commendable to persevere in that state during life, in contradiction to nature and the end of our being. We have generally more respect for a marriageable girl, than for a young married woman; but we have more for the mother of a family, than for an old maid: and this appears to me very reasonable. As we do not marry so soon as we are born, nor is it proper to marry very young,

sufficient to authorise us to decide concerning religion, they afford a sufficient reason for us to examine into it; and I require nothing else but permission to make this examination. I neither say nor think, that there is no good religion upon earth; but I affirm, and it is but too true, that there never has been a religion publicly established which hath not given the most cruel wounds to humanity. All parties have occasionally tormented their fellow-creatures, and offered human sacrifices to the Deity. Whatever may be the source of these contradictions, certain it is they subsist; and can it be a crime to wish their removal? Charity never thirsts after blood, nor doth the love of one's neighbour inspire us with the thoughts of massacre. In like manner, it is not zeal for the salvation of souls that is the cause of persecution; pride, arrogance, and self-love, are the cause. The more unreasonable any religion is, the more it is propagated by force: he who professes absurd tenets, cannot bear that others should see them represented in their true light. Reason in such

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a state of virginity, which all ought to support and esteem, is useful and necessary, as it is salutary and honourable; but it is so only with a view, at a proper time, to bestow its purity on that of marriage. Now! will it be said, with an air of triumphant raillery, do these old bachelors pretend to preach up the obligations of matrimony? Why do not they themselves marry? Very true, why do they not indeed? It is because your absurd institutions have made a state, which is sacred and delightful in itself, so ridiculous and unhappy, that it is almost impossible to support it without being either a knave or a fool. Ye sceptres of iron, absurd laws! it is you whom we may reproach for our not having fulfilled our duties on earth: it is from us the cry of nature is heard against your barbarity. How can you presumptuously reproach us with the misery to which you have seduced us?

a case, becomes the greatest of crimes, and must at all events be suppressed, as men are ashamed to want it in the eyes of others. Thus absurdity and persecution have the same source. Mankind must be constantly terrified and intimidated. Leave them a moment to the use of their reason, and you are undone.

On this consideration alone it appears to me an act of public good, to instruct people under such circumstances to reason on the subject of religion: for by so doing they are instructed in their moral obligations, persecution is deprived of its sting, and humanity is restored to its native rights. To this end, however, it is necessary to recur to general principles, to such as are common to all mankind; for if, when you begin to reason, you lay any stress on the authority of priests, you put a sword into the hand of fanaticism, and furnish her with the means of persecution.

Those who love peace also should never recur to the authority of books. This is the way never to come to any determination. Books have been the source of inexhaustible disputes. Take a view of the histories of nations, and you will find that such as had no books had no disputes among them. Would you subject mankind to human authority, they would all be so differently affected by it, that though every one should be possessed of the greatest sincerity and the soundest judgement, it would be impossible for them ever to agree. Never reason, therefore, on the maxims or arguments of others. Human language is not sufficiently clear and explicit: Not even God himself, should he deign to speak to us after our mode of speech, could say

any thing which would not afford us some occasion for dispute.

Our languages are the work of men, and men are creatures of confined talents. Our languages are the work of men, and men are deceitful. Hence, as there is no truth so clearly announced but that chicanery will find it in some degree equivocal, so there is no falsehood so gross that it may not be supported by some pretended reasoning.

We will suppose, for instance, that a man should surprise us at midnight, by declaring it to be broad day; our surprise would, doubtless, be accompanied with laughter, and we should treat him with ridicule: but give him only time and means to establish a sect, and sooner or latter you would see his partisans labouring to prove that he was in the right. They would say, that when he pronounced it was day, it certainly was so in some part of the world or other; and nothing could be more true. Others again might refine upon the assertion, and maintain, that, as there are always some particles of light scattered up and down in the atmosphere, it is daylight even all night long. And thus a number of subtle casuists joining in the dispute, they would presently make you see the sun shine at midnight. This evidence, indeed, might not prevail universally; the debate degenerating, according to custom, into cruelty and bloodshed. One party would be for the explication, another against it; one would be for taking the matter in a figurative sense, and the other in a simple one. Some would say, He affirmed at midnight, that it was then day, and it was night. Others would say, He affirmed at midnight that

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it was day, and it was day. Each would tax his opponent with insincerity and obstinacy : A battle or massacre must end the dispute ; streams of blood would flow on all sides ; and if the new sect should in the end be victorious, it would be demonstrated that it is day at midnight. Such is the history of almost all the quarrels that have arisen about religion.

The innovations of most religious sectaries have been established by fanaticism, and maintained by hypocrisy : hence it is that they are so repugnant to reason and virtue. Enthusiasm never reasons ; so that, whilst its frenzy lasts, any thing goes down, nor is it very nice about articles of faith. Its method also is extremely convenient ; doctrines are so easily adopted, and morals so difficult to practise, that, taking the easiest way, they supply the want of good works by the merit of an implicit faith. But after all, fanaticism is a critical state which cannot last for ever. It hath its fits long and short, more or less frequent ; and hath its intermissions, during which indifference prevails. During these intervals, the believer comes a little to himself, and is astonished to find himself surrounded with such a heap of absurdities. But the religion is established, its forms prescribed ; laws are enacted in support of them, and transgressions are punished. Who will venture to stand up, of himself, to protest against all these, to except against the laws of his country, and deny the religion of his fathers ? It is held more prudent to submit in silence ; it is our interest to be of the opinion of those whose possessions we are to inherit. Every one acts the same farce, therefore, with his neighbours ; laughing in his

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sleeve at what he affects publicly to revere. Such, my Lord, is the behaviour of the greater part of the professors of most religions, and particularly of yours; and such is my key to the inconsistency which is so remarkable between their doctrines and their practice. Their belief is all affectation, and their manners the same as their faith.

Why is it that one man is interested to take cognisance of the belief of another, or the state of that of the citizens? It is, doubtless, because it is supposed that our faith hath an influence on our morals, and that on our ideas of the life to come depends our conduct in the present. But, if this be not the case, of what consequence is our belief, or the affectation of it? The appearance of religion is no longer of any other use than to dispense with the reality.

In a state of society, every one is entitled to inform himself, whether another believes himself under any obligation to be just; the sovereign having the right to examine into the reasons on which every one founds such obligation. Add to this, that established national forms ought to be observed; this is what I have particularly insisted on. But with regard to opinions merely speculative, and that have no influence on morals, and which do not tend to the transgression of the laws; every person should be at liberty to think as he pleased, nor would any one be either entitled or interested to dictate their sentiments to others. Thus, for example, should any person, tho' invested with authority, come to ask me my opinion concerning the famous question of the hypostatical union; of which the Bible says not a word, though so many grown chil-

children have held councils, and so many unhappy men have suffered on that account; I should civilly desire him, after having owned I did not understand nor give myself any concern about the matter, to trouble himself about his own business; and, if he still persisted, I should take my leave of him.

This is the only principle on which any thing determinate and equitable can be deduced from disputes about religion; and without which, every one laying down on his part the thing in question, nothing is agreed on or understood; while religion, which ought to contribute to the happiness of mankind, is productive of their greatest evils.

But as religions grow old, they lose sight of the object they had first in view; they increase in subtilties, while every thing is to be understood, explained, and determined: thus the doctrine grows daily refined, and the moral practices of it as constantly decay. There is undoubtedly a wide difference between the spirit of Deuteronomy and that of the Talmud; between the spirit of the Gospel and the quarrels about the Constitution. St Thomas asks, and determines it in the affirmative, Whether articles of faith do not multiply by process of time? That is to say, The successive professors, refining upon one another, come in time to know much more than hath been said by Jesus Christ and his Apostles. St Paul ingenuously confesses, "that he saw things but as through a glass, darkly, and in part." Our Theologues have made a much greater progress: they see every thing, know every thing: they have cleared up all the obscurities of Scripture; have determined what

appeared indeterminate; and have shewn us, with their usual modesty, that the sacred writers stood in great need of their assistance to become intelligible, and that the Holy Spirit knew not how to explain itself clearly without them.

When men have lost sight of their moral duties, to busy themselves only about the opinions and frivolous disputes of priests, a Christian is no longer asked if he believes in God, but if he be orthodox: he is required to subscribe to a set form of useless and sometimes unintelligible tenets; and when he hath so done, all is well, he is asked no further questions. Provided he doth nothing to get himself hanged, he may live almost as he pleases; his morals are nothing to the purpose, his belief is secure. When religion is come to this pass, of what use is it to society, or advantage to individuals? It serves only to stir up dissensions, troubles, and quarrels, of every kind, among them; and to set them a-cutting each others throats about the solution of ænigmas. Certainly it would be better to have no religion at all, than a religion so egregiously misapplied. Let us preserve it, if possible, from degenerating to that point; and be assured, in spite of chains and persecution, that you will do a meritorious service to mankind.

Let us suppose, that, wearied out with such destructive quarrels, mankind should assemble to put an end to them, and agree about a religion adapted to the different peoples upon earth. Every one would begin, undoubtedly, by proposing his own as the only true, rational, and demonstrable religion, as the only one agreeable to God and useful to man: but his proofs would by no means

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means confirm his persuasions, at least in the opinion of other sects. Each party would have no voice but its own. It is no less certain that all the others would unite against it. In this manner the deliberation might go round, one proposing, and all the rest rejecting; this would never be the way to come to an agreement. It is to be conceived, therefore, that after much time lost in such puerile altercations, men of sense would seek the means of conciliation. To this end, they would begin by banishing all professed divines from the assembly; nor would it be difficult for them to see how indispensable this preliminary step would be. This good work being done, they would say to the rest, Till you can agree upon some one principle, it is impossible you should ever understand each other; and it is an argument by which no person ever was convinced, to say you are in the wrong because I am in the right. You say, this is right, because it is agreeable to God; but this is precisely the very thing in question. If we knew what religion was most agreeable to him, there would be no farther dispute between us. You say that is right, because it is useful to mankind. This is quite another thing. Men may judge of this particular. Let us take this utility, therefore, as our guide; and proceed to establish those doctrines which are most conducive to it. We may thus hope to come as near the truth as it is possible: for it is to be presumed, that, whatever is most useful to his creatures, must be most agreeable to the Creator.

“ Let us see, then, if there be any natural affinity between us; if there be any thing held in common by us all. Ye Jews, what think you

of the origin of mankind? We think they are all the offspring of one common father. And you Christians, what is your opinion on this subject? The same as that of the Jews. And you Turks, what say you? We think the same as the Jews and Christians.—Very well, so far is good; as men are all brothers, they ought undoubtedly to love each other as such.

“ But of whom, say you, did our common father receive his being? for he certainly did not make himself.—Of the Creator of heaven and earth. Jews, Turks, and Christians, all agree in this: here is another great point gained. Again, of man, the work of this Creator, is he a simple or compound being? Is he formed of one substance, or of many? Answer, ye Christians! He is composed of two substances, the one mortal, and the other immortal.—And you Turks! We think the same.—And you Jews! We had formerly but confused ideas of this matter, as may be seen by the expressions of the sacred writings; but we have been since enlightened, and at present are of the same opinion as the Christians.”

In proceeding thus, by way of interrogatories, on divine providence, the life to come, and other matters essential to the peace of society and the good of mankind; and having obtained almost uniform answers from every one; the querists would say to them, (By the way, it is to be remembered that the Priests are banished the assembly,) “ Wherefore, my friends, do you thus torment yourselves? You appear to be all agreed as to those points which are of consequence for you to know; and though you may differ in sentiment as to other matters, I see very
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little inconvenience. Draw up a few articles of an universal religion, which may be called, if you will, the Humane and Social Creed, and which every person living in society may be obliged to receive. And if any one should speak or write against it, he should be banished from society as an enemy to its fundamental laws. As to those matters on which you are not all agreed, form of your particular creeds so many national religions, and profess them in sincerity and truth; but do not go on tormenting yourselves in order to make other nations receive them, as you may rest assured God Almighty doth not require this at your hands. For it is as unjust to insist on subjecting others to your opinions as to your laws; missionaries appearing to me to be just as wise as conquerors.

“ In pursuing each your different doctrines, however, cease to imagine them so fully demonstrated, that those who do not look upon them in that light are insincere. Cease to believe, that all those who examine your proofs and reject their evidence, are for that reason obstinate infidels, whose incredulity is criminal. Cease to think, that reason, a regard for truth, and sincerity, are confined to yourselves. Do what we will, we are always induced to treat those as enemies, whom we accuse of wilfully resisting the force of evidence. We may lament their error, but we hate their obstinacy. Give the preference to your own reasons, if you will; but always remember that such as are not converted by them, may also have theirs.

“ Honour, in general, all the founders of your respective modes of worship. Let every one pay the reverence which he conceives due to that.

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of his own; but let him not despise those of others. They might be men of great genius and great virtues; and these are always respectable. They have declared themselves messengers from God; this might be, might or might not; it is a subject which the generality of mankind cannot judge of, in an uniform and consistent manner, the proofs of it not being equally adapted to the comprehension of all. But, though this be the case, they should not be hastily treated as impostors. Who knows how far continual meditations on the Deity, or the enthusiasm of virtue, may have disturbed, in their sublime imaginations, the mean and regular order of their common ideas? A too great elevation of mind sometimes turns the brain, and things are no longer seen in their ordinary light. Socrates himself imagined he had a familiar; but no one hath dared, on that account, to accuse him of being a knave. Shall we treat the founders of a whole people, the benefactors of nations, with less regard than a particular individual?

“In a word, let there be no more disputes among you, about the preference due to your several religions. They are all good when they are established by law, and contain what is essential to your happiness. The form or mode of worship, is the police of religions, and not its essence, and it belongs to the sovereign of every country to regulate it.”

I have thought, my Lord, that a person, who should reason thus, would not be therefore a blasphemer or impious; but that the conciliatory expedient he might thus propose, would be just, rational, and useful to mankind. I did not think, also, that it would prevent his having

a particular religion or mode of worship, any more than other people, or his being as sincerely attached to it. A true believer, knowing that an infidel is also a man, and probably an honest one, may, without a crime, interest himself in his fate. He may justly prevent the introduction of any foreign mode of worship in his country : but let him not consign to damnation all those who think differently from himself ; for whoever pronounces so rash a judgement, becomes a professed enemy to the whole human race. I am constantly told, that civil toleration should be admitted, but not a theological : for my part, I am of a contrary opinion ; and believe that a good moral man, be his religion what it will, may be saved. But I do not for that reason think it lawful to introduce foreign modes of worship in any country, without the permission of its sovereign : For tho' it may not be directly to disobey God, it is to disobey the laws ; and disobedience to the laws is disobedience to God.

With regard to such religions as are once established or tolerated in any country, I conceive it is both cruel and unjust to suppress them by violence, and that the sovereign is his own enemy who injures the religious sectaries of his country. There is a wide difference between embracing a new religion, and professing that in which we are born and bred : it is the first only that can in any shape be criminal. One ought neither to establish a diversity of religions, nor suppress those which are once established : for a son cannot be to blame in adopting the religion of his father. All the arguments in behalf of public tranquillity make against the advocate

vocate for persecution. Religion never causes any troubles in a state, unless when the prevailing party would oppress the weak, or when the weaker party, being of a persecuting spirit, cannot live in peace with any other. But no lawful worship, that is to say, a worship comprehending any thing of the essence of religion, the professors of which require of course nothing but peace and toleration, ever gave rise to rebellions or civil wars; unless when it was forced to act in its own defence, and repel its persecutors. Never did the Protestants, for instance, take up arms in France, unless when they have been persecuted. Had they been permitted, they would have been contented to live in peace and quiet. I must frankly confess, indeed, that the reformed religion had at first no right of establishment in France contrary to the laws. But when transmitted from fathers to children, it became that of a considerable part of the French nation, and the Prince had solemnly treated with this party in the edict of Nantz: that edict became an inviolable contract, which could not be annulled without the joint consent of both parties: so that, ever since that time, the profession of the protestant religion is, in my opinion, lawful in France.

Indeed, were it not so, the subject should surely be left at liberty to chuse the alternative of leaving the kingdom with his effects, or of remaining, on condition of his conforming to the established religion. But to compel them to stay, and yet refuse to tolerate them; to insist on their existence and annihilation at the same time; to deprive them of the common pri-

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privilege of nature, to annul their marriages *, to declare their children bastards—But hold, I shall say too much in speaking the truth here.

I may venture to observe, however, that it might be political to deprive the *French* Protestants of their chiefs: but the government should have stopped there. Political maxims have their applications and distinctions. In order to prevent dissensions, which there is no longer any just reason to fear, the government hath deprived itself of very considerable resources of which it stood in great need. What hurt can a party do, in such a kingdom as *France*, which hath neither great men nor nobility at their head? Examine into all your preceding wars, called religious, and you will find them to have taken their rise at court and amidst the cabals of the great. When the intrigues of the cabinet had embroiled public affairs, the chiefs excited the people in the

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* In an arrest of the parliament of Tholouse, concerning the affair of the unfortunate Colas, the Protestants are reproached with intermarrying with each other; marriage being, according to the Protestants, an act merely civil, and of easy fulfilment, both in its form and effects, to the will and pleasure of the King. So because marriage is reckoned by the *French* to be a civil act, it must follow that they are obliged to submit to the will of the king, who makes it an act of the Roman Catholic religion. Thus the Protestants, to be legally entitled to marry, are obliged to become Catholics, notwithstanding, according to them, it is an act purely civil. Such is the logic of *France*, the parliament of Tholouse.—The kingdom of *France* is so very extensive, that the *French* imagine the whole human race should have no other laws than theirs. Their parliaments and tribunals appear to have no idea of the law of nature and of nations; and it is very remarkable, that in all this great kingdom, in which are so many universities, colleges, and academies, wherein are taught so many frivolous arts and sciences, there is not one professor of natural law among them. The *French* are the only people in Europe who have looked on this study as useless.

name of the Lord. But what intrigues, what cabals, can be formed by a parcel of tradesmen and peasants? By what means can they form a party, in a country that contains nothing but servants and masters, and in which equality of condition is either unknown or looked upon with dishonour? A tradesman proposing to raise troops might be listened to in *England*, but would set every body a-laughing in *France*.*

If I were a King—No—a Minister—still less; but if I were a man in power in *France*, I should say, Every one among us is ambitious of posts, of employments; every one is for purchasing the power to do ill; *Paris* and the court swallow up every thing. Let us leave these poor people to fill up the void of the Provinces; but let them be tradesmen and always tradesmen, labourers and always labourers. Not being able to emerge from their situation, they will make the most of it. They will supply the place of our people, in those conditions of life which we all aspire to get out of; they will make commerce and agriculture flourish, which we abandon; they will furnish out our luxury; they will labour, and we shall reap the fruits of it.

If this project would not be more equitable than those which are now pursued, it would at least

* The only situation in which a people, thus destitute of chiefs, will take up arms, is that of despair, to which being reduced by their persecutors, they have no other choice than in the manner of their destruction. In which case, the world beholds with astonishment the power which a contemptible party may deduce from their despair; a circumstance which persecutors never have calculated beforehand. And yet these wars have occasioned so much bloodshed, that they ought seriously to think of the consequence before they render them inevitable.

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least be more humane, and undoubtedly more useful. It is less the tyranny and ambition of the great, than their prejudices and confined views, which are so injurious to the common people of all nations.

I will conclude what I have to say on this subject, by transcribing a short discourse which bears some relation to it.

A Paris of Suratte having secretly married a Turkish woman, was discovered, seized, and, having refused to embrace Mahometanism, was condemned to death. Before he went to execution, he addressed his judge in the following manner:

“ Will you, then, take away my life? For what crime is it you punish me? I have rather transgressed my own law than yours: My law speaks to the heart, and is without cruelty; my crime hath been punished by the censure of my brethren. But what have I done to you deserving of death? I have behaved to you as if you were of my family, and have chosen a sister from among you. I have left her to her own faith, and for her own interest she hath respected mine. Confining myself willingly to her alone, I have honoured her as the instrument of that worship which the author of my being requires, and have by her means paid that tribute which every man owes to his species. Love bestowed her on me, and virtue hath endeared her to me; she hath not lived in a state of servitude, but hath entirely possessed the heart of her husband; my fault hath made her no less happy than myself. To expiate so venial a crime, however, you would have had me turn liar and impostor; you would have compelled

me to profess your sentiments, without respecting or believing them : as if the violator of our laws deserved to be subjected to yours, you have offered to my choice perjury or death ; and I have chosen the latter, for I will not deceive you. I die, then, since it must be so ; but I die worthy to revive and reanimate the body of another just man. I die a martyr to my religion, without fear of changing it after death for yours. May I come again to the Mahometans to teach them to become humane, merciful, and just ! For serving the same God as we do, as there are not two Gods, you are blinded by your zeal to torment his servants, and are only sanguinary and cruel because you are inconsistent.

“ You are mere children, that in your play are capable only of doing mischief to mankind. You imagine yourselves wise, and you know nothing of God. Can your new-fangled tenets be agreeable to him, who exists and hath been adored from all eternity ? How can such a modern people speak of the religions established before them ? Our rites are as old as the stars in the firmament : The first rays of the sun lighted and received the homage of our forefathers. The great Zerdust beheld the infancy of the world ; he foretold and described the order of the universe : And yet you, ye men of yesterday, you would set yourselves up to be our prophets. Twenty ages before Mahomet, before the birth of Ishmael or his father, the Magi were of ancient standing. Our sacred books had given law to Asia and the world, while three great empires had successively flourished and passed away under our ancestors, before yours had existence.

“ Such

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“ Such, ye prejudiced mortals, is the difference between you and us. You call yourselves believers, and you live like barbarians. Your institutions, your laws, your religion, nay even your virtues, serve only to vex and debase human nature. The duties you prescribe are all gloomy and painful. Such are your fastings, self-denial, stripes, mutilations, and seclusion; ye know not how to lay yourselves under any obligations but such as are attended with affliction and restraint. You make men hate life, and the means of their preservation; your women are without men, your lands without cultivation; you devour the brute creation, and massacre the human; you delight in blood and cruelty, and by means of the twofold yoke of fanaticism and despotic power impose customs that are destructive to our species and shocking to nature.

“ As to us, we are men of peace; we neither do, nor wish, ill to any thing that breathes, not even to our tyrants themselves: We give them, without reluctance, the fruits of our labour, contented to be useful to them, and to discharge our own duty. Our numerous herds still cover your pastures; the trees we planted afford you fruit and shade; your lands, which we cultivate, supply you with nourishment by our means; a simple and harmless people increase and multiply under your oppression, and draw from the bosom of our common mother that plenty and abundance which you could not have procured for yourselves. The sun, which lights us at labour, is a witness of our patience and your injustice: when it rises, it finds us constantly employed in well-doing; and when it sets

it attends us home to our families, there to prepare ourselves for new labour.

“The truth is known only to God. If, notwithstanding all this, therefore, we are deceived in our religion, it is hardly to be believed that we shall be condemned to Hell; we, who are employed only in doing good upon earth; and that you should be of the number of the elect and chosen of God, who do nothing but ill. But, supposing we are really in an error, you ought to shew it some respect, for your own advantage. Our piety makes you fat, and yours makes you lean; thus we repair the mischiefs which are done you by a destructive religion. Believe me, you had better let us enjoy our own opinions, which are so useful to you; there being just reason to fear, that if we should adopt yours, it would prove the greatest evil that could happen to you.”

I have thus endeavoured, my Lord, to give you an idea of that spirit in which the Savoyard's creed was written, and of those considerations which induced me to publish it. On which, I now take the liberty to ask you, in what respect can you call his doctrines blasphemous, impious, or abominable? and what you find in it so scandalous and pernicious to mankind? I ask the same of those who have charged me with publishing what I ought to have kept secret, and with the intention of disturbing the public peace and good order of society; a vague and impertinent imputation, with which those, who reflect least on what is useful or hurtful, excite the credulous public against a well meaning author. To recal people to the true faith which they have thrown aside, is this to teach them to believe

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believe nothing? To advise every one to submit to the laws of their country, is this to disturb the peace and good order of society? Do I write against all religious worship, by exhorting every people to abide by the established modes of their country? Do we deprive a man of what he has, by advising him not to change it? Is the paying a respect to every religion, making a mock of all religions? In a word, is it so essential to the professors of each, to hate one another, that, if that hate be removed, religion itself is abolished?

Yet this is what the people are told by those who are in power, when the public odium is to be excited against the advocate for truth. So now, ye cruel persecutors, your arrests, your mandates, and your journals, exasperate and abuse the public on my account. On the credit of your clamours the world conceives me a monster of wickedness: Your clamours, however, will, sooner or latter, subside, and my writings will remain to your shame. The more moderate Christians will search them, with astonishment, for those horrid sentiments you pretend to find there, and will only see the morals of their divine Master mixed with lessons of peace, concord, and charity. May they learn thence to be more just than their fathers! May the virtues they gather from thence avenge me one day of your maledictions!

With regard to such objections as relate to the particular sects into which the world is divided, would I could give them sufficient force to make every one less opinionated of his own, and less an enemy to others; to induce every one to be indulgent and candid, from the natural and striking consideration, that if he had been
born

born in a different country, or among a different sect, he would have infallibly taken that for error which he now takes for truth, and that for truth which he now takes for error ! It is of so much consequence to mankind to regard less the opinions which serve to divide, than those which unite them ! On the contrary, by neglecting what they approve in common, they are embittered against each other on account of their particular sentiments ; sticking most for those opinions which seem the most unreasonable, while every one supplies with confidence that authority which reason refuses. Thus, while we are all agreed at the bottom about every thing which is truly interesting, and of which we take little notice, we spend our lives in disputation, in quarrelling, and in persecuting each other, on account of those things we understand the least, and which it is least necessary for us to understand. Decisions after decisions are made to no purpose, and their contradictions palliated in vain by an unintelligible jargon ; we find every day new questions to resolve, and new subjects to quarrel about ; because every doctrine hath infinite branches, and because every body, full of the importance of his petty refinement, believes that to be essential which is not so, and neglects what really is so. Hence, if any one proposes objections which they cannot resolve, which, on account of the perplexity of their doctrines, becomes every day more easy to do, they are as fretful as children ; and because they are more attached to their party than to the truth, and have more pride than sincerity, the less they are able to prove, the less are they disposed to pardon any doubt.

My

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My own history may serve to shew, better than any other, the judgment we ought to form of our modern Christians; but as this would say more of them than is credible, it may perhaps one day give rise to an opinion directly opposite: that which is now the opprobrium of my contemporaries may be their glory; when the well-meaning reader of my work shall cry out, in the simplicity of his heart, "What heavenly times must those have been when such a book as this was burnt as impious, and its author persecuted as a malefactor! Doubtless, the productions of that age must have breathed the most sublime devotion, the whole earth must have been covered with saints!"

But other books will likewise remain. It will be known, for example, that the same age produced a panegyrist on the feast of St Bartholomew, a Frenchman, and, as it may well be believed, an Ecclesiastic, without exciting either Parliament or Prelate against him. Then indeed, by comparing the morals of the two books, and the crimes of their respective authors, the language of the world might be changed, and a different conclusion drawn.

Those are abominable doctrines which excite people to injustice, to murder, and fanaticism. For what can be more abominable than to reduce violence and injustice to a system, and to deduce them from the mercy of God? I shall abstain here from drawing a parallel that may displease you. So far, however, your Lordship will agree with me, that if France had professed the religion of the Savoyard Priest, a religion so pure and simple, inculcating the fear of God and the love of man, your fields would not have
for

so often been dyed with blood ; a people so gay and agreeable would not have astonished the rest of mankind with their cruelties in so many massacres and persecutions, from the time of the inquisition of Tholouse * to the feast of St Bartholomew ; the Counsellor Du Bourg would not have been gibbeted for having given his opinion in favour of the Protestants ; the inhabitants of Merindol and the Cabrieres had not been put to death by an arret of the Parliament of Aix ; nor in our own times the unhappy Calas been put to the torture and expired on the wheel, for a crime of which he could not be guilty. But we shall now return, my Lord, to your censures, and the reasons on which you found them. It is always men, says the Curate, who tell us the word of God, and who tell us it also in unknown tongues. On the contrary, we often stand in great need of God to ascertain the word of men ; it is, at least, certain he might have given us his own word, instead of making use of such suspected instruments. The Curate complains that so much human testimony is requisite to ascertain the divine word : *How many men are there, says he, between God and me !*

To this you reply : " To justify this complaint, my dear brethren, we ought to be able to

* It is true that St Dominic, a Spanish saint, bore a considerable part in this inquisition. This saint, according to a writer of his order, had so much charity in preaching against the Albigenses, as to unite himself to certain devout persons, who, being zealous for the faith, took care to extirpate those heretics by the material sword, who could not be subdued by the sword of the spirit.—This kind of charity little resembles that of our good Curate, and was indeed differently rewarded. The professors of the one are persecuted, while those of the other are canonized.

to affirm that a revelation must be false, when it is not made to every individual; we ought to be able to say, that God cannot require us to believe any thing he has said, unless he had particularly addressed himself to us."

On the contrary, however, this complaint is justifiable only by admitting the truth of revelation. For if, you suppose it false, what complaint have you a right to make against the means God hath made use of, when he hath confessedly made use of none? Ought he to account to you for all the abuses of an impostor? When you permit yourselves to be duped, it is your fault, and not his. But if God, doubtless at liberty to use his own means, hath given the preference to those which require on our part so much erudition and such profound investigation, is the Curate to blame to wish, "That, being always reduced to the necessity of examining, comparing, and verifying the evidence, God had deigned to have saved him all that trouble?" should he have served him with a less willing heart?

Your minor, my Lord, is so admirable, that I shall transcribe it verbatim. I am indeed fond of making use of your own words; this is my greatest partiality. "But is there not an infinite number of facts even prior to that of the Christian revelation, of which it would be absurd to doubt? Now by what means do we acquire the knowledge of these facts but by human testimony? By what other means did our author himself become acquainted with Sparta, with Athens, and with Rome, on whose laws, manners, and heroes, he lavishes such extravagant encomiums? What a number of men between
him

him and even the historians that transmitted to him an account of those events!"

If the subject were less serious, or had I less respect for your Lordship, this manner of reasoning would furnish me with an opportunity of diverting my readers; but God forbid that I should forget what is due to the subject I am treating, or to the persons whom I address. At the hazard, therefore, of being flat and insipid in my reply, I shall content myself with barely pointing out your error.

You will please to consider, then, that it is perfectly consistent with the order of things, that human facts should be attested by human witnesses. They cannot be confirmed by any other means; for how should I know that Sparta and Rome ever existed, unless by means of contemporary authors? Now between me and authors, who lived so far distant from me, there must necessarily be intermediate communicants: But where is the necessity of any such between God and me? and wherefore at least such as lived at so great a distance of place and time, that they must stand in need of so many others? Is it simple or natural that God should have made choice of Moses to speak to John-James Rousseau?

Add to this, that no one is obliged, under pain of damnation, to believe that Rome or Sparta have existed; nor is any one consigned to eternal flames for having doubted it. Every fact, of which we are not eye-witnesses, must gain credit with us from the moral evidence of its truth, and all moral evidence is capable of a greater or less degree of certitude. Can I believe, therefore, that divine justice will cast me for ever into hell, merely for not determining exactly

exactly the point at which such evidence becomes irrefragable?

There is not an historical fact in the world more fully attested than that of the Vampires. It is confirmed by regular information, certificates of Notaries, Surgeons, Vicars, and Magistrates. And yet, with all this, who believes in the Vampires? And shall we be all damned for not believing? However well attested, even in the opinion of the incredulous Cicero, are many of the prodigies related by Livy, I cannot help regarding them as so many fables, and certainly am not the only person who doth so. My constant experience, as well as that of mankind in general, is much more convincing in this respect than the testimony of individuals. If Sparta and Rome were in themselves prodigies, they were prodigies of the moral kind; so that we should be like the Laplanders, who fix the natural stature of man at four foot, if we should circumscribe the human mind within the standard of those little souls which exist in modern times.

You will please to remember, my Lord, that I go on to examine your arguments in themselves, without defending those you have controverted. After this necessary intimation, I will take the liberty to make another supposition on your method of argumentation.

I will suppose that an inhabitant of St James's street should address himself to the Archbishop of Paris, in the following manner: "I know, my Lord, that you neither believe in the beatification of St John de Paris, nor in the miracles which it pleased God to work openly on his tomb in the sight of the most enlightened and

numerous multitude. I think it my duty, therefore, to assure you, that I myself saw that Saint in person rise up from the place where his bones were deposited."

To this, we will suppose, he adds a detail of those particular circumstances which would be most striking to the spectator of such a fact. I am persuaded, that, on receiving this piece of information, you would begin your reply by inquiring into the situation and sentiments of the informant; concerning his confessor, and other matters of that kind: and when you had comprehended, both by his manner and discourse, that he was a poor mechanick, who could not produce his certificate of confession, you would be confirmed in the opinion of his being a Jansenist. In which case, you would doubtless answer him in a tone of raillery: "Ay, ay, my friend, you are a convulsionary, and have seen the resurrection of the Abbe Paris? It is not at all surprising in you, who have seen so many other miracles."

In reply to this, I go on to suppose he persists in the truth of his relation. He will tell you, that he was not alone when he saw this miracle; that there were two or three persons with him who saw the same thing; and that others, to whom he had spoken of it, assured him also they themselves had seen the same. On this, you would ask him if all these witnesses were Jansenists too? "Yes, my Lord, they were; but this is no matter; they are sufficient in number, of irreproachable manners, of great good sense, and in every respect unexceptionable; the proof is complete, and nothing is wanting to our declaration to ascertain the veracity of the fact."

Some

Some less charitable Bishops might send for a commissary, and consign the honest man, who had been honoured with this extraordinary vision, to the hospital for lunatics. But you, my Lord, more humane, without being more credulous, would content yourself, after giving him a serious reprimand, to dismiss him thus: "I know that two or three witnesses, of good morals and common sense, are sufficient to attest the life or death of a man; but I know not how many are requisite to confirm the resurrection of a Jansenist. Go then, my friend, and till I know this, endeavour to rectify and compose your brain. I dispense with your fasting; and here is something to buy you a good dinner."

This, my Lord, is nearly what you would say to him, and what every other sensible man would say in the same case. Hence I conclude, as well from your Lordship, as from every other man of sense, that the moral proofs, sufficient to ascertain the facts which are in the order of possibilities, are not sufficient to ascertain facts of a different order, or those which are supernatural: On which I leave you to judge of the justice of your comparison. And yet, the following is the exulting inference you bring forth against me: "The scepticism of our author, therefore, with regard to this particular, is evidently founded on nothing but the interests of his own infidelity."

If my infidelity, my Lord, should ever procure me a bishoprick worth an hundred thousand livres per annum, you might then talk of the interests of my infidelity.

I proceed to transcribe your remarks; taking the liberty only of restoring, when necessary,

those passages of my book which you have omitted.

“What if a man (says he a little further) should come and harangue us in the following manner: *I come, ye mortals, to announce to you the will of the Most High; acknowledge in my voice, that of him who sent me. I command the sun to move backwards, the stars to change their places, the mountains to disappear, the waves to remain fixed on high, and the earth to wear a different aspect.* Who would not, at the sight of such miracles, immediately attribute them to the Author of nature?”—“Who would not think, my dear brethren, that a writer, who speaks in this manner, wanted only to be a witness to a miracle to become a Christian?—You might have said still more, my Lord, as I do not even stand in need of miracles to be a Christian.

“But hear what he says farther; “The most important examination, after all, remains to be made into the truth of the doctrine delivered; for as those who say that God is pleased to work these miracles, pretend that the devil sometimes imitates them, we are no nearer than before, though such miracles should be ever so well attested. As the magicians of Pharaoh worked the same miracles, even in the presence of Moses, as he himself performed by the express command of God; why might not they, in his absence, pretend, on the same proofs, to the same authority? Thus, after proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, you are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by the doctrine, lest the works of the devil should be mistaken for those of God. What is to be done in this case? There is but one step to be taken; and

and that is to recur to reason, and leave miracles to themselves: better indeed had it been never to have had recourse to them ^{***}

This is as much as to say, continues your Lordship, *shew me a miracle and I will believe.* Yes, my Lord, it is as much as to say, *Shew me a miracle, and I will believe in miracles.* And again, *Yet when you have shewn me a miracle, I will not believe.* Yes, my Lord, it is saying, agreeable to the precept of Moses, that though a miracle be shewn me, I will not therefore believe in any absurd or unreasonable doctrine it may be calculated to support. I should sooner believe in the power of magic, than acknowledge the voice of God in such injunctions as contradict my reason.

I have said that the plainest arguments of common sense might in this particular be obscured and perplexed by subtle distinctions: This is also one of my predictions; of which the following passage is the accomplishment.

“ When a doctrine is acknowledged to be divine, and to be founded on the truth of positive revelation, we make use of it indeed to judge of miracles; that is, to reject the pretended prodigies which impostors may set up against such doctrine. When the point in question is an entire new doctrine, which is said to be dictated by the spirit of God, miracles are produced as proofs of it; that is to say, the person who assumes the character of a missionary from the Most High, confirms his mission and the doctrines he

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preaches

* I have been obliged here, after his Lordship's example, to confound the text and the notes. The reader may consult both by turning to Emilius, vol. ii. p. 196, &c.

Preaches by miracles, which are the testimony of God himself. Thus the doctrine and the miracles are made use of respectively, according to the different points of view in which they are placed, in the study or illustration of religion. But in this there is no abuse of argument, ridiculous sophistry, or absurd reasoning in a circle."

Of this I leave the reader to judge. For my part, I shall not add a syllable. I have sometimes replied to your arguments by others of my own; but shall here leave you to be answered by yourself.

Where then, my good brethren, is that philosophical candour and sincerity of which this writer makes so great a boast?

In answer to this question, my Lord, I can only reply, that I never piqued myself on any philosophical sincerity, for I know of no such thing. Nay, I cannot say much in favour even of Christian sincerity, while the professed Christians of our own times take it so ill that we do not suppress every objection they are not able to remove. But for pure candour and simple sincerity, I may boldly ask, whether yours or mine be more evident in the case before us?

The farther I advance, the more interesting is the subject between us; I must therefore continue to transcribe your mandate: in a discussion of so much importance I should not omit even a single word.

Will it be believed, that, after having taken the greatest pains to invalidate the human testimony of the Christian revelation, the same author should pay it the most solemn and positive deference imaginable?

There would, doubtless, be a reason for it; as

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I hold every doctrine to be revealed, in which I acknowledge the traces of the divine Spirit. It is requisite only to render your expression less equivocal. If, by saying a deference to it, you mean to the Christian revelation, you are in the right; but if you mean to the human testimony of it, you are certainly wrong. But be this as it will, I appeal to your testimony against those who pretend that I reject all revelation; as if to confess that a doctrine is attended with difficulties insuperable by the human understanding, is to reject it; and as if the not admitting it upon human testimony were to reject it, when there are other equivalent or superior proofs, on account of which that may be well dispensed with.

To convince you of this strange inconsistency, and at the same time to serve for your edification, my dear brethren, I shall cite the passage wherein he hath done this in the plainest terms. "I will confess to you, says he, that the majesty of the scriptures strikes me with admiration; as the purity of the gospel hath its influence on my heart. Peruse the works of our philosophers with all their pomp of diction: How mean, how contemptible are they, compared with the scriptures! Is it possible that a book, at once so simple and sublime, should be merely the work of man? Is it possible that the sacred Personage, whose history it contains, should be himself a mere man? Do we find that he assumed the tone of an enthusiast or ambitious sectary? What sweetness, what purity in his manners! What an affecting gracefulness in his delivery! What sublimity in his maxims! What profound wisdom in his discourses! What presence of mind,
what

what subtilty, what truth, in his replies! How great the command over his passions! Where is the man, where the philosopher, who could so live and so die, without weakness and without ostentation? * When Plato described his imaginary good man loaded with all the shame of guilt, yet meriting the highest rewards of virtue, he describes exactly the character of Jesus Christ: The resemblance was so striking, that all the Fathers perceived it.

“ What prepossession, what blindness must it be, to compare the son of Sophroniscus to the Son of Mary? What an infinite disproportion there is between them! Socrates, dying without pain or ignominy, easily supported his character to the last; and if his death, however easy, had not crowned his life, it might have been doubted whether Socrates, with all his wisdom, was any thing more than a vain sophist. He invented, it is said, the theory of morals. Others, however, had before put them in practice; he had only to say, therefore, what they had done, and reduce their examples to precept. Aristides had been *just* before Socrates defined *justice*; Leonidas had given up his life for his country, before Socrates declared patriotism to be a duty; the Spartans were a sober people before Socrates recommended sobriety; before he had even defined virtue, Greece abounded in virtuous men. But where could Jesus learn, among his compatriots, that

* I have thought proper, as I came along, to fill up the breaks made by the archbishop; not only to supply those omissions which he may have made with an insidious design, but also every other, as the want of connection frequently weakens the passage, and as my enemies are very solicitous to suppress every thing I have said in favour of religion.

that pure and sublime morality, of which he only hath given us both precept and example. The greatest wisdom was made known amidst the most bigotted fanaticism, and the simplicity of the most heroic virtues did honour to the vilest people on earth. The death of Socrates, peaceably philosophising with his friends, appears the most agreeable that could be wished for; that of Jesus expiring in the midst of agonizing pains, abused, insulted, and cursed by a whole nation, is the most horrible that could be feared. Socrates, in receiving the cup of poison, blessed indeed the weeping executioner who administered it; but Jesus, in the midst of excruciating tortures, prayed for his merciless tormentors. Yes, if the life and death of Socrates were those of a sage, the life and death of Jesus are those of a God. Shall we suppose the Evangelic History a mere fiction? Indeed, my friend, it bears not the marks of fiction; on the contrary, the history of Socrates, which nobody presumes to doubt, is not so well attested as that of Jesus Christ. Such a supposition, in fact, only shifts the difficulty, without obviating it: It is more inconceivable that a number of persons should agree to write such a history, than that one only should furnish the subject of it. The Jewish authors were incapable of the diction, and strangers to the morality contained in the gospel; the marks of whose truth are so striking and inimitable, that the inventor would be a more astonishing character than the hero *." *It would be difficult, my dear brethren, to express a more explicit homage to the authenticity of the Gospel.* I am obliged

* Emilius, vol. ii. p. 215, &c.

bliged to you, my Lord, for this concession, as you are by so far less unjust than my other enemies. *And yet, say you, the author acknowledges it only in consequence of human testimony.* Here, my Lord, you are mistaken; I acknowledge such authenticity in consequence of the gospel itself, and that sublimity which I find in it, abstracted from any moral evidence. I do not want any assurance that a gospel exists, when I I am myself in possession of it. *It is always men that report what other men have reported,* and nothing more: they do not report the existence of a gospel; this I see with my own eyes; and should the whole world maintain that there is no such thing, I should be firmly convinced the whole world was mistaken. *What a number of men between God and him!* Not one. The gospel itself determines this point, and this is in my own hands. By what means soever it came there, and by whomsoever written, I acknowledge in it the dictates of the Divine Spirit. This is as immediately present as possible; there are no human witnesses between this evidence, and my own heart; the sense in which human testimony intervenes, regarding the history of this sacred book, its authors, the time when it was written, &c. all which points enter into those critical discussions in which moral evidence universally is admitted. Such is the reply of the Savoyard Curate.

Nothing can be more evident, you say, than that the writer here contradicts himself, and is confuted on his own principles. Your Lordship is welcome to enjoy my confusion.—*How strangely insatuated therefore is the author to add,*
 “ And yet, with all this, the same gospel a-
 bounds

bounds with incredible relations, with circumstances repugnant to reason, and which it is impossible for a man of sense either to conceive or admit! What is to be done amidst all these contradictions? Be modest and circumspect: regard in silence * what cannot be either disproved or comprehended, and humble thyself before the Supreme Being, who only knows the truth. Such is the involuntary scepticism in which I remain." *But can this scepticism, my dear brethren, be indeed involuntary, when he refuses to admit the doctrines of a book, which, by his own confession, cannot be the work of man? when this book bears the marks of truth, so striking, so great, and so inimitable, that the inventor would be more astonishing than the hero of it? Surely we may here safely say, that iniquity hath belied itself.*

You charge me with iniquity, my Lord, without a reason; and often impute to me falsehood, of which you gave no example. You will please to

* In order that mankind should impose on themselves this respectful silence, it is requisite that somebody should give them for once the reasons for so doing. He, who is sensible of these reasons, may give them; but those who censure others without giving them, may as well be silent. To address the public boldly and with frankness, is the right of every man, and even his duty on subjects of utility: But it is not right for one individual publicly to censure another; this is attributing to himself too great a superiority of virtue and abilities. It is for this reason I have never taken upon me to criticize or reprimand any one. I have told the age indeed some harsh truths; and I have not been severe on individuals; but when I have occasionally controverted or mentioned the writings of others, I have always spoken of living authors with the utmost tenderness and circumspection. The public is witness of the return they have made me. Indeed, all those gentlemen, who are so very forward and ambitious to teach me humility, appear to find this advice much easier to give than to take.

to observe, I take a contrary method with you.

The scepticism of the Curate is involuntary, for the very reason you give that it is not so. He would have rejected the gospel indeed, for the reasons before given, if supported only by those feeble authorities you would give it, and if that Divine Spirit which breathes in its morals and doctrines did not give it all that authority which human testimony must ever want in a matter of this kind.

He admits, therefore, of this sacred book, with all the admirable things it contains, and which the human understanding may comprehend: *But as to those incredible things which are repugnant to reason, and which it is impossible for a man of sense either to conceive or admit, he regards them in silence without comprehending or rejecting them, and humbles himself before that Great Being who only knows the truth.* Such is his scepticism; and this scepticism must needs be involuntary, since it is founded on irrefragable proofs both on one side and the other, which force the understanding to remain in suspense. This scepticism is that of every rational and sincere Christian, who is desirous of knowing the things of heaven only so far as he can comprehend them, of knowing those only which are of importance to his moral practice; rejecting, with the apostle, all foolish and uninformative questions, which serve to engender strife.

You suppose me to reject revelation, in order to adopt natural religion; now I have not, in the first place, rejected revelation. After this, *you accuse me of not even admitting natural religion, or at least of not acknowledging the necessity of it.* And your only proof of it is in the following

lowing passage, which you quote for that purpose. "If I am mistaken, it is without design. This is sufficient to prevent my errors from being imputed to me as a crime. And though you should be mistaken in the same manner, it is of very little consequence." "That is to say," continues your Lordship, "It is sufficient, according to this writer, to be persuaded you are in possession of the truth, in order that such persuasion, tho' attended with the most monstrous errors, should not be a subject of reproach; and that every man, who professes himself to be sincere and ingenuous, should be accounted religious and wise, tho' adopting even the horrid doctrines of atheism. Is not this throwing open the door to introduce all the modes of superstition, fanatical systems, and chimerical notions of the human mind?"

For your part, my Lord, I am persuaded, you cannot here say, with the Curate, *If I am mistaken, it is without design.* For it is very evident that it is with design you are pleased to give into a mistake yourself, and then impose it on your readers. This, my Lord, I engage unanswerably to prove; and make this previous declaration, that you may be more attentive to what I say.

The profession of faith by the Savoyard Curate is composed of two parts. The first, which is the longest, of the greatest importance, and abounds most with new and striking truths, is intended to controvert the doctrines of modern materialism, and to confirm the existence of God and the principles of natural religion, with all the force the author's abilities would admit of. Neither your Lordship, nor the priests, have ta-

ken any notice of this part, the subject of it being indifferent to you ; for, in fact, the cause of God affects you but little, provided the interests of the clergy are secure.

The second part, much shorter, more irregular, and more superficial, contains certain doubts and difficulties relative to revelations in general; ascribing, however, to ours that real certitude which is evident in the purity and sanctity of its doctrines, and in that sublimity altogether divine which distinguished its great Author. The design of this second part, is to make every one more moderate and reserved in the profession of his own religion, and in taxing others of different persuasions with insincerity ; by shewing, that the proofs of the best were not so demonstrative as to authorise them to treat those as criminals who do not see so clearly as themselves. This second part, written modestly and with all possible respect, is that only which hath attracted the attention of your Lordship and of the magistrates. But you have nothing but persecution and abuse to offer in refutation of my arguments. You have weighed the evil consequences of doubting what is really doubtful ; but you have not considered the good consequences of proving what is really true.

In fact, the first part, which contains every thing which is really essential to religion, is absolute and decisive. The author here neither deliberates nor doubts. Both his conscience and reason are fully determined ; he believes, he affirms, and is most strongly persuaded of the truth of what is laid down.

As to the second part, he begins it, on the contrary, with declaring, that " the examination

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tion he is going to make is very different from the former ; presenting to his view nothing but perplexity, mysteriousness, and obscurity ;" that no farther authority should be placed on his discourse than that of reason ; that he was ignorant himself whether he was right or wrong, and that all his affirmations are only so many rational doubts.

He proposes, therefore, his objections and difficulties. At the same time, also, he proposes the reasons and grounds of his belief : So that from the whole discussion there results a certitude in all the essential points of religion, and a respectful scepticism concerning the rest. Towards the end of the second part, he insists again on the circumspection with which he ought to be heard.

" If I were more positive in myself, I should have assumed a more decisive and dictatorial air ; but I am a man ignorant and subject to error. What can I do more ? I have opened to you my heart without reserve : What I have thought certain, I have given you as such ; my doubts I have declared as doubts, my opinions as opinions ; and have given you my reasons for both. It remains now for you to judge."

When the author of that paper, therefore, says, " If I am mistaken, it is without design, which is sufficient to prevent my errors from being imputed to me as a crime ;" I will ask every reader of common sense and the least sincerity, Whether it be on the first or second part that the suspicion must fall of his being in an error ? Whether it must fall on that which he positively affirms to be true, or on that which he hesitates upon ? Whether this suspicion relates

to his falsely believing in a God, or his being in the wrong as to his doubts concerning revelation? You, my Lord, have declared the first, against all reason, and with the sole view of making me appear criminal; I may defy your Lordship to assign any other motive. Where then is, I will not say justice, or Christian charity, but your sense and your humanity?

But, supposing you could have been mistaken as to the object of the Curate's suspicion in this case, the very passage you quote would have undeceived you in spite of yourself. For, when he says, *This is sufficient to prevent my error from being imputed to me as a crime*, he acknowledges that such an error might be a crime, and might be imputed to him, if he were not sincere: But on the supposition that there is no God, where is the crime of believing there is one? And supposing it to be a crime, who is to impute it to us? The fear, therefore, of being in an error, cannot relate to what is said of natural religion; the discourse of the Curate being, in fact, a very strange heap of absurdities indeed in the sense you have ascribed to it. It is then impossible to infer, from the passage you quote, either that *I do not admit of natural religion*, or that *I do not acknowledge its necessity*. It is still much less possible to infer from thence, *that every man who professes himself sincere and ingenuous should be accounted religious and wise, though adopting the horrid doctrines of atheism*. I will add also, that it was equally impossible for you to think the inference you thus drew a just one. If this be not demonstrated, nothing can possibly be so, or I must be totally void of common understanding.

To

To shew that no divine mission can authorise a man to propagate absurdities, the Curate conceives a dispute to arise between a pretender to inspiration, whom you are pleased to style a Christian, and a rationalist, whom you are pleased to call an unbeliever; these he supposes to talk in their own language, which he disproves, and which is assuredly neither his nor mine. On this head, you charge me with notorious partiality and insincerity, and you prove it by the foolishness of the discourse of the first of these characters. But if what he says be so very foolish, why do you honour him with the name of Christian? And if the rationalist refutes only futile assertions, what right have you to tax him with infidelity? Doth it follow, from the absurdities advanced by a pretender to inspiration, that he must be a Catholic? or from those which a rationalist refutes, that the latter must be an infidel?

"If reason and revelation contradict each other, you say, it is certain that God would contradict himself." This is a very great concession, my Lord; for it is very certain that God cannot contradict himself. Again, *"You tell us, ye impious infidels, that the tenets which we look upon to be revealed, contradict eternal truths: But it is not sufficient for you merely to assert this."* Certainly it is not; let us endeavour, therefore, to do something more.

I dare say, you already foresee the point I aim at. Indeed, it is plain, you passed over this mysterious article as if you had walked on burning coals, on which you were afraid to trust your feet. You oblige me, however, to stop you for a moment, even in this painful situation. I

shall be prudent enough, however, to detain you as little as possible.

You will agree with me, I imagine, that one of those eternal truths, which serve as the first principles of ratiocination, is, that *a part is less than the whole*; and it is for having affirmed the contrary that the dogmatist appears to you to talk foolishly and absurdly. Now, according to your doctrine of transubstantiation, when Jesus held his last supper with his disciples, and having broken bread gave unto each of them his body, it is clear that he must hold his whole body in his hand; and if he eat of the consecrated bread himself, as he probably might, he must put his head into his mouth. Here then is a clear and sufficient proof that a part is greater than the whole, and that the thing containing is less than the thing contained. What say you to this, my Lord? For my part, I know nobody but the Chevalier de Caufans *, who can get you out of this difficulty.

I am not insensible, indeed, that you have the resource of St Augustin: but that amounts to the same thing; this good father, after having piled up a heap of unintelligible arguments about the Trinity, very ingenuously confessing they had no meaning: *But*, adds he, very frankly, *we express ourselves in this manner, not with the view of saying any thing, but only that we may not be totally silent* †.

Every thing considered, my Lord, I think the best method you can take with regard to this article,

* A gentleman who undertakes to demonstrate various impossibilities.

† Dictum est tamen tres personæ, non ut aliquid diceretur, sed ne taceretur. *Aug. de Trin.* .. v. c. 9.

article, as well as many others, is that which you have already taken with M. de Montazet, and for the very same reason.

“ *The insincerity of the author of Emilius is not less reprehensible in the language of his pretended Catholic.*” We Catholics, says he, make a great noise about the authority of the Church: But what do we gain by it, if it requires as many proofs to establish this authority as other sects require immediately to establish their doctrines: The church determines, that the church hath a right to determine: Is not this a special proof of its authority? “ Who would not think, my dear brethren, from the pretences of this impostor, that the authority of the church is to be proved only by its decisions, and that it proceeds arbitrarily thus; I determine that I am infallible, therefore I am infallible. A scandalous imputation! my dear brethren.”—This, my Lord, is your assertion; now let us examine your proofs. In the mean time, will you venture to affirm, that the Catholic divines have never established the authority of the church on that very authority itself, *ut in se virtualiter reflexum*? If they really have done it, I lay on them no scandalous or calumnious imputation.

The constitution of Christianity, the spirit of the Gospel, and even the errors and weakness of the human understanding, all serve to demonstrate, that the church, established by Jesus Christ, is an infallible church. All this, my Lord, is vague and indeterminate; these things, which you say serve to demonstrate, in fact demonstrate nothing. Let us proceed, therefore, directly to the substance of your demonstration. “ *We are assured,*
that

that, as the divine legislator always instructed mankind in the ways of truth, the church of Christ will ever do the same. But who are you that give us this as a sole and unanswerable proof! Are not you the church, or its heads? By the manner in which you argue, you seem to make yourselves very sure of the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Yet what is it you have said, and what says the impostor? You will examine this point yourselves; as I really have not the courage to do it.

I ought, however, to remark, that the force of the objection which you have thus attacked, lay in the words which you took care to suppress toward the end of the passage here pointed at, *And yet, depart from this, and we enter into endless discussions* *. The Curate's argument, in plain terms, is this: To make choice of one religion out of several, says he, one of these two methods is requisite: either to hear the proofs of every different sect, and then compare them together; or to rely altogether on the authority of those who instruct us in such tenets. Now the first method requires such a degree of knowledge as few persons are in a state of acquiring, and the second would justify every one in professing the religion of the country where he was born. As an instance of this, he brings that of the Roman Catholics, in which the authority of the church is held sacred; and on that he establishes his second dilemma. Either the church arrogates to itself this authority, and says, *I determine that I am infallible, therefore I am so*: by which means it falls into the sophistical error of reasoning in a circle: or else it must prove

* Emilius, vol. ii. p. 207.

prove that it received this authority from God; in which case, there is as great a multiplicity of proofs required to shew that the Romish church hath received this authority, as other sects require to establish directly the truth of their doctrine. No advantage, therefore, is gained in the way of instruction; nor are the people more capacitated to examine into the proofs of the authority of the church among the Catholics, than into those of the doctrine among the Protestants. How then are they to determine in any reasonable manner, otherwise than by the authority of their instructors? But, granting this, the Turk will determine in the same manner; and how will he in that be more to blame than you? This, my Lord, is the argument to which you have made no reply, and which I conceive indeed to be unanswerable *. But your Episcopal liberality hath extricated you from the difficulty, by disengenuously mangling the passage of the author.

Thank heaven I have now finished this very
pain-

* This is one of those terrible objections which my opponents are very cautious of meddling with. Nothing is more easy than to reply by abuse and pious declamations. It is not very difficult to shift off what is embarrassing. Hence it must be confessed, that the divines have, in their controversies, many advantages, which they want, in disputing with the ignorant, and with whom they must make up the defect as well as they can. They can reciprocally amuse each other by suppositions which cannot be objected to by those who have themselves nothing better to offer. Of this nature is the expedient of I know not what kind of faith, which, in order to get rid of the difficulty, they oblige the Deity to transmit from father to son. This jargon, however, they reserve for their disputations with their own profession: Should they make use of them in their disputes with us profane cavillers, they would justly be afraid of being turned into ridicule.

painful task; in which I have pursued your arguments, quotations, and censures, step by step; having shewn, that as often as you have attacked my book you have been in the wrong. There remains only the single article of government. I am very ready however to forgive every thing that may be said on this head; being very certain, that when the man who groans under the miseries of a people, and himself experiences them, is accused by you of poisoning the sources of public felicity, every reader must be sensible of the weight of your arguments. If my Treatise on the Social Compact did not exist, and it were necessary to prove anew the important truths which are there displayed, the compliments you pay to governments at my expence would be one of the facts I should bring in proof of them; and the fate of the author would be still a more striking one. There remains nothing more for me to say on this head; my own example hath said every thing, and the passion of private interest ought not to obscure useful truths. The decree that hath been issued against my person; the burning of my book by the common hangman; these are the authentic pieces which I shall transmit to posterity in my justification; my sentiments are not less confirmed by my writings than by my misfortunes.

Thus, my Lord, have I discussed every thing you have alledged against my book. I have not passed over one of your propositions without examination; but have shewn you to be wrong in every particular, and am not in the least afraid any exception will be taken against my proofs: they must appear, indeed, unanswerable, to all persons of common sense.

But

But supposing, after all, that I had been in some places mistaken, nay, if I had been mistaken throughout, surely a book might meet some indulgence, in which so sincere a love for virtue, and a real regard for truth, are manifested even in the midst of error, or the evil that may be found there! Surely some indulgence is due to an author so little dogmatical and positive, that he often cautions his readers against trusting to his notions, advises them to weigh his arguments, and to give them no authority but that of reason! A book that breathes nothing but peace, candour, patience, the love of harmony, and obedience to the laws in every thing, even in affairs of religion! A book, in short, wherein the cause of God is so boldly defended, the utility of religion so firmly established, good manners so much inculcated and respected; in which vice is disarmed of the weapons of ridicule, wickedness is described so void of sense, and virtue so truly amiable! Were there not even one word of truth in the work, the reveries it contains ought indeed to have been commended and encouraged as the most pleasing and delightful chimeras that could be invented to soothe a heart of sensibility and virtue. Yes, I will be bold to say, that a government truly enlightened, a government whose views are truly salutary and useful, if such a one existed in Europe, would have done public honour, would have erected a statue, to the Author of *Emilius*. I know mankind too well, indeed, to expect so much gratitude from them; but I did not know enough of them to expect what hath really happened.

After having proved that you are unreasonable
in

in your censures, it remains for me to prove that you have calumniated me by your abuses. But, as you abuse me only in consequence of the errors you impute to my book, when I shew that those pretended errors are yours, not mine, do I not in fact shew that the consequent abuses belong to yourself, not to me! You load my work with the most odious epithets; and call me an abominable, rash, and impious impostor: What strange language doth Christian charity dictate to the ministers of Jesus Christ!

But pray, my Lord, what do you, who reproach me with blasphemy, when you make the apostles your accomplices in that calumny which you are pleased to load me with? To hear you talk, one would imagine that St Paul had done me the honour to think very particularly of me, and to predict my coming as that of Antichrist. And in what manner, pray, hath he predicted it? You tell, us in the beginning of your mandate,

“ St Paul, my dear brethren, hath foretold that perilous times should come, in which men should be lovers of themselves, proud, blasphemers, unholy, false accusers, high-minded, lovers of pleasures more than of God, men of corrupt minds, reprobates concerning the faith.”

I will not conend that this prediction of St Paul is not fully accomplished; but if he had foretold, on the contrary, that there would ever be a time when such people were not to be found, I must confess I should have been more struck with the prediction, and still much more so at its accomplishment.

After this prophecy, so remarkably well applied, you have the goodness to draw my portrait,

trait, in which your Episcopal gravity condescends to amuse itself with antitheses, and I find myself a very droll personage indeed. This part, my Lord, appears to me the best of your whole Mandate. It is certainly not very easy to write a more agreeable satire, or to defame a man with more wit and spirit. *A writer hath here started up* [not very high,] *who, educated in the midst of error,* [it is very true, I was brought up in the Romish religion,] *is full of the language of philosophy* [it is somewhat strange I should speak in a language I do not understand,] *though no true philosopher.* [Oh! granted; I shall never be ambitious of that title, to which I acknowledge I have no just pretensions; nor do I renounce it, I assure you, out of modesty.] *Possessed of a multiplicity of knowledge* [I have learned to be ignorant, indeed, of a multiplicity of things which I imagined I knew] *which nevertheless hath not served to enlighten his understanding,* [it hath taught me to think it enlightened,] *though he hath made use of it to darken the understanding of others.* [The darkness of ignorance is much better than the false light of error.] *He is given up to paradoxes both in opinion and practice;* [certainly he is a great loser by not thinking and acting like the rest of the world!] *uniting simplicity of manners with ostentation of doctrine;* [simplicity of manners elevates the soul—as to ostentation of doctrine, I know not what is meant by it;] *A zeal for ancient maxims, with a passion for establishing the most singular novelties;* [there is nothing more new to us than ancient maxims;] *the obscurity of retirement, with the desire of being known to the whole world.* [Here, my Lord, you

perfectly resemble our romance-writers, who know every thing their heroes said, or thought, even in their closets. If it were the desire of being known that made me take up the pen, how comes it that this desire influenced me so late, or that I delayed so long to gratify it?] *We have seen his invectives against those very sciences which he himself cultivated.* [This proves, that I do not imitate the generality of men of letters, and that in my writings I prefer the interests of truth to my own.] *We hear him acknowledge the excellence of the Gospel,* [always, and with the greatest sincerity,] *while he is endeavouring to depreciate its tenets.* [Not so; I would promote the charity it inculcates, which is almost suppressed by the priests.] *We see him describing the beauty of virtue, at the same time that he is striving to extinguish the love of it in the hearts of his readers.* [Is this true, ye honest and well-meaning readers, have I extinguished in your hearts the love of virtue?]

He hath assumed the preceptorship of human kind, in order to deceive them; he hath erected himself into a public monitor, to lead the world astray; and hath played the oracle of the age, in order to complete its destruction. [I have already examined your proofs of this.] *In a Treatise on the Inequality of Mankind, he hath reduced man to a level with the brutes:* [I will appeal to the reader, whether a man be debased most, by being accounted merely stupid, or naturally wicked?] *In another production still more recent, he hath insinuated all the poison of inordinate pleasure, under pretence of prohibiting it.* [Oh that I could but, indeed, substitute the real charms of pleasure instead of the false ones of debauchery!]

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ery! But be assured, my Lord, the clergy of your diocese are proof against *Eloisa*; they have got a preservative in *Aloisia* *.] *In the present, he takes advantage of the earliest moments of life, to establish in the mind of man the maxims of irreligion and infidelity.* [This imputation hath been already examined and refuted.]

Such, my Lord, and even yet more cruel, is the manner in which you treat me; with whom you are not acquainted, and of whom you know nothing but by hearsay. Is this behaviour dictated by that evangelical morality of which you pretend to be the defender? We will suppose you desirous of preserving your flock from the contagious principles contained in my book; but why should you, on this account, break out into personal abuse of the author? I know not what end you promise yourself by such unchristian-like conduct; but I know, that, to defend one's religion by such means, is the way to render it very suspicious among all honest well-meaning people.

And yet it is you who call me rash and presumptuous! Can I have deserved that appellation merely for proposing my doubts, and even that with the greatest modesty, without attacking or naming any one? In particular, my Lord, it ill becomes you to treat, in this manner, one whom you speak of with so little justice and decorum, and whom you so wantonly and so indecently abuse.

You treat me as impious; but of what impiety can you accuse me, who never speak of a Supreme Being but to render him the honours which are his due, nor of my neighbour but to

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excite

* An infamous, obscene book, well known in France.

excite every one to love theirs? The impious are those who unworthily profane the cause of God, in making him act subservient to the passions of men. The impious are those who, setting themselves up for interpreters of the divine will, the arbiters between God and man, exact to themselves those honours which should be paid only to the Deity. The impious are those who assume the right of exercising the power of God upon earth, and would open and shut the gates of heaven at pleasure. The impious are those who order libels to be read in their churches—At this horrible idea my blood is all inflamed, and tears of indignation start from mine eyes. Ye priests of the God of peace, doubt not but ye will one day be called on to give an account of the use you have made of his temples!

You treat me as an impostor; and why? I am in your opinion in an error; but where is my imposture? Is to reason and to be mistaken, an imposition? Even a Sophist, who deceives others without deceiving himself, is not an impostor, while he confines himself to the authority of reason, tho' he abuses it. An impostor desires to be credited on his own word; he would even have it taken implicitly. An impostor is a knave who imposes on others for his own interest; but pray, my Lord, what interest could I propose to myself in this business? Impostors, according to Ulpian, are those who play delusive tricks, and use imprecations and exorcisms: now, my Lord, I have never done any thing of this kind.

You men of place and dignity can talk away at your ease. Acknowledging no other prerogative than your own, no other laws than such

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as yourselves impose, you are so far from thinking yourselves under a necessity to be just, that you do not think yourselves obliged to observe the common rules of humanity. You proudly oppress the feeble, without being called to account by any one for your injustice ; and whenever your own interest or the policy of state requires it, you sweep us before you like the dust. Some pronounce sentence or burn, others dishonour and abuse, without right, without reason, without disdain, and even without anger ; but merely because they are on their route of business, and the unhappy wretch falls in their way. While you insult us with impunity, it is not even permitted us to complain ; but if we attempt to demonstrate our innocence and your injustice, we are still farther accused of wanting respect for you.

You, my Lord, have openly insulted me : I have proved that you have falsely aspersed my reputation. Were you a private man, as I am, that I might cite you to appear before an equitable tribunal, there to have a fair hearing, I on the behalf of my book, and you with your Mandate, you will certainly be cast, and sentenced to make me a reparation as public as hath been the offence. But you, my Lord, are in so high a station, that you can easily dispense with being just : and I am nothing. As you profess the Gospel, however, as you are a Prelate, whose business it is to teach others their duty, you certainly know your own, in such a case. For my part, I have done mine, and have nothing farther to say.

I am, my Lord,

A Motiers, }
Nov. 18, 1762. }

With profound respect, &c.

J. J. ROUSSEAU.

ANECDOTES

Relative to the

PERSECUTION

OF

Mr J. J. ROUSSEAU;

CONTAINED IN

A LETTER from a Gentleman at *Neuf-*
chatel to his FRIEND.

YOU require of me, Sir, a particular account of the disturbances Mr Rousseau hath occasioned and received, in the new asylum he lately made choice of in this country. I am not surpris'd to find you so greatly interested in the minutest circumstances respecting a writer almost as famous for his personal misfortunes, as celebrated for his literary merit.

I know not if it be in my power, however, to gratify your curiosity so far as it may extend; being ignorant of many of the steps which Rousseau's enemies have taken to persecute him, as well as of the greater part of their motives for such persecution. Indeed the few that have come to my knowledge have by no means encouraged me to inquire after the rest. It would
give

give too much pain to a candid and ingenuous mind to contemplate such means and motives. I shall leave their recapitulation, therefore, to the severe and caustic pen of the Satirist, who may possibly take a cruel pleasure in delineating a picture at once disgraceful both to religion and humanity.

From me you will receive only a faithful narrative of facts, elucidated by a few annotations, and authenticated by copies of the original papers which have appeared in the course of this extraordinary scene of inquisitorial persecution.

It will be necessary, first of all, to inform you, that towards the latter end of last year, Mr. Rousseau had proposals made to him for the publication of a complete edition of his works, as well those in manuscript as what have been already printed. The conditions were accepted; and, on the first application to government, permission was readily granted for the publication intended.

This undertaking appearing very lucrative, it excited the envy and disgusted the avarice of many who could not come in for a share. Being, at the same time, advantageous to the author, who would have derived from it a little fortune, sufficient for his wants, and equal to his desires, it gave no little umbrage to the invidious dispositions of his enemies.

Things were in this train when his *Letters written from the Mountains* made their appearance; a work which hath served as the pretended foundation for all that disturbance of which I am going to give you an account.

I need not tell you, Sir, with what avidity
those

those letters were received by the public, or in how many countries they were proscribed and burnt by the common hangman. For our part, we remained peaceable spectators of such ridiculous bonfires, till about the end of February, when the zeal of our ecclesiastics, which had so long lain smothering in darkness, had acquired sufficient warmth and fuel to burst into a blaze. The Reverend Assembly of our Clergy complained to the Government and to the Magistrates against the *Letters written from the Mountains*; representing that work as an impious and scandalous performance, and soliciting its proscription, as also the suppression of the projected edition of the author's works in general.

This proceeding of the Reverend Assembly bore so striking a contrast to the silence they kept on the publication of *Emilius* *, when its author was admitted to the holy communion, that one would have been apt to suspect some personal interest affected by the work in question, had it not been certainly known, that those members of the sacred college who were the most zealous for the proscription of the *Letters from the Mountains*, had never once read them.

The Council of State, indeed, does not easily take fire at this kind of Remonstrances; but the Civil Magistracy took the complaint into consideration, and proscribed the book. The officer charged with the execution of this business acquitted himself also to a miracle; proclaiming the said *Letters* to be prohibited, as attacking every

* As also his letter to the archbishop of Paris. It is true, that letter makes no attack on the Protestant clergy any more than *Emilius*.

very thing the most *reprehensible* † in our holy religion. What do you think, Sir, of this blunder? How egregiously pertinent was it to stumble so luckily on the truth!

The reverend Assembly adjourned, however, to the 13th of March, when they determined to proceed against the author; who, being advised of the disturbance which the fermentation of this venerable body might occasion in the state, thought it his duty, as a good citizen, to endeavour to prevent the storm. To this end he sent the following paper to Professor de Montmollin, the pastor of his church, in order to have it communicated to the reverend Assembly.

The Declaration of Mr Rousseau to the Assembly of the Clergy; transmitted them by Professor de Montmollin.

“ Out of the deference I owe to Professor
“ de Montmollin my pastor, and the respect I
“ bear to the reverend Assembly of the Clergy,
“ I offer *, if they will admit of it, to engage
“ myself, by a writing signed with my own
“ hand, never to publish any new work relative
“ in any shape to matters of religion; nor ever
“ to treat of religion cursorily in any new work
“ I may hereafter publish on any other subject:
“ Promising farther, to continue to display,
“ both in my sentiments and conduct, the value

† Probably instead of *respectable*.

* This offer, which has lately been made public, hath dissipated much of that prepossession which had irritated the people against Mr ROUSSEAU: and this consequence of its being made known, sufficiently accounts for this declaration's being so long and so carefully kept secret.

"I have I set upon the happiness of being united
to the church.

"Mr Professor is desired to communicate this
Declaration to the venerable Assembly.

Motiers, March
10, 1765.

J. J. ROUSSEAU."

Would you not think, Sir, you who know the extent of Christian charity, and are a lover of peace and tranquillity—would you not readily conceive, I say, that the reverend Assembly should, on the receipt of this paper, accept the offer it contained, publish it abroad, and have it transcribed in letters of gold in their Registers?

But, no—Undeceive yourself; and guess, if you can, at the motives which induced the clergy to make no reply to this offer of Mr. Rousseau; to keep it from transpiring; and to proceed precipitately, the same day, to their final determination of this business.

You may guess, also, at the reason for the members then present entering into a solemn and inviolable engagement of secrecy, with regard to the questions determined to be proposed to Mr Rousseau, as well as with regard to every thing that had passed, or should pass, in this *inquisitorial Synod*. Their silence on this head was thought a matter of importance; as by this means those members of the clergy who were not present at their deliberations, could not penetrate the secret. Vain precaution! This impenetrable secret was even known long before the Assembly had begun to deliberate: in consequence of which, some persons, who correspond with the court, had time to inform the king, and that even on the strength of ad-

advices received from Paris and Geneva. You may be surpris'd, Sir, at all this; and indeed so am I; but the fact is nevertheless true. For certain it is, that M. M * * *, Counsellor of State and Solicitor-general, received soon after the following letter:

“ The King is displeas'd that your fellow-
“ countrymen are exasperated at a man whom
“ he protects; and hath declared, that he will
“ highly resent any farther persecution of Mr.
“ Rousseau. This I have from his Majesty's
“ own mouth; you may report it to whom you
“ please.”

This letter was dated the 10th of March, and came from my Lord Marshall; that illustrious Briton, who is so good a judge of merit, so firm a protector of oppress'd innocence, and, in a word, so truly worthy the friendship and confidence of a king, who is himself so eminently skilled in the knowledge of mankind.

Compare the date of this letter with the distance of places, and you will see it required very early advice, to be inform'd, at such a distance, of what should happen in the Assembly of our Clergy, appointed for the 13th of March.

Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, a report prevail'd, which every day increased, that Mr Rousseau had written a new tract, entitled *Des Princes*. Nobody pretended, indeed, to have seen it; but it was boldly affirm'd, notwithstanding, that all aristocratical governments, and in particular that of Berne, were very ill treated in it. So mighty officious, indeed, were some persons in this affair, that they
even

even wrote from Berne, to Mr F***, Printer at Yverdon, desiring him to procure the book of Mr Rousseau, in order to print and publish it ; in consideration, as they said, that it was a *very good thing*.

Mr Rousseau saw into the design of this officiousness, and accordingly wrote to Mr F*** in the manner following, desiring him to print and publish his letter.

“ SIR, *Motiers, March 14, 1765.*

“ I did not write the work, entitled *Des Princes* ; I have not even seen it ; nay, I doubt whether any such work exists. I can easily guess whence such a story proceeds, and for what purpose it is calculated. At the same time, my enemies do themselves justice in attacking me with arms so worthy of their cause. As I have never disavowed any work I have really written, I ought to be believed when I speak of such as are not mine. I desire, Sir, you will publish this Declaration, for the sake of truth, and in justice to a man who hath no other defence.

“ Your humble servant,

“ J. J. ROUSSEAU.”

I observed, that the reverend Assembly proceeded precipitately to pass sentence on Mr Rousseau, without allowing a second day for their deliberations. In fact, Sir, during their convocation on the 13th of March, they fulminated against him, in direct opposition to the constitution of this country, a sentence of Excommunication. Very prudently, however, this
As-

Assembly suppressed this irregular sentence, on the receipt of the following anonymous letter, very probably addressed to it by one of its own members.

LETTER to the *Assembly of the* CLERGY.

“ I find you are solemnly met to sit in judgement on Mr Rousseau, or rather on his *Letters from the Mountains*. I have not entered into your sanctuary; permit me nevertheless to offer the advice of one of its best friends. This advice is, that the Writer in question, if we consider him in the light of a Christian, as he appears in the first volume, needs rather to be slightly reprehended, than persecuted by Protestant churches: and as to his character of a citizen, which he displays in the second volume; so far from deserving to be reprehended, he merits almost to be canonized in every republican state. The reason is, that tyranny and arbitrary power are subjects he understands better than either the Gospel or the Reformation. He hath pursued the phrensy of despotism into its inmost recesses, and exposed its most refined artifices; without having suffered the enchanting beauty of style in the least to enervate the masculine vigour of his reasoning. But as for the Scriptures and the Reformation, he appears to have overlooked several essential points which he should have observed in the one, and to be ignorant of many useful things he might have learned from the other. Add to this, that it is unfortunate, or rather fortunate, that the more attractive we find his

“ diction, the less seductive will be the scepticism of his arguments; because the oftener we are induced to read them, the more shall we perceive them to be only a legendary farrago of chimeras, dropt from a fantastical pen, under the influence only of an imagination perhaps itself already too chimerically affected.

“ As to what relates to the holy communion, or the alternative of prohibiting or permitting his attendance at the Lord’s table; I am afraid, that, so long as it pleases our Sovereign to protect him, it would be an hazardous attempt to deny him such privilege; as, by thus endeavouring to build castles in the air, you may come down yourselves to the ground. It would be dangerous also to infringe the judgement of the Consistories in this matter; whose independence hath been too often occasionally pretended and acknowledged by the reverend Assembly itself. It is not proper it should act inconsistently; the matter may become intricate; and it is equally important both to Religion and to the State, that the Assembly should not expose itself. The only business in which the Assembly can with propriety interfere, is an examination into the works of the writer; the dispersion and propagation of which it is its duty to oppose, by prudent admonitions addressed to the author by means of his pastor, exhorting him to write and publish no more; and also by making earnest remonstrances to the Government, in order that the privilege granted for printing the projected edition be repealed. If the assembly act prudentially, they will insist no farther than to obtain these ends; which

“ which will be two very considerable and difficult points gained *.

“ It is certain, that it is of very dangerous consequence to extend the privilege of toleration to foreigners; as this would be, in a manner, giving an invitation to the authors and editors of pernicious books to seek an asylum in this country, and risk the making it a rendezvous for those poultry scribblers of the present times, whose disposition principally induces them to employ their pens against the doctrines of religion and morality.

“ There is yet another reason why the

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* Not at all. On the contrary, nothing so easy. For, with regard to the first, the assembly had nothing to do but to admit of Mr Rousseau's offer. And as to the second, it might have been obtained on speaking half a word to him. Witness the following extracts of letters written to one of his friends on these occasions.

“ I must confess to you, I shall look with some anxiety on the engagements I am going to form with the company in question, should we come to an agreement; so that if we break off, I shall not be much mortified.”—Again, in another letter to the same, he says: “ You will please to proceed no farther with the company, till they have got the formal consent of the Council of State; which I doubt, however, of their being able to obtain. And, as to the permission they have solicited from the Court, I doubt the grant of that still more. My Lord Marshall is well acquainted with my sentiments on that head: he knows very well that I not only ask for nothing for myself, but that I am determined never to make use of his interest at Court, to obtain any thing whatever relative to the country I live in, which may be disagreeable to the particular government of it. I do not mean to interfere in any shape with these matters, nor to proceed farther in our treaty till they are determined.”

The light which Mr Rousseau then looked upon the projected edition of his Works, was well known to the six persons who were desirous to engage in it; and could not, therefore, be a secret to all the members of the reverend Assembly of the Clergy.

“ Assembly, convened to deliberate on the pre-
 “ sent affair, should act with caution. It is
 “ said that the first mover of all its proceedings
 “ resides in a neighbouring capital, in the per-
 “ son of an apostate ecclesiastic; one who seeks
 “ only, in this business, to do himself credit
 “ with a D’Alembert or a Voltaire; the rivals
 “ or enemies of our celebrated Rousseau.
 “ Would it not be scandalous for an Assembly
 “ of Divines and Pastors, so greatly distinguished
 “ in the reformed part of Europe, to permit
 “ themselves thus to be actuated, in a matter
 “ of religious importance, by an intriguing
 “ ecclesiastic, given up wholly to worldly pur-
 “ suits and personal prospects? How can they
 “ think of listening to such a person, when the
 “ matter in question relates to the means of si-
 “ lencing or reclaiming a poor and honest, tho’
 “ mistaken unbeliever? How can they think of
 “ being advised or directed by a man, who is
 “ known to have the strictest connection with
 “ an inventor of bawdy tales, defamatory hi-
 “ stories, and the revivers of systems of impiety
 “ and materialism? by one who piques himself,
 “ as the highest merit, on being the creature,
 “ the favourite, of the Ambassadors of a Crown
 “ which is daily imprisoning or hanging up his
 “ countrymen and brethren for preaching the
 “ Gospel in its purity; rendering himself by
 “ this means even an accomplice in all the anti-
 “ christian cruelties of Popery *? What a con-
 “ trast! Of what influence should be the sug-
 “ gestions of such a cabal over an Assembly of
 “ Protestant Divines?”

This

* Let not any reader be offended at these expressions, as they are consecrated by the preachers of the gospel.

This letter occasioned a new deliberation on the 13th; when, at the request of Mr de Montmollin, pastor at Motiers, a written order was formally given him, to cite J. J. Rousseau to appear before the Consistory, and to propose to him the following questions:

First; Whether John James Rousseau doth not believe in Jesus Christ, who died for our sins, and rose again for our justification?

Secondly; Whether he doth not believe in Revelation, and regard the Holy Scripture as divine.

Mr de M * * * was further commissioned and directed, that, in case Mr Rousseau did not make satisfactory answers to the above questions; he, the said Pastor, should proceed to excommunicate him, doubtless *at all events*. There is good reason, at least, to conclude as much from the measures that were taken in the church of Motiers to bring about this conclusion; all, as it was pretended, for the greater glory of God. In the first place, endeavours were used to stagger the consciences, and intimidate the elders of the church, being members of the Consistory, by telling them, that J. J. Rousseau was the Antichrist; that the security of the country depended on his excommunication; that all the different members of the State highly interested themselves in it; that the allied Cantons, and particularly that of Berne, had threatened to renounce its ancient alliance with this country, if Rousseau was not excommunicated. Nay, reports were even spread among the women in the town and its neighbourhood, that Rousseau, in his last work, had affirmed that women had no souls, but were

merely on a footing with the brutes. By these, and a thousand other stories calculated for the same purpose, the common people seemed very ripe for serving poor Rousseau like another Orpheus †, or at least making him to undergo the fate of a Servetus.

Matters were in this situation when our pretended Antichrist addressed the following letter to Mr N***, Solicitor-general.

“ Motiers, Mar. 23, 1765.

“ I know not, Sir, whether I ought not to
 “ rejoice at misfortunes which are accompa-
 “ nied with so many consolations. Those I ex-
 “ perienched from your letter were very agree-
 “ able, tho’ less so than what I received from
 “ the packet it contained. I had communi-
 “ cated to my Lord Marshall the reasons which
 “ made me desirous of quitting this country, to
 “ seek tranquillity for myself, and to leave it
 “ here behind me. I have the satisfaction to
 “ find he approves of those reasons, and is of
 “ my opinion that I ought to go. Thus, Sir,
 “ my resolution is taken; and, though I protest
 “ it is taken with regret, it is irrevocable. Is
 “ it possible the goodness of any of my friends
 “ can disapprove of a desire, in my present me-
 “ lancholy situation, to find some peaceful spot
 “ whereon

* This is by no means an exaggerated state of the case. It is well known that we have here more than one zealot, who, for the love of God, and the salvation of souls, would willingly have furnished faggots on this occasion for an Auto-da-fe. The friends of Mr Rousseau were very glad indeed, that the severity of the season confined him to his room; he might otherwise have been in great danger of being torn to pieces by our modern Baechants, whose termagant spirits were enraged to the highest degree in behalf of their souls.

“ whereon to lay my bones? With a greater
“ share of health and strength, I should have
“ consented, for the good of the public, to meet
“ my persecutors face to face : but, debilitated
“ by infirmities and misfortunes without ex-
“ ample, I am very unfit to act a part, which,
“ indeed, it would now be cruel to impose on
“ me. Wearied out with disputes and quarrels,
“ I can no longer support them. Let me go
“ hence, therefore, and die elsewhere in peace;
“ for here that would be impossible, though less
“ on account of the ill disposition of the inha-
“ bitants, than from their too great vicinity to
“ Geneva; an inconvenience, which all the
“ good-will in the world cannot enable them
“ to remove.

“ My resolution, Sir, of leaving this coun-
“ try, being what my enemies have sought to
“ reduce me to, it ought naturally to prevent
“ any farther proceedings against me. I am
“ not, indeed, as yet in a state of health to un-
“ dertake a journey; and it will require some
“ little time to settle my affairs here before I
“ go. In the mean time, I hope not to be
“ treated worse than a Turk, a Jew, a Pagan,
“ or an Atheist; but that I may be permitted,
“ for a few weeks at least, to enjoy that hospi-
“ tality which is not refused to the greatest
“ stranger. Not that I mean, Sir, for the fu-
“ ture, to consider myself as such : On the con-
“ trary, the honour of being enrolled among
“ the citizens of this country, will be always
“ dear to me, as well for its own sake as for
“ that of the hand by which it was presented to
“ me. At the same time, the zeal and fidelity
“ which I owe the king, as my prince and pro-
“ tector,

“ tector, will be numbered among the first of
 “ my duties. Let me add to this, that I leave
 “ behind me some possessions truly to be re-
 “ gretted, but of which I do not mean altoge-
 “ ther to divest myself; these are, the love and
 “ esteem of those friends which I have been so
 “ happy as to find even in the midst of my dis-
 “ graces, and which I hope to preserve tho’ at
 “ a distance.

“ As to the reverend gentlemen the Clergy,
 “ if they think proper to proceed against me
 “ before a Consistory, I shall crawl as well as I
 “ can to appear on their citation, since they
 “ will have it so; but they will find, that, for
 “ any thing I shall have to say to them, they
 “ might have dispensed with all this formality
 “ and parade. They have the power, and are
 “ at liberty, to excommunicate me, if it affords
 “ them any amusement; and, indeed, I should
 “ be greatly amused too, were I only excom-
 “ municated after the manner of Mr. de Vol-
 “ taire*.

“ Permit me, Sir, to address this letter in
 “ common to the two gentlemen who have
 “ had the goodness to write to me in so gene-
 “ rous and interesting a manner on this occa-
 “ sion. You will readily perceive, that, in my
 “ present state of embarrassment, I have nei-
 “ ther

* The reader will possibly be surprised to find the name of this celebrated writer so closely connected with that of the reverend Assembly of our Clergy. It was occasioned, however, by a letter which M. de Voltaire is said to have written to Paris; and in which it is assured, that he piqued himself much on his power and interest to get poor Rousseau expelled from his new country, in spite of the protection afforded him by its sovereign.

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“ther time nor words to exprefs how much I
“am affected with your and their concern for
“my welfare.

“I am, Sir,

“with greatest respect, &c.

“J. J. ROUSSEAU.”

On Sunday the 24th of March, twelve days after the deliberations of the reverend Assembly, the pastor of Motiers convened the admonitory Consistory: having, by the election of two new elders, completed the number required, so as to suit with his plan of reserving two voices to himself.

The Consistory being met, he produced the orders, which he had brought in his pocket from the Assembly; and which he now displayed with ample reflections on the subject, concluding at length, as might be very naturally expected, with a charge adapted to his design.

This interval of twelve days had been fully employed, and that with so much success, that M. de Montmollin, writing to a friend at Geneva, is said to have positively assured him, the sentence of excommunication would pass on Mr Rousseau.

This being resolved on, it was to no purpose that the King's officer, who is always present at the meetings of the Consistory, reminded it of infringing the laws and constitution of the State. It was in vain he exclaimed against that species of inquisition which the assembly of the Clergy had introduced, in open defiance of that consti-

stitution, and in direct violation of the rights and privileges of the people: his voice was not heard; or, if heard, was neglected; whilst the majority determined, that Mr Rousseau should be cited, on the 28th instant, to appear before the Consistory on the 29th.

This determination was accordingly transmitted and received with politeness on the side of both parties. But Mr Rousseau, by the advice of his friends, which was founded on very sufficient reasons, very prudently declined making his personal appearance; sending in writing what he had to say to the Consistory on this occasion, accompanied with the declaration he made to Mr de Montmollin when he was received to the holy communion in 1762.

Letter from Mr ROUSSEAU to the Consistory, consisting of the Pastor and the Elders of the Church of Motiers.

“ GENTLEMEN,

“ On receiving your citation of yesterday, I
 “ determined, in spite of my ill state of health,
 “ to appear before you to-day; but find it im-
 “ possible, notwithstanding the goodness of my
 “ inclination, to sustain the fatigue of a tedious
 “ audience: having reflected also, that, with
 “ regard to the matter of faith, which is the
 “ single object of that citation, I may as well
 “ explain myself in writing. I doubt not also
 “ that the charity, which must ever accompany
 “ your zeal for religion, will induce you to ad-
 “ mit of the same reply by letter, as I should
 “ give to the questions of Mr de Montmollin,
 “ should I have done it by word of mouth.

“ It

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“ It appears to me, then, Gentlemen, that
 “ the severity, with which the reverend Assem-
 “ bly have thought proper to proceed against
 “ me, should have been founded on some posi-
 “ tive law; which I am assured does not now
 “ exist in *this* country *. Nothing, indeed,
 “ can be more novel, more irregular, and more
 “ destructive to civil liberty, and, above all,
 “ more contrary to the true spirit of our holy
 “ religion, than such violent proceedings in a
 “ matter of pure faith †.

“ For

* And which never did exist there, but to the terrible misfortune of the inhabitants.

† Mr Rousseau might have added, that nothing could be a greater contrast to such proceedings, than even the conduct of our own clergy; who, towards the end of the last century, absolutely refused to adopt the *Consensus*, notwithstanding it was the profession of faith adopted by all the other Protestant churches of Switzerland, because they would lay no restraint on the conscience. Nay, the same clergy have even persisted to this day in the like refusal; though *now* they are desirous of imposing on individuals the yoke which they and their Protestant forefathers were unable to bear. Let these gentlemen begin at least by laying down a regular and uniform creed of their own. For till then we shall hardly be disposed to forget a notorious and recent fact; which is, that in the last edition of a little work, received into all our public schools, and published under the immediate direction of our pastors, without any regard to the inspection of the civil magistrate, there are a number of texts of Scripture omitted, (doubtless for very good reasons,) and among others the following: 1 John v. 7. “ For there are *three* that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and *these three are ONE*.” 1 Cor. xiv. 40. “ Let all things be done *decently* and in *order*.”

Ibid. xiii. 13. “ And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but *the greatest of these is charity*.”

See also, 1 Tim. i. 5. John v. 39, 58. Rom. x. 9, 13. Tit. iii. 8. 1 Pet. iii. 13. Jude 20, 21, &c.

It is certainly high time for the clergy to make some alteration in the doctrines commonly received. But to pretend to add an inquisition to their instruction, is rather too great a
 stride,

“ For let me beg of you to consider, that,
 “ having long been received into the bosom of
 “ the church; and, being neither Pastor nor
 “ Professor, nor invested in any manner with
 “ the authority of public instruction, but only
 “ a simple individual among the number of the
 “ faithful; I ought not to be subjected to any
 “ examination or inquisition concerning matters
 “ of belief. Such an inquisition, unheard of
 “ in this country, tends indeed to sap all the
 “ foundations of the reformed religion; at once
 “ infringing both gospel-liberty and Christian
 “ charity, as well as the authority of the Prince
 “ and the rights of the subject, whether we
 “ consider the latter as a member of the church
 “ or of the state. An account of my actions, or
 “ moral conduct, is certainly due, at all times,
 “ to the magistracy and to my fellow-citizens.
 “ But these not admitting of any infallible
 “ church that hath the authority to prescribe
 “ what their members shall believe; as I have
 “ been once received into its communion, I am
 “ responsible only to God for the articles of
 “ my future faith.

“ To this let me add, that, when I was ad-
 “ mitted to the holy communion in this parish,
 “ about three years ago, soon after the publi-
 “ cation of *Emilius*, I gave to Mr de Mont-
 “ mollin himself, a declaration in writing;
 “ with which he seemed fully satisfied, requi-
 “ ring

stride, in a country whose inhabitants have imbibed the love
 of liberty with their mother's milk. Let our pastors reflect on
 the rivers of blood which such an attempt once caused to be
 shed in the Netherlands, and the *spirit of party* will certainly
 yield, either through probity or compassion, to the *spirit of pa-
 tristianism*.

“ ring no farther explanation of me with regard
“ to matters of belief, but promising he never
“ should require any other.

“ I abide by his promise ; and particularly
“ by my own declaration : how inconsistent,
“ how absurd, how scandalous will it be, there-
“ fore, to have been satisfied with it on the
“ publication of a book in which Christianity
“ itself appeared to be so violently attacked ; and
“ yet not to be satisfied with it on the publica-
“ tion of another book, in which the author
“ may doubtless be guilty of some errors, the
“ natural attendants on human frailty ; but in
“ which he certainly errs like a Christian *,
“ as he constantly refers to the authority of the
“ gospel. In the former case, they might in-
“ deed, with some propriety, have denied me
“ the participation of the holy communion, but
“ in the present they ought to allow it me. If
“ you act otherwise, gentlemen, at the peril
“ of your own consciences be it ; for my part,
“ act as you will, mine is at ease.

“ I am ready, gentlemen, to pay you all
“ that deference which is justly your due ; I
“ therefore heartily wish you would not entirely
“ forget the protection with which I am ho-
“ noured by the King, lest you compel me to
“ apply for that of the government.

“ Let me beg of you, gentlemen, to receive
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* It might be also added, And with one of the principal ad-
vocates for the reformation, the celebrated THEODORE de
BEZA ; who nevertheless was not cited before a Consistory
for having said, in a note on John ii. 23, 24. “ *Non satis tuta
“ fides eorum qui miraculis nituntur.*” It is true, that in his time
the word *Reformation* was not an unmeaning term.

“ in good part the strongest assurances of my
 “ profound respect.

“ Annexed, you will find a copy of the de-
 “ claration abovementioned; on which I was
 “ admitted to the holy communion in 1762,
 “ and which I now confirm.

“ J. J. ROUSSEAU.”

This declaration hath appeared in public long
 since; but I think it would not be improper to
 insert it on this occasion. Here, therefore, it is.

*The Declaration of Mr ROUSSEAU, previous to
 his being admitted to the holy communion, after
 the publication of his Emilius: Addressed to the
 Pastor of the church of Motiers.*

“ Sir,

“ The respect I owe your character, and my
 “ duty as a parishioner, obliges me, before I
 “ offer to approach the communion-table, to
 “ impart to you my sentiments respecting the
 “ objects of our faith; a declaration which is
 “ become necessary from the strange prejudices
 “ that have arisen against some of my writings.
 “ It is to be lamented, that the Ministers of
 “ the gospel should, on this occasion, revenge
 “ the cause of the church of Rome, for want of
 “ hearing what I have to offer, or even of ha-
 “ ving read my book.

“ You, Sir, do not stand, indeed, in this
 “ predicament; I expect, therefore, at your
 “ hands, more equitable treatment. Be this,
 “ however, as it may, the work carries its
 “ own explanation with it; and as I can justify
 “ it only by means of itself, I abandon it, such
 “ as it is, either to the approbation or censure
 “ of

“ of the judicious reader, without undertaking
“ to defend or pretending to disavow it.

“ Confining what I have to say at present,
“ therefore, to my own person, I declare to
“ you, Sir, with all respect, that, since my
“ being re-united to the church in which I was
“ born, I have always made profession of the
“ reformed religion; the less suspected, in-
“ deed, as in the country where I resided no-
“ thing farther was required of me than to keep
“ silence; even some doubt of such profession
“ being suffered to remain, in order that I
“ might continue to enjoy those political advan-
“ tages, of which I should otherwise have been
“ deprived on account of my religion. To this
“ true and holy religion I now profess myself
“ also sincerely attached, and shall continue
“ so to the latest hour of my life: I desire,
“ therefore, to be externally united to the
“ church, as I am internally from the very bot-
“ tom of my heart. And this I protest to you,
“ Sir, I desire not only from the consolation
“ which I promise myself from a participation
“ in the communion of the faithful, but even
“ as much with a view to their public edification
“ as my own private advantage; for it is by no
“ means proper, that a sincere and ingenuous
“ reasoner should not openly appear a member
“ of the church of Christ.

“ I shall wait on you, Sir, to receive a verbal
“ answer to this letter, and to consult you re-
“ specting the manner in which I ought to con-
“ duct myself on this occasion; that I may give
“ no cause of offence to a Minister whom I ho-
“ nour, nor of scandal to the congregation I
“ would wish to edify.”

After many difficulties, which arose on the part of Mr de Montmollin respecting the reception of these papers, the King's officer carried his point so far as to obtain the permission of having this read: in doing which, the pastor reversed the order of their mission, and recited the declaration first. During the lecture also, he was observed to be greatly agitated; every now and then shrugging up his shoulders, and stopping short to comment on what he had read, in a manner very expressive and edifying, though not a little singular in a pastor who for two years and a half past had judged this very declaration sufficient to justify his admitting the author to the communion.

Nor was this the only indecency committed in this Assembly, the same servant of God endeavouring constantly to interrupt the servant of his Prince, when the latter made any representation on the subject. Nay, he went so far as to propose an adjournment of the Assembly, when he saw what turn their deliberations were likely to take; and that merely on the frivolous and unprecedented pretext of one of the elders being absent; on whose voice he doubtless imagined he could depend.

These efforts, however, being insufficient, he tried another scheme; and modestly pretended, that he himself had two voices in the chapter. Yet one would have naturally thought his delicacy should have made him refrain from voting at all on this particular occasion, as he was now become in a manner a party in the affair, by representing the Assembly of the Clergy in exhibiting the orders they had given him; and which he now insisted should be conformed to,
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in the deliberations of the consistory: but it appears he was determined to carry his point *per fas & nefas*.

At the breaking up of the Consistory, our Pastor's dissatisfaction broke forth, in the rudest manner, against those of the elders who had differed from him in opinion. He reproached them in the severest terms for not having listened to the voice of their spiritual conductor; to all which, however, they honestly and plainly told him, "they thought it much safer to listen "to the voice of their own consciences."

They had, in fact, had time sufficient to reflect on the conduct of this spiritual guide; on the measures he had taken to deceive them, and the false steps he would have them take in this business. Being apprehensive of the ill consequences that might attend on their proceedings, therefore, four of them thought it expedient to address themselves to the Council of State, the proper Assembly to judge of order.

But here I imagine that I hear you exclaiming with surprise, in the words of Boileau,

Tant de fiel entre-t-il dans l'ame des devots!

Whence, say you, can such spleen and malice arise? What can afford a sufficient cause for this furious animosity? A Pastor, of whom Mr Rousseau had spoken more than once with high encomiums*, must surely have very singular

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* Particularly in his letter to the archbishop of Paris, and in the first volume of the *Letters written from the Mountains*. In regard to these encomiums, a lady of this country, who knows the world well, very pleasantly said, that she had been offended, as well as others, at the writings of Mr Rousseau, and that not less with his assertions than with his doubts; in proof
of

motives to falsify these encomiums by his own conduct! Doubtless, Sir! It is, indeed, whispered, that he was certainly touched with that powerful influence, which is usually denominated the *Auri sacra fames*.

I leave you to guess the rest; and pass on to the abovementioned address of the four elders.

To the President and members of the Council State.

“ Respectable Lords,

*“ The subscribing elders, members of the
“ admonitory Consistory of Motiers and Bover-
“ resse, take the liberty of addressing your Ex-
“ cellencies; being greatly surprised to find
“ themselves required to deliberate on a case
“ which surpasses the bounds of their very limi-
“ ted knowledge. For which reason they in-
“ treat your Lordships to give them directions
“ for their conduct with regard to the three
“ following points:*

*“ 1. Whether we are obliged to engage in a
“ rigorous scrutiny concerning matters of
“ religious belief?*

*“ With regard to this first article, we must
“ ingenuously avow the incompetence of our
“ knowledge in theology; nor can we think it
“ reasonable that such knowledge should be re-
“ quired of us, who have always imagined the
“ duties of our charge confined to the repre-
“ hension and suppression of indecencies and
“ irregularities of manners; without venturing
“ to*

*of which, she alledged these passages respecting his pastor. All
the world were of her opinion; and when it was told Mr Rouf-
seau, he answered in the bitterness of his heart, “ True, I
“ ought to have been aware of the danger of commending an
“ ecclesiastic while he was living.”*

“ to encroach upon the *sovereign authority* on
“ which we depend.

“ 2. Whether a Pastor has, or ought to
“ have, two votes in the Consistory?

“ On this second point we beg leave to ob-
“ serve, that the Consistory of Motiers and
“ Boveresse being composed of six elders, with
“ the Pastor as president, if this maxim were
“ established, the members of the said Consistory
“ would serve only for mere cyphers in any fu-
“ ture debate.

“ 3. and lastly, Whether the deacon of Val
“ de Travers hath a right to sit and vote
“ in the Consistory of Motiers and Bove-
“ resse?

“ With regard to this last article, it appears
“ to us, that if the deacon is desirous to inter-
“ fere in matters of *correction*, he ought also to
“ labour in those of *instruction* and *edification*.
“ Nor should the Pastors prevent his catechising,
“ as he is legally bound to do, in the chapel of
“ Boveresse*.

“ Your

* For the explanation of this circumstance, it is necessary to observe, that, at the instance of the pastors, the communities of Val de Travers, who enjoyed a foundation for a schoolmaster, consented to suppress that place, and to transfer the pension to a deacon, charged to assist the clergy in the execution of their functions. The inhabitants of Boveresse stipulated in particular, that the deacon should come every fortnight to teach and explain the catechism in their chapel, in order to prevent their children being deprived of all instruction. For these two years past, however, the poor people solicit in vain for their catechism and their abandoned chapel.

Our modern pastors are by no means like those of the primitive churches, who would brave the cross and stake to spread abroad their instructions, and solicit the people to receive them *gratis*. Ours, on the contrary, find it more easy and commodious to confine their pastoral solicitude to the emolument of the prebend. To do justice to all parties, however,

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" Your Lordships will please to take under
 " consideration the *first* article of our most hum-
 " ble remonstrances; which gives us the more
 " concern, as the object of it so far surpasses
 " our judgment and abilities. In regard to the
 " *two latter*, we are also by so much the more
 " interested in them, as we are anxious for the
 " faithful discharge of our duty, and may sub-
 " ject ourselves to censure, while our intentions
 " are perfectly innocent. We flatter ourselves
 " that your Lordships will please to direct our
 " conduct by an arret of Council; which will
 " be an additional motive to those already sub-
 " sisting for putting up our most earnest pray-
 " ers to the Almighty for your preservation.

Signed,

A. H. BAZENCENET, A. FAVRE,
 L. BARRELET, A. JEANRENAUD."

This request being presented the first of April,
 the government judged it necessary to expedite
 the following preliminary orders.

" April 1.

" The Council of State, having received the
 " informations of Mr. Martinet, member of
 " the Council, and Captain-governor of Val de
 " Travers, bearing date the 25th and 30th of
 " March last, with regard to what passed in the
 " Admonitory Consistory, assembled on Sunday
 " the 24th and on Friday the 29th of the same
 " month, respecting the Sieur Rousseau; as also
 " the joint representations of four elders of the
 " church, Favre, Bazencenet, Barrelet and
 " Jean-

it must be owned, that these emoluments are but small, and
 little proportioned to the value of that instruction for which
 they were intended as a salary.

“ Jeanrenaud, and deliberated thereon ; it is
“ *resolved*, That the conduct of the said Governor hitherto is fully approved ; and that, in
“ expectation of receiving further orders concerning the final determination of this affair,
“ he do signify to the said Sieur Rousseau, that
“ the Council of State will secure to him the full
“ enjoyment of the protection granted him by
“ the King, of the favour he is honoured with
“ by my Lord Marshall, and of that which is
“ due to him as a subject of the state. In consequence of which, the Council dispense with
“ his paying any regard to all or any of the citations which may be sent him from the Consistory ; whose whole procedure against him
“ is hereby superseded, and with regard to
“ which a definite order will speedily be issued.”

The next day was published the Arret following.

“ *April 2.*

“ At the request of the four elders of the
“ Consistory of Motiers and Boveresse, Favre,
“ Bazencenet, Barrelet, and Jeanrenaud, it is
“ *resolved*, That the delicacy and prudence with
“ which the said elders proceeded in the presentation of their address to the Council of
“ State, is approved and commended.

“ *Resolved* concerning the three articles contained in their said request, That the council
“ pronounce, in order,

“ On the *first*, That the Admonitory Consistory is to take cognisance only of divisions,
“ disorders, and licentious of manners ; having
“ no right to interfere in any other business
“ whatever, but particularly having no authority
“ rity

" rity to call any one to account for matters of
 " faith or private judgment: That the mem-
 " bers of the Consistory have still less right or
 " pretension to proceed rigorously in the prose-
 " cution of any such business; as the Consisto-
 " ry itself depends on a superior power, to
 " which its members should refer their discove-
 " ries of this kind when of importance to the
 " state; and to which alone it belongs to take
 " cognisance and to punish in its own prudence,
 " if the case require, agreeable to the forms of
 " law.

" That the said four elders are consequently
 " justifiable in refusing to take cognisance of
 " such subjects, notwithstanding they may be
 " required so to do by their pastor; as they
 " ought not in any manner to aid or assist in
 " such proceedings as are contrary to the con-
 " stitution of the State, whatever means may be
 " taken to engage them therein *.

" With regard to the *second* article, *resolved*,
 " That it is unprecedented for the pastor
 " presiding over the Admonitory Consistory to
 " have more than one vote; and that whosoever
 " hath, in such a case, assumed a double vote,
 " be properly reprehended and restrained to the
 " due discharge of his proper functions: That
 " it is not permitted such presiding pastor to
 " present to the Consistory the resolutions, or e-
 " ven final determinations, of the Assembly of
 " the Clergy; by which the Consistory cannot,
 " and ought not, to be affected, that Assembly
 " having no authority over the Consistory:
 " That

* Observe this, ye ministers of the God of peace, who com-
 mands obedience to the powers that be.

“ That a pastor may, indeed, consult such Assembly for his own particular direction, and
“ even follow their advice, if he thinks proper;
“ but that he ought in no case whatever to lay
“ any the least restraint on the free votes and
“ suffrages of the other members of the said
“ Consistory; and of this the officer of the
“ State, who is present, is required to take particular note.

“ As to the *third* article of the said request
“ of the four elders abovementioned, it is *ordered*, That Mr Martinet, Counsellor of State,
“ Captain and Governor of Val de Travers, do
“ make proper inquiry into the late practices,
“ as well as into the former customs on which
“ such practices may have been founded, respecting
“ the pretended right of the deacon of Val
“ de Travers to sit and vote in the Admonitory
“ Consistory of Motiers and Boveresse; and
“ upon his report deliberation will be held, and
“ farther resolutions taken therein *.”

Such, my dear Sir, is the present situation of things here: and it is hoped the reverend Assembly of the Clergy will, on this occasion, have the good sense to apply the ancient maxim, *noli movere camarinam*, and so much patriotism at least to be quiet †; especially after Mr Rousseau

* This arret, coming directly from the Council of State, and serving to authenticate the facts above recited, reflects no little honour also on our government; and will, to every good citizen, be as valuable as the *Magna Charta* to Englishmen.

† We are assured, indeed, that our clergy will now sit down in tranquillity; and that M. de Montmollin, in particular, comforts himself with the pleasing hope, that in *another reign* things will go better both with him and with the venerable Assembly. This may serve as another encomium on that sovereign, under whose government we have the happiness to live.

seau hath sent the following letter to Mr N***, Solicitor-general: with a copy of which I shall conclude mine.

*Letter from Mr ROUSSEAU to Mr N***, Solicitor-general.*



" Motiers, April 6, 1765.

" Permit me, Sir, before your departure, to
 " intreat you to add another favour to the many
 " you have obligingly conferred upon me;
 " that is, to present my sincerest acknowledgements and profound respects to the members of the Council of State. It is greatly
 " consolatory for me to enjoy, under the auspices of government, that protection with
 " which the King hath honoured me, and the favours which my Lord Marshall hath so
 " kindly bestowed. These instances of generosity and goodness are so great and valuable, that they lay me under new obligations, which
 " my heart will ever duely acknowledge, not only as a faithful subject to the State, but as
 " a man particularly obliged to that illustrious body by which it is governed. I flatter myself, that hitherto a perfect simplicity hath
 " been observed in my conduct, and as great an aversion to controversy, as a love for peace
 " and tranquillity. I will venture to say, no man hath endeavoured less to spread his opinions, or hath been less an author in his social and private character: and tho', during
 " the course of my misfortunes, the solicitations of my friends, my duty, and even my
 " honour, may have obliged me to take up the pen in my own defence, or in that of others,
 " I can

" I can safely say I have always discharged this
" disagreeable office with regret; regarding the
" cruel necessity of it as an additional misfor-
" tune †.

" At present, Sir, I thank heaven, I am
" quit of this duty; and am determined, for
" the future, to be silent. For the sake,
" therefore, of my own repose as well as that
" of the State in which I have the happiness
" to live, I voluntarily engage myself, so long
" as I possess the same advantages, not to write
" upon any subject which may give offence
" to the people of this country, or of those
" adjacent. I will even do more, and return
" with pleasure to that state of obscurity, in
" which I ought always to have lived, and hope
" never more to excite the attention of the pu-
" blic, in any shape, regarding myself.

" I heartily wish I could offer my new coun-
" try a tribute more worthy of it. The sacrifice

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" I

† Mr Rousseau received, indeed, during several months to-
gether, repeated and multiplied solicitations, even from Ge-
neva itself, to urge him to write in his justification. It is there-
fore not to be wondered at, if his friendship, his duty, his ho-
nour, at length yielded to them. It is surprising, however,
that people should be so fond of discovering, in the *Letters from
the Mountains*, sentiments which are not expressed there. For
my part, I sincerely avow, that the prudent, reserved, and pa-
triotic * conduct of the citizens of Geneva, since the publica-
tion of that work, appears to tally exactly with the maxims
and advice which those Letters inculcate. Not but I can ea-
sily discern, that a person, whose love of liberty and aversion
to despotism were less than mine, might not approve of the
publication of that Work, or labour to invest its author with
the title of a *Professor of truth and liberty*.

* Notwithstanding all that has been insinuated to the contrary by the
author of the *Dialogues between a citizen of Geneva and a foreigner*;
this writer making his citizen talk like a child, and his foreigner very in-
veign to the purpose indeed!

“ I here make it, indeed, is of little value, and
 “ as little to be regretted: since I prefer the
 “ friendship of its inhabitants, and the fa-
 “ vour of its Governors, infinitely above the
 “ breath of popularity and the vain applause of
 “ the world.

“ Let me intreat you, Sir, to accept of my
 “ most humble and respectful acknowledgments.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Neufchatel,

April 14, 1765,

J. J. ROUSSEAU.

“ P. S. In taking a review of my letter, I
 “ perceive, Sir, I have not strictly kept
 “ my promise; but have sometimes lost
 “ sight of my design, by dwelling too mi-
 “ nutely, perhaps heavily, on particulars.
 “ But the heart was afflicted, and it was
 “ impossible to do otherwise. Who could
 “ forbear expatiating on so copious a sub-
 “ ject? I do not flatter myself, however,
 “ that I have told you every thing; and
 “ am, therefore, satisfied that I have not
 “ altogether broken my promise.”

ADVERTISEMENT.

ON the publication of the foregoing letter, written, as it afterwards appeared, by Mr du Peyrou of Neufchatel, the reverend Pastor M. de Montmollin undertook, in defence of himself, a refutation of the facts and reasonings contained in it. This he published in the form of Letters, to the number of nine; the substance of which is contained in the following summary.

Ab-

Abstract of Professor de MONTMOLLIN's Refutation of the foregoing Libel.

“ If I had consulted only my own peace and tranquillity, I should have been silent with regard to the anonymous libel which hath lately appeared against me ; and which, being only a farrago of misrepresentation, falsehood, calumny, and abuse, can excite only the contempt of men of understanding and probity.

“ A writer who is ashamed to subscribe his name to assertions or insinuations respecting the moral character and reputation of another, hath been in all ages held in just detestation, as the most dangerous enemy to society. Such a writer, indeed, may be truly compared to an assassin, who stabs a man in the dark, or destroys him while he sleeps securely in his bed. His word, at least, ought to pass for nothing with the public, as I have often heard Mr Rousseau himself acknowledge.

“ For my own part, I am not afraid to subscribe my own name, nor to mention those of others who may be interested in this affair ; as I shall write nothing but what is exactly true, and shall besides strictly abide by that moderation which is so conformable both to my ministerial and personal character.”

After this introduction, the reverend professor goes on to relate the affair of Mr Rousseau's first application to him, on that gentleman's arrival at Motiers, in order to be admitted to the holy communion ; giving a transcript of his letter on that occasion ; which, being before

printed *, is here omitted. In the copy of a second letter, addressed to a brother pastor at Geneva, on the same occasion, M. de Montmollin proceeds, after the customary preamble, as follows:

“ It is now about three † months since Mr
 “ Rousseau arrived at Motiers, and took up his
 “ residence in the house wherein he now lives.
 “ My friends and relations recommended him
 “ to me as a person of merit and probity, who
 “ sought only a peaceful retreat where he might
 “ end his days in tranquillity, *without writing*
 “ *any more ‡*: a circumstance which was af-
 “ terwards confirmed to me by the verbal as-
 “ surance of Mr Rousseau, whose health is very
 “ precarious, and is daily on the decay. On
 “ his arrival, he wrote to my Lord Marshall,
 “ desiring permission to reside in this country;
 “ which was readily granted him. His Excel-
 “ lence also informed the King, who was pleased
 “ to admit of Mr Rousseau’s petition; *supposing*
 “ he would behave himself in a proper manner.
 “ From that day to this, Mr Rousseau, whom
 “ I have had frequent occasion to see, hath ap-
 “ peared in a very favourable light; comport-
 “ ing

* See page 390.

† This letter is dated Sept. 25, 1761.

‡ The passages marked in italics throughout this letter are those which Mr Rousseau either retrenched, added, or altered, in the copy submitted to his perusal by M. de Montmollin, when the latter was called upon, in his own vindication, to send it to several persons of eminence, both ecclesiastical and civil, who thought he had extended his toleration too far with regard to Mr Rousseau. Providentially, says the professor, I have retained this copy with the alterations and corrections written by Mr Rousseau’s own hand. The professor had written, *without troubling himself to write any more.*

ing himself with great prudence and discretion, and politely refusing to satisfy the impertinent curiosity of those who came hither to ask him imprudent or unnecessary questions.

In the mean time, he hath assiduously frequented the church, with such an external appearance of religious respect and devotion, that the people have entertained a very good opinion of him. For my own part, I have frequently conversed with him, and have started several objections against a number of propositions contained in his writings. On all which occasions he hath replied with great moderation; complaining bitterly that he hath been misrepresented, not only as an infidel and an enemy to religion, but even as an atheist; whereas he protested to me, that he was sincerely a Christian, and that of the reformed religion.

On the twenty-fourth of August, he wrote me the letter before mentioned; and the next day waited on me, in consequence of its contents; when I had an opportunity of entering into a more particular conversation with him, with regard to the nature and tendency of his writings, and principally that of *Emilius*. On that head, I observed to him, that there appeared to me a manifest contradiction between the principles established in his writings, and that ardent desire he testified to be admitted to the communion of the faithful.

He again protested, that he was at heart a Christian and a Protestant; that he was desirous of acting as such; and that he looked upon his participation at the Lord's table as

“ one of the most consolatory events that could
 “ happen to him ; expressing his hopes that my
 “ pastoral charity would not refuse him the ad-
 “ vantage of such consolation. To all which
 “ he added, as a proof of his sincerity, and of
 “ his request’s arising from motives purely con-
 “ scientious, that, being under the immediate
 “ protection of the king, he might reside at
 “ ease in this country, without being under any
 “ necessity of complying with any external
 “ modes of religion : but that he desired from
 “ his heart to know Jesus Christ for his Saviour,
 “ whenever he should be called to appear before
 “ his sovereign Judge.

“ With regard to his *Emilius*, also, in parti-
 “ cular, he again assured me, that he meant to
 “ say nothing in that work against the reform-
 “ ed religion ; having in view only the three
 “ following objects: *First*, To combat the church
 “ of Rome, and particularly that doctrine which
 “ affirms that there is no salvation out of her
 “ pale ; as there can be no doubt that a Pagan
 “ of probity and virtue, Socrates, for instance,
 “ although he never had heard the name of
 “ Christ, might be saved.

“ On this occasion he admitted, that he was
 “ led to exalt the idea of natural religion, as
 “ being the foundation of revealed ; and that
 “ he might possibly have dropped some expres-
 “ sions that might be misapplied, and seem to
 “ have a tendency to depreciate the Protestant
 “ religion ; but that this was never his inten-
 “ tion.

“ In the *second* place, it was his design to op-
 “ pose, though not directly, yet sufficiently
 “ plain, that infernal performance *Dé l’Esprit*;
 “ in

“ in which the author maintains the detestable
“ principle, that to perceive and to judge is the
“ same thing; *a principle which evidently tends*
“ *to establish materialism* *.

“ *Thirdly, To demolish those of our modern*
“ *philosophers, whose vanity and presumption*
“ *have induced them to sap the foundations of*
“ *all religion, both natural and revealed.*

“ In answer to all this, I freely represented
“ to Mr Rousseau, that, if these were his in-
“ tentions, his readers had indeed greatly mi-
“ staken them; and that they were very na-
“ turally led into such mistake, by the scepti-
“ cal and ludicrous manner in which he had
“ treated the most essential doctrines of Chri-
“ stianity.

“ Being thus pressed, he replied, that he ad-
“ mitted and believed every doctrine that was
“ essential, or that any minister ought to deem
“ essential, in the Christian religion: *that he*
“ *was so far from ludicrously endeavouring to*
“ *bring religion into ridicule, he had never spo-*
“ *ken of it but with the most profound respect;*
“ *although, in opposing two adversaries to each*
“ *other, and imitating their manner, which he*
“ *censures, he sometimes makes one of them speak*
“ *of it with less reverence* *. He ingenuously
“ confessed, that he had many doubts and scrup-
“ les which he could not get over; but that he
“ desired nothing more ardently than to have
“ these doubts removed, and in the mean time
“ adhered to that way of thinking which was
“ generally acknowledged the safest. He farther
“ de-

* This was added by Mr Rousseau.

† Added by Mr Rousseau.

“ declared, that, if he was supposed to have an
 “ indifference for all religions, it was a * *false*
 “ imputation; for that he looked upon the
 “ Christian religion as the only one that was
 “ true, and capable of making us wise to sal-
 “ vation. At the end of this conference, I told
 “ him I would communicate the purport of it,
 “ as well as his letter, to the Consistory, and
 “ that I should afterwards return him my an-
 “ swer.

“ The Consistory unanimously determined,
 “ that Mr Rousseau might be admitted to the
 “ communion, on the supposition of his sincer-
 “ ity, and with the proviso that I should again
 “ converse with him on that head. I imparted
 “ this determination accordingly to Mr Rousseau,
 “ and in the mean time made farther inquiries
 “ after his character and conduct, for my own
 “ satisfaction and justification. After all which
 “ precautions, to prevent any scandal arising
 “ from the proposed admission, I waited again
 “ on Mr Rousseau, and told him that I was
 “ charged, on the part of the Consistory, to re-
 “ present to him, “ That every person who
 “ came to the holy communion made a public
 “ profession of believing in Jesus Christ, and
 “ that consequently the members of the church
 “ regarded him as a member of Christ: but
 “ that if in this case he only made an external
 “ and verbal profession, I thought myself obli-
 “ ged to tell him, he would be the most vile
 “ and deceitful of all hypocrites: that he was
 “ accountable, however, only to God; and that
 “ if he acted sincerely, as I was bound in Chri-
 “ stian charity to believe, I blessed God for the
 “ happy

* Added by Mr Rousseau.

“ happy circumstance, and felicitated him there-
“ on with all my heart.” To this I added,
“ that I doubted not, if he seconded the opera-
“ tions of grace which appeared to act in his
“ favour, but he would find, by happy experi-
“ ence, that the doubts and scruples he had
“ mentioned would insensibly dissipate; and
“ that, having a clear head and a good heart,
“ the work of grace would soon be completed.
“ I then spoke to him again of his *Emilius*, and
“ of the public profession he was going to make
“ of Christianity: to which he replied, that in
“ time the prejudices conceived against him
“ would vanish.

“ Mr Rousseau received the communion the
“ Sunday following, with an humility and de-
“ votion that edified the whole church; and
“ seemed to carry with them all the appearance
“ of sincerity. A number of very sensible and
“ pious persons in the congregation were in
“ particular highly rejoiced at the religious de-
“ portment of Mr Rousseau, who hath made
“ himself loved and esteemed in these Cantons
“ by his candour, affability, moderation, and
“ charity. For though he is not rich, he is
“ very charitable, and that without ostentation;
“ of which he gave some extraordinary proofs
“ on the day of his receiving the sacrament.”

Under these circumstances, M. de Montmol-
lin thinks he should have been wanting in his
duty as a minister of Christ, had he refused Mr
Rousseau the privileges he was desirous of as a
member of his church; it belonging only to him
who searcheth the heart and trieth the reins, to
judge whether or not the participant was actually
sincere. “ It is to be wished, indeed,” continues
the

the reverend pastor, "for the sake of my own peace and tranquillity, that my toleration, tho' founded both on the principles of humanity and Christian charity, had been more reserved and confined. I should not in that case have been the dupe to the goodness of my own heart, nor have had so much reason to complain of having been unjustly traduced in the opinion of the public! Where is there a pastor, who would not have been rejoiced as I was, to see Mr Rousseau, whose celebrity was so general and extensive, present himself in a light so desirable to the cause of truth and religion? I will frankly confess to you, Sir, that, independent of the satisfaction I felt in regard to the salvation of Mr Rousseau, and the edification of my fellow Christians, my self-love was not a little flattered by this event, which I looked upon as one of the most honourable of my life. The consequences, however, have taught me the propriety of adopting the remark which the anonymous Libeller hath put into the mouth of a certain lady of his acquaintance respecting Mr Rousseau's commending an Ecclesiastic in his life-time. Yes, my friend, I may well say, in like manner, that I have learned, to the sorrow of my heart, the danger of commending an author during his life-time, especially when he piques himself so greatly on his reputation. To promise to write no more, yet still to write on, and that more than ever against religion, is a conduct so inconsistent and problematical, that, I confess frankly, I am unable to account for it. But to confine myself to facts, which I shall leave to explain themselves: During the time in which I imagined Mr Rousseau enjoyed at leisure that

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tranquillity which he had by his above-mentioned conduct procured to himself, without thinking of writing any more on religious subjects, it appears that he was very differently employed: For at the latter end of the year, behold his Letters from the Mountains made their appearance; in the perusal of which I saw the author discovered himself by his writings, and that it was no longer the Savoyard Curate who spoke, but Mr Rousseau himself. A copy of this work was sent me by the author, with the following letter *.

Motiers, Dec. 23, 1764.

“What a pity, Sir, that a man, who is so
“fond of peace, should be always engaged in
“war! It was impossible for me to refuse stand-
“ing up in defence of my compatriots, as they
“had done in mine. This is what I could not
“do, without resenting those insults, which,
“with the blackest ingratitude, the ministers of
“Geneva have had the baseness to load me in
“the midst of my misfortunes; and which they
“have carried even so far as to abuse me from
“their pulpits, which they are unworthy to a-
“scend. But as they are so fond of war, they
“shall

* Let the reader put himself in my place, and judge what I ought to think of Mr Rousseau, when I saw to what degree he had insulted so distinguished and respectable a body as the clergy of Geneva. I confess, I was very little flattered with the exception this writer made of me in the Amsterdam edition of his book; as the odium he endeavoured to throw on the ministry in general, must necessarily in some degree affect me. But it is no wonder; that a writer, who could so indecently insult a respectable body of magistrates, should abuse the ministers of religion, who have no other arms to defend themselves than charity and patience.

" shall have it; this, however, is my first act of
 " hostility, tho' I have suffered many from them
 " who have been the aggressors. In this work,
 " I have nevertheless defended one of their chief
 " prerogatives; which they have tamely sub-
 " mitted to be deprived of, voluntarily stooping
 " under the yoke of tyranny themselves, that
 " they may be supported in their insolent au-
 " thority over others. As for the rest, the quar-
 " rel is merely personal between them and me;
 " or, if I have introduced the Protestant reli-
 " gion, it is as its defender against those who
 " would subvert it. Such are my reasons, Sir,
 " for having written this performance; and you
 " may be assured, that the more I am laid under
 " the necessity of explaining myself, the greater
 " honour will redound to you for your conduct
 " towards me and the justice you have already
 " done me.

J. J. ROUSSEAU."

" The Company of Pastors, being informed of
 the manner in which the *Letters from the Moun-
 tains* were received throughout Europe, and
 particularly by the churches of this country,
 thought themselves under an obligation to take
 notice of this work, as well as of the new edi-
 tion projected of Mr Rousseau's other pieces.

" The Libeller is pleased to represent it as an
 offence, that the reverend class were silent on
 this head for the space of two months. But
 could a body of men dispersed throughout the
 country take up less time to examine the work
 in question, and to judge properly of the effects
 it might produce? These, and these only, were
 the springs of their subsequent zeal and activity.

Will

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“Will it be said that the clergy had no business to take these objects into their consideration? Surely their quality of ministers of the gospel necessarily called upon them to support the cause and interests of their Divine Master! The clergy of every communion would have done the same; and I can take upon me to aver, that both ours and the neighbouring churches, tho’ of a different communion, were greatly edified by that conduct and resolution, which are so conformable to the avowed principles of a company of defenders of the truth, who ought to maintain the cause of Christ.

“The anonymous libeller was not well informed, when he intimated that the clergy took no notice of *Emilius* at the first appearance of that work; the venerable class having made remonstrances on this head to the Government in the year 1762, in order to prevent its being circulated in this country; a proof of which fact the writer may find by recurring to the registers of the Council of State. It is farther observable, that in this remonstrance the class did not mention the author’s name; an instance of that moderation for which they have been ever distinguished, notwithstanding the libeller’s malicious insinuations to the contrary.

“The mistake of the crier, who proclaimed the prohibition of Mr Rousseau’s performance, was not less ridiculous than the anonymous writer’s remark on it. But to proceed to facts of greater importance.

“The Assembly of the Clergy appointed the 12th and 13th of March *, in order to deliberate

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* M. de Montmollin was not present at the former meeting

on the means of removing the scandal which the publication of Mr Rousseau's last work had occasioned. And here, with all the deference due to the anonymous writer, I must take the liberty to observe, that, according to the ecclesiastical constitutions of this country, the clergy have a right and authority to take notice of matters of faith, as well as morality, when any scandal arises from them. This is the very letter and the spirit of our discipline; of which I might cite numerous examples. The anonymous writer compares the proceedings of our clergy, with those of an inquisition. Absurd and ridiculous! The objects of inquisitorial prosecution are concealed facts, that of our Assembly was notorious and open.

“ Not having seen Mr Rousseau during my illness, I thought my pastoral duty required of me to pay him a visit before the meeting of the appointed Assembly. I accordingly waited on him, though hardly recovered, on Friday the 8th of March, in the afternoon; in order to prevail on him, if possible, to take such measures as might best agree with my sentiments respecting him, and the discharge of my own duty. I signified to him the apprehensions I was under on his account, and the consequences which I foresaw would be the result of the Assembly. I opened my heart freely to him on this occasion, as a citizen, a Christian, a pastor, and a friend; in doing which perhaps I did too much, but it was a proceeding which my heart dictated. I own Sir,
I

ing of the clergy, being, as he says, confined by sickness, and having no knowledge, either directly or indirectly, of what was done there; much less that Mr Rousseau's books were the objects of their deliberation.

I was desirous of preventing Mr Rousseau's suffering any chagrin this account, because I then firmly believed him to be sincere in his error. I proposed to him therefore several expedients which suggested themselves; and among others, that he would promise me not to receive the communion at Easter, as well for his own sake as for that of general edification; hoping that, in a short interval, the fermentation which had been raised in the minds of the people on his account might possibly subside. Was this, Sir, the conduct of a persecutor? Mr Rousseau hesitated some time; and at length gave me for answer, that if I would assure him he should participate on the ensuing festivals, he might be induced to acquiesce in my proposal. I represented to him, that this did not depend on me; that I was only a single member of a numerous body, and could answer only for my own vote. He persisted, however, in telling me, that his fortune was in my hands, and that he was determined to have all or nothing; while I continued to assure him, that I would do him all the service in my power, consistent with my duty. Mr Rousseau then said, that he would enter into an engagement with me, not to write any thing more upon the subject of religion; in consequence of which he hoped he should not be farther disturbed: to which he added hastily and abruptly, "Well, Sir, my fortune depends upon you: if you return with good news, I shall be heartily glad to see you; if not, we have nothing to say to each other." To this I replied, being much concerned at his prepossession, "As you please, Sir," and returned to my own house heartily afflicted. As I was not to set out till

Monday, I conceived Mr Rousseau might in the interim be better advised, and that I should hear from him: but I heard nothing of him till Sunday evening; when Mr Guyenet, Lieutenant of Val-de-Travers, who has the honour to be in the good graces of Mr Rousseau, came to inform me, that Mr Rousseau had sent for him to complain against me for the coldness with which I had received his declaration; and to tell him, that if I had required it in writing, he would certainly have given it me. He hath nothing more to do then, said I, then to send it to me; I am ready to receive it, and will present it to the Assembly: but I conjure you, added I, by that interest which you take in Mr Rousseau's affairs, as well as that which you are sensible I take myself, to let his declaration be clear and positive. Mr Guyenet would have had me return to Mr Rousseau: but the weather was too severe to permit me to risk my health; and as I had nothing new to say to him, Mr Guyenet went himself, and brought me soon after a written paper from Mr Rousseau, which I told him I thought insufficient, giving him my reasons for thinking it unsatisfactory. To these he told me he would bring an answer, and accordingly brought me a second paper * on Monday morning: to which I objected, in like manner, that instead of making our Clergy easy, it would rather irritate them the more against him †: desiring that he would alter the words

* The anonymous writer says, this declaration was not known till within a short time before his writing; whereas it was notoriously known in the very beginning of the affair, not only in the country, but even in Geneva. Mr Guyenet told me he had orders to make it public, as I also did to every one who had a mind to see it.

† The terms of his former declaration were still more exception-

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"*I will continue* to shew by my sentiments and
"conduct the value I set upon the happiness of
"being united to the church," into, "*I will*
"*endeavour to shew, &c.*"; the expression *I*
will continue, after so flagrant an instance of his
late defection, being more than sufficient to give
offence. The Lieutenant was loath to return
with this message; but seeing I was going to
proceed on my journey, he went out hastily, de-
siring I would wait his return. I did so; when
he informed me, that he could not prevail on
Mr Rousseau to alter a single letter of his decla-
ration. So much the worse said I; I am really
sorry for his obstinacy: but please to tell him,
that he is himself the cause of those troubles in
which he will possibly be involved; but it is his
own affair, as he is determined not to listen to
the advice of his friends.—

"Being arrived at Neufchatel, I found there the
same fermentation as in my own and the neigh-
bouring parishes. The *Letters from the Moun-*
tains, the projected edition of Mr Rousseau's
writings, the remonstrances of our company,
and the proscription of his works by the civil
magistrate, all together did not a little agi-
tate the minds of the people. Every body had
their eye on the conduct of the Clergy in this cir-
cumstance. What will our ministers do? said they
publicly. Will they defend the gospel, which hath
been so openly attacked; or will they suffer it to be
torn in pieces by its enemies? And what will you
do, Sir? said they to me. Will not this last per-

M m 3

form-

tionable; for he there made the offer of being silent, on condi-
tion of their not molesting him: but it is not for culpable in-
dividuals, as I then told Mr GUYNET, thus to make condi-
tions, and give law to their legal superiors.

formance of Mr Rousseau's put an end to your toleration? He is your parishioner. Will you do nothing for the sake of religion, for the edification of the faithful, and for your own character? Had a native of the country, added they, dared to speak or to write any thing like what hath been advanced by Mr Rousseau, the clergy would have been readily inflamed against him. What! is Mr Rousseau, a citizen of yesterday, invested with greater privileges than a natural born subject? Is he not subjected, like every other citizen, to the laws of the state, and those customs which have prevailed from times immemorial.

"At the meeting of the Assembly, the Christianity of Mr Rousseau was brought on the tapis for examination; when I presented the declaration given me by Lieutenant Guyenet on the preceding Sunday. This, being taken into consideration, was deemed insufficient to repair the mischiefs which had been already effected by the publication of the *Letters from the Mountains*; and that something more was required of Mr Rousseau, in regard to the injured honour of religion. So that, so far were the Assembly from thinking that his declaration should be transcribed in letters of gold in their registers, that they conceived it included its own condemnation: for if the book in question had not insulted religion, Mr Rousseau had no need to enter into engagements to write no more against it.

"Agreeable to the custom of the Assembly, I was then called upon to give in my information; which, I appeal to all present, was done in the spirit of toleration and charity, which I have ever displayed toward Mr Rousseau. After this I
went

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went out of the Assembly, conformably also to the same customs *.

“ I know not where the anonymous libeller learned, that the reverend Assembly fulminated a sentence of excommunication against Mr Rousseau, in defiance of the laws and constitution of the country. They were by no means ignorant of the limits of their spiritual jurisdiction; but at the same time they knew themselves authorised to give directions to the members of their own body, respecting their behaviour in their respective consistories, without pretending to lay any restraint on the suffrage of the elders. It is false, it is absolutely false, that the Assembly deliberated on the anonymous letter which the libeller has inserted, and which was addressed only to some few members, of which I was one. On the contrary, it was not even publicly read, because it was anonymous.

“ The following is a copy of the directions given me by the Assembly to regulate my particular conduct towards Mr Rousseau.

Neufchatel, March 13, 1765.

“ The Assembly being this day met to deliberate on the measures it ought to take with regard to Mr Rousseau, whose antichristian sentiments, displayed in his writings, and particularly in his *Letters from the Mountains* lately published, have given the greatest scandal to the whole Christian church, and particularly to that of our own country; it was judged proper to begin with the examination
“ of

* It is the custom in this assembly, for the pastor of any parish to withdraw, when any matter is under deliberation respecting any one or more of his own parishioners.

“ of Mr de Montmollin pastor of Motiers
 “ whose parishioner Mr Rousseau at present is.
 “ The information of the said pastor, being heard,
 “ the Assembly were given to understand, that
 “ Mr Rousseau, having been previously advised
 “ of the object of the present deliberations, had
 “ sent him a paper, signed with his own hand,
 “ to be delivered to the Assembly *: Which
 “ paper being read, and maturely considered,
 “ the Assembly is of opinion that it is insuffi-
 “ cient to atone for the scandal which the publi-
 “ cation of his mischievous and impious wri-
 “ tings have raised.

“ They think themselves, therefore, indispen-
 “ sably obliged to declare to M. de Montmollin,
 “ that, after the publication of the *Letters from*
 “ *the Mountains*, he ought to not to look upon
 “ Mr Rousseau as a Christian or member of the
 “ church. At his requisition also the Assembly
 “ judge it expedient to give him directions for
 “ his future conduct towards Mr Rousseau,
 “ whom he ought to cite to appear before the Con-
 “ sistory, in order to be properly admonished,
 “ and to be made acquainted with their resolu-
 “ tion concerning his being adjudged unworthy
 “ of communion with the faithful, until he shall
 “ have manifested, in every respect, the senti-
 “ ments of a true Christian, first, By solemnly
 “ declaring in the Consistory, that he believes in
 “ *Jesus Christ, who died for our transgressions,*
 “ *and rose again for our justification;* secondly,
 “ By acknowledging his regret for having writ-
 “ ten any thing contrary to that belief, and a-
 “ gainst revelation; and, lastly, By consenting
 “ that such declaration and acknowledgment
 “ should

* See page 373.

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“ should be made public for the edification of
“ the church, and the reparation of the scandal
“ he hath occasioned.

Signed, A. DE LUZE,

*Pastor of the church at Cornaux, and
Secretary of the venerable Assembly.*

“ On the next day I quitted Neufchatel, in order to return home to my particular affairs. How then can the author of the libel rashly advance, that secret practices had been used in the church of Motiers? No secret practices were made use of, either on my part, or on that of the friends to religion and tranquillity. I call on all my parishioners to witness this, as also on the very elders themselves who voted against me in the affair of Rousseau.

“ The public were curious and impatient to know the resolution taken by that Assembly; that strict silence, however, was observed, to which the oath taken by the members necessarily obliged them; a silence which, nevertheless, the anonymous letter-writer affects, I know not why, to make so very mysterious. For my own part, I am still ignorant whether the ministers present made a secret of the above resolution to those who were absent: but I know very well that I made no mystery of it to any of my absent brethren, when I had an opportunity of seeing them. And why should I? when it is well known that the *Letters from the Mountains* were censured by the pastors in general, who were justly apprehensive of their dangerous effects on their respective flocks.

“ On Sunday, the twenty-fourth of March, the Consistory met, according to the practice of all
the

the churches of this country, to proceed on the subject of accusations *; at which time two new elders were presented and chosen; who, if they had not been prevented by various circumstances, would have been chosen some time before. But Easter was approaching; and the elders insisted on the election of colleagues, because they were become too few in number to sustain the burden of the church. Yet with what malignity doth the anonymous libeller take upon him to charge me "with having fixed on this opportunity to "complete the Consistory, in order that I might "have more of its members at my devotion?" But did not the officer of the Prince also vote at this election?

"On this very day, the Consistory came to my house, according to custom, before the morning service, with the two new-elected elders; at which time, and not before, I informed them of the affair of Mr Rousseau, which was to be proposed in the Assembly of the Consistory after the sermon.

"In this Assembly I represented to them, that it was not without great concern and reluctance that I laid before them the affair of Mr Rousseau, with whom I had had personal connections; but that the honour of religion and the edification of the churches in general, and that of Motiers in particular, induced me to lay aside all private considerations; and that the more especially, as all

* These accusations consist in the inquiry made by the pastor, of the elders, whether any scandal hath come to their knowledge, and what he ought to do for their better edification? The pastor also relates what he knows of such things, and they all enter into such measures as they think most efficacious to remove them.

all the world had eye, since the publication of the *Letters from the Mountains*, on the conduct we should adopt with regard to Mr Rousseau, and more particularly the Assembly of the Clergy, and the neighbouring churches. I thought it would be proper, therefore, for the discharge of our duty, that Mr Rousseau should be cited to appear in the Consistory, and that, if they judged it expedient, I would confine myself to the merely asking him two general questions, viz.

“ Whether he believed the Scriptures to be the revealed will of God? And whether he also believed that Jesus Christ died for our transgressions, and rose again for our justification?”

Two questions very simple; the affirmative answer to which is essential to the faith of a Christian *.

“ In support of my opinion I made use of the direction which the reverend class had given me, and which the elders desired me to read. This I did; at the same time expressly declaring that I did not pretend to lay any restraint on their suffrage; and appealing to them, in the presence of the officer, whether I had ever so done. On which they all unanimously replied, that I always left them at perfect liberty in this respect, and that they were happy in having a pastor who behaved so well to them.

“ On giving their votes, the majority were for citing Mr Rousseau to appear before the Consistory, to be held at the minister's house on the 29th, after sermon, according to custom. Mr

Rouf-

* Sanctify the Lord God in your hearts, and be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason for the hope that is in you, 1 Pet. iii. 15.

Rousseau was, in consequence, properly cited, and returned the answer above inserted †.

“ I pass over in silence what the anonymous writer has falsely imputed to me, in regard to my affirming in the Consistory that Mr Rousseau was the *antichrist*. Never did I say or think of such an absurdity. I know not what it is to abuse any one, though I can stand up boldly in the defence of truth when my duty calls upon me. Now my duty called upon me to represent to the Consistory what I thought we were bound to do in such a case, for the edification of the whole Christian church.”

Mr Montmollin proceeds to refute some other passages contained in the anonymous letter; but as every thing is already extracted that is of moment to his justification, it is here judged expedient to close this abstract of the professor's letters.

A Letter from Mr ROUSSEAU, relative to the preceding.

Motiers-Travers, Aug. 8, 1765.

“ No, Sir; let them say what they will, I shall never repent the praise I have bestowed on M. de Montmollin: I thought him worthy my greatest acknowledgments, and praised in him what I had experienced, his truly pastoral conduct with regard to me. I have not extolled his character, with which I am unacquainted.

“ I praised neither his truth nor probity. I will even confess that I received at first no very agreeable impressions from his outward

“ ap-

“ appearance; which is not calculated to pre-
“ judice one much in his favour. His tone of
“ voice, his deportment, and displeasing aspect,
“ gave me an involuntary disgust; I was amazed
“ to find such affability, humanity, and sweet-
“ ness of temper, such virtues concealed under
“ so gloomy a physiognomy. But I soon smo-
“ thered that unjust prepossession; for ought we
“ to form an opinion of a man on such delusive
“ signs, which are so plainly contradicted by
“ his conduct? Must one pry, with malignant
“ curiosity, into the secret principle of a per-
“ mission so little expected? I have the strongest
“ aversion for that base artifice of viewing the
“ good actions of others only on the dark side,
“ and never had sufficient sagacity to find out
“ bad motives for doing good. The more I per-
“ ceived an indifference for M. de Montmollin
“ arising in my mind, the more I strove to sub-
“ due it, by reflecting on the gratitude I owed
“ him. Let us suppose the same case possible
“ to happen again, and I should just act in the
“ manner I did.

“ M. de Montmollin now unmask, and shews
“ what he is in reality. His present conduct is
“ an explanation of his former behaviour. It is
“ easily seen that his pretended moderation,
“ which he loses at the very time it is most proper,
“ is derived from the same source as that perse-
“ cuting zeal with which he is so suddenly in-
“ spired. What was his original view? What
“ are his present designs? I really know not;
“ but I am sure his intention was never good.
“ He not only admitted me to the communion,
“ with an obliging warmth of friendship; but
“ sought me earnestly and induced me to hear

“ him, whenever I seemed to be cheerful, on the
“ subject of Christianity: and when I proved
“ that I did not attack it, or denied I had any
“ such intention, he would in his turn rally me
“ severely on my confidence in religion, on my
“ person, and belief; he would have me excom-
“ municated, banished; he raised the whole pa-
“ rish against me. He pursued me with a re-
“ morseless violence, bordering on madness.

“ Are these extraordinary diversities consist-
“ ent with his duty! No; charity is unchange-
“ able, virtue never contradicts itself, and con-
“ science knows no equivocation.

“ After shewing himself so little moderate at
“ the beginning, he resolved to be more so when
“ it was too late. That affectation did not serve
“ him; and as every one saw thro’ the disguise,
“ he did well to return to his natural disposi-
“ tion. By destroying his own work, in doing
“ me more harm than good, he has acquitted me
“ of all obligations. I owe him nothing but an
“ acknowledgment of the truth: it is what I owe
“ to myself; and since he obliges me to confess
“ it, I shall do so.

“ You desire to know what passed between
“ us relative to that affair.—M. de Montmol-
“ lin gave his account to the public as a church-
“ man; and dipping his pen in that poisoned
“ honey which proves mortal, took all the ad-
“ vantages his situation afforded. For my part,
“ Sir, I shall unfold my narrative in that plain
“ unaffected style which persons of probity al-
“ ways use to each other. I shall waste no time
“ in protestation of my sincerity. I leave it to
“ your good understanding and love of truth to
“ settle that affair between him and me.

“ I

“ I am not, thank heaven, one of those
“ whom the church makes bigots, and after-
“ wards despises. I have the honour to be one
“ who is esteemed, and at the same time perse-
“ cuted. When I took refuge in this country,
“ I brought letters of recommendation to no
“ person whatever, not even to my Lord Mar-
“ shal. I had but one letter, which I carried
“ every where, and which with my Lord Mar-
“ shal would have been alone sufficient. Two
“ hours after my arrival, as I was writing to
“ his Excellency to inform him of it, and to beg
“ his protection, a stranger, whom I had never
“ seen, entered, and called himself the minister
“ of the place, paying his compliments with
“ great familiarity; and seeing I wrote to my
“ Lord Marshal, made me an offer of adding a
“ few lines, by way of recommendation, with
“ his own hand. I did not accept his offer, but
“ sent away my letter; and met with such a
“ reception as oppressed innocence might hope
“ to find wherever virtue is held in esteem.

“ Having no expectation of so much civility
“ from a pastor, who was an entire stranger to
“ me, I told every body the circumstance the
“ same day; and among others to colonel Ro-
“ quin, who testified the most affectionate re-
“ gard for me, and would have very willingly
“ accompanied me hither.

“ M. de Montmollin continued his assidui-
“ ties; I thought this might be of some advan-
“ tage to me, and as the September communion
“ was approaching, I wrote him a letter, to
“ know if, notwithstanding the public report,
“ I might present myself there. I chose rather
“ to write than to pay him a visit, which might

“ be productive of tedious explanations, and
“ those I endeavoured to avoid. For if I should
“ make a declaration neither to disavow nor de-
“ fend my book, that would in effect be con-
“ strued as if I declined entering on any dis-
“ cussion of that point; and indeed, whenever
“ I was obliged to vindicate my honour and my
“ person with respect to that book, I always
“ condemned what errors it might contain, sa-
“ tisfied with shewing that the author meant
“ not to attack Christianity, and that it was
“ wrong to prosecute him as a criminal on that
“ account.

“ M. de Montmollin answered, that I might
“ come the next morning and know his reso-
“ lution. I should have done so, if he had not
“ prevented me by coming himself. I may
“ forget these trifles; but I think he came, and
“ I certainly remember with what demonstra-
“ tion of joy he testified the pleasure he recei-
“ ved from my request. He told me very
“ politely, that he and his congregation should
“ be much honoured, and that a step so unex-
“ pected would greatly edify all the faithful.
“ That moment I confess was the happiest I had
“ ever known. A man must be sensible of mis-
“ fortunes like mine, and experience the distress
“ of a tender heart torn from every object of
“ its affection, in order to judge what consol-
“ ation I received in belonging to a society of
“ brethren, who might indemnify me for the
“ losses I had sustained, and for those whose
“ esteem I could no longer cultivate. I ima-
“ gined, that by heartily joining with this small
“ congregation, in an affecting and rational wor-
“ ship, I should more easily forget all my ene-
“ mies.

“mies. The first time I went to the church;
“I was affected, even to the shedding of tears.
“Having never lived among Protestants, I formed
“notions that they and their Clergy were
“angels. Their worship, so pure and void of
“ostentation, was exactly what suited my
“mind; it seemed instituted on purpose to inspire
“the miserable with hope and resolution.
“All those that partook of it appeared so many
“true Christians united in bands of the
“most perfect charity. How have they undeceived
“me, in depriving me of the pleasure
“of enjoying an error so agreeable! My eyes
“were at last opened, and it was but from the
“effect of imagination that I judged of the value
“of being admitted amongst them.

“Perceiving that M. de Montmollin never
“mentioned a word with respect to my sentiments
“in matters of faith during his short visit, I
“believed he had reserved that conversation for
“another opportunity; and knowing how fond
“these gentlemen are of assuming a right which
“doth not belong to them, of judging of the
“faith of Christians, I declared to him that I
“did not understand submitting to any interrogation
“or eclaireissement whatever. He answered, that
“he should never require it; and has so well kept
“his promise, that I have always found him very
“circumspect in avoiding any discussion on the
“subject of doctrine, and till the last affair he
“never hinted any thing of it, though I happened
“to speak to him sometimes on that head.

“In this manner things went on, both before
“and after the communion; still the same
“affectionate concern on the part of M. de Mont-

“ mollin, and the same silence with respect to
“ theological subjects. He even carried the
“ spirit of toleration so far, and shewed it so
“ openly in his sermons, that I was often in
“ pain for him. As I had a real regard for
“ him, I concealed not the fears I began to
“ have on his account; and I remember, that
“ preaching one day very strenuously against the
“ want of toleration amongst the Protestants, I
“ was very much startled to hear him maintain,
“ with earnestness, that the reformed church
“ had still need of a farther reformation, both
“ in manners and doctrine. I then little ima-
“ gined he would afterwards have shewn in
“ himself so convincing a proof of the necessity
“ of that reformation.

“ This doctrine of toleration, and the uni-
“ versal esteem it met with, excited the jealousy
“ of many of his brethren, particularly at Ge-
“ neva. They loaded him with continual re-
“ proaches, and spread those nets which have
“ at last caught him; I am sorry for it, but
“ this was not my fault. If M. de Montmollin
“ had supported his pastoral character by ho-
“ nourable means; if he had been satisfied to
“ have only employed in his defence, with bold-
“ ness and freedom, the weapons of Christiani-
“ ty and the truth; what an example would he
“ have given to the church and to all Europe,
“ and what a glorious triumph would he have
“ gained to himself! He made use of the arms
“ of his profession; and finding them soften in
“ defending himself, contrary to the truth, he
“ then wanted to render them offensive by at-
“ tacking me. But he was mistaken; these
“ rusty weapons, strong indeed against those
“ who

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“ who fear them, but weak and useless when
“ courageously resisted, are now broken: He
“ took a wrong method to succeed.

“ Some months after my admission into this
“ congregation, M. de Montmollin entered my
“ apartment one evening, with an air of per-
“ turbation. He sat down, and continued a
“ long time silent; he at last spoke, beginning
“ with one of those tedious prefaces which cu-
“ stom had rendered easy. He came then to
“ the point, telling me, that his admitting me
“ to the communion had very much chagrined
“ his brethren, whose censure he had attracted
“ on that account; that he had been reduced
“ to the necessity of justifying himself in such
“ a manner as must undoubtedly stop their
“ mouths; and if his good opinion of my prin-
“ ciples had suppressed the demand of those
“ explanations which any other person in his
“ situation would have exacted, he could not,
“ however, suffer it to be believed, without
“ hurting his credit, that I had never yet given
“ him any account of my sentiments with regard
“ to religion. Thus saying, he drew a paper
“ from his pocket, and began to read, in a
“ rough draft of a letter to a minister at Gene-
“ va, some parts of a conversation between us
“ that never passed, but wherein he inserted,
“ very artfully, some words here and there,
“ spoken at random, and on quite a different
“ subject. Judge, Sir, what was my surprise:
“ it was such, that I recovered not my attention
“ till he had read the whole letter. In those
“ places where fiction was most prevalent, he
“ interrupted himself, saying, *If you perceive*
“ *the necessity—my situation—my profession—one*
“ *must*

“ must take a little care of one’s self. On the
 “ whole, this letter was written with a good
 “ deal of address; and, except in a few particu-
 “ lars, great care was taken to make me say
 “ what I might very naturally have said. When
 “ he had done, he asked me if I approved of
 “ that letter, and if he should send it just as it
 “ was?

“ I answered, I was sorry he was obliged to
 “ have recourse to such methods; but that as to
 “ myself, I could say no such thing: But that
 “ since he had taken upon him to say it, it was
 “ his own affair and not mine; and that I
 “ saw nothing there to which I should be ob-
 “ liged to give the lie. As this can prejudice
 “ nobody, replied he, and may be of use to
 “ you, I easily pass over a small scruple, which
 “ can answer no end, but to prevent a good act.
 “ But tell me if, on the whole, you are satis-
 “ fied with this letter, or if you see any thing
 “ in it that might be altered for the better. I
 “ told him, I thought it very proper for the
 “ end it was intended. He urged me so much,
 “ that, to humour him, I pointed out some tri-
 “ fling corrections, of no consequence. Now I
 “ must tell you, that in the situation we sat, the
 “ standish was opposite to M. de Montmollin;
 “ but whilst we were talking, he pushed it, as
 “ by chance, to me; and as I held his letter,
 “ to read it again, he reached me the pen to
 “ make the necessary amendments; which I
 “ did, with all the frankness natural to me.
 “ That done, he put up his letter, and retired.
 “ Excuse my being so particular, it is absolutely
 “ necessary.

“ But I shall not be so explicit with respect
 “ to

“ to my last interview with M. de Montmollin,
“ which is much easier conceived. You com-
“ prehend what might be said to a person who
“ coldly tells you, ‘ Sir, I am ordered to break
“ your head; but if you would have your leg
“ broke, perhaps that may satisfy them.’ M. de
“ Montmollin must undoubtedly have been
“ concerned in difficult affairs sometimes, and
“ yet I never saw a man more confused during
“ that whole transaction. In such a case, no-
“ thing can be more embarrassing than to be
“ at odds with a man of a free and open dispo-
“ sition, who, instead of using subtle and equi-
“ vocating arguments, answers abruptly, and
“ affronts you, contrary to reason and good
“ manners. M. de Montmollin affirms, that I
“ told him at parting, that if he returned with
“ agreeable news, I should embrace him; if
“ not, that we should turn our backs on each
“ other. I might have said something of that
“ kind, but in politer terms; but as to these
“ last expressions, I am certain I never made use
“ of them. M. de Montmollin may recollect,
“ that he did not make me turn my back so easi-
“ ly as he imagined.

“ As to the devout pathetic he employs to
“ prove the necessity of using rigour, it may be
“ perceived for what kind of persons it was in-
“ tended; persons, with whom neither you nor
“ I have any concern. But setting aside the
“ jargon of this inquisitor, I shall examine his
“ reasons, as they relate to myself, without en-
“ tering into those that may have a reference to
“ others.

“ Quite disgusted with the miserable profes-
“ sion of an author, to which I was so little ad-
“ apted,

“ apted, I had long since resolved to renounce
“ it. When *Emilius* was published, I had de-
“ clared to my friends at Paris, Geneva, and
“ elsewhere, that it should be my last work; and
“ that in completing it, I had laid down the pen,
“ never to resume it. I received many letters to
“ dissuade me from that design. At my arrival
“ here, I told the same to every body; even to
“ to you and M. de Montmollin. He is the
“ only person who thought of changing that
“ proposal into a promise; and to pretend that
“ I had engaged myself to him to write no more,
“ because I shewed such an intention. Suppose
“ I told him I should go to-morrow to Neuf-
“ chatel, must that be taken as an engagement
“ from my words; and if I should fail in going,
“ must I be prosecuted? This is exactly the case;
“ and I no more thought of making a promise
“ to M. de Montmollin than I did to you, only
“ from a bare intention, of which I equally in-
“ formed both.

“ Dare M. de Montmollin affirm, that he e-
“ ver understood the matter in any other light?
“ Dare he be positive, as he has had the bold-
“ ness to report, that it was on that condition
“ he admitted me to the communion? As a
“ proof of the contrary, when I published my
“ Letter to the Archbishop of Paris, M. de
“ Montmollin, far from accusing me with
“ breach of promise, was very well pleased with
“ that piece, which he extolled to me and eve-
“ ry body, without saying a word of that fabu-
“ lous promise which he now accuses me of
“ having made him. Take notice, however,
“ that my Letter to the Archbishop is much
“ stronger on the subject of mysteries, and even
“ mi-

“ miracles, than that about which he makes so
“ great a noise. Besides, observe, that I there
“ speak in my own name, and no longer in the
“ character of the Vicar. Could they find mat-
“ ters of excommunication in the one, which
“ have not even been subjects of complaint in
“ the other?

“ If I had actually made such a promise to
“ M. de Montmollin, which I really never
“ thought of doing, would he infer, that it was
“ of so absolute a nature as to admit of no ex-
“ ception; not even to publish a memorial of
“ defence, in case I should be attacked by a pro-
“ cess at law? And what exception would be
“ more permissible than that, where, in justify-
“ ing myself, I also justified him, by shewing
“ the falsehood of his admitting a profaner of
“ religion into his church? What promise could
“ acquit me of what I owed to myself and to o-
“ thers? How could I avoid writing in defence
“ of my honour, the honour of my ancient
“ countrymen, which so many extraordinary
“ motives rendered necessary, and in discharge
“ of such sacred duties? Who will believe that
“ I promised M. de Montmollin silently to en-
“ dure reproach and ignominy? Even now that
“ I have entered into a solemn engagement with
“ a respectable society, who can accuse me of
“ breaking my covenant, if, forced by the out-
“ rageous violences of M. de Montmollin, I
“ have repulsed him as publicly as he dared to
“ offer them? Whatever promise an honest
“ man may give, it will never be required,
“ much less presumed, that it should extend so
“ far as to be the witness of his dishonour.

“ In publishing the Letters written from the
“ Moun-

“ Mountains, I discharged my duty to myself,
“ and at the same time did not neglect what I
“ owed to M. de Montmollin. He judged so
“ himself; for when the work was printed, of
“ which I sent him a copy, he continued to act
“ in the same manner as before. He read it
“ with pleasure; spoke of me with praise; not
“ a word that favoured of objection. He saw
“ me often since, he always testified the greatest
“ friendship; no complaint of my book. There
“ was then a report of an intended edition of
“ all my works. He not only approved that
“ design, but even desired he might be con-
“ cerned. He was so anxious, that I did not
“ think proper to give any encouragement,
“ knowing the present company was already too
“ numerous, and wanted no more associates.
“ He was displeased at my coldness; which he
“ resented more than it deserved; and some time
“ after covered his disappointment by casting
“ a reflection, That the dignity of his station
“ forbade his engaging in any such design. It
“ was then the Synod began to oppose him,
“ and made remonstrances to the Court. In
“ fine, our good understanding was still so en-
“ tire, and my last work so little affected it,
“ that, for a long time after that publication,
“ M. de Montmollin, among other conversa-
“ tion, told me, he had a mind to solicit the
“ Court for an augmentation of his stipend, and
“ requested I would insert a few lines in a letter
“ he intended to write to my Lord Marshal for
“ that purpose. That method of recommend-
“ ing himself, and making his interest, seeming
“ too familiar, I asked fifteen days, in order to
“ draw up an address to my Lord Marshal be-
“ fore-

“forehand. He gave me no answer, and never mentioned the affair afterwards. From that time he began to look on the Letters from the Mountains with another eye, tho’ he never in the least hinted his disapprobation in my presence. He only said once, *For my part, I believe in miracles.* I might have answered, *I believe in them as much as you.*

“Since I am on the subject of my treatment from M. de Montmollin, I should acquaint you, that I have more matters of complaint to mention. Touched with a sense of gratitude, I have sought all occasions of testifying it, both in public and private; but I never prostituted so noble a principle to the base purposes of interest; I was never governed by example, and know not how to traffick in holy things. M. de Montmollin wanted to meddle in all my affairs, to be acquainted with all my correspondents, to direct and be the depository of my last will, and superintend my little household. This is what I would never permit. M. de Montmollin liked sitting long at table; for my part, it is a pain to me. He seldom eat at my house, and I never at his. In effect, I repulsed all the familiar intimacy he wanted to establish between us, in as gentle and polite a manner as possible; which always becomes improper, when it is not equally convenient on both sides. These are the wrongs I complain of; I confess them, without repenting the handsome things I have said. My injuries are great, but they are the only ones I received; and I call to witness every person who knows this country, if I have not often made myself

“ disagreeable to honest people, by commend-
 “ ing what I thought praise-worthy in M. de
 “ Montmollin.

“ Notwithstanding any secret animosity he
 “ might have had against me, he would ne-
 “ ver have blazed it abroad at so improper a
 “ time, if other motives had not pressed him to
 “ resume the opportunity he had suffered to e-
 “ scape. He perceived too well that his con-
 “ duct began to be disgusting and contradictory
 “ to me. What conflicts must he have had
 “ with himself, before he presumed to charge
 “ me with so apparent a falsehood? For let us
 “ condemn the Letters from the Mountains as
 “ much as we please, will they say more against
 “ me in effect than Emilius; after the publi-
 “ cation of which I was not refused, but readi-
 “ ly admitted to the holy communion? Do they
 “ condemn me more than my letter to M. de
 “ Beaumont Archbishop of Paris, which never
 “ seemed to give any offence? Suppose these
 “ works were a complication of errors, as they
 “ would insinuate, of what consequence is that?
 “ Why then let me not be justified by them,
 “ and let the author of Emilius remain inex-
 “ cusable. But I can never admit, that the au-
 “ thor of the Letters from the Mountains de-
 “ serves the same censure on this account. Is
 “ it usual, after pardoning a criminal, to punish
 “ him for having made a bad defence on his
 “ trial? Yet this is the case with M. de Mont-
 “ mollin: and I defy either him, or his bre-
 “ thren, to produce any of those sentiments in
 “ my last writings, they so strongly censure,
 “ which I cannot prove to be more firmly esta-
 “ blished in those that precede them.

“ But

“ But being instigated underhand by others,
“ he seized the pretext they offered ; certain,
“ that by exclaiming, right or wrong, against
“ an infidel, the people would be immediately
“ excited to fury ; he rings the alarm-bell of
“ Motiers, when all was over, because a poor
“ man durst defend himself against the Gene-
“ vans ; and finding that nothing but success
“ could save him from contempt, he spared no
“ pains to make his point sure. I saw it plainly
“ at Motiers, and shall forbear troubling you
“ with a repetition of what passed there, as you
“ are better acquainted than I with the whole
“ procedure ; every one at Neuschâtel knows
“ it ; strangers that came to the town saw it,
“ and sighed ; for my part, I was silent. M. de
“ Montmollin excused himself on account of the
“ orders he had received from the Synod. But
“ suppose these orders had been legally execu-
“ ted ; if they had been just, why did he not
“ know of them sooner ? Why did he not pre-
“ vent them, whose particular province it was ?
“ Why, after reading over and over the Let-
“ ters from the Mountains, could he find no-
“ thing in them worthy of censure ? or why was
“ he silent on that head to me, that was his pa-
“ rishioner, as often as he came to visit me ?
“ What became of all his pastoral zeal ? Would
“ he pass for a blockhead, who can see nothing
“ in a book relative to his own profession, but
“ what is pointed out to him by others ? But,
“ on the contrary, if these orders were unjust ;
“ why did he submit to them ? Ought a mi-
“ nister of the Gospel, a pastor of the church,
“ to persecute a man, whose innocence he is
“ assured of, in obedience to any power what-
“ ever ?

“ ever? Did he not know, that to appear in
“ judgement before the Consistory, is an indig-
“ nity, an affront, too cruel for a man of my
“ time of life, especially in a country-town,
“ where they are ignorant of all consistorial
“ matters but admonitions against pravity of
“ manners? Ten years ago my appearance in
“ the Consistory at Geneva was excused on a
“ much more lawful occasion, (and for which
“ I almost blame myself,) contrary to the ex-
“ press words of the law. But it is not the
“ least surprising that they should know these
“ forms of decency and regularity at Geneva,
“ of which they are ignorant at Motiers.

“ I cannot tell whence M. de Montmollin
“ took his instructions, when he said there was
“ nothing of the Inquisition in this affair. He
“ might have said as justly that there was no
“ Consistory, for it is the same thing on that
“ occasion. He gives out, nay, he insists, that
“ no matter of temporal cognisance ought to
“ be within its jurisdiction. The contrary is
“ known to every one in the affair of the pro-
“ ject; and who is ignorant, that imposing on
“ the credulity of the Council of State, with
“ regard to matters of religion, they engaged
“ them in measures which had well nigh de-
“ prived me of the King’s protection? The
“ proper step to be taken was, first an excom-
“ munication; after which, fresh remonstrances
“ to the Council of State would have done the
“ business; they actually tried those methods,
“ and their present uneasiness proceeds from
“ their disappointment in failing of success.
“ For otherwise, what is it to M. de Montmol-
“ lin? Is he afraid I should not come to receive
“ the

“ the communion from his hands? Let him be
“ satisfied; I am not so very anxious about
“ communions as many persons are. I admire
“ the voracious holiness with which they de-
“ vour the consecrated bread: for my part, my
“ stomach is not so strong.

“ He says he had but one plain question to
“ ask me on the part of the Consistory. Why
“ did he not let me know it, when I was served
“ with the citation? What a piece of artifice
“ was it, first to surprise a man, and then oblige
“ him to answer that moment, without giving
“ the least time for reflection. This was the
“ question mentioned by M. de Montmollin,
“ which he reserved *in petto*, as the principal,
“ among others he has not told us, and for
“ which he was unwilling I should be prepared.
“ It is well known, that his design was to catch
“ me tripping, and puzzle me with so many
“ litigious interrogatories as must in the end
“ answer his purpose. He very well knew my
“ weakness and bad state of health. I do not
“ think he intended to exhaust my strength;
“ but at the time I was cited I was extremely
“ ill, and not in a condition to go abroad, ha-
“ ving kept my room for six months: it was the
“ winter season, and very cold weather; a
“ strange remedy for a poor infirm creature, to
“ remain many hours standing, and to be inter-
“ rogated before elders concerning matters of
“ divinity, of which the most learned among
“ them declared they understood nothing! No
“ matter: they never inquired even if I was
“ able to leave my bed, if I had strength enough
“ to walk without support; they gave themselves
“ no trouble on that account. Pastoral charity,

“ entirely taken up with matters of faith, never
 “ stoops to the mean and sordid concerns of ter-
 “ restrial affairs.

“ You are no stranger to what passed in the
 “ Consistory, during my absence; of the read-
 “ ing of my letter there, and the methods that
 “ were proposed to hinder its effect. Your in-
 “ formation in that affair was well grounded.
 “ Can you imagine, that, after this, M. de
 “ Montmollin all at once changed his condition
 “ and title, and, transforming himself into an
 “ ecclesiastical solicitor to manage the cause,
 “ resumed his former character in order to
 “ become its judge. *I acted* (says he) *as Pastor,*
 “ *as President of the Consistory, and not as re-*
 “ *presentative of the venerable Synod.* It was
 “ too late to change his part, when he had till
 “ then played one so indifferent. We ought,
 “ Sir, to dread those who can voluntarily act two
 “ parts in the same piece. It would be strange
 “ if one good character could be made out of both.

“ He rests the necessity of being rigorous, on
 “ the scandal raised by my book. Here are new
 “ scruples, which he had not at the publication
 “ of *Emilius*, the scandal of which was at least
 “ as great, and the Clergy and news-writers
 “ made no less noise. They burnt my book,
 “ railed at and insulted me all over Europe.
 “ M. de Montmollin finds now those reasons to
 “ excommunicate me, in the same arguments
 “ that were then no impediment then to my ad-
 “ mission to the communion. His zeal, accord-
 “ ing to the precept, acts in all forms, agreeable
 “ to time and place. But pray, who raised the
 “ scandal in his parish on account of my last
 “ book of which he now complains? Who was

“ it

“ it affected to make a frightful uproar, both by
“ himself and by his friends? Who, among all
“ that people so full of sanctified rage; who
“ could have known that I had committed so e-
“ normous a crime, as to prove that the Council
“ of Geneva had wrongfully condemned me, if
“ pains had not been taken to paint so extra-
“ ordinary an act in colours that struck every
“ eye? Who, amongst these people, was capa-
“ ble of reading my book, and judging of the
“ matters it contained? If you please, the zea-
“ lous follower of M. de Montmollin, that learn-
“ ed blacksmith, whom he so often cites as an
“ evidence; that profound scholar, who is at
“ once so good a judge of horse-shoes and books
“ of theology. I am willing to believe he can
“ just read, and go through a whole line with-
“ out spelling; and who else of the conspiring
“ rabble can do so much? If they should glance
“ at the words *gospel* and *miracles* in the pages
“ of the book, they would imagine they were
“ reading a book of devotion; and knowing I
“ was a good man, they might have said, *God*
“ *bless him! he edifies us greatly.* But they had
“ been well assured that I was an impious abo-
“ minable wretch, who said there was no God,
“ and that women had no souls; so that, with-
“ out reflecting on what they might read to the
“ contrary, they repeated in their turn, like
“ parrots, *He is a wicked man, a villain; he is*
“ *Antichrist; he should be excommunicated, and*
“ *burnt.* They were charitably answered, no
“ doubt: *Go you on with your clamours; leave*
“ *the business to us, and all will be well.*

“ The usual method of the church-gentry
“ seems to me extremely well calculated to an-

“ fwer

“ fwer their purpose. After establishing their
“ competency of jurisdiction over all matters of
“ scandal, they raise a scandal out of every sub-
“ ject they please; and then, on account of
“ that scandal, take cognisance of the cause in
“ order to judge it. Here is a sure way to ren-
“ der themselves masters of all the people, of all
“ the laws, of all the kings, and of the whole
“ world, without the contradiction of any per-
“ son whatever. You remember the story of
“ the surgeon, whose shop was at the corner of
“ two streets, and who going out at one door,
“ wounded the passengers, and suddenly retreat-
“ ing, came out at the other in order to dress
“ them. This story will suit all the clergy in
“ the universe, except in this particular, that the
“ surgeon at least cured those he wounded,
“ whereas these gentlemen destroy all they attack.
“ Let us not enter into the history of their
“ secret intrigues, which will not bear the
“ light. But if M. de Montmollin did nothing
“ but in obedience to the synod, or in discharge
“ of his conscience, why has he shewn so much
“ acrimony in this affair? Why was all the mob
“ of the country raised? Why his violent ser-
“ mons, flaming with remorseless zeal and un-
“ relenting bitterness? Why these private petty
“ Councils? Why so many idle reports spread,
“ to terrify me with the roarings of the popu-
“ lace? Is not all this public and notorious?
“ M. de Montmollin denies it. Why should he
“ not, who denied his pretending to have two
“ voices in the Consistory? Yet I find three
“ voices, if I do not greatly mistake; that of
“ his deacon, who was there only as his re-
“ presentative; then his own voice, which
“ made

“ made the odd one ; and, lastly, that which
“ he claimed in order to divide the suffra-
“ ges. Three voices in himself had been a
“ great advantage, even to absolve or acquit a
“ delinquent. But he would make use of them
“ in order to condemn, and could not obtain
“ them. Where was the harm ? M. de Mont-
“ mollin was too happy, that his Consistory,
“ wiser than himself, had drawn him out of a
“ scrape with the synod, with his brethren, with
“ his correspondents, and with himself. *I have*
“ *done my duty*, might he have said, *I have vi-*
“ *gorously pursued the cause ; the Consistory have*
“ *not judged the affair according to my senti-*
“ *ments. Rousseau has been absolved, contrary*
“ *to my opinion. That is no fault of mine ; I have*
“ *done : I can carry matters no farther, with-*
“ *out flying in the face of the laws, without dis-*
“ *obeying the prince, and disturbing the public*
“ *peace. I am too good a Christian, too honest a*
“ *citizen, too devout a pastor, to attempt any*
“ *such thing.* Though he had been foiled, he
“ might still, with a little address, have prefer-
“ ved his dignity, and recovered his reputation.
“ But vanity, once irritated by disappointment,
“ is not so provident. We find it more difficult
“ to forgive those we have attempted to injure,
“ than those to whom we have done the injury
“ in fact. Enraged to see that credit on which
“ he so much piqued himself baffled in the face
“ of all Europe, he could not prevail on him-
“ self to give up the cause : he said in the Con-
“ sistory, that he was not without hopes of re-
“ newing it : he tries it at another Consistory ;
“ but, in order to screen himself, he proposes it
“ by his blacksmith, that faithful instrument of
“ his

“ his enterprizes, whom he calls to bear testi-
“ mony that it was not done thro’ his means.
“ Was not that a fine stroke ! It is not that M. de
“ Montmollin wants artifice ; but a man, who
“ is blinded by passion, is always committing
“ blunders when he gives himself up to it.

“ That expedient failed him again, and you
“ might imagine that his malignity ended there.
“ Far from it : in the next meeting of the synod,
“ he proposed another method, founded on the
“ impossibility of escaping the diligence of the
“ prince’s officer in his parish ; that was, to
“ wait till I went into another parish, and then
“ begin the prosecution anew, at fresh costs. In
“ consequence of this fine expedient, the violent
“ sermons recommenced, the people were again
“ put into disorder, and it was expected these
“ animosities would have forced me to quit the
“ parish. This, indeed, was too much for a
“ man of M. de Montmollin’s tolerating spi-
“ rit, who did nothing but by the orders of his
“ superiors. My letter grows very long : but
“ it is necessary it should be so ; why should I
“ curtail it ? Would it shorten it to multiply
“ ceremonies ? Let us give M. de Montmollin
“ the pleasure of saying ten times successively,
“ *Sister Dinarzade, are you asleep ?*

“ I have not entered upon the point of right :
“ I have resolved to meddle no more with that
“ affair. I confined myself, in the second part
“ of this letter, to prove that M. de Montmol-
“ lin, notwithstanding his affected tone of de-
“ votion, was not brought into this affair thro’
“ zeal for the faith, nor by a sense of his duty ;
“ but, according to custom, has made the cause
“ of God subservient to his passions. Now
“ judge

“ judge if for such purposes they usually employ
“ the most honest means; and excuse my en-
“ tering into a discussion of matters that would
“ draw a sigh from virtue herself.

“ In the former part of my letter I mention-
“ ed facts, in opposition to those advanced by
“ M. de Montmollin. He had the artifice to make
“ use of circumstances to which I could answer
“ nothing, but by a true recital of all that pass-
“ ed. From the different assertions on both sides,
“ you must conclude one of us to be a liar, and
“ I allow the propriety of that conclusion.

“ When I would finish my letter and dis-
“ patch it in haste, I am still turning over new
“ leaves. Reflections innumerable offer them-
“ selves, and one must not always begin a-new.
“ Yet I cannot pass over what I have this mo-
“ ment before me. *What shall our ministers do?*
“ (it is said;) *shall they defend the Gospel, at-*
“ *tacked so openly by its enemies?* It is I, there-
“ fore, who am this enemy to the Gospel, be-
“ cause I resent the manner in which they dis-
“ figure and degrade it. Why do not the pre-
“ tended defenders imitate the method I would
“ establish? Why do not they make use of such
“ parts as conduce to their edification, in ren-
“ dering them good and just, and lay aside such
“ as are of service to nobody, and which they
“ understand no better than myself?

“ *If a native of this country had dared to ad-*
“ *vance, in words or writing, any thing near*
“ *to what has been done by Mr. Rousseau, would*
“ *not the ministers have acted with the same ri-*
“ *gour?* No, certainly; I dare believe so for the
“ honour of the state. What would then be-
“ come of your privileges, you that are the people
“ of

“ of Neuchâtel, if, for some small matter that
 “ might give your ministers a handle for being
 “ litigious, they could persecute, among your-
 “ selves, the author of a transaction, printed
 “ in another part of Europe, only for his de-
 “ fence in a strange country? M. de Montmol-
 “ lin has picked me out as a proper subject by
 “ which he may lay the yoke on you; but how
 “ unworthy must I be of your protection, if I
 “ could suffer, by my example, a servitude to
 “ be established which I found not amongst you!

“ *Has Mr. Rousseau, our new citizen, any*
 “ *more privileges than all our ancient citizens?*
 “ I do not claim any of their privileges; I only
 “ demand those I am entitled to as a man and
 “ a stranger. The correspondent quoted by M.
 “ Montmollin, that wonderful person whom he
 “ has not named, and who praises him so much,
 “ is a very extraordinary reasoner. According
 “ to him, I would claim more privileges than
 “ all the citizens, because I opposed their mea-
 “ sures in which every citizen would have ac-
 “ quiesced. So that to take from me the right
 “ of defending my purse against a thief that
 “ would rob me, he might as well say, *You are*
 “ *certainly a very strange man, who will not*
 “ *suffer me to take your money! I could easily rob*
 “ *any of the natives, if they came in my way.*
 “ Observe here, that the Professor Montmollin
 “ is the only sovereign judge who condemns
 “ me; and that law, the Consistory, the Magi-
 “ stracy, the Government, the Governor, and
 “ the King himself who protects me, are all so
 “ many rebels against the supreme authority of
 “ M. de Montmollin.

“ The anonymous correspondent asks, if I
 “ am

“ am not obedient to the laws and customs of
“ the state? And from answering in the affir-
“ mative; he concludes, that I must submit to
“ a law that never existed, and to a custom that
“ never was known. M. de Montmollin re-
“ plies, that there is such a law at Geneva, and
“ that I myself complained of its being violated
“ to my prejudice. So that at Geneva they
“ have violated a law which exists there, and
“ doth not exist at Motiers, on purpose to con-
“ demn me; and they made use of it at Motiers
“ to excommunicate me. You must own that I
“ am in a pretty situation! It was certainly in
“ one of his gay humours that M. de Mont-
“ mollin reasoned in that manner.

“ He diverts himself in the same way in a re-
“ mark on the offer I made to the synod, provided
“ they dropped their prosecution. He says, I
“ did it in jest, and that we ought not thus to
“ pretend to give law to our superiors.

“ First, he certainly is not serious, in saying,
“ that an humble and satisfactory offer made to
“ persons who complain against us, tho’ in the
“ wrong, is dictating to them, and prescribing
“ them rules.

“ But the best of all is, his calling the gen-
“ tlemen of the Synod my superiors, as though
“ I was one of their brethren. For every one
“ knows that the Synod has no jurisdiction but
“ over the clergy; and besides, having no power
“ over any other person, its members are supe-
“ rior to nobody, as being such. So that to
“ treat me as a churchman, is, in my opinion,
“ a very ill-judged pleasantry. M. de Mont-
“ mollin knows very well I am no churchman;

“ and that I have, thank God, no very great call
“ that way.

“ Indulge me a few words concerning the
“ letter I wrote to the Consistory, and I have
“ done. M. de Montmollin does not promise
“ many remarks on that letter; I believe he is
“ in the right, and that he would have still done
“ better never to have meddled with it: give me
“ leave to run over such as relate to myself; I
“ shall not detain you long.

“ *How can a person (says he) answer to*
“ *what he knows nothing of?* as I have done,
“ by proving before-hand that they had no
“ right to ask me. *Such a faith as we are*
“ *only to account for to God, is not professed*
“ *in any part of Europe.* And why is there
“ any other faith, but such as makes us account-
“ able only to God, published in any part of
“ Europe? Observe that strange pretence of
“ hindering a man from speaking his own opi-
“ nion, by imputing to him other sentiments.

“ *He that errs as a Christian, is ready to re-*
“ *nounce his errors.* A pleasant sophism! *He*
“ *that errs as a Christian, knows not that he*
“ *errs.* If he should reform his errors without
“ knowing them, he would err nevertheless, and
“ would besides be a liar. Then he could not
“ err as a Christian.

“ *Is the rendering miracles doubtful, a re-*
“ *liance on the authority of the Gospel?* Yes,
“ when it is by the authority of the same Go-
“ spel they are rendered doubtful. *And to ri-*
“ *dicule them.*—Why not! when, relying on
“ the authority of the Gospel, it can be proved,
“ that the ridicule is no where but in the inter-
“ pretations of divines. I am certain that M.
“ de

“ de Montmollin is very well pleased with his
“ laconic manner of expression. It is always
“ easy to reply to an argument with a jest.

“ *As to the remark of Theodore Beza,*
“ *he would never have said otherwise, if the*
“ *Christian faith had not been entirely supported*
“ *by miracles.* Take care, Mr Professor; ei-
“ ther you do not understand Latin, or you are
“ a bad man. This passage, *Non satis tuta fi-*
“ *des eorum qui miraculis nituntur*, doth not
“ signify, as you pretend, that the Christian
“ faith is not supported by miracles alone. On
“ the contrary, the meaning is, *the faith of him*
“ *who relies on miracles, is not of much solidity.*
“ This sense is very applicable to that passage
“ in St John, on which he comments, where it
“ is said, *That many believed in Jesus on ac-*
“ *count of his miracles; but he did not trust them*
“ *with his person, because he knew them well.*
“ Do you think he would put more confidence
“ at this time in those who make so great a
“ noise about the same faith?

“ *Would not every one believe they heard Mr.*
“ *Rousseau say, in his letter to the Archbishop*
“ *of Paris, that they ought to erect statues to*
“ *his memory for writing his Emilius?* Ob-
“ serve, he says this at a time when he is pinch-
“ ed by the comparison of *Emilius* and the *Let-*
“ *ters from the Mountains*; M. de Montmollin
“ cannot tell how to escape, and so he brings
“ himself off by cutting a caper. If we were
“ to follow him through all his extravagancies,
“ if I were to examine the weight of his ar-
“ guments, and analyse his extraordinary rea-
“ sonings, I should never have done, and I must
“ hasten to the end. At the conclusion of all,
“ he

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“ he values himself much on having his name
“ made use of. I cannot see how that is an oc-
“ casion of boasting; for when a man has ta-
“ ken such a part in affairs as he has done, he
“ may well be ashamed of owning himself.

“ As to you, Sir, who have, in regard to
“ him, preserved that anonymous character
“ with which he now reproaches you; pray
“ own yourself, since he would have it so: re-
“ ceive that praise of honest men, which is your
“ due. Shew them openly the worthy advocate
“ of a just cause, the historian of truth, the
“ apologist for the rights of the oppressed, of
“ the Prince, of the state, and people, all in-
“ vaded by him in my person. My defenders,
“ my protectors, are known; let him, in his
“ turn, shew his anonymous author, and all his
“ abettors in this affair: he has named already
“ two of them, let him name all the rest. He
“ has done me much injury, he would do me
“ a great deal more; let all the world know
“ his friends and mine, and I desire no other
“ revenge.

“ Accept, Sir, my best respects, &c.

“ J. J. ROUSSEAU.”



F I N I S.

